The Republic of Vietnam’s diplomatic opportunities during the war of 1965-1973

,

,

Recently, there has been a significant shift in the body of studies on the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), as both Vietnamese and international historians have sought to reassess the regime’s political engagement and its role in managing international relations to safeguard essential national interests. The RVN, however, was historically perceived as a steadfast friend of United States (US) foreign policy, exerting significant control over local authority by collaborating with close allies to implement Cold War anti-communism measures and effectively pursue nation-building initiatives [Tuong Vu, Nu Anh Tran, 2022; Veith, 2021]. Ending the first Republic by Ngô Đình Diệm’s assassination in 1963, the RVN faced political challenges under military junta control and social fatigue powered by anti-war movements driven by communists and the Student Union [Miller, 2011]. The RVN’s foreign policy also focused on enhancing its standing and garnering external backing to fortify the regime in South Vietnam. The Many Flags Campaign , waged by the United States in September 1964, offered Saigon a chance to go global and remain active in its international relations.

Military engagement arose from political unrest and instability in both political and military spheres in South Vietnam after the passing of Ngô Đình Diệm. After at least 14 coups d’état happened, followed by many political transformations in regimes, Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, two rising political stars in South Vietnam, executed the establishment of the “National Leadership Committee” 1 in June 1965. In the midst of war escalation, the RVN reshuffled the regime and devised numerous new foreign policies to secure allies’ involvement and strengthen Saigon’s position in its regional and international milieu. However, such attempts by Saigon remain silent in history.

This constitutes an academic gap. American and Anglophone literature focused on loss, grievances, and war casualties in several studies, portraying the RVN as a US-funded puppet government. Vietnamese domestic historians used primary sources from the Vietnam Ministry of Defense and Archives 3 to describe the Communist Party’s plans, how they waged the war, and how they achieved victory in their anti-American war. The openness of Archive 2 sources provides promising insights for historians seeking to craft RVN history. Using post-revisionist methods, new academics from the United States have expanded the corpus of study and challenged traditional communist historians’ prejudiced perspectives about the RVN’s real contribution to Vietnamese national history. In fact, in Anglophone and Vietnamese literature, many book chapters and research papers on the RVN explore the RVN’s education, military strategy, democracy building, and social issues [Fear, 2018; Tuong Vu, Fear, 2019].

This study, however, is not concerned about the topic of the relationship between Saigon and Washington, as many works cast a lot of light on this volatile relationship. Conversely, it investigates current literature on the RVN’s foreign policy and how Saigon maintained a balanced perspective on other partnerships and endeavoured to engage closely with its Free World Military Forces (FWMF), particularly with Thailand, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, to share a mutual goal of anti-communism, reconstruct a democratic society, and reestablish peace in Vietnam. These countries poured a lot of energy into supporting Saigon in its military training, reorganization, and mobilization, as well as providing financial and medical support to rescue the regime from communist alignment and reinforce the power of democracy within the country. This essay delves into Saigon’s response to such external support, examining how the regime utilized this significant advantage to strengthen its position in the anticommunist crusade. Scholars have deeply rooted this topic, revealed the intricacies of these studies and provided valuable insights for future research on the Cold War era of the Vietnamese Republic in the 20th century.

Scholarship on the Republic of Vietnam’s foreign policy and national diplomacy building

The academic paper investigating RVN foreign policy dates back to William Henderson and Wesley R. Fishel’s 1963 study. Being close friends with Ngô Đình Diệm and engaging with the political evolution in South Vietnam under the First Republic (1955–1963), the two authors indicated the Foreign Ministry’s disorganization and incorrect persona grata designation which had become two major weaknesses. Diệm performed his impartial stance, pursued building a third-world nation, and departed from the United States administration, which hindered a political capacity to mobilize the support of all countries in the world and helped Washington achieve its anti-communist goal in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia [Henderson, Fishel, 1966, pp. 3–30]. A focus on settling domestic tensions also abandoned the idea of strengthening international ties and improving the RVN’s position in international relations. As a result, Diệm’s attempts to improve South Vietnam’s situation in both internal and external spheres were of little use.

Following the Fall of Saigon in 1975, some Vietnamese and American historians reexamined the Vietnam War, evaluating its internal dynamics and the circumstances that led to the United States and the RVN’s defeat. Of particular interest is the work of Richard A. Hunt, which claims that while the Vietnam War allies sought to halt communism, they used different approaches [Hunt, 1982, p. 132]. During the Vietnam War, five allies demonstrated a strong linkage of core interests with the United States in the form of American aid to bolster economic growth, but they also placed these countries under strict security measures. Similarly, Stanley Robert Larsen and James Collins argued that the five allied forces did not specifically seek a relationship with Saigon, but rather responded naturally to the United States’ requests for economic growth. In these two works, Saigon’s role is only a fleeting glimpse [Larsen, Collins, 2005].

Since the early 21st century, there has been an advancement in impartial investigation. Lien Hang Nguyen revealed a deception involving Hanoi and clandestine negotiations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Washington to advance their interests in the Vietnam War and exclude the RVN from the Paris peace talks [Lien Hang Nguyen, 2012]. In the midst of Hanoi’s military demonstrations in the South and covert talks between Lê Đức Thọ and Henry Kissinger, Washington planned to withdraw from South Vietnam, challenging Saigon’s belief in Washington’s commitment to protect it from Hanoi’s aggression during the Vietnamization era. Lien Hang Nguyen also investigates the RVN’s reactions to Hanoi’s responses and its increasing support for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of the Republic of Vietnam. An appropriately exploited source enabled the author to study this event from multiple perspectives and criticize Hanoi’s determination to conquer South Vietnam through its military power and diplomatic conspiracy. Pierre Asselin concerns how Hanoi utilized military techniques to wage war in and undermine the RVN’s nation-building efforts [Asselin, 2002; 2021]. In the first book, Asselin delves into Hanoi’s trajectory, examining internal conversations of Washington to balance its interests between the RVN and the DRV. Asselin, on the other hand, outlines Hanoi’s abortive efforts to achieve a triumph in the late 1960s, as well as the RVN’s proactive role in raising its voice at the Paris conference venue. Neither Hanoi nor Saigon remained loyal to deescalating internal conflicts, and the United States, apparently, kept their presence on battlefields at bay [Asselin, 2002]. Asselin helps readers discern Hanoi’s intentions to play tricks in its conversations with Washington to weaken the Saigon government, as well as Saigon’s defense preparations for halting Hanoi’s invasion across the South. These works shed light on how Ho Chi Minh and his government alleged their “righteousness” to implement the revolutionary war in the south of Vietnam and rallied nationwide support for the South Vietnamese people.

The work of revisionist and post-revisionist Western academics on the role of diplomatic RVN history has provided a detailed historical analysis of the Saigon government’s perception of the importance of national diplomacy in showcasing its overseas presence in international forums and using it as a diplomatic instrument to support its fight-and-build plans throughout the war. Beginning with a captivating account of a Vietnamese demonstrator who opposed the United States’ war expansion in South Vietnam, Heather Marie Stur posited that the RVN leaders did not intend to establish a puppet government in Hanoi’s discourses. Instead, they remained proactive and leveraged international collaboration to garner sufficient support from other countries for the advancement of democracy and peace in South Vietnam [Stur, 2020, p. 116]. According to H. M. Stur, the appearance of the RVN in regional and international forums challenged Hanoi’s ability to maintain its integrity in promoting genuine peace under an autocratic regime by communists.

Trần Nam Tiến initially addressed Ngô Đình Diệm’s divergence from the entrenched perspectives of domestic Vietnamese historians, highlighting his diplomatic strategies aimed at extricating himself from the influence of the United States in his policymaking and resisting greater American involvement in Vietnam [Trần Nam Tiến, 2015, p. 27]. Nonetheless, the execution of an independent foreign policy did not materialize under the Second Republic, as Trần illustrated the inequitable stance of Saigon at the Paris conference and the dynamics of the Saigon–Washington relationship, which enabled the United States to curtail its military engagement. Saigon’s reliance on the United States resulted in a precarious situation for the regime following Washington’s cessation of aid [Trần Nam Tiến, 2019, p. 70]. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu continued to be regarded as a notorious leader of South Vietnam in most of Trần’s articles, particularly when he assessed the RVN’s efforts to establish its foreign policy and attain a favourable resolution amid the disputes in Paris [Trần Nam Tiến, 2020, pp. 279–281]. The RVN’s diplomatic standing and its dealings with partners are comparatively weak and ineffective.

Vietnamese historians have also focused on the allies of the RVN during the Vietnam War (1964–1973) [Quân đồng minh Mỹ, 2009]. The United States significantly courted five nations: Thailand, the ROK, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, during its conflict in South Vietnam. This work offers a comprehensive analysis of the causes and effects of these nations. This subject is revisited in a recent work by Nguyễn Duy Truờng, intending to expand the scope of this research. It examines the FWMF’s military contributions, as well as its economic, scientific, and technological aid and consequences in the post-involvement period [Nguyễn Duy Truờng, 2021, pp. 25–34]. However, traditional analyses of Vietnam entirely overlook Saigon’s significance in these relationships.

The Republic of Vietnam and Thailand

Thailand is one of the RVN’s neighbouring countries. The United States’ strategic presence in Southeast Asia after World War II, which addressed security issues along the Thai–Laotian border and supported anti-сommunist regimes, shaped Thailand’s foreign policy. Frank C. Darling became an early-bird author in examining the position of Thai troops in South Vietnam, highlighting location, demographics, and resources as the reasons the United States engaged with Thailand more than Britain [Darling, 1967, pp. 215–217]. The neutrality of Bangkok became fragile as soon as the military junta established a regime and supported Washington’s policy to eradicate сommunism in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s involvement in the Vietnam War stems from its economic growth aspirations, which further enhanced the Bangkok–Washington partnership.

Bangkok’s response to the Many Flags Campaign highlights the significance of the campaign in forging a strong relationship with Washington, while also demonstrating a fear of сommunist expansion within Thailand. Arne Kislenko elaborated on the role of Chinese and Vietnamese communities in Thailand as typical dangers to Thailand’s national security, highlighting Bangkok’s heavy reliance on Washington to address this concern [Kislenko, 2004, p. 69]. The vulnerability of Bangkok’s foreign policy under the military junta also became a crucial factor, prompting Thailand to fortify its ties with the United States in order to safeguard its national stability. At least, the United States was an ideal partner for Bangkok to reinforce the political power of the military junta [Kunthic, 2018, p. 39]. Richard A. Ruth delves into the memories of Thai soldiers serving in the South Vietnamese Army, expressing both positive and fearful sentiments. Although fighting against communists in a periphery role, Thai troops narrated a different story, which is distinct from the Thai home policy toward Vietnamese communities in northeastern Thailand. Thai soldiers also believed that they cultivated a close friendship with RVN soldiers, which in turn maintained the high morale of both Thai and RVN troops, thereby limiting the capabilities of communists in South Vietnam [Ruth, 2010].

The Republic of Vietnam and The Republic of Korea

The ROK participation in the Vietnam War signifies several difficulties in Seoul’s foreign policy, encompassing its economic interests and a closer alignment with the Washington government. Seoul favoured a Southeast Asian geopolitical stance rather than solely assisting Saigon in vanquishing the communists [Kim, 1966]. Although it is evident that Seoul significantly depended on the economic and military assistance of the United States, it also reveals a substantial influence of South Korea in Southeast Asia [Song Jeong Nam, 2004, p. 430]. The Many Flags campaign executed this plan, reinforcing Seoul’s standing in Vietnam and broadening its influence in Southeast Asia. The ROK exhibited a fervent commitment to the war in South Vietnam, as evidenced by its excessive compensation, in contrast to Thailand and the Philippines. The Nixon Doctrine serves as a litmus test for the United States’ three Asian allies regarding their participation in the war, with South Korea emerging as the most valuable partner in assisting Saigon with its fight-and-build strategies and maintaining engagement with the regime until the conclusion of the Vietnam War [Đỗ Diệu Khuê, 2016, p. 173].

Chang Jin Park elucidates a political objective akin to the confrontation with communism in both countries during the tenures of Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, focused on safeguarding the political and territorial integrity of the Free World, grounded in comparative analyses of the United States’ foreign policy in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The RVN and ROK have shown considerable political agency regarding United States foreign aid and established strategic partnerships to combat communist activities without adopting a neutral stance [Chang Jin Park, 1975, p. 22]. Likewise, South Vietnam and South Korea are regarded as two of the United States’ closest friends, serving as proxies to execute a contentious conflict. Lương Thị Hồng asserted that the essence of the Korean War originates from a civil dispute, resulting in a direct confrontation between two superpowers. According to Lương, the Vietnam War primarily sprang from a deep-seated imperialistic effort to hinder Vietnamese nationalism, as expressed by Vietnamese communists, mirroring a dominant narrative of the Vietnamese Communist Party [Lương Thị Hồng, 2020, p. 65].

Korean-written studies present valuable intellectual suggestions for the Saigon–Seoul connection. Võ Thị Khánh Loan analyzes Saigon’s efforts to augment broader collaborations with Seoul in economic and cultural domains [Võ Thị Khánh Loan, 2018, pp. 3–4]. The two states concur that establishing a secret partnership that mitigated America’s influence on nation-building and encompassed social, economic, and cultural dimensions was essential for consolidating national authority. During the conflict, Saigon served as a vital commercial hub and strategic ally for the ROK in Southeast Asia. The initial inquiry distinctly illustrates how the RVN forged its connections with the ROK and leveraged this alliance to transform the nation during the conflict. Lee Sin Jae presents an additional instance of the ROK’s involvement in the economic development of South Vietnam, specifically through the Korean Agricultural Technical Group (KATG), which provided support in agriculture, water management, and fisheries [Lee Sin Jae, 2020]. Đỗ Thanh Thảo Miên examines the historical dynamics of Vietnamese and Korean interstate relations throughout the Cold War period. The book examines Saigon–Seoul relations as a case study, presenting new evidence of Saigon’s efforts to enhance political and commercial ties with Seoul. It contextualizes these efforts within the broader dynamics involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Hanoi– Pyongyang relationship, while also investigating the overlooked Cold War history of Vietnam and Korea [Đỗ Thanh Thảo Miên, 2022]. Hà Triệu Huy conducted a thorough analysis of archival data from Archives 2 of Vietnam to address a scholarly deficiency in the examination of the Saigon– Seoul economic relationship. His paper reiterated the political and economic benefits, as well as Seoul’s strategic significance in Southeast Asia, while fostering this relationship despite its decline throughout the Vietnamization period [Hà Triệu Huy, 2022, p. 37]. This study is the inaugural examination of RVN leaders’ thoughts, uncovering the regime’s aggressive diplomacy aimed at reconciling with friends for civic support and advancing the nation in a competitive struggle against Hanoi.

The Republic of Vietnam and the Philippines

Numerous experts enhanced the understanding of the American–Filipino relationship during the Cold War period. Despite the significance of this tripartite alliance to the anti-communist objectives of all three parties in Southeast Asia, Vietnam War literature does not prominently include the relationship between Saigon and Manila. The research by M. Ragos-Espinas is presumably the first study to assess the efficacy of this alliance. It offers substantial insights into the economic connections between Manila and Saigon during the conflict, highlighting Manila’s emphasis on the economic prospects in South Vietnam [Ragos-Espinas, 1997, pp. 57–68]. The recruitment of Korean, Filipino, and Thai soldiers during the Vietnam War pertains to the operations of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), which significantly contributes to South Vietnam’s strategic initiatives in rural development and offers medical assistance to war-affected individuals [Blackburn, 1994]. Ferdinand Marcos liberated Manila’s political agenda from United States influence with minimal military assistance, adeptly leveraging Washington’s cooperation while bolstering Manila’s standing in international peacebuilding efforts.

Recent research has expanded to include studies reevaluating Ferdinand Marcos’ reactions to the Vietnam conflict, seeking to demonstrate that Marcos actively engaged in political decisions to resist the dominant power of the United States. Matthew Jagel utilized PHILCAG as a case study to illustrate Manila’s assertive alignment with the Free World, concurrently enacting a “go global” policy to cultivate relationships with all nations globally [Jagel, 2013, p. 37]. Archie Resos contends that Marcos fostered a sense of regional solidarity among Southeast Asian nations as South Vietnam emerged as a political entity committed to peacebuilding in Southeast Asia [Resos, 2014, p. 89]. Clayton Riddle used Manila as an example of decolonization and democratization in the Philippines, which benefited Marcos’s presidency by receiving continuous economic and military support from the United States and simultaneously asserting greater autonomy from Washington’s regional strategies [Riddle, 1988]. It also correlates with Ben Walker’s assertions that South Vietnam is not the focal point of Manila’s foreign strategy. Nonetheless, expanding logistical support to the RVN would achieve dual purposes for Marcos: reinforcing his leadership and consolidating Manila’s standing in global affairs [Walker, 2016]. The circumstances in South Vietnam substantially impacted Manila’s degree of cooperation with the United States. Manila struggled to fully disengage from Washington’s policy, as heightened skepticism towards Marcos following the Fall of Saigon in 1975 indicated ongoing uncertainties in defense policy between Washington and Manila, despite Manila’s efforts to align with communist blocs to pursue its commercial interests during the Sino-American détente [Winger, 2022, p. 393]. It illustrates the susceptibility of Philippine foreign policy, which primarily depends on the actions of the United States and the evolving dynamics of world politics.

The Republic of Vietnam and Australia

Historians largely overlook the Saigon–Canberra relationship, focusing instead on the adverse effects of anti-war activities on Australia. Peter Edwards mentions the role of the RVN when examining Canberra’s assessment of Southeast Asian communism and insurgencies [Edwards, 2014]. However, Canberra failed to understand the circumstances of the RVN, which hindered Australia from enacting a more effective policy to support Saigon in its anti-communist efforts. Canberra’s primary focus is on implementing the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) and deterring Southeast Asian communism from Australia. David McLean emphasized the political determinants shaping Australia’s actions, highlighting the ideological disparities between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party in their pursuit of autonomy from British and American political influences in the policy-making process. It also reveals Australia’s foreign policy ambivalence and unpredictability in attaining these objectives of political independence [Mclean, 2006, pp. 64–79]. A. N. Mason-Jones posited that Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War does not inherently signify the American–Australian alliance but rather indicates a heightened awareness of Australia’s ties to the Asia–Pacific region, with the RVN serving as a suitable partner for this notion [Mason-Jones, 1994].

Becky L. Bruce identified the balance of power between the United States and Britain as a crucial factor in shaping Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War and affirming its presence in Southeast Asia. The significance of preventing communists from annexing South Vietnam was clear in its role in curbing communist expansion in Australia, aligning with the strategic objectives of the Free World alliance advocated by both London and Washington. It demonstrates that Canberra enhanced its knowledge of regionalism in Southeast Asia as a separate entity while simultaneously strengthening its links with both Britain and the United States during this period [Bruce, 2004, p. 218]. The article by Philip Derry elucidated the RVN-Australia relationship and its implications for the persistence of Australia’s military presence in South Vietnam, as well as Saigon’s proactive engagement in placating overseas dissidents and cultivating a favourable international image. Nguyễn Cao Kỳ demonstrated with finesse and adept diplomatic maneuvering that a democratic system might emerge from a military dictatorship that impeded Hanoi’s capacity to unify Vietnam under an authoritarian communist administration [Derry, 2015, p. 74].

The Republic of Vietnam and New Zealand

Like Australia, New Zealand’s participation also produced a significant volume of study in the Vietnam War studies. The rise of communism in Southeast Asia prompted New Zealand, under Keith Holyoake, to prioritize security concerns in the region. David McCraw elucidated New Zealand’s hesitance toward military deployment to South Vietnam, which Keith sought to postpone preventing New Zealand’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts. In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into existence, and New Zealand persisted in the conflict, albeit with limited capabilities, until the dissolution of the First Republic of Vietnam after the coup d’état [McCraw, 1981]. Nigel E. Thalakada and Roger Bell examined the differences between Australia and New Zealand in their responses to Washington’s call to enhance strategic presence in South Vietnam. New Zealand, however, favoured economic and educational assistance for the RVN above military involvement, although ultimately Wellington consented to exerting military influence in South

Vietnam. It underscores the significance of Southeast Asia in New Zealand’s geopolitical strategy, indicating that New Zealand did not foster a belief in the possibilities for development under a communist system [Thalakada, 2012; Bell, 2019]. Although they lacked a study of Saigon’s involvement in this camaraderie, these works enhanced New Zealand’s understanding, enabling historians to identify a significant correlation between New Zealand’s diplomatic endeavours and the advantages Saigon could derive from this alliance.

Ian McGibbon illustrates New Zealand’s commitment to logistical support for South Vietnam and the collaboration between New Zealand troops and the RVN to thwart communist defenses. As a result, Saigon collectively sought New Zealand’s assistance in the civic sector of education and economy, which was essential for its development and reconstruction initiatives [McGibbon, 2010]. David Belgrave also highlights Saigon’s diplomatic prospects, as New Zealand enhanced its relations with Southeast Asian nations to pursue peace restoration and increase its strategic presence in the region. He emphasizes the significance of Sino-American rapprochement, which prompted Wellington to reverse its strategy about ties with communist blocs and forsake South Vietnam, exemplifying New Zealand’s adaptable diplomacy [Belgrave, 2016].

Conclusion

The RVN’s presence in southern Vietnam during the Vietnam War sparked much debate among historians about the legitimacy of this regime and the United States’ financial support for Saigon in its struggle against communism. Numerous studies depicted the Saigon government as a supporter of the United States’ administration in Southeast Asia, which contributed to its relatively poor reputation. Recent archive-based research has revitalized the understanding of Saigon’s active collaboration with its partners, independent of the United States’ influence over the political landscape. Historians largely profited from the accessibility of source materials located in the United States presidential archives and the local archives of nations where the FWMF operated during the war. Some articles by Trần Nam Tiến, Liên Hằng Nguyễn, Sean Fear, and Hà Triệu Huy about RVN diplomacy show important diplomatic efforts of the RVN and show how determined and strong it was to beat the DRV through diplomatic means.

During the conflict, Many Flags provided Saigon with an opportunity to reconcile with its FWMF allies and further its nation-building and economic development initiatives. During the Many Flags and Vietnamization periods, the RVN’s diplomatic efforts, in the pursuit of democratic development, sought to address the dispute in a more democratic fashion. To avoid isolation in its pursuit of peace restoration and international support, the RVN leadership actively cultivated alliances and established communications with numerous nations. In the context of national diplomacy, Many Flags precipitated the escalation of conflict; yet numerous discussions among RVN leaders aimed at superseding this approach with diplomacy and peace negotiations remain unchronicled in contemporary Vietnam conflict literature. The endeavors of Saigon pose an intriguing subject that warrants exploration.