Voters Supported the President: On the Results of the Election to the State Duma of the Eighth Convocation

September 17–19, 2021, the election to the State Duma of the 8th convocation was held in Russia. In our opinion, this event should be analyzed “in the context of large and small life cycles of the country’s political system” ¹ , that is, as part of the internal Russian political process which took place in a certain context of global trends in world politics on the one hand, and in domestic political life on the other hand, along with presidential elections (in which voters have already supported Vladimir Putin four times) and the all-Russian referendum on amendments to the Constitution.

Each of these political events and forms of expressing the will of the people is a kind of large-scale cross-section of public opinion, allowing us to see trends in the key changes in the socio-political agenda at the federal level, as well as expectations of society from the government.

In other words, we, as the authors of the article, are interested in the results of the latest vote not only from the point of view of the balance of political forces in parliament; we consider the results as markers of the changes taking place in society and as markers of the RF President’s consistent efforts aimed at the formation of a new, post-Soviet statehood, as well as the framework of

“Never in recent decades has U.S. policy been so contradictory, inconsistent and openly disastrous. This is the most important thing. Today America is weaker than ever... Biden is just rapidly destroying America, and the more globalism agonizes, the more clearly humanity sees the weakness of the one who recently claimed to be the undisputed leader…

Russia has a historic chance not only to make multipolarity irreversible, but also to dramatically expand the area of its influence on an almost global scale... It requires strategy, determination, will, concentration of forces. And the key point is that it requires ideology. Big geopolitics requires big ideas”2.

the public administration system, which he will hand over to his successor in the future.

Speaking about the foreign policy situation, we should note that the State Duma election that took place on September 17–19, 2021 was held under relatively calm conditions. The term “relatively” in this context is most appropriate. Granted, there have been no concrete and drastic steps aimed at weakening Russia; nevertheless, the anti-Russian sanctions still remain, as well as regular references to the “Russian threat” in public speeches by international politicians, attempts by the Ukrainian authorities to consolidate the Western political establishment based on opposition to the Kremlin’s geopolitical influence, the ongoing tension due to occasional large-scale military exercises and attempts to make Russia the main culprit of the energy crisis in Europe.

Nevertheless, if we assess the international political situation around Russia during the parliamentary election and (for example) at the beginning of 2021, we can state with a certain degree of confidence that it has not experienced a dramatic deterioration. This is partly due to an objective combination of circumstances that does not depend on the actions of the Russian authorities (such circumstances include a continuing decline in the geopolitical status of the United States after the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, the instability of political relations between some foreign countries ³ , the “gas crisis” in Europe).

However, in many ways, the fact that the State Duma election campaign was as peaceful as possible and was not accompanied by any signs of a sharp deterioration, is the result of the following purposeful and strategically verified actions of the President himself and his team:

V some tension in relations with the United States (which is especially evident in comparison to the beginning of 2021) was eased after a personal meeting between Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden in June 2021;

V a law prohibiting persons involved in the activities of extremist organizations from being elected to any positions in power ⁴ was adopted in time (or maybe it was a bit overdue); this, in fact, leveled the possibilities of the non-systemic opposition to create a situation of mass protests around the parliamentary elections, similar to the one that took place in 2011 ⁵ ;

V the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was completed; today the pipeline is becoming an important tool in ensuring the economic, energy and political security of the country;

V the Russian economy has been gradually recovering after a crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (as announced by the President on September 21, 2021).

“Despite the general unstable situation in the global economy and the complex processes going on in world markets, the Russian economy has recovered. Just a little while ago, we said it “has recovered in general”; today we can already say that it has recovered”6.

The head of state made sure that foreign policy conditions did not become a force majeure circumstance that prevails on the Russians’ choice of the new parliament composition. Or, in other words, the voting results reflect the internal sociopolitical agenda and the internal state of Russian society quite clearly.

For example, we would like to focus on some of the most significant trends according to the results of the analysis of the database of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation ⁷ .

First, the increase in voter turnout in 2021 in comparison with the 2016 State Duma election (Insert 1).

If we compare the results of parliamentary elections from 20078 to 2021, it should be noted that over the past 13 years, the number of Russians taking part in the voting has decreased by 13 million people (the turnout has decreased from 64 to 52%; see Insert 1).

However, in 2021, compared with 2016, nationwide turnout increased by 4 p.p. (from 48 to 52%), that is, by almost 3.8 million people. At the same time, in the 2016 election the turnout growth was noted only in four regions of the Russian Federation, while in 2021 it was noted in 60 regions (Tab. 1) .

The increase in the voting period from one to three days, as well as the introduction of an online voting form, could hardly have produced such a significant impact. For example, the increase in the voting period up to three days at the referendum on the adoption of amendments to the Constitution did not lead to the fact that the turnout at the polling stations was greater than at the presidential election in 2018 (in both cases it was 68%).

Table 1. The number of RF constituent entities in which the turnout at the State Duma elections has increased

Turnout, % of the number of voters 2016 compared to 2011 (results of the election to the State Duma of the 7th convocation) 2021 compared to 2016 (results of the election to the State Duma of the 8th convocation) Dynamics (+ / –) Amount of RF constituent entities in which the turnout increased 4 60 +54 Calculated according to: RF Central Election Commission database. Available at:

Insert 1

– from 48 to 52% (by 4 p.p., or 3.8 million people). The increase in the turnout is observed in almost all federal districts (except the Volga and Ural federal districts, where the share of people participating in parliamentary elections has been steadily decreasing since 2007). At the same time, in general, over the period from 2007 to 2021, voter turnout at the elections to the State Duma decreased by 12 p.p. (from 64 to 52%); moreover, the decrease is noted in all federal districts. Thus, over the past 14 years, the number of people voting in parliamentary elections in the country as a whole has decreased by 13 million people.

In addition, online voting in the 2021 election took place only in seven RF constituent entities ⁹ , and in all these territories, the turnout was less than the national average (43–50 vs. 52%; Tab. 2 ).

Second, the internal state of Russian society is reflected in the voting results for United Russia, the ruling party.

During the period from 2007 to 2021, the share of votes cast for the United Russia party decreased from 64 to 50%, or by almost 17 million voters (from 45 to 28 million; Fig. 1; Insert 3 ).

In 2021, the nationwide support for the party in power decreased from 54 to 50% (0.5 million people); deterioration of the position of United

Table 2. Dynamics of voter turnout at the election to the RF State Duma in the constituent entities in which online voting was tested in 2021

Территория* Turnout Year Dynamics (+ / –), 2021 to... 2007 2011 2016 2021 2016 2011 2007 % Russia 63.78 60.21 47.88 51.72 +3.84 –8.49 –12.06 Moscow 55.36 61.71 35.35 50.26 +14.91 –11.45 –5.10 Sevastopol – – 47.01 49.26 +2.25 – – Rostov Oblast 67.58 59.35 48.24 48.80 +0.56 –10.55 –18.78 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 57.28 58.87 44.49 48.48 +3.99 –10.39 –8.80 Kursk Oblast 63.27 54.74 47.02 47.01 –0.01 –7.73 –16.26 Murmansk Oblast 58.14 51.87 39.73 43.84 +4.11 –8.03 –14.30 Yaroslavl Oblast 62.38 55.88 37.80 43.40 +5.60 –12.48 –18.98 people. Russia 69609446 65766594 52700992 56484685 +3783693 –9281909 –13124761 Moscow 3970859 4433781 2634377 3905133 +1270756 –528648 –65726 Sevastopol 2233577 1964245 1573413 1659674 +86261 –304571 –573903 Rostov Oblast 1591380 1601889 1196988 1246468 +49480 –355421 –344912 Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 663813 590383 389313 436834 +47521 –153549 –226979 Kursk Oblast 618864 519503 443485 424788 –18697 –94715 –194076 Murmansk Oblast 411455 349647 248532 257491 +8959 –92156 –153964 Yaroslavl Oblast – – 147430 166555 +19125 – – * Ranked in descending order of the turnout in 2021. Calculated according to the RF Central Election Commission database. Available at:

Source: RF Central Election Commission database. Available at:

Figure 1. Dynamics of support for the United Russia party in the State Duma elections for the period from 2007 to 2021

Russia compared to the previous elections to the State Duma was noted in 70 RF constituent entities (Tab. 3) . At the same time, we cannot but agree with the estimates of experts who note that “if the ruling party gains 50% of the votes with a turnout of 50%, this means that only a quarter of citizens support the government” ¹⁰ . Nevertheless, United Russia managed to maintain a constitutional majority in parliament.

Such contradictory results for the support gained by the party in power objectively reflect the current public sentiment; on the one hand, people are dissatisfied with the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life, they do not approve of the stalling of national projects and promises voiced by the head of state in his Address to the Federal Assembly in 2018; on the other hand, society tries to address existing problems within the framework of the socio-political consensus that has developed today, supports the system of public administration created by V.V. Putin and supports the President of the Russian Federation himself.

Third, it is worth noting that there is a growing support for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and for the Just Russia party, while the position of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) has deteriorated; all this reflects the public’s demand for an agenda of a “leftist”

nature (social justice, strong state power, priority of traditional spiritual and moral values) ¹¹ .

Nationwide, the share of people who voted for the KPRF increased by 6 p.p. (from 13 to 19%; Insert 4 ). If in 2016, compared with 2011, the growth of support for the KPRF was noted only in 11 RF constituent entities, then in 2021, compared with 2016, it was noted in 79 regions (see Tab. 3).

The share of Russians who voted for Just Russia in 2021 increased by 2 p.p. compared to 2016 (from 6 to 8%; Insert 5 ). On the one hand, this is not much, but, on the other hand, the growth is noted in 63 RF constituent entities (while in the previous election, the increase in support for Just Russia was registered only in 11 regions). In part, the increase in support is due to the unification of the party with Z. Prilepin’s bloc; however, in our opinion, this is not the only explanation (as evidenced by the growth of support for the KPRF, and the deterioration of the position of the LDPR).

As for the LDPR, the nationwide share of those who support it has almost halved (from 12 to 7%; Insert 6 ). Moreover, we should pay attention to the fact that in the 2021 parliamentary election, the share of votes cast for the LDPR increased only in seven RF constituent entities, while in 2016 – in 68 (see Tab. 3).

Table 3. Number of RF constituent entities in which the support for parliamentary parties increased, % of voters

Political party 2016 to 2011 (results of the election to the State Duma of the 7th convocation) 2021 to 2016 (results of the election to the State Duma of the 8th convocation) Dynamics (+ / –) United Russia 52 15 –37 KPRF 11 79 +68 LDPR 68 7 –61 Just Russia 11 63 +52 Calculated according to the database of the RF Central Election Commission. Available at:

10 Glazyev S.Yu. The future lies with open voting. Official Website of S.Yu. Glazyev. September 29, 2021. Available at:

11 The remaining parties (the ecological party “Zelenyye”, the Russian united democratic party “Yabloko”, the all-Russian political party “Partiya Rosta”, the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice, the Communists Party of Communist of Russia, the Civic Platform party, the Green Alternative party, the All-Russian political party “Motherland”, the Party of Pensioners) could not overcome the 5% barrier and gained 8.85% of the votes nationwide (in total, 4.98 million people voted for these parties).

Insert 3

districts, except the North Caucasian Federal District. Moreover, in five of the eight districts (Volga, Ural, Siberian, Far Eastern, Northwestern), the share of votes cast for the United Russia party in 2021 was lower than in 2016 and 2007.

In general, over the period from 2007 to 2021, the share of Russians who voted for United Russia in the State Duma elections decreased by 14 p.p. (from 64 to 50%), that is, over the past 14 years, the party in power lost 16.7 million votes.

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districts (especially in the Far Eastern, Ural and Central – by 6–10 p.p.).

At the same time, in the period from 2007 to 2021, the LDPR has not actually lost its positions: in all federal districts, changes are insignificant (no more than 1% of votes). Nationwide support for the LDPR decreased from 8.1% to 7.6%, or by 1.4 million people.

Following the results of the vote, the New People party appeared in the State Duma for the first time. Apparently, the fact that the party was able to overcome the 5% barrier in most RF constituent entities (58) indicates that its program ¹² reflects the interests of a certain part of Russia’s population, primarily young people, who act as the “main force of the party” ¹³ .

“The success of the New People [Novyye lyudi] party is explained in different ways. One of the reasons can be that this political project has an advantageous name, which resonated with the people who were tired of the irremovability of the establishment. Another explanation is that New People met the expectations of market supporters and business for a moderately liberal party” ¹⁴.

In particular, the State Duma has become more balanced after it included the New People party in its composition. According to experts, “following the results of the September election, the State Duma now consists of two accumulating structures. They include the party that attracts the extreme leftwing post-Soviet populism, that is, the Communist

“A parliamentary billet is being constructed, within the framework of which it would be possible to carry out party and personnel modernization without the loss of manageability ...

The presidential administration has already taken over the personnel issue... here we see a long-term governmental strategy to form a meritocratic corps of managers, governors, officials – and now politicians”15.

Party, and the new right-wing parties, whose task is to support liberal shifts and unpopular reforms” ¹⁶ .

Thus, perhaps the main outcome of the latest State Duma election consists in the fact that its result reflects objective trends in Russia’s public sentiment. This includes strengthening civic consciousness, defining clear boundaries of the socio-political consensus based on the priority of national interests and the basic values of the welfare state, and strengthening the role of young generations in shaping the political agenda.

Apparently, such a result was achieved mainly due to the efforts undertaken by V. Putin and his team, who tried to reduce the severity of internal and external force majeure factors as much as possible. First, they managed to ease international political tension around Russia; second, they prevented possible attempts of the non-systemic opposition (the “fifth column”) to discredit the results of the vote.

We should note that the initiatives and management decisions taken by V. Putin are aimed at the long-term perspective, at the future generations of Russians. In this sense, such significant moments of modern Russian history as the 2007 Munich speech of the President, the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, the amendments to the 2020 Constitution, etc., perform the same role as the “less visible” decisions adopted by V. Putin or his ideological associates from the patriotic, nationally oriented bloc (for example, arrests of regional level leaders17; personnel changes in key positions responsible, in particular, for the development of the education and upbringing system, which is designed to ensure a high moral level of the younger generations18, etc.).

All these steps, as well as the creation of the most peaceful internal and external political

“According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation in 2020 “ 949 law enforcement officials, 539 officials of state and local government bodies, 58 deputies of the regional and municipal level who committed corruption-related crimes have been convicted”¹⁹.

“In total, 34 heads of regions, including 19 in office, have been prosecuted in Russia since 1996... ten governors were convicted in the past five years ”²⁰.

situation during the State Duma election, the situation that allows Russian citizens to make the most informed and verified choice in accordance with their internal needs and beliefs, are consistent elements of a unified whole – the construction of a new Russian statehood, the main postulates of which were outlined by V.V. Putin in his 1999 article “Russia at the turn of the Millennium”.

Other concrete steps taken by the President himself and his associates, who share state priorities in the administration system were aimed at building a “strong state” and “forming an integral system of state regulation of the economy and social sphere”.

Keynotes of V.V. Putin’s article “Russia at the turn of the Millennium”21 (1999):

“Achieving the necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. This is also a political problem and, I dare say, in a certain sense, an ideological one. More precisely, an idea-driven, spiritual, moral problem.

Chances for a decent future:

• A)    The Russian idea. Fruitful creative work, which our Fatherland needs so much, is impossible in a society that is in a state of disruption, that is internally divided... The main point of consolidation of Russian society is what we can call the primordial, traditional values of Russians: patriotism, sovereignty, statesmanship, social solidarity.

• B)    A strong state. We are at a stage when even the most correct economic and social policy fails due to the weakness of the state authorities and governing bodies. The key to the revival and rise of Russia today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs a strong state power and must have it. This is not a call for a totalitarian system... A strong state power in Russia is a democratic, legal, capable federal state.

• C)    Efficient economy.

• 1.    I think that one of the main lessons consists in the fact that throughout all these years we have been moving gropingly, at random, without clear ideas about national goals and frontiers that will ensure Russia’s position as a highly developed, prosperous and great country. The absence of such a promising development strategy designed for 15–20 years or more is particularly acute in the economy... The country needs a longterm national development strategy.

• 2.    The second important lesson of the 1990s is the conclusion about the need for Russia to form an integral system of state regulation of the economy and social sphere... The point is to make the Russian state an effective coordinator of the economic and social forces of the country, building a balance of their interests, determining optimal goals and parameters of social development, creating conditions and mechanisms for their achievement.

• 3.    The third lesson is the transition to the implementation of a reform strategy that would be optimal for the conditions of our country.

• 4.    We cannot but see that for Russia, any transformations and measures that involve deterioration in people’s living conditions are practically out of the question”.

First of all, this applies directly to the State Duma elections. For example, if in the 2016 parliamentary election the President of the Russian Federation and his All-Russian Popular Front distanced themselves from United Russia (which, according to experts, became one of the factors contributing to a decline in the electoral ratings of the party in power ²² ), then in 2021 the situation has changed dramatically. Experts note that “at the last stage, the President actually led the United Russia campaign” ²³ , and V. Volodin, Speaker of the State Duma, openly stated that the “high result of United Russia” is due to the support of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin” ²⁴ .

In June 2021, the head of state participated in the 20th Congress of United Russia and presented five of its leaders (S. Shoigu, S. Lavrov, E. Shmeleva, D. Protsenko, A. Kuznetsova) who became the “face” of the party, replacing Dmitry Medvedev (who performed the role in 2016).

After the announcement of the final results of the voting, the President has initiated the creation of five party commissions25, which, according to the head of state, “will help to build the work so that

• K. Kostin (Chairman of the Board of the Civil Society Development Fund): “The party has always had separate commissions and projects at different levels, but the current commissions are structures of a different level, among other things because they are headed by political heavyweights.

The new commissions will not duplicate the work of existing authorities, for example, the Ministry of Health or the State Duma Education Committee. They will become points of coordination of various branches of government. The fact is that United Russia is not only a legislative power at the State Duma level, and not only an executive power at the governmental level. United Russia also includes regional authorities (governors, legislative assemblies). And their work must be brought together. Do not forget about responsibility. The President, as the leader of the party, and its top five members symbolize this responsibility” ²⁶.

all the instructions of the voters and the people’s program of the party are fully implemented” ²⁷ .

According to political scientists, in this way, “points of coordination of various branches of government” were created, which, obviously, was another step in streamlining the entire system of public administration under the direct leadership of the head of state.

Apparently, a series of V.Putin’s personal meetings with leaders of the Duma factions was aimed at addressing the same task, which experts assessed as “setting up the Lower House for constructive work” ²⁸ .

In addition, on September 27, 2021, United Russia deputies A.A. Klishas and P.V. Krasheninnikov (who were part of the working group on the preparation of proposals for amendments to the RF Constitution) submitted a draft law “On a unified system of public power” (USPP) to the State Duma; the draft law, in particular, involves the abolition of the limit on the number of terms for the election of governors, but most importantly (as experts note) – actually leaves the role of “the only real manager” to the President, and turns everyone else into “hired managers”29.

It is also important to note that on the same day (September 27, 2021), a regular meeting of the Security Council was held, at which V.V. Putin initiated a discussion of the main directions for improving the strategic planning system. The head of state noted that “we need a balanced, consistent and integrated strategic planning system to create up-to-date and well thought-out plans and programs to achieve specific results. Our planning system should encourage all government bodies, civil society in general, and the business community to follow

K. Kalachev (Head of the Political Expert Group): “The law on USPP is the cherry on the cake; all these years, in fact, we were witnessing defederalization and the formation of a unitary centralized state, it remains only to formalize it legislatively. The government seeks to adjust all regions to unification, despite local and national specifics; they are being levelled regardless of their differences, in order to strengthen control. At the same time, there is a goal to secure the opportunity for governors, who are effective from the Kremlin’s point of view, to continue what they started. And to be re-elected in order to hold the election of 2024 peacefully, since, apparently, according to the estimates of the supreme power, many regions in which the powers of their heads are about to expire successfully coped with the elections of this year and withstood some kind of stress test. And it is important that regions have no vacillations associated with a possible reboot of the system – the governors have received a clear message that horses won’t be changed in midstream”. At the same time, the expert noted that it does not matter whether this initiative was intended for the President or for his successor, since the chosen course of strengthening the vertical of power is being continued, any possibility of turbulence should be eliminated” ³⁰.

“The first reading of the draft law on public authority has already been scheduled for November 9... it is quite obvious that the customer of the Klishas-Krasheninnikov draft law is the presidential administration, which carries out the instructions of the leader of the country. Judging by the text of the document, the main thing was to fulfill this instruction as soon as possible...

One of the novelties of the future law is to create such conditions for interaction between the executive and representative authorities in regions, which in case of conflicts will lead them to dead ends, which only the President of the Russian Federation or the State Council on his behalf will be able to overcome ”³¹.

the same logic and achieve priority goals together for the sake of a successful, prosperous future in Russia” ³² .

“The Government has prepared the Integrated Plan to achieve the national development goals... I would like to thank my colleagues from the Government and, considering today’s conversation, do the following.

First, bring all the indicators of the Integrated Plan in line with the results of 2020 in order to fully consider the significant changes that have taken place both in Russia and all over the world.

Second, it is necessary that our goals and indicators for the upcoming period until 2024 are in line with the level we are starting from.

Third, I would like to ask you to outline the specific plans and results that will be achieved in the next three years on every national goal based on the prepared Integrated Plan, so we can review them after 2023”33.

Recall that Vladimir Putin spoke about the need to improve the strategic planning system at a meeting of the State Council in December 2020, after which some experts noted that Russia, in fact, “is reviving Gosplan on the example of the USSR”, and “the initiative to revive Gosplan in the country belongs personally to the President of Russia” ³⁴ .

However, in September 2021, after the adoption of a new National Security Strategy and the successful implementation of the parliamentary election, the task of improving the strategic planning system was set by the President in a new, more specific form. Thus, the participants of the Council considered the draft “Fundamentals of state policy in the field of strategic planning in the Russian Federation”, which (according to the Secretary of the Security Council N. Patrushev) is scheduled to be submitted to the head of state for approval in November 202135.

Thus, over the past months, we see a clear course of actions taken by the RF President so as to strengthen the internal foundations of Russian statehood, which is a logical continuation of his initiative to amend the RF Constitution.

Today, some signs of a “recovery” in the administration system are already evident. Thus, a number of experts express a cautious “hope that the Mishustin government has become stronger to such an extent that it will really begin to limit the arbitrariness of the monopoly” ³⁶ . This happened after the decision was made to increase the tax on excess profits for the oligarchs. “A very serious step has been taken, and what is absolutely and fundamentally important – it has been taken upon the consent of the parties” ³⁷ .

“For quite a while, there has been an ongoing discussion concerning the desire of the Mishustin government to deprive the oligarchs of the part of the super profits they receive due to favorable economic conditions. The discussion went on for a long time, various statements were made, and here is the conclusion: the government will introduce an excise tax on steel – 2.7% and change the calculation of the mining tax, not only for ore, but also for coal and fertilizers. As a result, the level of withdrawal of natural rent in the relevant industries from the beginning of next year will reach a level that is officially recognized as the global average. That is, they discussed the problem regarding metallurgists, and during the discussion they expanded the scope of raising the tax on excess profits to include coal oligarchs and oligarchs who produce fertilizers”38.

However, there still remains a full range of tasks that the President has to address; and the goals he set for himself in 1999 are yet to be achieved. Apparently, this work will continue after 2024, when the next presidential election will take place in Russia.

High-profile corruption scandals are still breaking out in the administration system. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the persons involved in them are directly related to the system responsible for the upbringing of the younger generations – not only for their educational potential, but also their moral and ethical level.

The dynamics of subjective assessments of the population regarding their own financial situation have not shown steady positive changes for many years; this fact obviously plays a key role in reducing support for the party in power in the long-term (over the past 14 years) and short-term (over the past 5 years) dynamics.

Even in the “pre-covid” period (actually since 2013), according to the results of a long-term sociological monitoring, the proportion of people considering themselves “poor and extremely poor” exceeded the proportion of people with “average earnings” (Fig. 2) .

In October 2021, former Vice President of Sberbank, Ex-Deputy Minister of Education of Russia Marina Rakova (who held this position in 2018–2020) was charged with fraud. The case against Rakova was initiated on the fact of embezzlement of budget funds during the implementation of the state program “Education” in 2019, when she was Deputy Minister of Education. Suspicions were raised after an expertise that revealed inconsistencies in the performance of the work under state contracts. The damage caused to the state, according to the investigation, amounted to 50 million rubles. Other defendants in the case included S. Zuev (rector of Moscow Higher School of Social and Economic Sciences of a non-state university, better known as Shaninka), K. Kryuchkova (executive director of Shaninka) and a number of other persons.

As experts have noticed, “under Rakova, the contractor of the project “Teacher of the future” within the framework of the Russian national project “Education” was a non-governmental university that works closely with the UK. If someone starts testifying, it may turn out that the “Teacher of the future” cost the government even more than the fifty million rubles already stolen” ³⁹.

Figure 2. Dynamics of social self-identification, percent of respondents

Question: “What category do you belong to, in your opinion?” Source: VolRC RAS public opinion monitoring.

Many important points that characterize the current socio-political situation in the country also manifested themselves during the State Duma election. Moreover, they are noted at all territorial levels (federal, regional, municipal), which indicates their complex, system-wide and long-term nature.

The analysis of Central Election Commission data shows that voter turnout at parliamentary elections is significantly lower than for presidential elections or for the all-Russian referendum on amendments to the Constitution. For example, at the 2016 and 2021 State Duma elections, the turnout was 48–52% (53–57 million people); at the latest presidential election (2018) and the allRussian vote on constitutional amendments (2020) the turnout was 68% (74 million people; Insert 7; Tab. 4 ).

The same applies to the support for the government represented, on the one hand, by the United Russia party, on the other hand, personally by V.V. Putin (at the presidential election) and the amendments he proposed to introduce to the Basic

Law (at the all-Russian referendum in 2020): 50– 54% voted for United Russia in the parliamentary elections of 2016 and 2021 (28 million people); 77% voted for V.V. Putin in the 2018 presidential election and for amendments to the Constitution in 2020 (see Insert 7; Tab. 4).

Thus, Central Election Commission data show that presidential elections attract much more attention of the population than parliamentary elections; in our opinion, this indicates that Russians hope and expect that the head of state take decisive action in addressing the most critical issues. Some experts note that “it is President Vladimir Putin that is the main and ideally the only real politician in Russia” ⁴⁰ .

Amendments to the Constitution concerning the distribution of powers between the authorities ⁴¹ , the emergence of the “right wing”, the New People party, in the State Duma – these events apparently can be considered as steps toward the creation of an extensive, balanced and stable system of public administration. Moreover, these steps certainly have

Table 4. Voter turnout dynamics at key elections at the federal level

Voter turnout and support for the authorities 2007		State Duma elections				Presidential election	All-Russian vote on amendments to the Constitution
		2007	2011	2016	2021	2018	2020
Turnout	%	63.78	60.21	47.88	51.72	67.54	67.97
	million people	69.6	65.8	52.7	56.5	73.6	74.2
Support for the	%	64.30	49.31	54.20	49.82	76.64	77.92
authorities*	million people	44.7	32.4	28.5	28.1	56.4	57.8

* Support for the United Russia party in the elections to the State Duma; support for V.V. Putin in the RF presidential election; support for amendments to the Constitution in the all-Russian referendum.

Calculated according to the RF Central Election Commission database. Available at: potential that will fully reveal itself in the future. But so far, this task still requires a solution, and it is not clear how it will be addressed further.

In addition, calculations carried out according to official CEC data in cities with major metallurgical corporations have shown that negative trends in long-term dynamics are more pronounced at the municipal level than at the national average, federal district, or regional levels.

For example, during the period from 2007 to 2021, there was a decrease in the turnout at parliamentary elections and support for United Russia:

V in Lipetsk by 20—24 p.p., and in the Lipetsk Oblast as a whole by 12–14 p.p.;

V in Magnitogorsk by 25—31 p.p.; in the Chelyabinsk Oblast by 21–27 p. p.;

V in Cherepovets by 23—27 p.p.; in the Vologda Oblast by 19–26 p.p. (Insert 7; Tab. 5) .

At the same time, we should note that during the period from 2007 to 2021 in all three analyzed cities, both the turnout and the support for the party in power decreased more dramatically (by 20–30 p.p.) than in the country as a whole (by 12–15 p.p.).

Thus, different methods reflecting the dynamics of public opinion (which include the results of sociological surveys, expression of the will of the people at elections and referendums of various levels) prove that the historical goals that V.V. Putin has been trying to achieve consistently throughout his presidential terms still require considerable effort and time.

First of all, this concerns poverty whose dynamics have produced no positive changes for many years; this fact gradually leads to a loss of people’s trust in the party of power (as evidenced by the loss of 17 million votes by United Russia in parliamentary elections over the past 14 years) and forces the head of state to recognize low incomes of Russians as “our main enemy and threat”.

“Our country, and hence all of us, are facing many difficult challenges. I will repeat that the low average income of our citizens, of millions of people, is our main enemy, a threat to steady development and our demographic future” ⁴².

Table 5. Dynamics of the voting results (turnout and support of the party in power) in the elections to the State Duma of the 5th and 8th convocations

Territory	Dynamics (+ / –), 2021compared to 2007
	Turnout		Support for the United Russia party
	%	people	%	people
Russia	–12.06	–13124761	–14.48	–16650041
Northwestern Federal District	–15.85	–1780948	–22.08	–1893983
Vologda Oblast	–18.93	–217121	–26.07	–241500
Cherepovets	–23.09	–63808	–26.62	–65399
Central Federal District	–12.36	–7219676	–15.37	–4009647
Lipetsk Oblast	–12.42	–131879	–13.62	–147954
Lipetsk	–20.40	–80140	–24.40	–78361
Ural Federal District	–17.78	–1696610	–23.36	–2245245
Chelyabinsk Oblast	–20.72	–643878	–26.95	–715629
Magnitogorsk	–25.39	–92853	–31.09	–104466

Calculated according to the RF Central Election Commission database. Available at:

Insert 7

The second key problem logically proceeds from the first one: apparently, the system of public administration created over the past 20 years fails to cope with the problem of poverty, which means that this system needs to be changed. Maybe this change should not be comprehensive and radical, but (in the President’s usual way) careful, consistent and to the point.

At the same time, the work of the head of state aimed at making appropriate personnel decisions, as well as his initiatives on reforming the system foundations of public administration and Russian society itself , is largely dictated by the time factor – the need to get as close as possible to achieving the goals set in 1999 while the President remains the central figure (moderator) in the system of public administration. After Russian society supported the constitutional amendment on the “zeroing” of presidential terms, the severity of this issue somewhat reduced, but did not disappear completely.

The tasks set by the President (to strengthen traditional values in society; reform the system of public administration; ensure a steady upward trend in in the standard of living and quality of life (primarily in the subjective assessments of the population); to achieve a geopolitical status of Russia as a stable, sovereign state respected by foreign partners; ensure its energy and territorial security for the long term) are of a historical nature; therefore, addressing these tasks is not limited to 2024, 2030, or any other year when presidential elections will be held and there is a chance that V.V. Putin may leave the post of head of state.

The task for Vladimir Putin personally is to “hand over” the country to his successor in a condition that corresponds to the ideological guidelines he set out in 1999 and consistently defended throughout the following decades. By the way, they showed the consistency of the ideas of a “humanistically active social state”, expressed in the priority of the “concept of the dignity of man and citizen”43, as well as traditional values as the basis for consolidation of Russian society; today they determine the boundaries of socio-political consensus, that is, the needs of society on the one hand, and the goals of state policy on the other.

What beliefs will Vladimir Putin’s successor adhere to? Will he/she be able to maintain the high standard set by the President’s actions in the domestic and foreign political arena (especially in the assessments of Russian society)? These are the questions that cannot be answered today; therefore, this requires the political administration system to be all set for overcoming any obstacles to the progressive development of Russia.

“We may say that current Russian society is in as hybrid-transitional condition, and its economy is a mixed one, dominated by a modernized, but still peripheral oligarchic-corporate “capitalism for the elite”. This capitalism has basically exhausted its constructive potential, and Russian society needs to continue its post-socialist transformation into a new condition – the condition of a more civilized knowledge society. It has already entered in its preparatory phase, but its further movement has slowed down. In order to successfully continue the movement that has begun, it is necessary to implement “modernization for all”, and the social state, as a humanistically active state, can become its main actor in Russia... It is necessary to promote the main directions (spheres) of the humanistically active function of the state that consists in promoting the establishment of conditions that ensure a decent life and free development of a person, as well as regional communities and the whole society on the basis of the observance of human rights”44.

In conclusion, we should abstract our mind from the title of the article for a while, since the parliamentary election is not the first one and not the last one for Russian society. It is important to emphasize another point – what deep changes taking place in the state, the country, the population are reflected in the results of the latest vote.

We think they indicate the following two things.

First, during the two decades of Vladimir Putin’s presidential terms, the country has formed an ideological vector of movement that is shared by both society and the state. This is a vector toward a welfare state, nationally oriented values, and a sovereign foreign policy. Even despite the absence of an official ideology in Russia and the existence of a “sixth column” in the system of public administration, there is simply no other vector in modern Russia.

Second, it is premature to say that the transformation of Russian society (its historical transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet formation) has been completed. This also applies to the system of public administration. It is not yet clear how the natural change of generations will affect them; what role the inevitable transit of presidential power will play in the country’s history; whether the fate of the fifth column will befall the sixth column; when (and whether) the vector of Russians’ subjective perception of the dynamics of the standard of living and quality of life will be reversed; whether Russia will be able to resist the powerful wave of cultural and spiritual and moral decay coming from the West; whether the anti-Russian nature of the policy of key foreign countries will ever be fundamentally overcome... All these are questions that must be

A.G. Dugin about the “sixth column”:

“In our society, the fifth column usually denotes only those who oppose Putin openly and completely, those who support the United States and NATO; they are against Crimea, against Russia, against Russian identity, against sovereignty, against Eurasian integration, against Russia’s strengthening as a world power. This is open and pure betrayal, if we consider it on the nationwide scale; and in relation to Putin, these are his open enemies. The sixth column implies those whom we cannot yet accurately define in our political dictionary: its representatives are for Putin and for Russia, but at the same time for a liberal, pro-Western, modernized and westernized Russia, for globalization and integration into the Western world, for European values and institutions; they strive to make Russia a prosperous corporation in a world where the rules and laws are set by the global West, of which Russia is destined to become part – on as worthy and profitable grounds as possible. The sixth column is not Putin’s enemies, but his supporters. If they are traitors, it is not on the scale of the country, but on the scale of civilization…” ⁴⁵.

“The sixth column includes liberals and westerners who occupy a high position in the state – in the hierarchy, government, economy. They are no better than the fifth column. They also consider Russia to be the periphery of Western civilization, they also despise the people and the state, are just as cynical about Russian history and can’t wait to return to the blessed 1990s.

The sixth column has been resisting Putin’s course for a long time, but little by little it was forced to endure it. And even began to mumble sluggishly and insincerely about the “Crimean consensus”... And now we see how the direct adherents of globalization, Westernism, liberalism, and world hegemony are changing their ideological positions. They are already dressing up as “patriots” and wholeheartedly stand for sovereignty. And even if they do not do this and continue to express discontent – like Chubais, Kudrin or Gref, they do not directly oppose Putin, preferring to act surreptitiously” ⁴⁶.

answered; otherwise it will be impossible to say that the post-Soviet society has been formed, and Russia has occupied a stable and unique niche in a multipolar world.

“Of course, it is good that at the very top of the government and in the public discourse there is a strong traditionalist statist anti-liberal position. This is an absolute achievement of the period from 2014 to 2020. Some of the statements made on the main platforms of the country about the nationalization of the elites and mobilization were considered marginal until recently.

But when a word from high-ranking officials is not followed by a deed, it causes bewilderment and confusion among the people. I would very much like to hope that all this is a prolonged artillery preparation before historical changes and transition to full sovereignty, rather than an expression of the impotence of the healthy part of the government, which is in the minority; while the systemic liberals are quietly working on the decomposition of society in the interests of their “partners”47.

Thus, the latest election to the State Duma of the 8th convocation, on the one hand, has demonstrated the growing discontent of Russians with regard to how the current party in power and the President are coping with key problems of concern to the population. On the other hand, society has given the head of state another “credit of trust”, hoping that through gradual reforms and personal initiatives he will be able to put the public administration system in order, as evidenced by steady positive changes in the dynamics of people’s subjective assessments of the state of the economy, their personal financial situation, the standard of living and quality of life in the country.

A. Ilnitskii (Adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Full State Adviser of the 3rd class): “Today, Russia is at a crossroads, trying to determine the model of the future. Moreover, for us it can only be our own – inherent and sovereign – decision. Meanwhile, all the postSoviet years, Russia has been moving in the paradigm of a catching-up development, trying on Western democracy. Today, this model is “bursting at the seams” – the more important it is for Russia to find its way...

Russia has exhausted the time and social resources of inertial development. It’s time for Big Decisions and Big Projects. What is the ideology of the Big Project? ([3 of 19 points]):

V crucial importance of the leading and organizing role of the state;

V the idea of a single economic plan for the country as a key organizing document for the revival and recreation of the domestic economy based on the synthesis of best aspects of state planning and market self-organization;

V nationalization of the elites according to the principle “whoever is not with us is against us”. Those “who are not with us” must realize that they risk losing everything...” ⁴⁸

In fact, this is what Vladimir Putin said at a meeting with deputies of the State Duma after the final distribution of seats in parliament. Noting the fact that “low incomes of our citizens, of millions of our people” are “the main enemy” and “a threat to stable development, to the demographic future”, he actually assessed himself, as well as the system of public administration he created with the use of a “hands-on approach”, at the same time focusing it on addressing the problem of poverty as its priority task.

The very fact of such a direct and self-critical summing up testifies to the President’s awareness of personal responsibility both for his work and for the work of United Russia, but the fact remains that in order to defeat the “main enemy”, the President still has to make a lot of efforts (primarily in addressing the problem of nationalization of the elites) in order to reformat the system of public administration; so that the “point” personnel changes that are currently being observed have a truly comprehensive and system-wide effect.