The system of oligarchic capitalism in Russia is inconsistent with the achievement of the goals of the special military operation

The special military operation has been going on for 19 months. At the celebration of the 78th anniversary of the Victory Day of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, the RF President noted that today there is nothing more important than the combat activities of SMO participants; national security, the future of the state and the Russian people depend on its results.

However, in the middle of 2023, amid the ongoing military actions and increasing threats to national security on the part of the Collective West and the Kiev regime, Russia faced an event that

“We take pride in the participants in the special military operation, all those fighting on the frontlines, those who deliver supplies to the front and save the wounded under fire. Your combat activities now are of paramount importance. The country’s security depends on you today as does the future of our statehood and our people ”¹.

jeopardized the achievement of the SMO goals: on June 23–24, the Wagner Group, businessman E. Prigozhin’s private military company ² , made an attempt at an armed revolt.

Many experts initially characterized this event ³ as a “stab in the back for those who hold the frontline” ⁴ ; demonstration of the “weaknesses of our system” ⁵ , “a failure of Russian statehood” ⁶ and even as “the first chord of a monstrous catastrophe” ⁷ .

However, today, two months after the revolt, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the “failure of Russian statehood” ⁸ was managed to be avoided. The acute phase of the crisis was quickly contained; authorities at all levels consolidated their unequivocal support for the head of state.

According to the results of sociological surveys conducted by federal and regional sociological centers, the attempted rebellion did not lead to negative trends in the dynamics of public support for the RF President (Tab. 1) .

• V. Volodin: “Russia’s problems and troubles have always occurred only because of betrayal, internal division and treacherousness of the elites. State Duma deputies, representing the interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation, advocate for the consolidation of forces and support President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin – our Supreme Commander-in-Chief”⁹.

• V. Matvienko: “The Federation Council – the chamber of regions – provides full support to the President – the guarantor of the Constitution – and has a clear understanding of the importance of a responsible and consolidated position of the whole society, residents and leadership of all RF constituent entities in the current situation”¹⁰.

Table 1. Dynamics of Russian President’s approval rating in April – August 2023, % of respondents

President’s approval rating according to...	Apr.	June	Aug.	Dynamics (+/-)
				<	6)
VCIOM*	77.3	75.1	73.3	-2	-2
Levada- Center**	83.0	81.0	82.0	-2	+1
VolRC RAS***	60.5	61.3	61.3	0	0

• *    1,600 respondents are interviewed in at least 80 regions of the Russian Federation. Survey method – telephone interview.

Average monthly data of VCIOM based on the results of the rounds of the monitoring conducted during the following periods:

v April 3 — April 9, April 17 - April 23, April 24 - April

30 (April):

V June 5 -June 11, June 12 - June 18, June 19 - June

25 (June);

V July 31 - August 6, August 7 - August 13 (August).

• * * Levada-Center is included in the register of foreign agents. Levada-Center surveys were conducted during the following periods:

V        April 20-26 (1,633 people);

V        June 22-28 (1,634 people);

V July 20-26 (1,629 people; the latest data at the time of writing the article).

Survey method – in-person interview at the respondent’s home.

• * ** VolRC RAS surveys were conducted in the following periods:

V March 21 - April 11 (April);

V May 16 - June 13 (June);

V July 12 - August 14 (August).

The survey covers 1,500 people aged 18 and older. Survey method – questionnaire at the respondent’s place of residence.

It is also important to note that the events of June 23–24 did not have any significant negative impact on the government’s implementation of key areas of state policy in the context of the SMO.

• 1.    The situation on the frontline has not experienced any serious changes and remains under the control of the Russian armed forces.

• 2.    Over the past two months, a number of steps have been taken to strengthen Russia’s international relations with friendly countries, primarily with the states of the African continent, as well as with North Korea, a number of Arab countries, etc.

• 3.    In the context of the SMO, ongoing economic sanctions, as well as increasing military and terrorist threats from the West and the Kiev regime, the government of the Russian Federation continues active law-making to strengthen the economic, organizational and ideological foundations of Russia’s domestic life ( Insert 1 ), which, as we noted earlier, is important not only for the present of Russia, but also for its future; in fact, it represents “the contours of an upcoming new Social Contract” ¹² .

July 10, Sergey Lavrov took part in the Sixth Round of the strategic dialogue between Russia and members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).

July 12–15, the Russian Foreign Minister paid a working visit to Indonesia and Thailand.

July 25–27, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu paid his first working visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where he held talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and also attended the parade in honor of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War.

July 27–28 , the second Russia – Africa Summit was held in Saint Petersburg, the RF President held several personal meetings with leaders of African states. According to their results, experts noted that Russia “has another powerful ally, almost the entire continent, 54 countries”¹¹.

Thus, the attempted revolt was quickly stopped thanks to the consolidated support for the President on the part of all authorities, the army and society. However, it would be a big mistake to ignore the very fact of an armed rebellion, which actually put Russia on the brink of civil war in the context of the ongoing special military operation.

“…The political crisis that had been brewing in Russia for a long time broke out in the form of an attempted coup d’etat. Fortunately, the coup was prevented, but no one says how to get out of the crisis that triggered it. It seems that there is a lack of conceptual vision of the essence of the problem, as well as scientific courage”¹³.

Insert 1

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¹⁴ The insert is a continuation of the monitoring of the most important regulatory legal acts signed by the RF President; we have been conducting this monitoring since June 2022 (the first issue of the monitoring is presented in the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). A difficult road after the Rubicon. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast , 15(3), 9–41). Starting from the current issue, the adopted normative legal acts are divided into thematic blocks concerning 1) the course of the SMO and the development of the military-industrial complex; 2) regulation of the information environment and the activities of foreign agents; 3) socio-economic support for citizens, and strengthening the country’s economy.

Continuation of Insert 1

Continuation of Insert 1

June 24, following the armed rebellion in Russia, a special meeting of the G7 countries (at the level of foreign ministers) was held, during which “an action plan was discussed in case of destabilization of the situation in Russia, as well as threats emanating from Russian nuclear arsenals in case of destabilization... Similarly, a hundred years ago, Western countries discussed the future of Russia in conditions of revolutionary chaos, and the result of this discussion was the military intervention of dozens of states, the dismemberment of the country into separate spheres of influence, British, French, American, Japanese, occupation of a number of Russian territories and their separation from the country. Now the same countries are again waiting with lust for a new weakening of Russia.

A clear understanding is needed – any internal turmoil, any anti-government rebellion, under whatever flag and pursuing whatever “just” goals, will automatically prompt our enemies to destroy Russia, deprive it of sovereignty, finally achieve the right of uncontrolled exploitation of our resources, divide Russia into many separate warring quasi-states”¹⁵.

The events that have taken place are important for an objective assessment of the state of the public administration system and the state of affairs in Russia. They allowed us to see the mistakes made in the practice of organizing the public administration system, and to be convinced of their “deadly threat to the statehood and the nation” (as the President noted).

“... any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation” ¹⁷.

According to A. Dugin, it is possible to point out a number of correct and incorrect theses in the “story of the military revolt” ¹⁸ . In particular, as the expert notes, it was right to support the President and condemn the attempted rebellion; but at the same time, its causes should be considered seriously in order to deeply and objectively understand the whole situation, draw appropriate lessons from it and prevent similar events in the future.

• 1.    It was right to support Putin in a critical situation and stand up for him.

• 2.    It was right to condemn the rebellion.

• 3.    It was right to take Prigozhin’s views seriously and note the validity of a number of his requirements and provisions.

• 4.    It was right to wish for the strengthening of the patriotic vector.

• 5.    It is right to always be on the side of the Russian people and the Russian state, trying to gather all the forces together in the name of the great Victory.

• 6.    It is right to desire more justice, honesty and sincerity in society and the state.

• 7.    It is right to condemn betrayal when there are grounds for such condemnation.

• 8.    It is right to give Lukashenko a standing ovation.

• 9.    It is right to actively participate in the creation of our common destiny.

• 10.    It is right to understand correctly that in order not to make mistakes anymore, sometimes it is necessary to make mistakes. It is human to err and Russians are no exception.

• 1.    It was wrong to rush to tear the Wagner Group to shreds, especially for those who had supported it with all their heart a little earlier.

• 2.    It was wrong to conclude that the “patriots were let loose by the authorities” and it is necessary to end this.

• 3.    It is wrong to talk to Putin in the form of an ultimatum.

• 4.    It is wrong and mean to be a liberal when your country is at war with a hostile liberal civilization.

• 5.    It is wrong to explain everything with money, clan battles and intrigues. Indeed, all this is there, but such explanations speak only about the pettiness and insignificance of their advocate themselves – the story is deeper and more complicated.

• 6.    It is wrong to be a passive observer at a critical moment in the life of the people.

And the reasons for what happened indicate, first of all, the shortcomings of the public administration system created in the previous 30 years.

Let us recall that it began to be built, in fact, back in the mid-1950s, during the period when Nikita Khrushchev was First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (1953–1964). According to experts it was then that “the party abandoned its role as the major (conceptual and ideological) force for the development of society, the moral and intellectual leader of Soviet civilization”; those events triggered internal “fermentation” of the elites and eventually led to the betrayal of national interests and the collapse of the USSR.

“After Stalin’s death, the party leadership did not dare to continue the work of his life. The Party abandoned its role as the main (conceptual and ideological) force for the development of society, the moral and intellectual leader of Soviet civilization. The party elite preferred the struggle for power and gradually reborn into a new class of “masters”, which culminated in a new civilizational and geopolitical catastrophe in 1991...

The Soviet system and economy were so stable that unjustified or destructive actions of the supreme power could not immediately cause a catastrophe... However, Khrushchev did the main thing: his de-Stalinization and “perestroika-1” dealt a fatal blow to the ideological foundations of Soviet civilization. The destruction processes were launched and led to the 1991 disaster”¹⁹.

After the collapse of the USSR, the elites who seized power created a system of oligarchic capitalism (or “crony capitalism”, “elite and criminal capitalism”, as some experts call it), actually bringing the country to the “edge of an abyss” by the end of the 1990s. According to experts, “the ruling class, carrying out the liberalbourgeois reforms of the 1990s, was guided not by the desire for happiness for all Russians, but completely different motives... the largest part of the reformers simply used liberal-market concepts for their own selfish purposes... ” ²⁰

“One of the main mottos of Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term ²¹ was “equidistance of oligarchs”, or rather “equidistant position of all market entities from the authorities”, as he stated on February 28, 2000 at a meeting with proxies.

The President was able to make the system manageable “in manual mode”. At least, it was no longer possible to carry out reforms similar to the 1995 “collateral auctions” reform ²² , when major

Vladimir Putin: “ Keeping all the players on the market at an equal distance from the authorities, on the one hand, and guaranteeing property rights, on the other, is a cornerstone of the political and economic spheres”²³.

national corporations, industrial enterprises, etc. were “handed over” for a song to the oligarchs for their personal use. As a result, “during this period, big business lost control over top officials (as it used to have in the 1990s)” ²⁴ .

In April 1994, 34% of Russians answered “I approve” to the question “Do you approve or disapprove of how Boris Yeltsin is coping with the duties of the President of Russia?”

By November 1999, their share decreased to 8% (the share of negative assessments increased from 66% to 92%, respectively) ²⁵.

This was a priority task for domestic policy, since without laying the appropriate groundwork it was impossible to implement a further nationally and socially oriented political course; in fact, a course to regain the public’s trust that the government had lost in the 1990s.

However, even after taking state institutions under “hands-on management” and receiving a “credit of trust” from the population for this (as evidenced by the fact that Vladimir Putin was reelected as head of state four times), the oligarchic-clan principle of the public administration system has not disappeared and, in fact, remains to this day.

Already in 2012, experts at Minchenko Consulting described the public administration system in Russia as “a conglomerate of clans and groups that compete with each other for resources... there are a number of structural contradictions within Putin’s “big government”.. . moreover, the ruling elite, in addition to solving its own management tasks, is focused on ensuring its stability over a long period of time... ” ²⁶ (Fig. 1).

By and large, this interpretation of the situation by experts remains in 2023 as well (although with more complex schemes of intra-elite interactions) (Fig. 2) : “In the real world, every representative of the elite has a large number of business lines, connections, interests, motives and goals... A large number of junior partners, allies, friends and enemies create intricate and complex configurations when a new support unit is formed for each serious decision or project” ²⁷ . It is extremely difficult, almost impossible to reconcile these intra-elite “blocks” and “configurations”, even in a system controlled by the President in “manual mode”; and therefore, as experts note, this system is occasionally shaken by “elite and near-elite conflicts”.

Thus, “underhand games” and the struggle of clan interests within the elites have always been there and still remain. And today, in the conditions of the SMO, they are becoming more vivid, more visible, since their consequences lead to a direct threat to national security, which is also felt by the broad strata of the population.

“ During the decades that Putin has been in power, this is obviously not the first conflict in elite circles or near them. There are too many people, too many conflicting interests. The President is used to being the arbiter in such disputes... The unprecedented nature of the current conflict lies in the degree of its publicity. One could speculate about the former ones. Here everything was stated with military directness… At the top, they understand perfectly well that it is difficult to reconcile individual people within the elite... it is much easier to marginalize an ambitious official or businessman than a paramilitary structure, which the government uses as an important tool – and is going to use further ”²⁸.

“The main part of the oligarchy was dissatisfied with these actions of government officials [SMO], as it suffered from the economic sanctions imposed by the West. Someone demonstrated their dissatisfaction be fleeing Russia and withdrawing their capital from the country. And someone began to look for an opportunity to remove those government officials, and first of all President Vladimir Putin, from power. It was this group that played on the political ambitions of Evgenii Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group ”²⁹.

Figure 1. Members of the “Politburo 2.0” in 2012

Source: Vladimir Putin’s Big Government and Politburo 2.0: Minchenko Consulting report. August 2012. Available at:

Figure 2. Members of the “Politburo 2.0” in 2023

Source: Russian elites a year after the start of the SMO: Minchenko Consulting report. May 2023. Available at:

For example, the fact that this was one of the main causes of the crisis of statehood, expressed in the June 24 revolt ³⁰ is proved by the goals of the so-called “March of Justice”, voiced by E. Prigozhin himself, and the assessments of independent experts indicating that the leader of the Wagner Group is not an independent figure, but only representing the interests of certain “patrons” .

The rapid relief of the crisis can be called a kind of “draw” in the battle of clans, while in the context of the common goals of national security and the struggle for sovereignty that Russia continues to pursue during the SMO, this is a clear “loss” for the President, for the public administration system and ultimately for the country as a whole, since the crisis itself demonstrated (to foreign countries, too) the

Nezavisimaya gazeta (editorial): “A month after the revolt, it is obvious that Prigozhin survived thanks to his connections in the highest echelons of power . Most likely, these connections, these people were and remain dissatisfied with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Apparently, they used Prigozhin for an unprecedented attack on the two key figures – leaders of the Russian Armed Forces... It can be argued that Prigozhin, in addition to his own commercial interests, fought for someone else’s interests in a different time perspective ”³¹.

P. Skorobogaty: “It must be understood that Prigozhin is certainly not an independent figure... since his very vigorous activity in Saint Petersburg, he certainly had partners, companions, and curators in various state authorities of the Russian Federation, including the Presidential Administration . And later, when he started a very large business in Africa, which concerned not only the private military company (the campaign associated with Prigozhin was engaged in politics there, lobbying for the interests of big business, etc.; a campaign in which a large number of those in power and those who make decisions were involved). And, of course, after he joined the SMO, these connections did not go away ... he has his own clear role; in this sense, he has connections with many figures ”³².

vulnerability of the system of oligarchic capitalism managed via “hands-on” approach.

“The damage that Evgenii Prigozhin inflicted on the Russian state with his psychopathic craving for power is also obvious. And it’s not just about the dead pilots and the loss of unique equipment.

First, it will be necessary to restore the country’s reputation abroad, both in the West and in friendly countries, where a legitimate question has arisen about the controllability of internal processes in Russia and the potential of its armed forces...

Second, difficulties may arise with our foreign operations and private military companies as their effective tool... How can we now trust people with weapons who have arrived from abroad, especially the authorities in those regions where coups and uprisings happen with enviable regularity?”³³

One of the leading Russian sociologists Zh.T. Toshchenko34 in his article “Social contract as a noumenon: The experience of sociological understanding”35 conducted an in-depth analysis of historical aspects related to the formation of the concept of Social Contract. Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that the entire history of humankind (including the Russian experience) shows that the inability of the authorities to adjust their policies in accordance with the key demands of society or a purely formal approach of the state to reach agreement with the majority of the population of the country ultimately leads to disastrous consequences for the statehood.

We find it necessary to emphasize the author’s idea that “unity at the moral level is especially important”, “moral unity... is based on the fundamental value orientations of the main social forces, the coordination of which is the function of the state ”.

“The Social Contract involves ensuring harmony and balance of interests not only between the whole people and the government, but also between the social communities and groups within society that make up this people; in other words, ensuring that the diversity of interests of social communities and groups is taken into account – and not only at the political, economic and social levels. It is especially important to agree on the moral level, since it is the most fundamental level, ensuring the true essence and nature of the Social Contract. Moral unity arises on the basis of observing and maintaining trusting relationships, eliminating any attempts at confrontation, rivalry, prejudice, is built on the basis of fundamental value orientations of the main social forces, the coordination of which is largely the responsibility of the state authorities ”³⁶.

This is what underlies the Social Contract, in which the main thing is not “the actual or formal participation in addressing economic, social and political issues”, but “the meaning universally recognized by all participants, for the sake of which the existence of the state is possible ” ³⁷ .

We should say that topic of Social Contract attracts the attention of scientists more and more often ³⁸ . In general, worldwide, as RAS Corresponding Member V.E. Dementiev points out, referring to Google Academy data ³⁹ , while during the period from 2001 to 2020, about 16 thousand materials appeared on the Internet every five years on issues related to the Social Contract, “then starting from 2021, in just two and a half years, there have been 15,800 such publications” ⁴⁰ . And this is no coincidence, because, on the one hand, “the beginning of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine is a turning point in Russian history” ⁴¹ ; “the situation itself causes an objective need to formulate the task of forming a new Social Contract after the completion of the SMO” ⁴² . On the other hand, thanks to the SMO, the whole world came into motion, many countries (China, Brazil, India, Iran, the countries of the African continent, etc.) began an active struggle to strengthen their national sovereignty against the hegemony of the United States and the countries of the Collective West.

There has already been an experience of a formal approach to the creation of a Social Contract in modern Russian history (after the collapse of the USSR and the change of the social system). It was the “Agreement on Public Consent” signed on April 28, 1994 by the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the upper house of Parliament V.F. Shumeyko, Chairman of the lower house of Parliament I.P. Rybkin, as well as a number of representatives of authorities, religious denominations, political parties and social movements43.

The writer, historian and lawyer E.M. Strigin noted in one of his books: “Why not remember about consent, when all the power is in your hands, you can talk about peace... just before the signing of the agreement in April 1994, V. Zorkin stated: “One of the most dangerous features of the political situation in today’s Russia is the split of the leading elite strata of society into warring ideological groups and political clans ”⁴⁴.

According to experts, the authorities remembered about public consent after the events of “Black October 1993” ⁴⁵ and the adoption of a new Constitution on December 12, 1993 (which, as we know, imposed a ban on official ideology in Russia).

The agreement was designed for two years; it stated, in particular, that its participants “assure that they will take all necessary measures to establish stability in the country, without which it is impossible to get out of the economic crisis” ⁴⁶ .

The priority tasks that the Government of the Russian Federation undertook to solve already in 1994 , were as follows:

V “reduce the level of inflation and control it”,

V “create prerequisites for economic recovery”;

V “ensure the elimination of budget arrears in the payment of wages”;

V “pursue an active social policy aimed at stabilizing and subsequently improving the standard of living, adapting the able-bodied population to new conditions, targeted protection of its most vulnerable strata from the negative manifestations of transitional processes, reducing the level of income differentiation, implementing the principles of social partnership”;

V “develop a federal program to promote employment and other social programs and organize their implementation” ⁴⁷ .

However, as practice has shown, “many agreed to reconciliation, but not all” ⁴⁸ ; “some of the political forces simply refused to join it” ⁴⁹ . In particular, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation G. Zyuganov noted that it was “a contract not of society, but of officials” ⁵⁰ .

“At the ceremony of signing the Agreement on Public Consent, Zyuganov, in accordance with the decisions of the faction, defiantly refused to sign the document, but conveyed the demands of the party and the faction to the government in writing. The agreement was also not signed by Aman Tuleyev, Grigory Yavlinsky and Mikhail Lapshin, the leaders of the irreconcilable opposition Viktor Anpilov and Viktor Tyulkin… The absence of the signature of Zyuganov, the main opposition leader, practically disavowed the document and made it meaningless for the authorities ”⁵¹

In addition, in the end, the promises of the authorities were never fulfilled or were formally fulfilled, as well as the very approach to creating a Social Contract in the country.

• 1.    For example, the population with monetary incomes below the subsistence level in 1994, compared with 1993, decreased by 10 percentage points (from 32 to 22%), but in 1995 it increased again (by 3 percentage points, to 25%), and by 1999 it increased by 5 percentage points (up to 30%; Tab. 2 ).

• 2.    The real disposable income of the population since the adoption of the Agreement on Public Consent (1994) by 1999 decreased by 27% (from 113 to 86%). The R/P 10% ratio has not actually changed (14–15 times).

• 3.    The federal program for the promotion of employment of the population of the Russian

  Federation for 1994 has indeed been developed ⁵² , but, as statistics show, the share of unemployed citizens in Russia continued to grow (from 8% in 1994 to 13% in 1999), the number of people employed in the economy decreased (from 69 to 64%).

The reaction of society to the formal approach of the authorities to the solution of such an acute issue as the achievement of public consent was, in fact, quite predictable: in 1995 and 1999 (that is, before the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidential terms and before the creation of the United Russia party on December 1, 2001) it was the RF Communist Party (the party that had not supported the 1994 Agreement on Public Consent) that received the majority of votes in the election to the RF State Duma (in 1995 – 22.3%, in 1999 – 24.3%; Tab. 3 ).

Table 2. Dynamics of indicators of the standard of living (1992–1999)

Indicator	Year								Dynamics (+ / -)
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	1999 to 1994
Population with incomes below the subsistence level, million people	49.7	46.9	33.3	36.6	32.7	30.7	34.3	43.8	+11
Population with incomes below the subsistence minimum, % of total population	33.5	31.5	22.4	24.7	22.1	20.8	23.4	29.9	+8
People’s real disposable income, % compared to the previous year	52.5	116.4	112.9	84.9	100.1	105.3	83.7	85.8	-27
R/P 10% ratio, times	8.0	11.2	15.1	13.5	13.0	13.5	13.8	13.9	-1
Unemployment rate, % of economically active population	5.2	5.9	8.1	9.5	9.7	11.8	12.9	13.4	+5
Number of people employed in the economy, million people	72.1	70.9	68.5	67.1	66.0	64.6	63.6	64.0	-5

Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook – 2000. Available at:

Table 3. Top three parties that obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995–2003 parliamentary elections

Party	Dec. 17, 1995		Партия	Dec. 19, 1999		Партия	Dec. 7, 2003
	%	abs. people		%	abs. people		%	abs. people
KPRF	22.30	15432963	KPRF	24,29	16196024	United Russia	37.56	22776294
LDPR	11.18	7737431	Yedinstvo	23,32	15549182	KPRF	12.61	7647820
Nash dom – Rossiya	10.13	7009291	Otechestvo – Vsya Rossiya	13,33	8886753	LDPR	11.45	6944322

Source: official website of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. Available at:

From the experience of the adoption and implementation of the 1994 Agreement on Public Consent it can be concluded that public statements (whatever form they may have) should, first, be coordinated not just with the majority, but with those participants in the political process who express the opinion of the majority of the population; second, they should not just be declared, but also supported by actual deeds, the results of which can be seen by the public.

However, it looks like after almost 20 years the “Politburo 2.0” (the new management team, the Presidential Administration, which implemented the May 2012 decrees and the 2018 national projects) has not learned this lesson. In previous articles, we have repeatedly cited expert opinions on this issue ⁵³ .

As statistics show, many of the key indicators identified in the May 2012 decrees ⁵⁴ (including the growth of real wages, life expectancy, etc.), have not been achieved on time and, by and large, remain not achieved at the present time ( Tab. 4 ).

Table 4. Summary of the achievement of targets, established by the May decrees of the President of the Russian Federation in 2012

“Increasing the share of high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries in GDP by 2018 in 1.3 times compared to the level of 2011” Share of high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries in GDP of the Russian Federation, % Data Deviation (+/-), times 2011 2018 2022 2018 target 2018 to 2011 fact 2022 to 2011 fact 19.6 21.3 22.6 +1.3 +1.1 +1.2 “Creating and upgrading 25 million high-performance jobs by 2020” Number of high-performance jobs in Russia as a whole, thousand units Data Deviation (+/-), thousand units 2013 2020 2022 2020 target 2020 to 2013 fact 2022 to 2013 fact 17492.8 21 946.6 22 862.4 +7507 +4454 +5369 “1.4 – 1.5-fold increase in real wages in by 2018” Real wages of employees of organizations, rubles, at comparable prices for 2022 Data Deviation (+/-), times 2011 2018 2022 2018 target 2018 to 2011 fact 2022 to 2011 fact 49294.8 57325.6 65338.0 +1.5 +1.2 +1.3 “Raising domestic research and development expenditures to 1.77 percent of GDP by 2015” Domestic research and development expenditures, % of GDP Data Deviation (+/-), p.p. 2011 2015 2021 2015 target 2015 to 2011 fact 2021 to 2011 fact 1.02 1.1 1.0 +1.77 +0.08 -0.02 “Ensure an increase in life expectancy in the Russian Federation up to 74 years by 2018” Life expectancy, years Data Deviation (+/-), years 2011 2018 2022 2018 target 2018 fact 2022 fact 69.83 72.91 72.73 +5.17 +3.08 +2.90 Source: Federal State Statistics Service. Available at:

53 See, for example:

1. Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2018). “Russian Federation – a welfare state?”: Assessing the results of 25 years of implementation of Article 7 of the Russian Constitution. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast , 11(6), p. 20.

2. Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2019). “Intellectual feebleness” of the ruling elites and the “deep people” of the “long state”. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast , 12(2), 9–35.

3. Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. Vote of confidence for the President is confirmed. Achievement of socio-economic development goals before 2024–2030 is uncertain. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast , 13(4), 9–37.

54 See, for example:

Presidential Decree 596, dated May 7, 2012 “On long-term state economic policy”;

Presidential Decree 597, dated May 7, 2012 “On measures to implement the state social policy”;

Presidential Decree 599, dated May 7, 2012 “On measures to implement state policy in the field of education and science”.

Moreover, according to statistics, the same applies to the prospects for their implementation, taking into account the adjustments in the Presidential decrees of May 7, 2018 ⁵⁵ and July 21, 2020 ⁵⁶ ( Tab. 5 ).

These facts show that the specific instructions of the head of state have not been carried out for years or were carried out inefficiently, and according to some experts, they were simply “sabotaged” ⁵⁷ by the ruling elite, led by the “Politburo 2.0”.

A similar situation took place with regard to the release of a single history textbook. Let us recall that the President gave the instruction to prepare it on February 19, 2013, noting the importance of a “structured view” of the younger generation about Russia’s past, a “unified concept” and a “unified logic” of studying Russian history in order to avoid “internal contradictions” and “double interpretations”.

“…Our children’s heads are filled with a mishmash of information obtained from a textbook, TV, the Internet, and there is no structured idea about the past of our Homeland, including the history of the peoples inhabiting it...

It seems to me that the system for preventing the interpretations that distort the historical past has not yet been sufficiently built. Perhaps I agree that a single textbook on Russian history will solve this problem... Perhaps we should think about introducing common history textbooks for Russian secondary schools, designed for different ages but built into a single concept and following a single logic of continuous Russian history, the relations between all its stages and respect towards all the episodes of our past... ”⁵⁸

Table 5. Brief information on achieving the targets set by Presidential Decree 474, dated July 21, 2020 “On the national development goals of the Russian Federation for the period through to 2030”

National development goal “Increasing life expectancy to 78 years” Life expectancy, years Data Deviation (+/-) 2018 (fact) 2022 (fact)* 2030 (target) 2030 to 2018 target 2022 to 2018 fact 72.91 72.73 78.0 +5.09 -0.18 * Without taking into account statistics for the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), Zaporozhye and Kherson oblasts. National development goal “Halving the poverty rate compared to the indicator of 2017” Number of people with monetary incomes below the poverty line (subsistence level) Data Deviation (+/-) 2017 (fact) 2022 (fact)* 2030 (target) 2030 to 2017 target 2022 to 2017 fact million people 18.9 14.3 9.5 -9.5 -4.6 % of total population 12.9 9.8 6.5 -6.5 -3.1 * Without taking into account statistics for the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), Zaporozhye and Kherson oblasts. Source: Federal State Statistics Service. Available at:

55 On national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024: Presidential Decree 204, dated May 7, 2018.

56 On the national development goals of the Russian Federation for the period through to 2030: Presidential Decree 474, dated July 21, 2020.

57 See, for example:

1. Podosenov S. Governors that are sabotaging the May presidential decrees will be dismissed. Available at: https:// news/567314

2. ONF leaders accused local officials of sabotaging presidential decrees. Available at: https://

3. Chaldey A. Why are national projects stalling? Available at:

58 Vladimir Putin’s speech at the meeting of the Council on Interethnic Relations, February 19, 2013. Available at:

However, as experts note, “the order was not fulfilled then: discussions within the professional community impeded the process” ⁵⁹ . The textbook for grades 10–11 was presented only 10 years later, on August 7, 2023; in the conditions of the special military operation that has been carried out for a year and a half.

That is, even in the context when, for many years preceding the SMO it was necessary to protect the historical memory and education of the younger generations of Russians, the President, apparently, failed to exert a decisive influence on the liberal top of the ruling elites in the implementation of such a specific, but very important tool as the preparation of a unified textbook on the history of Russia. It was possible to do this only during the special military operation that had already begun.

It should also be noted that the Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that “the Russian Federation is a social state” (Article 7), in which “everyone is equal before the law and the court” (Article 19). The Federal Law “On combating corruption” enshrines the principle of “inevitability of responsibility for committing corruption offenses”60. The Presidential Decree “On the national development goals of the Russian Federation for the period through to 2030” sets the goal of “reducing the poverty level by half compared to the indicator of 2017”61. And the decree “On the approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”62, signed by the President relatively recently (already in the conditions of the SMO), points out that justice is one of the “traditional values” and “moral guidelines that form the worldview of Russian citizens” (pp. 4–5), which the state “considers as the basis of Russian society” (p. 7).

Nevertheless, sociological research we conducted in the monitoring mode clearly shows that:

V for many years, from 44 to 50% of the population subjectively classify themselves as “poor and extremely poor” ( Fig. 3 ); moreover, from 2013 to the present, the proportion of the “poor and extremely poor” exceeds the proportion of those who classify themselves as “middle-income” people (as of February – August 2023 – 44 and 42%, respectively);

Figure 3. Distribution of answers to the question “Which category do you belong to, in your opinion?”, % of respondents*

* Data are given for each five-year period over the entire duration of the survey (1998–2023)

Source: VolRC RAS data.

V over the past 8 years (2015—2023), more than 50% of Russians have noted that “modern Russian society is arranged unfairly”, and during this period their share has increased from 51 to 55% ( Fig. 4 );

Figure 4. Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think modern Russian society as a whole is arranged fairly or unfairly?”, % of respondents*

2015   2016   2018   2019   2020   2021   2022 Feb.-Aug.

Fairly                          Unfairly

Difficult to answer

* The question has been asked since 2015. The average annual data are presented.

Source: VolRC RAS data.

V over the past 11 years (from 2012 to 2023), the share of people who believe that the level of corruption in Russia is growing has not actually changed (in 2012 – 18%, in 2023 – 16%; Fig. 5 ). The share of Russians who note a decrease in the relevance of the problem of corruption in the country, as well as 11 years ago, does not exceed 10%.

Figure 5. Distribution of answers to the question “How, in your opinion, has the level of corruption in our country changed over the past year?”, % of respondents*

35	31.6	31.1	30.8
30
25	18.1	22.1	15.7
20
15	8.9
10		5.1	7.5
5			-- ▲
0
	2012	2016	2023
Increased		Didn't change	Decreased

* Surveys were conducted in 2012, 2016 and 2023. Source: VolRC RAS data.

These facts demonstrate the importance of the role of the “Politburo 2.0” in the implementation of the informal essence of the Social Contract, the assessment of which cannot be reduced to citizens’ attitude toward the work of the RF President alone, but requires the achievement of public consent in many aspects:

V ensuring a socially fair organization of the state and society;

V subjective perception of the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life;

V attitude toward the entire system of public administration, or rather, toward the worldview and values that guide its representatives – the ruling elites of the country.

Society remains dissatisfied with the dynamics of solving the key issues underlying the Social Contract, such as “the requirement for a new ideology”, “the requirement to define the national economic system”, “the requirement to de-bureau-cratize the economy”, “combating extreme forms of inequality” ⁶³ . As for the nonobservance of human rights and freedoms, “which are usually fixed in the Constitution of the country and other official legal documents”, this leads, as a rule, to the fact that such a situation “is used by destructive forces to their own benefit” ⁶⁴ . This is exactly what Russia actually faced on June 24, 2023.

Of course, it should be borne in mind that as the needs are fulfilled, the level of claims of the population also increases. Experts say that “in Russia many consider themselves financially deprived and do not notice that the standard of consumption has been established at quite a high level among urban residents... Many (not all, but many) have actually raised the bar for life requirements so much that it is very difficult to please them”65. That is why dynamic changes are so important in solving the problems of reducing inequality, raising the standard of living and improving quality of life, etc. Without positive and stable dynamics between society and the state that is felt by a wide segment of the population, a vacuum is created that can only be overcome under extreme, forced force majeure circumstances (for example, an unprecedented increase in threats to national security). But this is only a temporary “tightening of knots” rather than compliance with the Social Contract.

The June 24 revolt is not the first and, most likely, not the last manifestation of the system-wide errors committed in creating the system of public administration over the 30 years preceding the SMO. In fact, the system of public administration (and the country as a whole) faced this in 1917, in 1991, in 1993, and almost always it led to extremely serious consequences – to the crisis of statehood and the “trauma” of society.

Spontaneous and/or disordered development of trauma society is directly related to the activities of actors, i.e. organizations and persons responsible for the condition of public administration and methods used to solve strategic problems of an economic and social nature. However, an analysis of the so-called economic elite and its activities shows that it is concerned primarily with its own clan and caste interests ”⁶⁷.

“The cardinal nature of the changes that took place in Soviet/Russian society during the years of perestroika, and then in the 1991–2000s, led to the emergence and consolidation of new traumatic features (characteristics) of public consciousness... First of all, there was disorientation and disorganization of public consciousness... of particular importance... was its traumatization expressed in a split, bifurcation, inconsistency and conflict of development ”⁶⁶.

For example, a number of experts similarly assessed the actions of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to raise the key rate to 12% (August 15, 2023 ⁶⁸ ; moreover, “with the possibility of an additional increase in case of increased pro-inflationary risks” ⁶⁹ .

They called this decision nothing less than “sabotage”70, “criminal act”71, “a sure way, in two steps, to plunge the economy into a state of clinical death”72, “a revolt of the elite” and “a special operation against the ruble, which was supervised from the outside”73.

State Duma deputy O. Dmitrieva described the actions of the Bank of Russia as an “extremely harmful measure”, adding that “the current leadership of the Russian Central Bank is acting in new conditions according to old American recipes” ⁷⁴ . And the head of the Duma faction “Jus Russia – For the Truth” S. Mironov called the Central Bank itself “the largest foreign agent in the Russian Federation” ⁷⁵ .

Moreover, it is important to note what analysts have been saying for years: “The leadership of the Central Bank of Russia is engaged in subversive work inside the country” ⁷⁶ and its “pests are consulting with their “senior comrades from the IMF who really want to replace Putin... for a person that suites their interests more, and therefore are consistently “playing dirty tricks” on our population, which, due to rising inflation and a reduction in income, will arrange a “Maidan” in our country” ⁷⁷ .

Judging by the regularity of such “elite riots”, perhaps, we can give only one answer to the question of how frequently Russia will be stepping on the same rake: in the end, everything rests on the question of what kind of state we are building; on questions of ideology.

Without a clear understanding, and most importantly, acceptance of ideological, value changes that occur against the background of the SMO in Russian society, culture and, in theory, should occur in the ruling elites of the country, it seems extremely difficult to promote further movement toward the formation of the contours of a new Social Contract. Rather, on the contrary, there is an increasing risk of new internal crises, which are unacceptable neither in the conditions of the SMO, nor in the run-up to the presidential election.

And if an armed rebellion turned out to be permissible in principle, even in the conditions of the AFU counteroffensive continuing to gain momentum, it means that it is most likely not possible to count on any significant, qualitative changes in the worldview within the “old” Russian elites... And the essence of the current worldview (at least for a significant part of elite circles) is convincingly shown by numerous expert assessments – the elites’ worldview is comprador, dependent on the West, and uninterested in strengthening the sovereignty of the Russian Federation ( Insert 2 ).

“The most odious representatives of the proWestern social elite emigrated from Russia after the start of the SMO. But the people defending the interests of the oligarchs remained in the civil service, in the departments, in the editorial offices of TV and radio studios, at computers ”⁷⁸.

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It is no coincidence that many experts note that “the current situation in Russia is similar to the situation in the mid-1930s in the USSR”83; thus, the popularity of the personality of Joseph Stalin has been growing for several years in almost all segments of the population, including among young people (for the period from 2005 to 2021 – by 39 percentage points, from 11 to 50%), people with higher education (by 17 percentage points, from 27 to 44%) and people with a high level of welfare (by 32 percentage points, from 15 to 47%; Tab. 6).

Table 6. Dynamics of the share of people supporting the installation of the monument to Joseph Stalin, in various socio-demographic groups, % of respondents

Population group 2005 2010 2015 2021 Dynamics (+/-), 2021 to 2005 Age 18–24 years old 11 12 28 50 +39 25–39 years old 17 26 33 45 +28 40–54 years old 33 20 37 46 +13 55 years old and older 44 36 42 52 +8 Education Below secondary 40 30 43 59 +19 Secondary 23 25 31 52 +29 Secondary professional 25 24 39 49 +24 Higher 27 17 32 44 +17 Financial situation We have barely enough money to buy food 35 27 45 56 +21 We have enough money to buy clothes 24 24 38 46 +22 We have enough money to buy durable goods 15 18 30 47 +32 Total according to the results of the survey Positively 29 25 36 48 +19 I don’t care 28 28 29 29 +1 Negatively 37 36 25 20 -17 I find it difficult to answer 6 12 10 3 -3 * The wording of the question: “How would you react to the fact that a monument to Stalin were erected on the next anniversary of the Victory?”. The survey was conducted on a representative all-Russian sample of urban and rural population of 1,620 people aged 18 years and older in 137 localities, 50 RF constituent entities. The survey method is a personal interview at the respondents’ home. Source: Stalin Center and Stalin Monument. Press release of Levada-Center*. Available at:

The authors of this study commented on the results of the survey that the growth in a positive attitude toward Stalin is also an idea of a “strong

“What is a request for Stalin today? First of all, this is a request for social justice , for “the thief to be in prison”. In addition to social justice, this is a request for sovereign greatness , so that no one tells us what kind of juvenile justice we should have, how we should raise children, and Western society, which is flooded with the pus of vice, does not teach us how to behave. This is the second thing besides social justice. And finally, for many people, this is such a revenge in general terms, a revenge for 30 years of our losses in the international arena, a revenge in the sense of a socio-psychological feeling”⁸⁴.

hand”; not for everyone, but for those who steal, including oligarchs and ministers.

And, perhaps, according to most experts, this is the main lesson that should be learned (first of all by the President) from this situation: the extremely liberal ruling elite creates conditions under which specific instructions of the head of state are not implemented, as well as legislative norms of the Basic Law – the Constitution, supported by the majority of the country’s population. This means that the elite, in fact, does not intend to fulfil the Social Contract; it does not want or cannot comply with it.

And such a system of oligarchic capitalism in Russia contradicts the achievement of SMO goals and sooner or later “cracks”, and, as real practice has shown, it can “crack” in various ways, up to an armed rebellion.

“There is an ongoing process of changing attitudes toward repression. More and more people over the past 10–15 years say that these were isolated cases, against people who deserved it, against the top, rather than mass repressions. Stalin is “good” in the mirror understanding of today: today the president and the elite do whatever they want. People say: there was no such corruption under Stalin, the top did not go on a vacation to the Maldives, they did not have houses with rooms full of money. This idea is also about a strong hand, an iron fist. People say: a strong hand is not for everyone, it’s for the top. Today, a strong hand is needed, again, not for everyone, repression is needed against those who steal: oligarchs, ministers. The same views are carried over to that period”⁸⁵.

“The war is being waged not only in Ukraine... this is only one of the frontlines and, perhaps, not even the most important one, the most important one is here, inside Russia. Taking this into account, we must be prepared that in this sense, “blows and answers will alternate more and more often”⁸⁶.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 7, paragraph 1: “The Russian Federation is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions that ensure a decent life and free human development”.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 19, paragraph 1: “Everyone is equal before the law and the court” .

“According to a separate quota for military personnel and children of combatants in Ukraine, more than 800 people have been admitted to Saint Petersburg universities. In each educational program, 10 percent of the total number of budget places were allocated for them... what will Russia be like in 10–15 years?

Talk about liberals sitting in government offices will be a thing of the past. These offices will be occupied by those who are now fighting for the future of our country on the battlefield. They will become deputies at the federal and regional levels and be employed in ministries and departments, in district, regional and republican administrations.

Ten percent of the total number of state-funded places at universities is quite enough to form a new elite. This elite will be very patriotic, adhere to common religious values, and it will determine the fate of Russia... In this new country, those who are called relocants today will then feel very uncomfortable”87.

A number of experts pin their hopes on positive changes in the country in 10–15 years. However, to put it mildly, this is a long time, during which the public administration system will certainly have to face more than one test of strength. And so that another crisis of statehood does not happen, the target indicators contained in laws, decrees, strategies and other regulatory documents must really be fulfilled. Otherwise, the new Social Contract will not be fulfilled and there will be no public consent.

And for this, a new Social Contract (the need for which, by and large, is already felt now, but the need for which, of course, will arise after the end of the SMO) must have not only clearly stated formal “points” (criteria) that meet the needs of the majority of the population, but also ideological, organizational, legal, personnel mechanisms for their self-defense against an inevitable threat of external ideological influence or internal greed of individual representatives of the ruling elites.