The transformation of the Norwegian foreign policy strategy in the formation of the bipolar world (after the war)

In the terms of the increasing confrontation between the East and West, the evolution of the role and place in the system of the Arctic geopolitical interests and the foreign policy of the USSR and the USA, Norway faces the need to change the course of its foreign policy in the first years after World War II. Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, in his address to the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) June 19, 1945 stated that the policy of the neutrality can not longer be safe for the country for the various reasons. First, is the experience of the World War II proved that Norway needed to strengthen the defense in the air and at sea (as it was with the air and sea, it was conquered by Nazi troops), but their efforts to create a new defense system of the country can not be [13, 24-27]. Second, an important strategic position in Norway has led to its vulnerability, so its neutrality would not be considered the warring powers in the new possible military conflict. As for cooperation with the Scandinavian countries, it is possible in the social, cultural and economic spheres, but not security. Continued speech of T. Lee received in the inaugural government statement of Einar Gerhardsen (where T. Lee was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs) to the Storting on June 28, 1945. It said that the purpose of the Norwegian foreign policy is active participation in the UN and in continuing cooperation with allies and the northern neighbors [13, p. 37].

Due to the fact that in the early postwar years, the economic recovery has become the most urgent problem for Norway, she resumes the socio-economic cooperation with its Nordic neighbors. Such cooperation was initiated in May 1945, when the leaders of the Social -Democratic movement in Norway, Sweden and Denmark met in Stockholm and decided to recommend to their parties and trade unions to resume cooperation in the economic, cultural and social spheres, and to consider the possibility of the creating a customs union [4]. But the inability to stay away from the safety review leads to the fact that for 13 and 14 July 1945 at a meeting of the Committee for Cooperation of the labor movement in Stockholm began discussing foreign policy strategy of the Scandinavian countries. The Swedish delegation pointed out that the northern countries can not and do not want to adhere to the policy of isolation and should join the universal, global international organizations (UN), but with certain reservations. Under the latter implying that northern countries will not provide troops to any military action outside its region [5]. They also proposed that within an international organization may be based, and regional - Northern League defensive. But at that time the Norwegian government was of the view that the Nordic countries should build friendly relations with the western and eastern states and be a sort of "bridge" between the East and West in order to maintain harmony in the international arena and to prevent the World War II [5]. On May 2, 1945 at the plenary session of the VIII Conference of the United Nations, T. Lee said: "... the approaching victory was possible only thanks to the sincere cooperation and understanding of the great powers, and ... necessary to the future peace and future security rested on the same foundation" [1, p. 259-261].

Officially, "the policy of building bridges" was proclaimed the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Lee November 6, 1945. It was the fact that Norway will not join any military and political blocs will not act before the great powers proposed to create international organizations and participation in the UN in solving the problems of the collective security. The most concise characterization of the Norwegian policy of "building bridges" was of the U.S. ambassador to Norway Wayne Cole: "1. Pro-British, American. 2. Pro-Soviet, how it is possible. 3. Prounited nations how it should" [6, p. 121]. The main content of the Norwegian policy of the "building bridges" in the early postwar years was that as little as possible to declare their position on matters of the serious disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western great powers. The policy of "building bridges" in the early postwar years was that as little as possible to declare their position on matters of the serious disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western great powers. It is also clear that foreign policy was designed to meet a wide variety of the foreign Inters community groups - supporters of the pro-Western supporters of the cooperation with the USSR apologists "Scandinavian integration" and neutralists. Despite the presence of the positive principles in the grounds of the policy, its practical implementation "bridging" was largely passive course.

Thus, in the early postwar years, Norway tried in its foreign policy is not to be adjacent to any of the parties to adhere to non provocative behavior, first of all, the Soviet Union. "Bridges" were built [3, p. 193]. This was due to the fact that the Soviet Union and the Western great powers regarded as Norway’s pro-Western country and understand that in the event of armed conflict it, anyway, will join the Anglo-American group. It was only a matter of time before Norway clearly show its instance and refuse to "sit on two chairs” [1, p. 259-261].

In the first public political statement of Halvard Lange made in February 1946 after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway clearly emphasized the elected position nonalignment: "As a loyal member of the United Nations, we must do everything in our power to strengthen mutual trust between the countries on which the activities of the organization, and hence - to cooperate with all, without participating in the creation of any units " [1, p. 260]. But in this case, because of the increasing deterioration of the relations between the East and the West Norway risked be in the "sitting on two chairs", as both Moscow and the West have been looking forward to, and when it determines its position.

Explicit notes irritation broke from the British Ambassador, Sir Lawrence Collier (generally configured pronorvegian), celebrated in April 1947, and that the Norwegian government, and all the people "increasingly tends to bury his head in the snow in hopes of avoiding involvement in the struggle between great powers" [1, p.261]. This tactic was first balancing has been challenged on the strength in June 1947, when U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced his plan to help the U.S. in the economic revival of the war-ravaged Europe.

Norwegian historian, Professor M. Skodvin dates first manifestations of the change in Norwegian policy of neutrality October 1947 [12, p.62], since it is the time of H. Lange responded positively to it Ernest Bevin (British Foreign Minister), who recommended to the Government to support and coordinate the establishment of the defense system in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. It is obvious that such an initiative carried out with the intention that Scandinavia will join in the future to the military alliance of the Western Europe.

Scandinavian historians such as B. Gaskell, G. Lundestad, Riste W., H. Andren [1, 2, 8, 11], the performance of the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in the House of Representatives January 22, 1948 is starting point to find ways of the new foreign policy. In it, he advocates the creation of the union in the Western Europe against the «Soviet threat». Nothing specific about the role of the Nordic countries in his speech does not say, but, according to G. Lundestad, "it was obvious that the Nordic countries are included in the speech of the Western Europe" [11, p. 46].

Norwegian Minister H. Lange in his address to the Storting on 12 February 1948 stressed that Norway will likely be required to reconsider the direction of its foreign policy [14, p. 43], that it, had every reason to believe that if the external political situation change for the worse, the Kingdom would revise the "working hypothesis", which was based on the policy of "building bridges" [10, p. 55].

The main problems at the moment is the need for an effective defense system, the stability of the international arena and, as John Kirby, an unwillingness to be involved in the Western military alliance, which began to form as early in 1947 [9, p. 373 ]. Agreeing with this view, we emphasize also that this reluctance was due not sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but rather, fear him which is formed at the end of the Norwegian World War II. One causes of fear, was the proximity of the USSR borders and Norway. For example, according to B. Haskell, "a common border ... Norwegian territories proximity to Murmansk ... Norway makes for a special territory of the USSR".

Not only fears of powerful neighbor - USSR - Norwegian authorities were forced to reconsider the principles of its foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy in the history of the twentieth century called expansionism. American interests as well as the impact on the affairs of other countries to expand. In the last years of the World War II Norway enters the field of view of the United States. Former United States President, Harry Truman wrote in his book "Years of the solutions": "Norway refers to the original objectives of the Allies ..." [15, p. 112].

So, caught between two rival systems, the Norwegian authorities were faced with the need to find new lines of the foreign policy. The last war obviously gave them to understand all their military vulnerability and showed the illusory idea that the Northern Region would remain for the foreseeable future in the historical conflict between the super powers. Note also that in the last years of the Second World War, these illusions were widespread enough; the Scandinavians have not yet tried to think and act as if serious political and military confrontation in their region can be avoided by strict neutrality. At the end of the war, even an idea of revival of neutrality - in the form of the refusal to accept the position of any of the countries that could potentially start to quarrel in the Northern Europe and the Arctic. But the postwar political events unfolded so rapidly that within a few years led Norway to abandon neutrality [7, p. 60].

Of all the Scandinavian countries, Sweden most persevered adheres traditional stance of neutrality, "personal" experience of the World War II urged the country made the right choice. This can be explained by the fact that Sweden is potentially less vulnerable than, Finland or Norway, and strategically less important to the U.S. than Denmark. Although the same Sweden could face increasing pressure from the Soviet Union in the Baltic, Finland or the Arctic. Still a priority for Sweden was the idea of the spread of "armed" neutrality for the whole Northern region through the creation of the North defensive alliance. This approach was not only in accordance with its traditional policy, but helped to avoid a conflict with the Soviet Union.

Norway, hoping to avoid the polarization of the forces in the region, in general, agrees with the Swedish arguments [7, p. 61]. But, unlike Sweden and Finland, needing a quick economic recovery took American aid for "Marshall Plan" and was a lot of related circumstance. As for geopolitical peculiarities of the northern Norway, they were as there is a common border with the USSR and the close location to the bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Therefore, Norway has a natural need to be combined with a sustainable policy of non provocative behavior. Her experience of the Second World War was to some extent similar to the Danish. This final general skepticism about the effectiveness of the neutrality. In addition, Norway has learned a lesson from the fact that its important strategic location was the cause of loss of the independence (in April-May 1940) due to the invaders that the country has managed only after the arrival of the external reinforcement. According to the American historian D. Fittsmariusa formed the Norwegian foreign policy stance since the spring of 1944 [7, p. 118].

Tracing changes in the foreign policy strategy of Norway after the war can be concluded that the policy of "building bridges" ended in failure, the cause of which was the growth of the contradictions between the great powers, the beginning of the bloc confrontation and the formation of the bipolar system. This served as constituents of the Soviet-Norwegian-American relations that affected the foreign policy of Norway. Soviet-Norwegian friendly cooperation trans- formed into untrusted. Adoption of Norway "Marshall Plan" and "Plan Bevin" caused a change of the orientation of Norway's foreign policy and the transformation of its foreign policy.