The potential of modern Russian generations

The interest in the issue of similarities and differences of the generations and their interaction is generally intensified in periods of radical social changes. Most famous studies of K. Mannheim [14] and Ortega y Gasset [16] are devoted to this problem. Margaret Mead reveals a generation gap in the life goal system in connection with the critical historical stages of socio-economic development [15].

In Russia the research in this direction, attracting attention of both scientists and the public, analyzes the course and consequences of the radical reforms of the 1990s that have a different impact on both the welfare and the value system of generations. The works of Yu. Levada [12], B. Dubin [5] and T. Shanin [26] are widely known. The worsening of the problem to maintain social system stability increases the urgency of identifying and studying mechanisms that, on the one hand, determine socio-demographic changes and, on the other, – stability of the society.

The concept “generation: is largely associated with demographics, with reproduction being its subject. This definition considers a generation as a group of people born in the same period of time. In addition, a generation is descendants of a couple or some couples by degree of relationship (parents – children – grandchildren, etc.). Along with this there is a concept “cohort” that has a meaning broader than just an aggregate of people born in the same time period; a cohort can be formed on the basis of other demographic events, and not just births [19]. The main age groups, generations, specifics of their life paths are determined by socio-economic conditions (primarily employment), have a social meaning due to social norms defined by basic stages of life: childhood, maturity, old age. It is possible to select different indicators for the definition of generations (not only purely demographic, but also economic, social, political, etc.). In this context, in Russia the younger generation (employment opportunity indicator – economic and demographic) is population under working age (aged 0–15), the middle – of working age (women aged 16–54 and men aged 16–59), and the older – women aged 55 and over and men aged 60 and over.

New stages of life’s journey are formed due to the changing conditions of social environment. For example, there is a new life stage between adolescence and adulthood, associated with “finding yourself” – “emerging adulthood” [27]. In the modern world old age is divided into two ages: the Old Old, or “old elderly” – a period of life when a person needs constant care; the share of such people, for example, over 80 in the total population will increase in the future (in demography, there is special indicator “depth of aging”, i.e. a ratio of this age group to the population of over working age (“third age”). There also is the Young Old or “young elderly”, who has physiological, social, and professional potential even in the “third age”.

The involvement in any historical event that determines specifics of its functioning is an important social characteristic of belonging to a “social generation”. In the first half of the 20th century the research in continuity of generations becomes important due to the growing dynamism of socio-economic development, living conditions and values of different generations. In this regard most interesting findings belong to the Spanish philosopher J. Ortega y Gasset [16], analyzing the specifics of perception of different forms of art and culture as intergenerational differences, and M. Mead, studying the features of adult’s perception of a “childhood world” as a special world in connection with the society’s development [15].

The first sociological approaches to the problem refer to the middle of the last century. K. Mannheim [14] links the formation of generations not only with the birth of a certain number of people in a specific period of time, but also with the historical events that affect the way of life of a generation. In demographics the generation length is defined as the mean age of a mother at child’s birth (27–28 years – in both developed and developing countries). “The Problem of Generations” by K. Mannheim is a fundamental work dedicated not only to a demographic, but also to socio-economic approach to the study of generations. It highlights two different approaches to the analysis of the generation problem: positivist and romantic-historical. The first approach is to a greater extent associated with the definition of boundaries and a size of generation on the basis of degree of their importance in public life. The problem essence is to calculate an average period of time required for the younger generation to supersede the older one in public life and mainly to identify a natural starting point of a new generation in history. The generation length amounts to 30 years, as up to 30 years a person usually learns something knew and matures and to 60 years he/she stops participating in public life.

A generation in the socio-demographic sense can be seen as a form of social communication, when norms help people compare themselves with “others” similar to “them” (on the basis of age characteristics or the same year of birth). It is important to consider transition from generation to generation, a stable, transmitted pattern and changes in the social norms. The mechanism of changes, transformation of norms and value systems, including fracture or total collapse of the regulatory system during the replacement of one generation by another, becomes crucial. The concept “generation” fixes corresponding points of rupture of social and cultural order, directions and mechanisms of mediation and transition between the “old” and “new”. In Russia the researchers of generations or generation problems always deal with a “trace” or “symptom” of another, not mentioned problem. More precisely, it a tangle of problems: 1) leadership (innovation); 2) its success, recognition (gratification) and (3) maintenance of the number and transfer of achievements (reproductions, including in a family). In other words, we are talking about systemic generational challenges of sustainable and continuous development of the Soviet and, maybe, Russian society – the era of rapid modernization (the 19th – beginning of the 20th century), which began in the 1990s and is continuing up to date. Outside the family institution (and forms of the traditional society) the concept of generation is viewed as a flow, movement (socio- romantic approach: romantic generation, a generation of 1914, a generation of 1968, etc.) or a chronological (synchronic) slice – of a so-called “conditional generation” and results of the impact of mass institutions: families, social sphere, production and social policy on it. This approach roughly corresponds to intra-family, historical and institutional generations and is close to Yu.A. Levada’s attempt to divide demographically and historically important generations [12]. So, the definition proposed by S.N. Zenkin is very interesting: “Generation is time, embodied in people, their dramatic fate, it includes the measure, associated with a life cycle of the human body, in the continuous duration of the historical process...” [9]

The potential of modern generations can be considered in various aspects: by number of generations, life expectancy at birth, proportion of representatives of different generations, both sharing and not sharing basic social values of the society, including values related to reproductive and other types of demographic behavior.

The ratio of a number of different generations is a fundamental indicator of sustainable development of economy and social life of the country. Relatively large population of working age (middle generation), of course, gives the country the opportunity for economic growth. The concept “demographic window” is based on the advantages of countries with low demographic pressure. A “demographic window” (“demographic bonus”) can not exceed the length of a generation and comes after the increase in the demographic load. Traditionally a higher proportion of older people is considered mainly in terms of negative consequences for pension systems and raised demographic burden on working-age population. The rise in the share of population of under-working age has different economic consequences in the short and long term.

The demographic potential of human capital, which differs among generations, is the population size, its age and gender structure. Since 2008 Russia has witnessed systematic reduction in the proportion of working age population in the total population, while on the eve of the first Soviet industrialization this share was high ( tab. 1 ) [23].

In 1926 the dependency ratio was 957 disabled people per thousand working age population. At the same time, the age dependency ratio was 167. Among those of working age it is advisable to single out groups of young people aged 20–24 and 25–29. The rural population of working age, including young (fast learning new working occupations, especially in the group of people aged 20– 24), aged 20–29 years, 3-fold exceeded the urban population of the same age. The similar situation was recorded in the age group of 30– 39 years (less creative, but more experienced and responsible), where families had more than one child to bring up and support. Still the

Table 1. Number and age structure of the population on the eve of Russia’s industrialization, 1926

Age structure	Population, million people	Share, in %
Entire population	92,681	100
Aged 20-24	8,732	9.4
Aged 25-29	7,324	7.9
Aged 20-29	16,056	17.3
Under working age	36,854	39.8
Of working age	47,830	51.6
Over working age	7,945	8.6
Calculated by: [23].

older generation helped the youth to acquire an occupation, qualification and experience through the institution of “mentoring”; it was the economic basis for generations’ interaction.

At that time Russia’s industrialization was conducted due to the rural population, primarily of young (under 30) and middle age (under 40). In this regard, there was a severe problem to educate the rural population and, above all, provide them with primary and secondary education. The country’s industrialization relied on the relatively young rural population. However, there was a “split” of the value and knowledge system of rural young people who moved to cities and the rural population. At the same time, the rural youth became familiar with an urban way of life mainly through the productive interaction with the older generation of citizens (aged 30–39).

On the eve of the World War II the population grew, thus indicating the economy’s development (increase in the number of producers and consumers). The number and proportion of population, including of working age and its main age groups, before the World War II are shown in Table 2 [23].

Compared to the 1926 level, there was an increase in the number and share of working age population, including the most promising (or productive) age groups.

Nowadays we observe the trend of aging population, while the country needs new industrial development ( tab. 3 ).

Table 2. Number and age structure of Russia’s population on the eve of the War, 1939

Age structure	Population, million people	Share, in %
Entire population	108,377	100
Aged 20–24	8,744	8.1
Aged 25–29	10,454	9.6
Aged 20–29	19,198	17.7
Under working age	42,072	38.8
Of working age	56,923	52.5
Over working age	9,362	8.6
Calculated by: [23].

Table 3. Number and age structure of Russia’s population, as of January 1, 2014

Age structure	Population, million people	Share, in %
Entire population	143,667	100
Aged 20-24	9,971	6.9
Aged 25-29	12,522	8.7
Aged 20-29	22,493	15.7
Under working age	24,717	16.4
Of working age	85,162	60.2
Over working age	33,788	23.5
Calculated by: [24].

The population of working age became greater than in 1939, but its share in the total population decreased. The population of working age grew by more than 2.7 times and the proportion of children reduced by 1.7 times – it is the future youth as a demographic basis for economic development. The dependency ratio was 661 per thousand population (it went down significantly, in comparison with the pre-war time), but in terms of persons over working age it was 390, i.e. rose by more than 2 times. This trend manifested itself most significantly in terms of urban population; in conditions of our large country it challenges further economical development.

Not only the number and age structure of the population, but also the indicators of life expectancy are significant. The founders of potential demography [22] introduce a term, such as life potential, defined as a number of life years, an individual or group is to live at a given age provided that the age-specific mortality rate is maintained (life expectancy at a certain age). Accordingly, life potential is largely influenced by the age and gender structure [1, 17, 28]. The Russian researchers, [20] when considering life potential of the population and its key age groups, in a certain sense associated with young, middle and senior generations of our country, show that life potential of the Russian population went down in 1990–2010. The reduction in life potential of the population is associated with a decrease in this indicator for younger generation (children) due to the decline in the number and proportion of this generation in the population structure. This trend is not overcome, as the younger generation is decreasing (while the number of births is still going up). At the same time, life expectancy rose in this period. In general, the death rate in Russia is much higher than in the economically developed countries; in the first quarter of 2015, compared to the previous year, the number of deaths from main causes of death (per 100 thousand population) went up.

Thus, we come to a socio-demographic indicator for the identification of the youth as a special group. The youth is part of the population aged 15–30 (sometimes 35 due to socio-economic reasons – see below), having its own life goals system, conditions and life way, socio-economic and demographic behavior and attitude towards measures of social and demographic policies that distinguish this group from other age groups.

Family is still one of the key social institutions that form basic values, attitudes and behavior styles. It is one of the first social institutions of human civilization. The transmission of social norms largely occurs in family. Over the ten millennia existence of “person reasonable”, its structure did not remain frozen. At the same time, living conditions of family, norms of behavior and values transmitted to new generations changed very slowly. The bourgeois revolutions accelerated the social time. The modern period can be called as an era of “rapid social relations” [21]. Today the livelihood of generations in our country is largely associated with “fragility”, variability of basic social institutions, especially family, and growing internal and external geopolitical challenges.

In these circumstances family is transformed and in some cases ceases to effectively fulfill its regulatory orienting function. The transfer of cultural heritage from generation to generation loses its linear-progressive orientation. As noted by the research associates of the Institute of Socio-Political Research of RAS Yu.A. Zubok and V.I. Chuprov, “constantly there appear risks associated with the inconsistency between learning and working (or both) and satisfaction of cultural needs. At the individual level this contradiction is resolved by consistent selection of priorities. In public life, especially when social policy is ineffective, the contradictions between material and spiritual production accumulate in the process of transferring cultures. The underestimation of the development of any sides of social production, whether it is material conditions of life or spiritual development, increases social risks not only in these spheres, but also in public reproduction as a whole. The role of social institutions to achieve and preserve the unity of both sides of production can hardly be overestimated” [10].

The viability and importance of a country and civilization are determined by the demographic factor; almost all demographic processes are associated with a basic social institution of society – family. The founda- tions of matrimonial, reproductive and selfpreserving behavior are, as a rule, formed in family. In this regard, the fundamental role in the decision of reproduction problems is played by family structures.

Their dynamics in Russia is characterized by:

• •    increase in age at the first union;

• •    growth in the proportion of singleparent families because of divorce, illegitimate births and widowhood;

• •    rise in the proportion of complex families, spouses or mothers with children living with their parents and/or other relatives because of housing problems;

• •    transition of some family social functions to extrafamilial institutions.

Studies show that there is a high share of younger people who do not find role models. The survey [3] conducted in May 2009 indicates that the proportion of young people having a role model reduces from 31.5% at the age of 14–17 to 23.1% at the age of 25–30. Relatives and friends are usually these models, particularly: relatives (close) – 35%; teachers – 9.5%; others – 29.9%. First and foremost, mother or father is viewed as an ideal. Heroes are not often considered as such. The ISESP RAS research, conducted in 2013, indicates (tab. 4) that more than 70% of schoolchildren,

Table 4. Respondent’s assessment of relationship with parents, in %

Options HVE SVE Working youth Pupils Good 84.6 73.6 78.6 76.7 Satisfactory 14.2 26.4 18.8 16.7 Bad 1.1 0.0 2.6 6.7 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 students and the working youth defines the relationship with their parents as good. School children have most strained relationships: 7% of the pupils have bad relations with their parents.

Scientists say that in the mass consciousness of Russian young people “success in life is a strong family and children, as well as respect of others. The second group of important life goals includes wealth (well-being) and interesting work; only after that – presence of trusted friends. The monograph “Youth of Russia: Sociological Portrait” presents an interesting formulation of the social conflict problem. According to the authors, this is a conflict between those Russians who have already taken their niche in the social structure and young outsiders that will begin to fight not so much for the niches themselves, as for the restructuring of the entire social space. Likely, other scenarios are possible due to the fact that the younger generation, as older age cohorts, is extremely heterogeneous. Today the main division of society is connected not so much with generation gaps, as with the income gap and economic inequality within the generations.

Family, as already mentioned, is the basis of microcosm of Russia, connection of generations and stability of society. Its changes (as well as of other public institutions) occur in the conditions of demographic structure transformation, its progressive aging. Young people, compared with their parents, learn longer, seek and find a stable job later, significantly differing in terms of remuneration, marry and have children later.

Both for the “generation of the third age” and the youth the demographers single out a new life stage (stage of uncertainty) between adolescence and adulthood, associated with “finding oneself”, called “emerging adulthood” by J. Arnett [15]. Society and family get a new social challenge, caused by the insufficient integration of young people into adulthood and the increasing economic burden on parents who have adult children. In this regard the age boundary of young people “shifts” from 30 to 35 years.

In the post-Soviet Russia the share of young people aged 15–34 in the total population changed in the following way. Since 1991 the highest proportion of the youth was recorded in 2006. The number and share of young people up to January 1, 2031 are given in accordance with the forecast of the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (amended in 2014 to include the Crimean Federal District and Sevastopol) ( tab. 5 ).

The important areas of studying the relationship of socio-economic and demographic behaviors of the generations (parents and young people) are the following: comparative analysis of the influence of the number of children born, expected and desired, the system of parents’ value orientations on their children’s generation. Children tend to learn the behavior pattern, dictated as acceptable by society, and their parents’ orientation on birth of children with regard to their life situations.

The study of reproductive orientations involves, as a rule, the use of the following indicators: ideal number of children (“How

Table 5. Number of young people and their share in the total population as of January 1 of the respective year, fact and forecast according to the medium variant

Year Number of young people, thousand people Share in the total population, in % 1991 4,388.3 29.5 2000 4,239.5 28.6 2006 4,513.8 31.6 2013 4,110.9 28.6 2014 41,109.3 28.6 2020 3,624.8 25.4 2025 3,225.3 21.4 2031 3,329.5 22.5 Calculated by [24, 18]. many children is it best to have in the family?”), desired number of children (“How many children (including those you already have) would you like to have in the presence of all necessary conditions?”), expected number of children (“How many children (including those you already have) do you plan to have?”), as well as the assessment of probability of the child’s birth in the next few years, usually in the next 3 years (“Are you going to have a baby in the next three years: definitely yes, probably yes, difficult to say, not, not in any case”. The question can also include a request to rate this probability on a scale). The main two questions are the ones about an expected number of children and assessment of the probability of birth in a given time period, with the first reflecting reproductive plans with regard to general life conditions of a particular family and the second – reproductive intentions in the near future.

According to the 2010 census, the average number of children born per woman of “generations of daughters”, who are over reproductive age (40–44 years), is 1.64,

“generations of mothers” at the age of 65– 69 – 1.88; for urban women the figures are 1.50 and 1.68, respectively, and for rural women – 2.03 and 2.48. As for “generations of daughters” at the age of 45–49, the number of children born per woman is 1.76, “generations of mothers” at the age of 70 and over – 2.08; for urban women – 1.61 and 1.83, respectively, rural women – 2.16 and 2.71. In other words, “the generation of mothers has more children than the generation of daughters”; that is a reflection of living conditions of these generations and their values [11].

According to the research in the Lipetsk Oblast (2006), values and reproductive plans of young people only partially coincide with those of their parents’1. The desired number of children among young male generation is 1.6 and the expected one – 1.5. Among male generation of parents it is 2.1 and 1.8

Table 6. Assessment of the some values significance by parents and young people (average score on a 5-point scale)

Values Parents Young people Comfortable housing 4.6 4.5 Work 4.2 4.3 Have a family 4.4 4.3 Have a child 4.3 4.2 Material well-being 4.5 4.5 Education 4.2 4.4 Career 4.3 4.4 Self-realization 3.7 4.2 Have 2 children 3.6 4.0 Have 3 children 2.4 2.3 respectively, i.e., significantly higher. Among the young female generation the desired number of children is 2.0 and the expected – 1.7. For their mothers this indicator equals to 2.3 and 1.7, respectively. Among the younger male generation the expected number of children is less than among their fathers, but among girls – the same as among their mothers (however, the desired number of children among daughters is lower).

Among girls, having no brothers and sisters, the expected number of children is 1.6; among girls, having a brother or sister, – 1.7 (i.e., in two-child families); among raised in three-child families – 1.8. Among boys the figures are 1.4; 1.5; 1.8, respectively. Among their mothers the expected number of children does not depend on the number of children in the family of their parents (i.e., grandparents of the youth), it always equals to 1.7 [4]. A parental family influences reproductive plans of today’s young people, but had no effect on reproductive plans of their mothers (here the important role was, probably, played by the difficult socio-economic situation, mothers lived in (on average, mothers are 37 years old, girls – 16 years old).

The differences in reproductive orientations of the youth and the older generation can be caused by another value system of young people born during the transition period, different from the value system of their parents (tab. 6) ².

The lowest assessments are given to having 3 children, 2 children and self-realization. Women estimate the importance of having a family and a child relatively high, men – housing and material well-being. The difference between the estimates of material well-being and having a family among women amounts to -0.1 points (the difference is not important), among men – 0.3 points (the difference is prominent); material wellbeing and having 2 children – 0.7 and 1.2, respectively; 3 children – 2.2 for both sexes (here the difference is significant by all indicators). The value system of young people is almost identical with the value system of their parents, except for such a goal, as selfrealization, which is more important for young people (see tab. 6).

The younger generation gives the lowest estimates to having 3 and 2 children and selfrealization. But for girls, unlike their mothers’ generation, material well-being and comfortable housing are relatively more important, for young men, compared to fathers, – education and career. The gap between family and extrafamilial values among the younger generation is wider than that of the older generation. So, the gap between evaluations of material well-being and family is 0.2 points for girls and 0.1 points for boys; 2 children – 1.1 for girls and 2.0 points for boys; 3 children – 2.3 for girls and 1.4 points for boys (significant differences). The crucial differences between generations are observed by such life goals, as self-realization and intention to have two children.

The nationwide survey of young people was conducted in September 2006 by a representative sample in 18 regions representing all federal districts (1,500 young people under 35 were polled)3. According to the results of the conducted sociological survey, the average desired number of children (number of children the respondents would like to have in their family in the presence of all necessary conditions) amounts to 2.04. Thus, even the number of children the respondents would have in the presence of all necessary conditions is less than that required to ensure reproduction of the population. The expected number of children is also 1.70.

The survey has an analysis of the value system of young people, including consideration of the importance of family values. The respondents were given a list of 13 values, such as wealth, housing, education, career, leisure, freedom, independence, values of family life in a registered marriage, a child, 2 children, and 3 children. The importance of these values was suggested to rate on a 5-point scale. Most crucial values for young people are the following: housing, material welfare, a child (3d position in the list of 13 values), education (profession, skills improvement). The value of family (registered marriage) ranges 7th4, a few children (8th); the value of having 2 children is in the middle of the list (9th position in the list of 13 values), 3 children – at the very end (13th position). The calculation of assessments allows us to conclude that for the youth the concept of “several children” is associated mainly with only 2 children. We should mention a low value of a registered marriage and 3 children5.

Table 7. Assessment of the significance of some life goals by “generations of children and parents” (average score on a 5-point scale)*

Life goal	Under 20	20-29	45 and over
Own good housing	4.8	4.9	4.7
Live in a registered marriage with my spouse, family	4.4	4.3	4.2
Raise a child	4.6	4.7	4.6
Work hard, but receive high remuneration for it	4.4	4.5	4.6
Material well-being of my family	4.8	4.9	4.8
Get education, improve skills constantly	4.4	4.1	3.2
Have my own family business, invest money and efforts in it and live on the revenue from it	3.6	3.5	2.9
Raise 2 children	4.1	4.1	3.8
Career growth	4.2	4.0	2.9
Have interesting leisure time	4.2	4.1	3.3
Communicate with friends a lot	3.8	3.7	3.0
Have 3 children	2.5	2.6	2.3
Be free, independent and do only what I want	3.1	2.7	3.3
* Groups of young people and people over 45 account for more than 1,500 people

In 2010 the study was carried out once again6. Among young people the average desired number of children is 2.3 and the expected one – 1.6. After the demographic policy implementation the desired number of children went up, but the number of expected, on the contrary, down. The highest estimates were given the same life goals, such as housing (1st position), material well-being and good health (2nd–3d)7, desire to live a long life and see grandchildren (4–5th). The value of one child is below the value of 2 children and the value of 3 children remains at the end of the rating.

According to the research in reproductive plans of the population, conducted under supervision of the Federal State Statistics

Service of the Russian Federation in 2012⁸, the importance of life goals are estimated by young people under 20, people aged 45 and over (conditionally by “generations of children and parents”), and young people aged 20–30 differently ( tab. 7 ).

The desired number of children among people under 20 is 2.2, at the age of 20–29 – 2.1, and at the age of 45 and over – 2.3%. The expected number of children accounts for 2.0; 2.0; 1.8, respectively. The low expected number of children among the older generations can be explained by the fact that their active reproductive age fell on the difficult 1990s and they were unable to realize their reproductive plans9.

The life goals system of young people under 30 and people aged 45 and over differs significantly by goals, such as getting education and constantly improving skills (the latter can be also important for older people), raising 2 children, having own family business and living on the revenue from it, having interesting leisure time, and communicating with friends a lot. The desire for freedom and independence is more characteristic of young people aged 20–30. Let us note the fact that among young people the desire for freedom and independence and the intention to do only what one wants range the last but one in the system of vital goals, unlike older people (among them this goal ranges 6–7th (i.e., in the middle of life goals, along with interesting leisure activities). Apparently, the hypothesis about the growth in young people’s individualism should be revised10. The youth’s assessment of family (registered marriage) and 2–3 children is significantly different from the respective estimates of the older generation. Material values are very important for all generations.

The value system regulates the priority of needs satisfaction. In conditions of limited resources they can be primarily spent on the needs that take highest positions in the hierarchy, but not on the satisfaction of needs in a few children. Raising people’s living standard and providing financial support to families with children without conducting simultaneous purposeful activities to increase the value of having several children can result in the fact that the received material support is perceived as insufficient for the birth of another child.

The desire to have children, its place in the value system is currently a major direct regulator of reproductive behavior. This presupposes 2 important conclusions for the demographic policy focused on boosting a birth rate: first, the improvement of living conditions, conditions to realize the need in children will lead to some rise in the birth rate within their desired number of children (i.e. among young people this figure will be below 2.03, probably no higher than 1.7 and 1.8). Second, the change in the need in children and the increase in the value of having several children (if this can be achieved) can bear disproportionately large and long-term results than improving the conditions of life (here the value, moral link between generations plays a crucial role). It is necessary to realize both directions. Only the joint solution of both challenges will make the demographic policy effective. It is especially important to consider this issue nowadays, as the economic possibilities for conducting this policy are limited.

The potential of generations, including their socio-economic activity, as well as the number of unborn generations are largely influenced by social values, which are formed today. The generations, including the generation of the 1990s, face a historic choice determining not only current, but also future opportunities of Russia.