Supreme Courts in Cooperation between the Center and Regions in Federations (Using the Example of the USA, Germany and the Russian Federation)

Автор: Butylin M.A.

Журнал: Общество: политика, экономика, право @society-pel

Рубрика: Политика

Статья в выпуске: 12, 2025 года.

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This article examines the role of supreme judicial bodies in ensuring stable interactions between the federal center and the constituent entities of federal states. Using case studies from the United States, Germany, and Russia, the article analyzes the participation of supreme courts in resolving disputes between levels of government. The focus is on two key characteristics of judicial activity: institutional independence and the enforceability of decisions. The analysis shows that the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany combines high autonomy, participation of federal subjects in the composition of its courts, and stable enforcement of decisions, ensuring its significant role in regulating federal relations. The US Supreme Court generally maintains its balancing function, but faces increasing political polarization and variability in the enforcement of its decisions. In the Russian model, despite its formally broad powers, the Constitutional Court is characterized by limited autonomy and low regional involvement, which reduces its influence on inter-level interactions.

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Federalism, delineation of powers, judicial independence, inter-level relations, enforcement of judicial decisions, institutional sustainability

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/149150277

IDR: 149150277   |   УДК: 342.56   |   DOI: 10.24158/pep.2025.12.5