All dogs go to heaven: animal resurrection and the problem of theodicy in western theology

This paper deals with the history of the doctrine of redemption of nonhuman living organisms in Western theology. While the belief in eschatological transfiguration of the whole universe has been an intrinsic part of Christian teaching from the very beginning, the afterlife of particular animals was not a matter of concern until the Modern era. Moreover, scholasticism, as St. Thomas Aquinas exemplifies, directly rejected the possibility of animal resurrection. Interest in the innocent suffering of both humans and animals was awakened in connection with the emergence of theodicy as a special intellectual project that has become a product of the secularization of thinking. The doctrine of the heavenly reward awaiting animals for their sufferings was called upon to protect faith in the all-goodness and justice of God. For the first time, this apologetic strategy was adopted by some Protestant authors of the 17th-18th centuries. However, the concept of the resurrection of animals continued to remain outside the theological mainstream until the second half of the 20th century, when it gained relevance due to the animal protection movement, the eschatological turn in theology and evolutionism, which blurred the boundary between humans and other biological species. Since the time of J. Moltmann the notion of animal redemption has been promoted by many Catholic and Protestant theologians as an important element of theodicy. The proponents of this idea generally seek to make the list of nonhuman creatures deserving resurrection as complete as possible to include in it not only pets and other animals related to humans, but all individual organisms with even rudimentary personhood and consciousness. The relations between the doctrine of animal redemption and the soul-making theodicy are discussed, and other possible approaches to problem of innocent sufferings are delineated. The compatibility of the doctrine of the redemption of animals with the soul-making theodicy is discussed, and alternative approaches to the problem of innocent suffering are outlined.