Vote of confidence for the president is confirmed. Achievement of socio-economic development goals before 2024-2030 is uncertain

Despite a continuing rather alarming epidemiological situation (related to existing trends in the spread of coronavirus infection, expectations of a “second wave” of the pandemic, periodic media reports about new coronavirus strains ¹ , and new potential threats of an epidemiological nature ² ), the world gradually overcomes this stage of its history. Quarantine restrictions are being consistently lifted, people return to work, resorts are being opened, traffic is being resumed, catering companies resume work, and so on.

Simultaneously, questions related to the structure and basic principles of the “postcoronavirus” world become more relevant. Undoubtedly, this topic had come to the surface before, when the world was just entering the “coronavirus phase” of its existence. At that time, experts said that “this humanity coronavirus crisis has already become so global that the return to the situation existing on the eve of the epidemic is simply impossible”3.

This is what happens. Today, the postpandemic structure of the world takes on an increasingly realistic shape: a period of hypotheses and assumptions gradually turns into a period of the need for active actions and political decisions that will determine the international situation and internal stability in each country, Russia included.

As many experts note, the coronavirus not just brought new problems to our lives but, moreover, exacerbated old protracted contradictions. The challenges that arise in the post-coronavirus era (political, economic,

“The crisis was long time coming. Nearly a decade of global economic growth was happening with a simultaneous catastrophic lag in the modernization of social and political systems. The Internet, digital technologies, and artificial intelligence created enormous opportunities that were selectively used by states and corporations, leaving out many applications… A deeper systemic strain has been growing for decades. Institutions of industrial civilization were coming apart at the seams. Education, medicine, economy –everything faced new challenges but have been remaining conservative so far. The coronavirus dramatically exposed all contradictions. And now “the old way” is not possible: we will have to go through a painful and deep change of society and economy’s foundations in order to completely enter the digital age”⁴.

and demographic) catalyze already turbulent processes that accompany the change of the technological order and the transition of global community from modern to postmodern. It makes the issue of public administration efficiency one of the most significant, systemforming problems that determine the further “viability”5 of the state. The “aggravating” factor for all countries is the noticeable deterioration of global economy caused by the consequences of the global pandemic and fluctuations of energy prices. According to the World Bank forecasts, in 2020, most of the world’s leading countries (except China) are expected to have the reduction of GDP growth by 5–9%, and in 2021 – growth not exceeding 4% (Tab. 1).

As data, presented in the table, shows, the rate of states’ recovery from the epidemiological crisis in 2020–2021 is different. It applies not only to the state of national economic systems but also to the internal psychological situation in the country. For example, officials of the

Table 1. GDP growth, % to the previous year (ranked by forecasts for 2021)

Country	2017	2018	2019 (estimation)	2020 (forecast)	2021 (forecast)
China	6.8	6.6	6.1	1.0	6.9
Indonesia	5.1	5.2	5.0	0.0	4.8
USA	2.4	2.9	2.3	-6.1	4.0
India	7.0	6.1	4.2	-3.2	3.1
Russia	1.8	2.5	1.3	-6.0	2.7
Japan	2.2	0.3	0.7	-6.1	2.5
Saudi Arabia	-0.7	2.4	0.3	-3.8	2.5
Brazil	1.3	1.3	1.1	-8.0	2.2
For reference: World	3.3	3.0	2.4	-5.2	4.2
Euro zone	2.5	1.9	1.2	-9.1	4.5
Developed countries	2.5	2.1	1.6	-7.0	3.9
Developing countries	4.5	4.3	3.5	-2.5	4.6
East Asia and the Pacific	6.5	6.3	5.9	0.5	6.6
Europe and Central Asia	4.1	3.3	2.2	-4.7	3.6
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.9	1.7	0.8	-7.2	2.8
Middle East and North Africa	1.1	0.9	-0.2	-4.2	2.3
South Asia	6.5	6.5	4.7	-2.7	2.8
Africa South of the Sahara	2.6	2.6	2.2	-2.8	3.1

World Health Organization assessed the anti-epidemic measures taken by the Russian authorities as “timely and correct” ⁶ , paying particular attention to population’s wide coronavirus test coverage ⁷ .

At the same time, in the USA, which the world leader according to absolute number of deaths along with absolute and relative indicators of coronavirus infection numbers ( Insert 1–2) , negative epidemiological processes are accompanied by the most severe cultural and political crisis, which currently

extends far beyond the USA, and the consequences of which are still hard to imagine.

Experts point out that “American Titanic has been fatally blown, and the situation with the coronavirus will only worsen the general crisis, not resolve... we will suffer all these changes for a long time. And the position of the global hegemon will become vacant immediately. The fight for it will begin. Perhaps it will leave no stone unturned. After all, it is not just the leadership that is at stake but the remaining resources of the Earth” ⁸ .

Martynov A. (politologist, director of the International Institute of the Newly Established States): “The United States is such a country that any similar things will have serious consequences in the world: not only in countries that are subordinate to the interests of the United States”⁹.

Bordachev T. (director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies): “Protests in the United States are the result of the socio-economic structure of American society, demonstrations in Europe are the result of accumulated problems of European societies, whose citizens are looking for a solution and a way to express their dissatisfaction with ruling elites in general”¹⁰.

Isakov A. (correspondent, interpreter of Regnum News Agency): “The race riots in the United States, at the first glance, are a relapse of not completely excessive contradictions of the Civil War (1861–1865), but, if you look closely, there is a much deeper crisis behind this one. It marks a civilizational breakdown that may end the existence of the most powerful Empire”¹¹.

Inozemtsev V. (economist, research supervisor and director of autonomous non-profit organization “Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies”): «Of course, Black Lives Matter protests are unlikely to start a civil war. But it will have quite serious consequences for the economy and liberal foundations of western society… All this suggests that “socialist” trends are here to stay, and it may cause significant harm to western economies over the next five-ten years. On the other hand, the new ideology of group differences seriously threatens liberal foundations on which western societies are built... I do not see any reasons for great optimism right now: just like in case of COVID, the world faced a virus that people are not immune to, so western countries now received a demand that they may not be able to meet while remaining themselves”¹².

Insert 1

According to the results of the 2nd quarter and currently, the United States is the world’s leader in a number of infections and deaths from coronavirus infection.

Russia is on the 11th place according to a number of deaths from coronavirus. According to WHO, as of August 16, 2020, 15685 Russians died because of coronavirus infection, which is 11 times lower than in the USA, and 2–3 times lower than in many Western European countries (Great Britain, Italy, France, Spain).

Insert 2

Per 100 thousand people, leader in a number of deaths from coronavirus among population is Peru (81.015 cases as of August 16, 2020).

In Russia, this indicator is 11.064 cases per 100 thousand people (15th position in the world), which is 7 times less than in the United States and 5 times less than in several Western European countries (Great Britain, Italy, Spain).

The gradual lifting of quarantine restrictions in Russia allowed one of the main political and social events of recent years to take place – the all-Russian vote on amendments to the Constitution. It was held for the first time within a few days, and it summed up the large-scale socio-political process launched by the President of the Russian Federation on January 15, 2020 in a regular Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

The discussion of constitutional changes took place during the entire period of the epidemiological crisis and, of course, became one of the important factors consolidating society in a period of uncertainty and anxiety concerning the spread of coronavirus infection, changes in lifestyle due to quarantine measures, and negative socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. No less significant is the fact that the possibility of extending Vladimir Putin’s presidential terms removed unnecessary questions about the transit of power until presidential elections of 2024, as we wrote in our previous article ¹³ .

However, it should be emphasized that the main part of constitutional amendments and its general “emotional component”, perceived by society, fully corresponded to challenges presented to the public administration system by the objective reality of the post-coronavirus period. These challenges consist of the need for a quick and efficient response to issues that have been troubling Russian society for many years: dynamic increase of the level and quality of life, government guarantee of social protection for general population, growing need for social justice and the reduction of huge inequality14, and the nationalization of elites, without which it is impossible to solve these problems.

It is no accident that, according to VCIOM surveys, the amendments concerning population’s social protection are of the greatest importance for Russians. Thus, more than 90% of respondents noted that it is important for them that the Constitution contains such principles as:

• V    government guarantee of affordable and high-quality medical care (95%);

• V    children as the top priority of government policy, their social support (93%);

• V    mandatory annual indexation of pensions (92%);

• V    guarantee of targeted social support, indexation of social benefits and payments (92%);

V state responsibility for protecting the rights of Russian workers and setting the minimum wage not below minimum subsistence level (92%) ¹⁵ .

We would like to emphasize that society needs for social justice and dynamic development of the level and quality of life did not arise simultaneously with the lifting of quarantine restrictions but existed long before the epidemiological crisis. Currently, while Russians return to their usual lives, expectations that Russian society has repeatedly given credit to the authorities for implementing, primarily increased by 33% and exceeded 1 billion rubles in the first half of 2020. This increase was in the form bonuses, which are 66% higher than salaries. On average, one member of the company’s management board approximately earned 643 thousand rubles a day, 80 thousand rubles an hour, and a little more than 22 rubles a second in January-June (if you take into account only 8-hour working days)... at the same time, employees of regional gas companies and subsidiaries of OOO “Gazprom Mezhregiongaz” still cannot receive bonuses for 2019. Those who really work and provide a stable cash flow from Russian consumers are left without money” (source: Ivanov A. Unsinkable. Untriable. Insatiable. Zavtra, dated August 14, 2020).

• ^{1 5} Constitutional amendments: Rating of preferences of Russians. VCIOM analytical review no. 4250, dated May 30, 2020. Available at:

  during the presidential elections (Insert 3), emerge again: thus, since 2012, the turnout for presidential elections in all federal districts of the Russian Federation has been at least 60%, and more than 56% of voters, who took part in the vote, consistently cast their votes for the current President of the Russian Federation V. Putin. At the same time, during the last presidential elections of 2018, turnout in all federal districts increased (from 65 to 68% in the whole country, i.e. from 72 to 74 million people) along with support for the head of the state (from 64 to 77%, or from 46 to 56 million people).

Compliance with public needs and time moment that requires its efficient implementation makes the all-Russian vote an important factor that mobilizes and consolidates the country in face of epidemiological and socio-economic threats. It helps relieve social tension by declaring the readiness and ability of state authorities to feel the mood of society and work for the realization of national interests. It is no coincidence that the results of the vote, which ended on July 1, 2020, were quite convincing: overall, the turnout in the country was 68% (74.2 million people); 78% (57.7 million people) voted for amendments to the Constitution (Insert 4) .

Results of the vote on amendments to the Constitution June 25 – July 1, 2020

Option	%	million people
For	77.9	57.7
Against	21.3	15.8
Turnout	68.0	74.2

However, as the practice of public administration in Russia over the last 15 years shows, the declaration of authorities’ intentions to implement policies in interests of the majority of country’s citizens does not guarantee the real implementation of its goals and objectives.

Considering the previous long-term experience of non-implementation of the President’s direct decrees and lack of tangible positive dynamics of changes in population’s level and quality of life, a number of experts have great doubts that the system of public administration built by V. Putin during his presidential terms will be able to cope with the implementation of obligations stated in the Constitution, since new tools for this have not been proposed yet.

For more than 10 years, despite the stated goals of “concentrating budgetary and administrative resources on improving the quality of life of Russian citizens” ¹⁶ , “increasing real salaries by 1.4–1.5 times by 2018” ¹⁷ , “2 times decrease of the poverty level” ¹⁸⁹ , “implementing breakthrough development of the Russian Federation, increasing the country’s population, raising citizens’ living standards, creating comfortable conditions for their living, as well as revealing the talent of each person” ¹⁹¹ , etc., a number of people with monetary incomes below the subsistence minimum is 12–13%, or about 18–19 million Russians (since 2007, Fig. 1 ). It includes the “new” government, which has been working since 2018 and has set itself the goal of “improving the quality of life of

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—•— mil. people     — ■ — as a percentage of total population

Source:

Table 2. Income growth and inequality in Russia (1989–2016), %

Income group (distribution of pre-tax national income per 1 adult) Group size as of January 1, 2019* (people) Average annual growth rate 1989–2016** Total real growth 1989–2016** All population 113892000 1.3 41 50% with the lowest income 56946000 -0.89 -20 40% with average income 45556800 0.5 15 10% with the highest income 11389200 3.8 171 including 1% with the highest incomes 1138920 6.4 429 including 0.1% with the highest income 113892 9.5 1054 including 0.01% with the highest income 11389 12.2 2134 including 0.001% with the highest income 1139 14.9 4122 * Population of the Russian Federation aged over 20 years (own compilation according to the Federal State Statistics Service). Available at: . ** Source: Novokmet F., Piketty T., Zucman G. From soviets to oligarchs: inequality and property in Russia, 1905–2016. National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2017. Cambridge, MA. P. 78. every person in the country through economic growth and social development”20.

One of the largest international studies of inequality, which we have already mentioned in one of our previous articles2112, shows that, nearly over the last 30 years (1989–2016), a total real income growth of 50% of Russians with the lowest incomes decreased by 20% (according to 2019 data, it is about 57 million people). Income level of 40% of population with average salaries (nearly 46 million people) increased only by 15%. For comparison, the share of income of 10% of the wealthiest citizens (11.4 million people) had a nearly 2 times increase – 171%, and the income level of 0.001% of the richest Russians (about 1000 people) had a nearly 40 (!) times increase – 4122% (Tab. 2).

Perhaps, it is possible to treat data of a particular study differently, but the fact is that it is also confirmed by statistical data. Thus, according to the World Bank, the income concentration index (Gini index ²² ) in Russia is comparable to it in the United States (41.4) and China (38.5), but it is significantly higher than, for example, in Germany (31.9), the United Kingdom (34.8), France (31.6) and many other western European countries. However, the main thing is that, in 2000–2018, the Gini index in Russia has not actually changed (in 2000 – 37.1; in 2018 – 37.5); therefore, there are no tangible positive changes in the distribution of income by major social groups and solving the problem of social inequality.

At the same time, the dynamics of a number and size of a wealth of dollar billionaires does not actually change, a number of which has increased from 60 to 100 people over the last 13 years (2006–2019), and their capital – from 153 to 275 billion rubles on average per billionaire (Tab. 3).

Data of public financial reports of large metallurgical corporations indicate a significant increase of funds directed at the personal

According to Forbes23, heads of mentioned enterprises are among 20 richest businessmen in Russia:

• V. Potanin (PAO “Nornickel”) – 1st position (welfare is estimated at 19700 million US dollars),

  • A. Mordashov (PAO “Severstal”) – 4th position (16800 mil. US dollars),

  • V. Rashnikov (PAO “Magnitogorskiy metal-lurgicheskiy kombinat”) – 15th position (7300 mil. US dollars).

Table 3. Dynamics of a number and wealth of Russian dollar billionaires

Year	Number, people	Wealth, bil. dol.	Wealth, bil. rub.*	Average per billionaire, bil. rub.
2006	60	337.3	9168.4	152.8
2007	100	521.7	13355.5	133.6
2008	32	102.1	2542.3	79.4
2009	62	265.0	8400.5	135.5
2010	101	432.7	13141.1	130.1
2011	96	376.1	11057.3	115.2
2012	110	426.8	13269.2	120.6
2013	111	422.2	13426.0	121.0
2014	88	337.0	12940.8	147.1
2015	77	282.6	17224.5	223.7
2016	96	386.3	25882.1	269.6
2017	96	386.4	22565.8	235.1
2018	106	417.7	26189.8	247.1
2019	100	425.1	27504.0	275.0
2019, % to 2006	166.7	126.0	300.0	180.0

* Wealth, given in Forbes in dollars, has been converted to rubles at the exchange rate set by the Bank of Russia. Sources: Forbes data; VolRC RAS calculations.

Table 4. Average salary of employees and average remuneration to management bodies of metallurgical corporations in 2012–2019, thousand rubles per month

Indicator 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Average for 2012–2019 PAO “Severstal” Salary of employees 39 47 53 54 61 64 65 67 56 Number of management employees, people 10 10 10 22 22 22 22 22 18 Remuneration 9848 10368 7398 2322 2530 2429 2621 2202 9755 To employees’ salaries, times 253 221 140 43 41 38 40 33 186 PAO GMK “Nornickel” Salary of employees 63 68,5 76 75 85 87 90 97 80 Number of management employees, people 19 24 26 27 27 27 27 27 26 Remuneration 12850 14253 6541 11433 12738 18638 21008 26817 15535 To employees’ salaries, times 204 208 86 152 150 214 233 276 190 PAO “NLMK” Salary of employees 39 43 48 52 58 60 62 63 53 Number of management employees, people 21 19 18 18 18 17 17 17 18 Remuneration 820 1288 2459 2571 3732 4145 3283 3241 2692 To employees’ salaries, times 21 30 51 49 64 69 53 51 49 PAO “MMK” Salary of employees 43 46 47 52 55 51 48 50 49 Number of management employees, people 26 25 25 23 23 23 25 24 24 Remuneration 887 2241 828 1539 1449 1858 1937 1885 1578 To employees’ salaries, times 20 49 18 30 26 36 40 38 32 Source: annual reports of metallurgical companies. Available at: ; ; ; investors/reports-and-results/ consumption of top managers, which causes a glaring gap in incomes in relation to the average salary of enterprises’ employees. Thus, in 2012–2019, an average monthly remuneration of one manager was tens or even hundreds of times higher (as at Severstal and Nornickel) than an average monthly salary of one corporate employee and, at the same time, increased at a higher rate (Tab. 4).

Perhaps, this unfair distribution of income was one of the reasons why, in all cities where these corporations are located (with the exception of Norilsk), the share of people who took part in the vote on amendments to the Constitution was lower than regional average numbers, and the share of those who did not support it was significantly (50–60%) higher (Tab. 5).

Table 5. Turnout (%) and percentage of people who voted against amendments to the Constitution on July 1, 2020 (% of turnout)

Territory	Turnout	Percentage of votes “against”	Deviation (+/-) of “against” votes from the Russian average (21.27%)
			p.p.*	%**
Russia	67.97	21.27	0	0
Vologda Oblast	58.72	28.01	+6.74	+31.69
Vologda	57.19	28.80	+7.53	+35.40
Cherepovets	48.10	32.51	+11.24	+52.84
Lipetsk Oblast	66.31	20.39	-0.88	-4.14
Lipetsk	44.19	34.31	+13.04	+61.31
Krasnodar Krai	58.99	28.97	+7.7	+36.20
Norilsk	79.71	16.23	-5.04	-23.70
Chelyabinsk Oblast	65.88	29.55	+8.28	+38.93
Magnitogorsk	59.64	35.09	+13.82	+64.97

* Difference between the share of votes cast against constitutional amendments in the region/city and the national average, given in percentage points.

** Difference between the share of votes cast against constitutional amendments in the region/city and the national average, given in % of the share of average number of “against” votes in Russia (21.27%).

“Over 25 years, assets worth of at least 750 billion dollars have been withdrawn from Russia, which is half of the country’s annual GDP. If these assets were invested in the domestic economy, it could increase production and tax revenues that could be spent on infrastructure development and social programs – but, instead, most of it was spent on foreign assets, including luxury yachts that sail distant seas”²⁴.

However, negative consequences of the inefficient course of economic development implemented by the liberal bloc of the Russian Government do not affect any specific territories but the country’s economy as a whole. Thus, together with the absence of real changes in the dynamics of poverty and inequality, capital outflow has been continuing in the country for more than 10 years. According to the Central Bank’s estimates, in January–February 2019, net export of capital from Russia by the private sector amounted to 18.6 billion dollars, which is 2.1 times higher than in the same period of 2018 (8.7 billion dollars) ²⁵ . At the end of 2018, net capital outflow increased 2.7 times in annual terms – from 25.2 billion to 67.5 billion dollars. Net outflow in 2017 amounted to 31.3 billion dollars (1.6 times increase by 2016).

It should be noted that the problem of Russia’s financial capital settling in offshore zones of foreign countries has long been ignored by the government. Only after amendments to the Constitution, which prohibit senior officials from “opening and holding accounts (deposits), storing cash and valuables in foreign banks located outside the territory of the Russian Federation”26, the President decided to tax income in the form of dividends transferred to accounts abroad at a rate of 15%27, under which the procedure for denouncing the double taxation Treaty with Cyprus began in August 2020 (Malta and Luxembourg are next in line for the corresponding changes to the agreements)28.

Nevertheless, these measures may contribute to the deoffshorization of the Russian economy in the future, but, for now, the leakage of domestic capital abroad remains one of the most acute problems of the Russian economy.

In this regard, some experts Express well-founded concerns about the prospects for further prolongation of the existing, largely liberal, course of economic policy ²⁹ , and also propose concrete measures to improve its efficiency in order to bring it in line with the objectives of global competitiveness and national development. However, for many years, the ruling elites have ignored these proposals, and they do everything to preserve the favorable (primarily for themselves) rules for conducting national economic policy ³⁰ .

Glaz’ev S.Ju.: “An immediate drastic change of economic policy is required. It should ensure the restoration of macroeconomic stability at the same time with putting the Russian economy on a path of rapid growth based on a new technological order. It requires a forced transition to the formation of a new world economic order with its characteristic institutions of strategic planning , subordination of monetary policy to the tasks of increasing investment activity, and public-private partnership aimed at improving people’s well-being” ³¹.

It forces experts to state: “Finally, it is time to recognize the failure of the economic development model of recent years . The main thing is to formulate an idea of a comprehensive development program... Reliance on national projects does not yet provide the economy with structural growth drivers... An L-shaped way out of the coronavirus crisis is not the strategy that is needed for an economy that has been living in virtual stagnation for many years, and people who lose their income ” ³² .

“The July presidential decree on national development goals is indeed very different from the similar May Decree of 2018. The achievement of targets is now postponed from 2024 to 2030. At the same time, the targets are significantly worsened… Instead of nine national goals, only five have been identified. For example, there is no goal to make Russia one of five largest economies in the world, to ensure 5% annual growth of labor productivity, to increase the number of technologically innovative enterprises to 50% of their total number, to ensure a steady excess of the birth rate over the death rate, and so on” ³³.

In July 2020, at a Meeting of Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, Russian President V. Putin said: “Despite objective current difficulties, our long-term goals remain unchanged”34. However, it seems that the tasks set out in 2018 national projects, which aim to provide Russia with a “decisive breakthrough in people preservation”35 by 2024, are being postponed for 6 years. At least, in almost identical wording, they are presented in the new Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation “On the national development goals of the Russian Federation through 2030” (Tab. 6). As noted by Prime Minister M. Mishustin, “setting new goals will require changes in national projects and strategic planning documents”36.

Thus, for more than 10 years, actual facts of public administration practice do not correspond to officially declared goals and objectives.

Although many reasons and explanations can be found for “stalling” the implementation of key national development goals (the global financial crisis, economic sanctions, the situation on the world energy market, the pandemic, etc.), they are unlikely to be able to “hold” public dissatisfaction with the lack of social justice for a long time, or, in other words, they are unlikely to prevent a threat to the government legitimacy.

Table 6. Wording of national development goals in key documents of 2018 and 2020

Wording in 2018* (“For the Government to achieve the following national development goals by 2024:…”) Target to be reached in 2024 Target to be reached in 2030 Wording in 2020** (“Set the following development goals characterizing achievement of national targets by 2030:…”) V increase life expectancy to 78 years (80 years by 2030) 78 years 78 years V increase life expectancy to 78 years V cut poverty in half 2 times 2 times V reduce the poverty rate by half compared to 2017 V ensure the global competitiveness of Russian education, make the Russian Federation one of the world’s top 10 countries in the quality of education 10 countries of the world 10 countries of the world V join the world’s top 10 countries in the quality of education V ensure the presence of the Russian Federation among top five countries of the world that carry out research in areas determined by the priorities of scientific and technological development 5 countries of the world 10 countries of the world V join the world’s top 10 countries in the volume of research and development, including through the creation of an effective system of higher education V share of the road network of urban agglomerations that is in a standard state: 85% by 2024 85% 85% V improve the urban environment quality index by at least 1.5 times; ensure that the road network in major metropolitan areas meets statutory requirements by at least 85 percent; V number of employees in small and medium-sized businesses, including individual entrepreneurs: 25 million by 2024 25 mil. people 25 mil. people V increase employment in small and medium-sized enterprises, including individual entrepreneurs and self-employed persons, to 25 million people V share of households with broadband Internet access: 97% by 2024 97% 97% V increase the share of households with broadband internet access to 97 percent V share of socially significant infrastructure objects that can be connected to broadband Internet access: 100% by 2024 100% 95% V increase the share of essential social services available online to 95 percent * Source: On national goals and strategic objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024: Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation no. 204, dated May 7, 2018. Available at: Passports of national projects on the official website of the RF Government. Available at: ** Source: Russia’s national development goals through 2030: Executive Order, dated July 21, 2020. Available at: events/president/news/63728

Platoshkin: “The first national projects in our country were formed in 2005. Absolutely the same… So what? Everything was there since then: catching up with Portugal in terms of GDP per capita: no. The program-2020, to create 25 million high-paying jobs by 2020: no one has said anything about it for a long time... It has been formulated many times, but nothing has been done yet. And judging by this, if people did not do the same thing before, why should the same people do something now? Are they reforged? Have they completed an internship program? These are the same people”³⁷.

“The Russian government believes that it is not necessary to worry about the current state of mind in society, which is rather sluggish and in a sense unattended. But the authorities make a grave mistake of assuming that these attitudes do not have an alarming dynamic ” ³⁸¹³ . ¹⁴

«Now it is clear that Putin’s new terms are again only a postponement – for an indefinite period. It looks something unbearable even at the very beginning. Unbearable exactly in the current way: we are invited to enjoy what we have, because it might, they say, get worse. And to do this, we only need to sacrifice, first of all, the dream of the Russian peace, social justice, any ideals, honesty, health, remnants of humanity (the transition to digitalization), culture, and education – barely everything. The balance of this equation - either suffer as it is, or regret it – steadily shifts toward discontent. Something similar in a small format happens in Belarus” ³⁹.

Indeed, 6 years have passed since Russian sociologists began to record a steady trend of people’s increasing need for change

(2014) ⁴⁰ , and today this demand forms the basis of protest actions. This is a complex challenge for the entire system of public administration, since this problem is not solved by the efficiency of individual services alone but shows the need for general transformation in a changing internal environment and in connection with a prevailing mood in society ⁴¹ .

This is quite clearly shown by the situation with the former governor of the Khabarovsk territory – S. Furgal. Mass protests of population in the Khabarovsk Krai (which were either organized by the team of the former governor, or were caused by dissatisfaction with the appointment of the new interim M. Degtyarev) “revealed” a much deeper problem than local corruption.

According to the experts, “ the model of vertical of power in Russia is faced with horizontal young beautiful society ” ^{42 17}, that is, the system of public administration, which has been arrayed by the President since 2000 in such a way that all the elements are in strict subordination, and balance of different elite forces is regulated directly by the head of state, conflicts with politically, economically, and morally fragile society, which starts to defend their interests more acively.

“It is no secret that the LDPR office in the Khabarovsk Krai has long been outsourced to a group formed during the long-term governorship of Viktor Ishaev (1991–2009), who then served as the presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District for four more years. And now he has been under house arrest for more than a year and a half in a criminal case with a “trifling” amount of 5 million rubles. Furgal and his team have become, in fact, only a new generation of this elite”43.

“…most likely, the unexpected consequence of Furgal’s arrest will be: in the following years, the insistence of regions, people in these regions, and politicians in these regions to determine a person in charge. And it will be followed by an even more insistent demand that a significant part of taxes that these regions generate be left in regions, so those elected could implement an agenda necessary for this region’s population, who supported the candidate for governor because he proposed this agenda to them, without Moscow’s approval”⁴⁴.

As it is known, any disease is more efficient to prevent than to treat. And if corruption and criminality in the government are considered to be among the most acute diseases of our society, then the state administration system did not determine the situation with Furgal, but, on the contrary, “missed” it. Because, first, this is not the first such case in our country45; secondly, it is obvious that Furgal’s rise to power was a long, multi-year process that took place within the framework of the system of state administration that was created, and, third, in such cases, it is not about one person but a whole team of people directly or indirectly involved in this criminal system.

At the same time, high-profile cases such as those of S. Furgal, V. Gaiser, A. Khoroshavin and many others should not be misleading, pointing out that all the troubles in Russia are concentrated only around stolen governors. This is only the “tip of the iceberg”, which is actually based on the actions of liberal elites who exist on all (including the highest) levels of government, who pursue mainly their own (rather than national) interests and do not have the sovereign status of the Russian economy in their priorities.

Famous latest cases: the case of the former minister of economic development of Russia A. Ulyukayev (sentenced to 8 years in

“Bureaucratic body, as well as the political and business elite, all trained according to the notes of the “Washington consensus”, can not be transferred overnight to the rails of a different, alien ideology”46.

maximum security penal colony in 2017 for especially large bribe reception – 2 million dollars) and even more egregious case – the case of the former RF minister for open government M. Abyzov, who organized a criminal community which carried out illegal money manipulations equal to billions of rubles for several years ⁴⁷ .

It could be seen as the main reason for the “stalling” of national projects, May decrees, and many election promises of the President, the implementation of which was and remains the basis of the government power legitimacy in the country. Long-term strategic objectives of public administration related to the implementation of national interests remain in the hands of liberal officials who still hold key positions in the public administration system.

It is no accident that experts say that “ in fact, Russian monetary policy is conducted in the interests of financial speculators . Monetary authorities guarantee super profits and encourage the flow of money from the real sector to the financial sector and further abroad. At the same time, the main part (from 60 to 90%) of turnover in the Russian currency and financial market is made by American hedge funds and its affiliates. After the Bank of

Russia let the ruble exchange rate float freely, they manipulate it, swinging it in order to extract excess profits due to the depreciation of ruble income and savings of Russian individuals and legal entities… Today, monetary authorities make the same mistakes, the consequences of which have a negative impact on the economy which have been stagnant for 5 years” ^{48 1} .

And the dynamics of public opinion, as one of the main criteria for the efficiency of the public administration system, “does not take long”, and it sensitively reacts to the lack of promises fulfilled by the authorities through the reduction of personal support to a person who is at its center – the head of state. According to the results of regional and all-Russian sociological studies, we may observe a slow but fairly stable growth in a number of Russians who negatively respond to the President’s activities, not only in the current dynamics (which may partly be caused by the socioeconomic and psychological consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic) but also in the annual retrospect. Thus, in comparison with the third presidential term (2012–2017), the level of V. Putin’s approval decreased from 77 to 63–64% across the whole country by 2019– 2020 (Fig. 2) . According to regional studies – from 63 to 53–56% (Fig. 3) .

Thus, long-term unresolved issues related to the increase of the level and quality of life which would be noticeable by wider population, as well as more equitable distribution of national wealth (Tab. 7) , has a negative impact on the dynamics of public opinion regarding the efficiency of the system of public administration and the President’s activities.

Figure 2. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the activities of the President of the Russian Federation? (in % from a number of respondents; VCIOM data for Russia)*

* There is no data on the level of disapproval of the President’s activities for 2000–2007.

According to VCIOM, in 2012–2017, the level of approval of the President’s activities (V. Putin’s 3rd presidential term) was 77%. In 2018, it decreased by 6 p.p. (to 71%), in 2019 – by 7 p.p. (to 64%). According to latest data for August 2020, it decreased by 4 p.p. and is equal to 60%.

In general, in comparison with an average approval level of the President’s activities for 2012–2017, in August 2020, it decreased by 17 p.p. (from 77 to 60%).

Figure 3. Do you generally approve or disapprove activities of the Russian President?

(in % from a number of respondents, data of FSBIS VolRC RAS in the Vologda Oblast)

According to data of the Vologda Research Center (FSBIS VolRC RAS), the average share of residents of the Vologda Oblast who approve of the President’s activities in 2012–2017 was 63%. By 2018, it increased slightly (by 3 p.p., to 66%), but in 2019 it decreased by 10 p.p. (from 66 to 56%), and, by August, it decreased by another 4 p.p. (from 56 to 52%).

In general, in comparison with an average approval level of the President’s activities for 2012–2017, in August 2020, it decreased by 11 p.p. (from 63 to 52%).

Table 7. Distribution of total monetary income and characteristics of differentiation of population’s monetary income, %

20% groups of Russia’s population 2000– 2004 2005– 2008 2009– 2012 2013– 2018 2019 First (with the lowest income) 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 Second 10.3 9.9 9.8 10.0 10.1 Third 15.3 14.9 14.9 15.0 15.1 Fourth 22.6 22.6 22.5 22.6 22.6 Fifth (with the highest income) 46.2 47.4 47.6 47.1 46.9 Source: Distribution of income of population. Federal State Statistics Service. Available at: mediabank/

It is also evidenced by the fact that, in most regions of the Russian Federation (47 out of 86), the proportion of people who voted against amendments to the Constitution on July 1, 2020 was above national average numbers ( Insert 5 ).

The all-Russian vote on amendments to the Constitution may, in some sense, be considered a referendum on the vote of confidence for the President. After all, it was V. Putin who launched this initiative, stimulated public discussions, created expert groups, and held meetings with their representatives. In addition, amendment on a potential possibility of extending the presidential term of the current head of the state was among the changes to the Main Law as well, and Russians voted, among other things, for it, too.

Based on this, it is logical to compare the results of the all-Russian vote, held on July 1, 2020, with the previous presidential election, held on March 13, 2018. Despite the increase of votes for adopting amendments to the Constitution in the whole country per 1.3 million people (+2.29%), in the regional centers and large industrial towns of 47 regions, where the share of votes against amendments was higher than the national average, a number of votes for amendments to the Main Law was significantly less than a number of people who voted for V. Putin in the presidential elections of 2018 (by nearly 33%, or 2.6 million people). In major cities of the Northwestern Federal District – less by 50% (294 thousand people), the Siberian Federal District – by 70% (768 thousand people; Tab. 8).

It means that residents of these territories over the past two years (“may be the most nondescript years in all of Vladimir Putin’s terms” ⁴⁹ ) have become more critical of how efficiently the government’s promises are being fulfilled. They supported the amendments to the Constitution, especially its social and patriotic component, but they are not sure that the efficient implementation of the government’s new social obligations is possible with elites who do not put social (i.e. public) interests in priority.

In oblast capitals of 36, out of 47, analyzed entities of the Russian Federation, the share of those who voted against amendments to the Constitution was higher than the average number for the region. Given that it is in oblast centers where administrative resources are most often concentrated, we may assume that such a vote, first, is a reaction of people to unfulfilled promises for breakthrough development in the level and quality of life, and it indicates their pessimistic attitude about the prospects for fulfilling these promises in the future, and, second, some kind of assessment of regional elites; conditions that they created as a relation to the norms of the Constitution. For example, in Moscow, the share of voters who voted against amendments to the Main Law on July 1 was 34% (in the Moscow Oblast – 20%), in Khabarovsk – 39% (in the Khabarovsk Krai – 37%), in Irkutsk – 41% (in the Irkutsk Oblast – 35%), and so on (Insert 5) .

Table 8. Increase/decrease of a number of votes for amendments to the Constitution on July 1, 2020, compared to a number of votes for V. Putin in the Russian Presidential election on March 18, 2018

Territory*	For amendments to the Constitution (all-Russian vote, July 1, 2020)	For V.V. Putin (Presidential election, March 18, 2018)	Deviation**
			abs.	%
Russia	57747288	56426399	+1320889	+2,29
Northwestern Fed. Distr.	5047418	4974294	+73124	+1,45
8 regions	1756603	2277051	-520448	-29,63
9 towns	585868	879929	-294061	-50,19
Far Eastern Fed. District	2516716	2632834	-116118	-4,61
9 regions	1 620 659	2 020 741	-400 082	-24,69
9 towns	602764	752946	-150182	-24,92
Siberian Fed. District	5450713	6171330	-720617	-13,22
8 regions	3 752 864	4 597 616	-844 752	-22,51
9 towns	1094324	1862818	-768494	-70,23
Ural Fed.District	4099934	4714255	-614321	-14,98
4 regions	3 086 407	3 750 461	-664 054	-21,52
5 towns	961940	1201400	-239460	-24,89
Central Fed. District	14408730	14033866	+374864	+2,60
11 regions	9623436	9782037	-158601	-1,62
9 towns	902925	1332911	-429986	-32,26
Privolzhsky Fed. District	13016049	12270602	+745447	+5,73
7 regions	3 492 484	4 042 900	-550 416	-15,76
7 towns	1033091	1440654	-407563	-39,45
TOTAL in all districts (8)	57643148	56015525	1627623	+2.82
in all regions (47)	23332453	26470806	-3138353	-11.86
in all towns (49)	5180912	7470658	-2289746	-30.65

* Regions where the percentage of votes cast against constitutional amendments was higher than the national average (21.27%); its regional centers; and some major industrial towns (all of them are shown in insert 5).

** The difference between the share of votes for amendments to the Constitution on July 1, 2020 and the share of votes for the President of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2018.

“Critics of the Constitution state that we must recognize not only the great support for Putin and the Constitution but also a significant number of those who said “no”. There were a lot of them in the industrial regions of Central and Northern Russia – about 40%. Given the huge turnout, we must admit that this is a deliberate step by citizens who considered it their duty to say “no”. And this is serious… People who said “no” did not say this to Russia’s sovereignty, national science, education, or industry. They expressed doubts that the current elite, which so easily lived in an integration model with the ungracious West and, in general, did not care about inequality, poverty, and economic helplessness of the country, is not able to build and even start thinking about way of building a strong sovereign Russia” ⁵⁰.

Based on these facts, it is difficult not to agree with the opinion of experts that “the consolidation of society around amendments to the Constitution did not work out. The result is high, but there is no monolithic support”51. The vote of confidence, once again given to the current government by society (as well as the constitutional majority of United Russia in the 2016 State Duma elections, or the record support for V. Putin during the 2018 presidential elections), is not infinite; it must be justified – even despite any force majeure circumstances. Otherwise, it may well be the last one52.

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“Even minor events, managerial and political mistakes may cause a sharp outburst of population’s dissatisfaction, not political, but socioeconomic... There is no strong demand for protests, but there is a weariness of a splinter positive agenda, distrust in the institutions of power, and disbelief in its efficiency. Now loyalists and opponents of the President wait for changes, for which Putin has already received a strong mandate twice over the last two years. What will they be like?” ⁵³

Thus, despite rather tense economic situation in the world (mostly due to the pandemic), the main challenge for the President and his system of public administration is now “inside” the country. Failure to comply with constitutional obligations and the lack of tangible progress in solving vital problems for population threatens the legitimacy of the government and the existence of the state itself. Therefore, in the coming months, the Russian state and V.V. Putin personally will face no less and, perhaps, even more serious tests than ones during the acute phase of the coronavirus infection spread .

The persistence of such problems as the non-functioning strategic planning system, the amorphous nature of officials’ personal responsibility, continuing practice of “delaying” the implementation of national projects, economic “reins” of the country in the hands of liberal elites of the Russian Government – all this makes the prospects for Russia’s socio-economic development extremely vague, confirming experts’ forecasts, to which we addressed back in 201754: Russia is expected to have “a scenario of the liberal model prolongation, a scenario of balancing on the threshold of sustainable development...”55.

On July 1, 2020, by supporting the amendments to the Constitution, Russian society, though with difficulty, issued another vote of confidence for the government and the President of the Russian Federation personally in order to further build the model of a nationally oriented state that he began to create back in 1999, which is based on the “Russian idea”, “strong state” and “efficient economy”56. Now the task of the

From the expert opinion of the RF Accounting Chamber (Feb. 2020): “The system of strategic planning for activities of Federal Executive bodies is currently unbalanced and inefficient, insufficiently regulated and methodically provided, with a low level of control and executive discipline. In this state, it does not contribute to the achievement of national goals and requires improvement.

In strategic planning, the problems of legislative regulation, methodological support, organization of control, openness, and availability of information are identified. The analysis showed that the normative legal acts, regulating this sphere, do not form a complete system of strategic planning. They are not coordinated with each other and are not updated in accordance with documents defining national goals and strategic objectives of the country’s socio-economic development. As the result, none of the approved activity plans of Federal Executive bodies for 2019–2024 meet the established requirements. Only 26% of state and subprograms’ programs indicators, for which they are responsible, are included in the activity plans of federal executive bodies. Out of indicators of national and federal projects, 55% are taken into account in the plans”⁵⁷.

“I am convinced that the achievement of necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. This is also a political problem and, I am not afraid to use this word, in a certain sense, an ideological one. More precisely, it is ideological, spiritual, and moral. And the last aspect at the present stage seems to me particularly significant from the point of view of the Russian society consolidation” ⁵⁸.

government administration system is to make sure that the most pessimistic forecasts of the expert community turn out to be wrong. The vote of confidence, issued by society, must be fully justified by the President, otherwise it may become the last, and not only for him.

Personal responsibility for resolving key issues of national security, which V. Putin took over himself on December 31, 201559, does not allow him to stare blankly at the ruling elite continuing to implement the course of national development, which is profitable for them personally, when prospects for the Russian economy, level, quality of life, and social stability in the country remain uncertain.

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It seems that expectations of the majority of Russians were formulated in a concentrated form by S. Konovalov in “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” no. 170, dated August 12, 2020: “We need our own “new course”, a new direction of movement, we need an institutional understanding of the new reality, we need to be ready for new challenges, we need to be ready to confront “black swans”... The “new course” is not only about tripling the economy, increasing the well-being of citizens, or fighting corruption. It is about the creation of a unified coordinate system, if you want – about a national idea that will change the idea of Russia in the world, but, most importantly, change the idea of citizens about their own country ” ⁶⁰.