The importance of “One Belt, One Road” to the Republic of Uzbekistan

Despite all the difficulties, contradictions and failures of the initial stage of the existence of the entire post-Soviet space, there was a constant search for ways to preserve and further develop close forms of interaction as a counterbalance to the protracted «collapse» of the former unitary system. This process was largely determined and still remains relevant by the realization that in the extremely complex and ambiguous conditions of globalization, as well as the clash of interests of the leading external.

What is “One Belt, One Road” or OBOR? One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is China’s much-touted new foreign and economic policy. It is a development strategy to connect China with Central Asia, Europe, and Indo-Pacific littoral countries. This policy has two components:

Belt– The “One Belt” refers to the land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt”. Here Beijing aims to connect the country’s underdeveloped hinterland to Europe through Central Asia.

Road – The “One Road” references the ocean-going “Maritime Silk Road”. It is to connect the fast-growing South East Asian region to China’s southern provinces through ports and railways1.

The 3,666km Central Asia-China gas pipeline predated the new Silk Road but forms the backbone of infrastructure connections between Turkmenistan and China. Chinese-built, it runs from the Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan border to Jingbian in China and cost $7.3bn4.

China signed agreements with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to build a fourth line of the central Asia-China gas pipeline in September 2013. Line D is expected to raise Turkmenistan’s gas export capacity to China from 55bn cu m per year to 85bn cu m.

China is not the only investor in central Asian connectivity. Multilateral financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank have long been investing in the region’s infrastructure5.

Then there is the Export-Import Bank of China, which lent more than $80 billion in 2015. This dwarfs the Asia Development Bank, which lent $27 billion over the same period. China has also redrawn Central Asia’s energy economics. Chinese companies now own close to a quarter of Kazakhstan’s oil production and account for well over half of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Recently they signed $15 billion in gas and uranium deals with Uzbekistan.

Conclusion. Uzbekistan is a regular participant of annual China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum which is held regularly to promote cooperation between parties to build the Silk Road Economic Belt jointly. Theoretically, if Uzbekistan’s political and strategic concerns are met, the initiative could be seen as viable, particularly given that many of the projects envisaged under “the Central Asia-China gas pipeline project” and the “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project” would dovetail into OBOR. Already all of Uzbekistan’s neighbors are a part of it, and Uzbekistan too is keen to increase connectivity with them.