The interpretation of doubts in favour of the accused, its connection with the presumption of innocence

The adherents of conventional understanding of innocence presumption link this presumption to the benefit its doubt to the accused. The contradiction in the solution of the matter of certain researchers has been revealed. Its essence is in the following: without denying the derivativeness of interpretation of doubts from innocence presumption, they believe it to be possible to bring the interpretation to the level of the principles of the process, thereby calling into the question of the existence of the presumption as the principle. The results of performed work on the determination of the nature of doubts are reflected in the study. The position on the identification of unproven guilt with proved innocence is sorted and its insolvency is shown. The scope of interpretation of doubts in favor of the accused, i.e. the qualification within criminal law is defined. The removal of this rule for the framework of the process allows disproving the existence of the connection between the presumption of innocence and interpretation of doubts. The phrase "reasonable doubt" is criticized.