What a 30-year absence of state ideology leads to: “Great nations are not built without great, guiding ideas, and having lost them, they collapse with a thunderous crash”

Автор: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V.

Журнал: Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast @volnc-esc-en

Рубрика: Editorial

Статья в выпуске: 4 т.18, 2025 года.

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This article is the third in a series of editorial publications released in April – August 2025 and dedicated to analyzing expert opinions on the necessity and feasibility of creating an official state ideology in the country. The relevance of this issue is driven, on the one hand, by national security concerns, which have sharply intensified since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, and on the other hand, by the goals of national development related to the need to define a vision for Russia's future in the context of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. A synthesis of expert assessments, facts, statistical data, and monitoring sociological studies, which reflect the state of society and people's subjective opinions about the situation in the country, leads to the conclusion that one of Russia's key internal problems is the unsatisfactory quality of its ruling elites. A significant portion of them are unprepared for change, continue to live by the principles of the country's departing era of “liberal fog”, and in every way, willingly or unwillingly, hinder Russia's transition to a new stage of historical development, thereby jeopardizing its present and future. In this sense, the ideology proposed by many experts, which would be “mandatory for those who aspire to join the cohort of leaders of the Russian state” (S.A. Karaganov), appears to the authors as a completely logical and necessary step on the part of the President and the ruling political party. As long as there is no clear answer to the question “What kind of state are we building?” at all levels of government, such an answer is also absent among the general public, and as a consequence, people's real lives often diverge from the public rhetoric of the authorities. The article focuses on the practical possibilities of implementing an ideology that could take on the character of a “philosophy of a common destiny” (Zh.T. Toshchenko) and form the basis of a new Social Contract, the need for which many experts have noted for our country. The authors' contribution consists of the systematization of expert opinions, statistical data, and public opinion polls covering Russia's historical development from the late 1990s (from the final years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency), as well as actual cases of corruption and high treason within the country's ruling elites (which primarily indicate that many of their representatives cannot be relied upon, as they are guided by personal interests that differ from the interests of the country, state, and society), and the administrative decisions made by the President, the Government, and the State Duma of the Russian Federation in the context of the pressing task of developing an ideology and forming a new Social Contract in Russia

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Ideology, national idea, new Social Contract, public administration effectiveness, special military operation

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147251827

IDR: 147251827 | УДК: 354 | DOI: 10.15838/esc.2025.4.100.1

Текст научной статьи What a 30-year absence of state ideology leads to: “Great nations are not built without great, guiding ideas, and having lost them, they collapse with a thunderous crash”

This article is the third part of a series of editorial publications united by the common title “What a 30-year absence of state ideology leads to”.

The first article published in April 2025¹ discusses objective historical processes that led to the “clash of civilizations” in the first quarter of the 21st century², due to the fact that the West, which is “at the peak of its power,” is faced with the “growth of civilizational self-awareness” and with the fact that non-Western countries are “returning to their own roots”.

In fact, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned the countries of the Collective West about the same thing in his Munich speech on February 10, 2007, when he said that “for the modern world, a unipolar model is not only unacceptable, but even impossible”3. And not as a forecast, but as an established fact, he noted this in his speeches in the mid-2020s, stating that “the countries of the world community are increasing their potential, changing the balance of power and the entire economic picture of the planet”4.

Indeed, the struggle of civilizations is an eternal process. “The world is a zone of constant conflicts, endless and ruthless competition of small, medium and large social communities (tribes, peoples, nations, civilizations) with plunder, humiliation and destruction for the losers. That’s how it was created... there was always a critical resource that one group wanted to take away from another”5.

In these conditions, it is extremely important what internal condition a country, civilization, its system of government, the state of society, etc. is in; how much it is internally ready to protect its national security and its national interests.

Especially when we consider the fact that “ the West has never had and will never have a more longterm enemy than Russian civilization. Hatred of Russia has always united Western civilization. The war against Russia has been waged by the West for at least 1,000 years ”⁶.

Therefore, in the first article (with the subtitle “The enemy is not only on the other side of the frontline” ), attention was focused on the fact that for Russia, the key internal threat to national security in this historical period is its own elites ; more precisely, that significant part of the elite on all levels of government that has been created and matured over the past 50 years and during the 25 years of Vladimir Putin’s presidential terms has not gotten rid of Western liberal dogmas in its worldview, as a result of which it does not want or cannot meet the new demands of the time, which are formulated by the President and have become key since the beginning of the special military operation (state sovereignty based on the principles of social justice and traditional values); thus the elite endangers the present and future of the country.

The real facts of corruption and high treason occurring at all levels of government are the clearest confirmation of this thesis. Some of them are presented in Insert 1 . Note that these are only facts that have occurred over the past two months (from June 10 to August 12, 2025), not to mention the much larger “accidents of the Russian statehood”⁷, which the country has had to face in recent years (such as the attempted armed coup carried out by the head of the Wagner Private Military Company E. Prigozhin on June 24, 2023, the arrest of deputy defense minister T. Ivanov on April 23, 2024, a series of detentions in late 2024 – early 2025 of persons involved in the activities of the Kursk Region Development Corporation (including ex-governor A. Smirnov, who was detained on April 15, 2025), which caused the invasion of the Kursk Region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) – “ the first case of invasion of Russia since the Second World War ”⁸. The Russian region was under the control of the AFU for 8 months and 20 days⁹. About 70 civilians were killed and 300 people were injured¹⁰, 1,174 residents of the region were on the wanted list¹¹, the material damage caused by the AFU’s attack on the Kursk Region exceeded three billion rubles¹²)…

13 Source: RT in Russian. The latest news about the arrests. Available at: Materials from TASS, RIA-Novosti, RBC, Kommersant, , news agencies were also used.

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The facts presented in Insert 1 indicate the systemic nature of corruption at all levels of government, and we note that this was revealed not after the start of the SMO, but much earlier. For example, A.I. Fursov wrote about this back in 2008. In 2017, V.A. Fadeev drew attention to the fact that large-scale criminal cases related to government corruption, broadcast in the media, are accompanied by “thousands of less high-profile cases” that few people know about…

We have been covering this topic (perhaps starting with one of the most high-profile criminal cases in Russia – against the current minister of economic development A. Ulyukayev14) on the pages of the Editorial column for many years15: we have cited official statistics of criminal cases, expert opinions, and specific facts about the actions of law enforcement agencies …1617

A. Fursov: “Corruption has been progressing throughout the post-Soviet period and has already acquired a systemic character. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian Federation, according to Transparency International, ranks 127th in terms of corruption (there are 174 countries in the list; for comparison: Brazil – 70th place, China – 71st, India – 74th; meaning that the closer to the first place, the lower the degree of corruption). According to the Indem Foundation, the amount of corrupt money in Russia exceeds the budget by 2.5–2.7 times; according to experts, in the last year or two, the standard size of a bribe in the Russian Federation has increased 13 times, and the volume of the corruption market has increased nine times.

The government has been delivering pinpoint strikes (during Putin’s presidency, according to V.S. Ovchinsky, 15 governors, heads of republics and chairmen of regional governments, 22 vice-governors, 15 mayors, 9 vice-mayors of territorial, regional and republican centers, 2 speakers of city dumas were accused and convicted or brought as witnesses); however, of course, this cannot systematically solve the problem: ‘snipers’ are not suitable where ‘katyushas’ are needed”¹⁶.

V. Fadeev: “The criminal cases of big officials are in plain sight, they are reported by the federal media. But there are thousands of less high-profile cases. For example, the famous case of Gaizer, head of the Komi Republic. In September 2015, he was arrested and charged with organizing a criminal community. Along with him, 14 more people were arrested, almost the entire top of the republic. Everyone knows about this case. It’s in plain sight. But few people outside the republic know about other anti-corruption cases in Komi: in 2015, 108 people were arrested in such cases, 113 last year, and 36 people were arrested in the 1st quarter of this year. But this is a very small region in terms of population…”¹⁷

Excerpt from the report of the analytical center of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Central Committee’s department for election campaigns “On cases against regional governors of the Russian Federation in 2000-2025: 29 criminal governors”: “Since 2000, according to Russian media, criminal cases have been initiated against 27 current or former governors. Almost everyone except S. Furgal (LDPR) and N. Belykh (self-nominated candidate) represented the United Russia party…”¹⁸

S. Obukhov (head of the Analytical Department of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee): “We observe the results of the management of the bourgeois-oligarchic system, in which the beneficiaries are conditionally 100 thousand families of the managerial elite... All these criminal cases are a clear signal of the crisis of the management model”¹⁹.
However, judging by the facts (presented in Insert 1) that continue during the SMO, this problem is only gaining relevance. Especially after the start of the special military operation, when the price of managerial mistakes, abuse of official authority and imitation of the fulfillment of direct instructions from the head of state sharply increased.¹⁸¹⁹²⁰
Thus, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in the first half of 2025, compared with the same period in 2022, the share of corruption-related crimes in the total number of crimes committed in Russia as a whole increased from 1.9% to 2.9% (or from 19 to 27 thousand cases), of which crimes related to bribery increased from 40 to 61% (or from 7.5 to 16 thousand; Tab. 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of corruption-related crimes in Russia

Indicator January – June 2012 г. January – June 2018 January – June 2022 January – June 2025 Dynamics (+/-), January – June 2025 to January – June 2022 abs. % abs. % abs. % abs. % abs. % Total number of crimes 1168045 100 992966 100 1003645 100 940519 100 -63126 0 corruption-related crimes* 34049 2.9 18696 1.9 18696 1.9 27124 2.9 +8428 +1 of them: related to bribery 6874 20.1 7519 40.2 7519 40.2 16480 60.8 +8961 +21 * Appears in the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 2012. Source: monthly reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation “The state of crime in Russia”. Official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Available at:

“The beginning of the SMO clearly showed the scale of the betrayal of the bureaucratic, cultural, media and business elite. Among the bribe takers and corrupt officials are generals of the Ministry of Defense, former deputy prime ministers and governors, ministers and heads of state corporations, deputies and cultural figures. Many, citing their anti-war position, fled to the coveted West.… But quite a few ‘elitists’ from the fifth column, who hate the president and his campaign, despise the patriotic upsurge in society, continue to actively work in government structures, in the media, in the field of culture, actually on the side of the enemy”²⁰.

Thus, it is obvious that there exist large, complex problems in the public administration system related to the moral character of a significant part of the ruling elites. This is evidenced by the real facts of corruption in power, statistical data, and opinions of many experts. But what is the reason for this?

The second article, published in June 2025, was devoted to the search for an answer to the above question²¹. Its subtitle, “The constitutional ban on state ideology means a ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism”²², explains the reason for the existence of the flaw of the entire post-Soviet system of public administration, which consists in the presence of a significant number of people “imbued” with liberal ideals and values of the “consumer society”, for which the main thing is “profit, and human rights are just an ideological background that hides the true essence of capitalism”²³.

As many experts point out, this flaw in the public administration system is caused by the country’s lack of its own ideology and lack of understanding of what kind of state we are building, which was fixed in the 1993 Constitution and which automatically consolidated the main outcome of the collapse of the USSR as a result of the defeat in the Cold War at the end of the 20th century – Russia’s “semi-colonial” position in relation to the Collective West; with all the ensuing consequences, starting, first of all, with the “semi-colonial” state of “minds”.²⁴

It is no coincidence that it was the Soviet elites – Gorbachev, Yeltsin and other “werewolves in power” (as Zh.T. Toshchenko, RAS Corres-

Yu. Afonin: “Human society always has one ideology or another… Otherwise, society simply could not exist and function. Why? Because ideology is, by and large, an understanding of how society should be organized, how people should behave in it. And also the rationale: why should it be this way and not otherwise…

You can write in the Constitution that there is no state ideology in the country. This is exactly what was done in the Russian Basic Law of 1993. But this rule has never actually been implemented. In reality, there was a state ideology, and it was openly imposed on society through the state media, through the education system. And this was precisely the ideology of liberalism…”²⁴

ponding Member, calls them) – played a key role in the collapse of the greatest world power of the 20th century – the Soviet Union25. And their very appearance was the culmination of a long process that began after the death of Joseph Stalin, when his era was replaced by the “Khrushchev thaw”, which destroyed the ideological foundations of the USSR, allowed (and even indulged in) the fact that the ruling elites gradually began to form closer ties with the West, share its values and ideals, and eventually were able to deeply imbue themselves with the idea that the Soviet “empire” should come to an end and started to promote this idea within the country, in their practical activities…

Some “werewolves in power”²⁶and their characteristic:

M. Gorbachev – “low cultural level, unscrupulousness, and primitivism of thinking led to the fact that he betrayed the ideals to which he swore in his youth and which he seemed to serve”;

B. Yeltsin – “betrayed the cause he served, rising to high party and government posts. He betrayed and sided with those for whom our Homeland was an “evil empire”;
N. Yakovlev – “his ambivalence was undeniable, and over time it only grew... there were and still are the most serious reasons to consider him a mole, that is, an enemy agent”;
B. Berezovsky – “his arrogance knew no bounds, and hardly anyone could surpass him in this… He stole on a gigantic scale. And he didn’t just steal, but often also demonstrated his impunity”;

A. Kozyrev* – “the most shameful foreign minister in the history of the country ... he is ready to do anything for the sake of profit”.

“First, in order to justify the overthrow of the Soviet system, the word ‘collapsed’ is used in relation to the USSR. They say that the Soviet Union was originally doomed to such an end, since its existence was an adventure conceived by Lenin and the Bolsheviks.…

Second, the undertakers of the USSR and their overt and hidden lackeys are very fond of this argument: they say that the Soviet people did not defend the USSR and agreed to its liquidation and the establishment of the CIS. But these statements completely ignore the fact that until the last days the Soviet people clearly expressed their position – the USSR must exist!

Third, there was a covert and latent deception of the people – manipulation of their consciousness. And the majority of people reacted based on historical experience. After all, there has been a change of leadership in the country from time to time. And each time, the new leader promised changes…

All of the above allows us to conclude that no objective circumstances led to that geopolitical catastrophe. Here, a huge and decisive role was played by the subjective factor – people who, by virtue of their position, consciously or thoughtlessly did everything to ensure that the Soviet country ceased to exist”²⁷.

On the other hand, a correct understanding of the “diagnosis” is the first step on the path to healing, and therefore the expression “A constitutional ban on state ideology means a ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism” contains the answer to the question “What should we do?”.2627

The third article is devoted to the analysis of expert opinions on this subject, the quintessence of which is reflected in the subtitle “Great nations are not built without great, guiding ideas, and having lost them, they collapse with a thunderous crash”²⁸.

Obviously, we are talking about the essence and the very possibility of adopting a state ideology in the country. Against the background of the challenges and tasks of national development that Russia faces today, after the beginning of the SMO, this issue is becoming more and more acute (Insert 2).

Is the very idea of adopting a state ideology in Russia a “distortion of the spirit and letter of the Constitution”²⁹, according to K. Remchukov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya gazeta newspaper?

Or, if we do not have an ideology, will we face the “inevitable decay and then degradation of the people and the country”³⁰, according to S. Karaganov, for instance?

Perhaps the key point in this discussion is the fact that “the term ‘state ideology’ has a negative connotation in modern Russian (political) language”³¹, which is caused by the experience of the Soviet past. In this sense, we agree with K. Remchukov that “the establishment of the principle of ideological diversity in the Constitution is one of the most important democratic achievements of the peoples of Russia”³².³³³⁴

Indeed, as the President has repeatedly stressed, “there is no Soviet Union, there is no return to the past. And Russia doesn’t need it anymore”³⁵. However, we should note that this is also understood by those who today advocate the need to create a state ideology in the country. Therefore, we are not talking about changing the Constitution, nor about radical methods of imposing ideology, nor even about its binding and directive nature for society.

With only one exception, a potential ideology should be mandatory “for those who seek to join the cohort of leaders of the Russian state”36.37

1. “Now, of course, we don’t necessarily need to repeal Article 13 of the Constitution, which prohibits state ideology. But I think the article is easy enough to bypass. For example, we can say that we are not offering ideology, but the Russian dream. That’s it”³³.
2. “It is clear that in the modern world and in modern, relatively free and pluralistic Russia, it is impossible to impose uniform binding ideological principles on everyone, as it was in the USSR. The imposed Marxist-Leninist unanimity and the lack of religion were among the key reasons for the intellectual emasculation of the ruling stratum of the USSR, which led to its defeat…
3. “Ideology may not necessarily be called ideology, in which case it will live under the guise of other concepts. Historically, this is often the case”³⁴.

“The Constitution states: “No ideology can be established as state or compulsory”. But this does not mean that there cannot be a SUPPORTED ideology. At least an ideology supported by the ruling party. The party not only can, it MUST have its own ideology, otherwise it is not a party, but a hobby club... No one prohibits or can prohibit the promotion and even the imposition of the moral and ethical “Code of the Russian” from kindergarten or school, the very living idea-dream of Russia, which people can and are called upon to strive for from a young age. Once again, the Code should not be binding on everyone, but mandatory for those who seek to join the cohort of leaders of the Russian state”³⁷.

End of Insert 2

For society, this is not an ideology imposed by “direct orders”, but rather a national idea, introduced from childhood “through textbooks, discussions, images, literature and art… Citizens need moral and patriotic guidelines”, S. Karaganov writes, “if not mandatory, then recommendatory”.

Vladimir Putin (1999): “I am against the restoration of state, official ideology in Russia in any form. There should be no forced civil consent in a democratic Russia. Any public consent here can only be voluntary. But that is why it is so important to achieve it on such fundamental issues as goals, values, and development milestones, which are desirable and attractive to the vast majority of Russians...”⁴⁸

Vladimir Putin (2024): “We had a dominant ideology… But the presence of a dominant ideology did not save the Soviet Union from collapse… Of course, there should be a unifying idea for a multinational country... we need unifying ideas. And of course, such a unifying idea – and today’s events show this – can be patriotism in the best, direct, rather than “patrioteer”, sense of the word”⁴⁹.

Thus, the expert opinion on potential Russian ideology today, taking into account the past 30th anniversary of the “liberal fog”, is as close as possible to the position of Vladimir Putin, who from the very beginning of his presidential term drew a clear distinction between the concepts of “ideology” and “national idea” and currently adheres to the same position.4849

And in this context, the state ideology (whatever you want to call it: “National Idea”⁵⁰, “Dream Idea”⁵¹, “Future Image”⁵², “Russian Dream”⁵³, etc.) is not just necessary, but natural, like air. After all, everything is really simple: the state always has one ideology or another, and the Russian Federation had one before 2022. But now it has collapsed, and that means it needs to be changed. If we do not change it ourselves, someone else will take over this niche again (as it was 30 years ago).⁵⁴

“Let’s make this clear: the Russian Federation had a state ideology, but it collapsed… If the ideology that was imposed on us 30 years ago cannot bring anything good to Russia, of course, it must be changed. We need a new ideology for the country’s development…”⁵⁴

The question of what this ideology should be is much more important and difficult. For example, the philosopher A. Dugin writes: “If we want to have an ideology, we will have to make a serious intellectual effort”55.56

After analyzing many expert opinions, we note the following: we believe that RAS Corresponding Member Zh.T. Toshchenko gave the most comprehensive, systematic answer to this question: he considers ideology not just as a kind of “Code of Honor” for the ruling elites, but in a deeper and broader context as a necessary condition for a new Social Contract.57

“A social contract is not a document. It is an independent social phenomenon, which is characterized by a special structure. This is a basic, but at the same time special state of the relationship between the government and the people, which is expressed in the philosophy of common destiny – the explicit (open) and latent mutually coordinated achievement of goals, means and methods of their implementation in the implementation of socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural transformations”⁵⁷.

“An analysis of the possibilities of ideological attitudes for consolidating Russian society shows that the Social Contract is under threat in the absence of a state ideology... The real situation requires the formulation of a strategic goal for the development of Russia, expressed in a state-social ideology with a clear definition of the means and methods of achieving it”⁵⁶.

Indeed, it is difficult to argue with experts that since the beginning of the SMO Russia has never come so close to forming a new Social Contract in its recent history (since the collapse of the USSR).58

Today, for our country, this is not just a natural development of the state, the starting point of which can be called 2000, the year of the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidential term. This is largely

“The implementation of the SMO, active and contradictory processes of socio-cultural turbulence within Russia and in neighboring countries require adjustments to the existing social contract”⁵⁸.

“As a result of the global transformation of the geopolitical system in 2022, the problem of a fundamental revision of the social contract arose... The shifts that have begun mark a radical change in the country’s governance regime from a dependent (colonial) to an independent (sovereign) one... There is already a need to form a qualitatively different social contract between the supreme power of Russia in the person of its president (and at the same time the leader of the nation!) and the population”⁵⁹.

a forced necessity dictated by the scenario of events in the foreign political arena.59

But in order for a Social Contract to take place in principle, it is necessary that it meets a number of criteria, which, according to Zh.T. Toshchenko, “form the basis of a social contract”⁶⁰(Fig. 1).⁶¹

The first and main one is the goal.

Many experts agree that currently the purpose of the Social Contract has not been formulated by the President of the Russian Federation. Neither, in fact, has been the ideology itself. Sovereignty, patriotism, social justice, etc. are necessary conditions for its realization, but these concepts do not give a definite “idea of reality, of history, of the place of a particular person in it and his obligations toward others”. Therefore, as Zh.T. Toshchenko rightly notes, “it is still unclear to many Russians what kind of State and society they are building”.

“The goal reflects the aspirations and orientations of the people ... The goal is perceived by people as achievable, even in a problematic situation…

At the same time, the state has a high responsibility to formulate a strategy for the development of the country that would satisfy the people not only in reality, but also would allow them to see a future life”⁶¹.

Figure 1. Criteria of a Social Contract

Source: Toshchenko Zh.T. (2025). The fate of the social contract in Russia: The evolution of ideas and the lessons of implementation: Monograph. Moscow: FCTAS RAS. P. 71.

Zh.T. Toshchenko: “As for modern Russia, the alignment of the goals of the state and the people largely shows uncertainty. It is still unclear to many Russians what kind of state and society they are building. The social state proclaimed in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, whose policy is aimed at creating conditions that ensure a decent life and free human development (Article 7.1), designates a certain general attitude that is not sufficiently specified before it is understood and implemented in current socio-economic, sociopolitical and everyday life”.

A. Shchipkov: “When talking about ideology, such obviously necessary concepts as sovereignty, statehood, patriotism, social justice, and a strong family are mentioned first of all. This series can be continued and refined. All this is necessary, but it is not an ideology, but the conditions for it”⁶².

S. Khudiev: “People sometimes consider ‘ideology’ as a set of moral ideals, such as solidarity, freedom or patriotism, or something related to national identity, such as ‘being proud of one’s history’. But this is not an ideology. Ideology presupposes a common set of ideas about reality, about history, about the place of a particular person in it and their obligations toward others.…”⁶³

In other words, based on the assessments of many experts, we can state that the first and main criterion of a Social Contract in Russia simply does not exist yet.6263

(which is expressed through the situation in the “economy; especially in terms of employment and the level of people’s welfare”⁶⁴) is also difficult to call satisfactory.

As Yu. Afonin writes, “it is possible to proclaim social justice, but it will be an empty phrase if most of the country’s property remains in the hands of several hundred oligarchic families”65.

Indeed, the Forbes list of the richest people on the planet continues to be replenished with Russian billionaires. In 2025, “the number of Russians in the ranking of the wealthiest people increased by 21 people and reached 146 people”⁶⁶; moreover, during the period of the SMO, each of them increased the amount of their annual income by 1.5–2 times (Tab. 2).

According to the Federal State Statistics Service, the poverty rate of the population in Russia continues to decrease slowly but surely (Fig. 2). This trend began in 2018, and over the period from 2018 to 2024, the proportion of people with incomes below the subsistence level decreased almost twofold (from 13 to 7%, or from 19 to 11 million people).

However, first of all, we should mention that the goal set by the President in the May 2018 Decree is “to halve the poverty rate in the Russian Federation”⁶⁷(from 12.7% in 2018 to 6.4% by 2024) – has not yet been achieved. Second, even with the positive dynamics of poverty reduction observed since 2018, we agree with experts that the condition of

Table 2. Dynamics of the wealth of the 10 richest Russian billionaires in the Forbes ranking for the period of the SMO, million USD

	2022	2023	2024	2025	Dynamics (+/-), 2025 to 2022
	2022	2023	2024	2025	million USD	times
V. Alekperov (Chairman of the Public Council of the “Our Future” Foundation)	10500	20500	28600	28700	18200	2.7
A. Mordashov (CEO of Severgroup Holding)	13200	20900	25500	28600	15400	2.2
L. Mikhelson (Chairman of the Management Board of PJSC Novatek)	14000	21600	27400	28400	14400	2.0
V. Lisin (Chairman of the Management Board of the National Sporting Federation)	18400	22100	26600	26500	8100	1.4
V. Potanin (President of Interros Holding, President of MMC Norilsk Nickel)	17300	23700	23700	24200	6900	1.4
G. Timchenko (Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kontinental Hockey League)	11300	18500	23400	23200	11900	2.1
A. Melnichenko (private investor)	11100	25200	21100	17400	6300	1.6
P. Durov (founder of Telegram)	15100	11500	15500	17100	2000	1.1
A. Usmanov (founder and main shareholder of USM)	11500	14400	13400	16700	5200	1.5
S. Kerimov (Member of the Federation Council)	4400	10500	10700	16400	12000	3.7

Source: Forbes rating. Available at: mdr7gt9gh4931870029

Figure 2. Population with money incomes below the poverty line / subsistence level

Source: Rosstat.

the Russian economy is “not as successful as the objective needs of social development require. Russia is still facing the urgent issue of a fundamental change in economic policy and the associated social unity of the people, without which a social contract cannot exist”⁶⁸.

So, according to Rosstat, in 2024, 62% of Russians had an average per capita money income of less than 60 thousand rubles per month (Tab. 3). Of this, a third or a quarter (according to various estimates⁶⁹) is “eaten up” by the minimum “consumer basket”⁷⁰.

Table 3. Distribution of the population by the amount of per capita money income

Population group by income level 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to… 2018 2022 % from total population Under 27 thousand rubles 54.7 51.4 49.8 44.5 34.5 29.5 22.9 -32 -12 From 27 to 45 thousand rubles 23.6 24.5 25.2 25.9 27.2 26.2 24.4 +1 -3 From 45 to 60 thousand rubles 9.3 10.1 10.5 11.6 13.8 14.4 15 +6 +1 Under 60 thousand rubles 87.6 86 85.5 82 75.5 70.1 62.3 -25 -13 From 60 to 100 thousand rubles 9.0 10.0 10.4 12.4 16.2 18.5 21.5 +13 +5 Over 100 thousand rubles 3.4 4 4.1 5.6 8.3 11.4 16.2 +13 +8 For reference: the number of permanent residents of the Russian Federation per year on average (million people) 147.8 147.9 147.7 147.2 146.7 146.3 146.1 -2 -1 million people* Under 27 thousand rubles 80.9 76.0 73.6 65.5 50.6 43.2 33.5 -47 -17 From 27 to 45 thousand rubles 34.9 36.2 37.2 38.1 39.9 38.3 35.7 +1 -4 From 45 to 60 thousand rubles 13.7 14.9 15.5 17.1 20.2 21.1 21.9 +8 +2 Under 60 thousand rubles 129.5 127.2 126.3 120.7 110.8 102.6 91.0 -38 -20 From 60 to 100 thousand rubles 13.3 14.8 15.4 18.3 23.8 27.1 31.4 +18 +8 Over 100 thousand rubles 5.0 5.9 6.1 8.2 12.2 16.7 23.7 +19 +11 *Own calculation on the basis of official data from Rosstat on the number of permanent residents of Russia on average per year (Official statistics. Demographics. Available at: . “Distribution of the population by the amount of per capita money income characterizes the differentiation of the population by the level of material wealth and represents indicators of the number (or shares) of the permanent population, grouped in specified intervals by the level of per capita money income” (source: Russian Statistical Yearbook. 2024: Statistics collection. Rosstat. 2024. P. 177).

“The remaining” 20–30 thousand rubles is the approximate cost of two nights in a Russian hotel⁷¹or a minimum cost of a holiday in a Russian resort for a family of three (and not at all of 5–6) people (that is, parents and one child)⁷² for one week.

And this, we note, applies only to those people who have incomes in the amount of 45–60 thousand rubles per month. In fact, among those 62% of Russians who have incomes of up to 60 thousand rubles, 23% (or 33.5 million people) have an average per capita money income of less than 27 thousand rubles.

These data confirm other figures from Rosstat, which show the distribution of money income among 20 percent of the population. In general, the situation has not changed since 1999 and looks even worse than in 1992: almost half of all money incomes in the country (46–47%; in 1992 – 38%) are owned by a small “stratum” of the richest people (Tab. 4).

And the special military operation, which has been going on for more than three years, has not made any changes to these statistics. On the contrary, in 2022, 20% of the country’s wealthiest

citizens had 45.8% of the total money income, in 2023 – 46.4%, in 2024 – 46.7%.

We should note that the data provided by Rosstat that the income level of the majority of Russians does not exceed 60 thousand rubles fully explain why, with a poverty rate of 7–8% (according to statistics⁷³) a significantly larger number of people classify themselves as “poor”. For example, in the Vologda Region (according to VolRC RAS) their proportion is 45–48% (Fig. 3).

At the same time, the main problems of concern to the population were and still are “inflation”, “low standard of living, poverty” and “stratification into poor and rich”. So, on average for 2018–2024 (Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term) compared with the period 2000–2003 (his first presidential term):

^ the share of people concerned about inflation increased by 16 percentage points (from 45 to 61%);

^ the problem of low living standards, poverty — by 8 percentage points (from 45 to 53%);

^ stratification into “poor” and “rich” — by 2 percentage points (from 30 to 32%; Fig. 4, Insert 3).

Table 4. Distribution of total money income by quintile group in the Russian Federation, %

Population group	1992	1999	2007	2012	2018	2022	2023	2024	Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to…
Population group	1992	1999	2007	2012	2018	2022	2023	2024	1992	2022
First (with the lowest incomes)	6.0	6.0	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.5	5.4	-1	0
Second	11.6	10.5	9.8	9.8	10	10.4	10.2	10.1	-2	0
Third	17.6	14.8	14.8	14.9	15	15.4	15.2	15.1	-3	0
Fourth	26.5	21.1	22.5	22.5	22.6	22.8	22.7	22.7	-4	0
Fifth (with the highest incomes)	38.3	47.6	47.8	47.6	47.1	45.8	46.4	46.7	+8	+1
Source: Rosstat data.

Figure 3. Dynamics of social self-identification*, % of respondents

1998–1999 2000–2003 2004–2007 2008–2011 2012– 2017 2018–2024

E*"Rich" and "middle-income" people "Poor" and "extremely poor"

* Wording of the question “Which category do you belong to, in your opinion?” (responses: “rich”, “middle-income people”, “poor”, “extremely poor”).

Source: VolRC RAS data.

Figure 4. The most pressing issues of concern to the population, % of respondents

1998–1999 2000– 2003 2004–2007 2008–2011 2012–2017 2018–2024

■ Inflation

—л— Low standard of living, poverty

—•— Stratification into "poor" and "rich"

Source: VolRC RAS data.

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Similar negative trends are observed in almost all major socio-demographic groups (Insert 4). Moreover, we note that we are talking not only about socially vulnerable groups (for example, pensioners or people who, according to selfestimates of their own incomes, fall into the category of bottom 20%), but primarily about the assessments of young people. So, on average, for the period from the first to the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin:

^ the share of those who are concerned about inflation has increased especially among people under the age of 30 (by 20 percentage points, from 40 to 60%) and residents of districts (by 21 percentage points, from 44 to 65%);

^ the problem of poverty — among residents of Vologda (by 15 percentage points, from 46 to 61%) and among people under the age of 30 (by 14 percentage points, from 39 to 53%);

^ the problem of population stratification among people under the age of 30 (by 7 percentage points, from 23 to 30%) and residents of Cherepovets (by 8 percentage points, from 28 to 36%).

Thus, the data provided by official statistics and sociological surveys of the population speak for themselves and suggest quite legitimate questions – can a new Social Contract take place while there still exist the same key problems that have been troubling Russian society for many years: low living standards, poverty, extreme inequality ...? What is the Image of Russia’s Future in relatively peaceful conditions; after the end of the SMO or even after a potential more global conflict with NATO...?74

Vladimir Putin: “Russia needs a peace option in Ukraine that would ensure its stable development and peace”⁷⁴.

These questions remain unanswered so far, and today the real situation regarding inequality and poverty continues to conflict in many ways with publicly declared government priorities for social justice and a welfare state.

This suggests that the second criterion of a Social Contract – the “means to achieve the goal” (as well as the goal itself) – is still not in a state that would allow us to count on the real achievement of a “common destiny” for society and the State.

According to experts and as the real historical experience of our country shows, “the people should believe that there is Truth behind ideology. The addressee of an ideology must wholeheartedly believe in it as a truth worthy of their absolute devotion”⁷⁵. If this is not the case, then there is no Social Contract.⁷⁶

Zh.T. Toshchenko: “Speaking about welfare as an indicator of the stability of a social contract, let’s pay attention to the need to specify it, and not just some statements about the well-being of the people. In Russia, attempts to overcome the low level of people’s welfare remain unresolved”⁷⁶.

“In the 1920s – 1960s, our Soviet state... was cemented by the belief that we were building and bringing to the world a new, just way of life – communism… Is it because of the communist faith, or rather, the belief that we affirm and defend the supreme truth, universal justice? The Soviet people withstood the most difficult trials, war, and devastation…

Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and his subsequent ‘cancellation’ were a huge trauma to the national organism. A spiritual trauma. The frontline soldiers who went on the attack with the name of Stalin felt insulted, and the youth questioned the very basics and largely came to the conclusion: everyone is lying… As a result of the ‘cancellation’ of Stalin and the general feeling of being deceived and disappointed, the people gave up on all these lofty matters, on the slogans and resolutions of the Party and wanted to live a small private life …”⁷⁷

of trust and agreement with regard to the President himself, but not with regard to the system of public administration he created.

For example, when United Russia wins parliamentary elections or acting governors appointed by the head of state prevail over other candidates during local election campaigns, many experts say in unison that this is a credit of trust not so much to them as to Vladimir Putin personally.798081

The third criterion of a Social Contract – the methods of its implementation– is “the most important structural element”… They are designed to ensure, through their application and use, that the social contract is effective, which allows the State, represented by the political authorities, to know that the people or only a part of them support and approve of the policy being pursued”⁷⁸.

Zh.T. Toshchenko identifies three such methods:

1) trust (“the basis for the existence of all social and political institutions, their representatives, especially those who head state organizations and institutions”);
2) consent (“presupposes a variable attitude not toward such a phenomenon as the State in general, but toward its specific actions and acts”);
3) solidarity (“a form of social cohesion and interconnectedness of individuals and social groups, which is based on common interests, goals and standards”).

Here are some relevant data reflecting the status of each of these methods. According to the results of sociological surveys and assessments by many experts, Russian society demonstrates a high level

For example:

1. S. Neverov (on the victory of the United Russia party in the 2012 regional election): “The vote that took place yesterday, in fact, throughout the country, which yesterday affected almost all our municipal bodies, local governments, is a real expression of support for the course of President Vladimir Putin”⁷⁹.
2. “The main reason for the success of the United Russia political party in the Duma election was the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin. This was stated by Konstantin Kostin, chair of the Board of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society during the round table “Single Voting Day – 2021: Results and trends’”⁸⁰.
3. K. Kostin, chair of the Board of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society, on the 2022 regional election: “The patriotic consensus that has emerged as a result of the special military operation and Russia’s opposition to Western sanctions is the main factor in this campaign… The main recipients of this electoral bonus are the governors, who were either appointed by the current president or supported by him when he was nominated for a new term, and the United Russia party, Putin’s party”⁸¹.

“There is no deep state in Russia, it is all in plain sight, but there is a deep people. The elite shines on the glossy surface, and over the centuries it has been actively (to its credit) involving the people in some of its activities – party meetings, wars, elections, and economic experiments. People participate in the events, but they are somewhat detached, they do not show themselves on the surface, living a completely different life in their own depths…

In essence, the society trusts only the top state official… In the new system, all institutions are subordinated to the main task – trusting communication and interaction of the supreme ruler with citizens. The various branches of government converge on the personality of the leader, being considered a value not in themselves, but only to the extent that they provide a connection with him”⁸².

This specificity of the attitude of Russian society toward the President and the state has largely sociocultural grounds, which are quite clearly outlined in V. Surkov’s concept of the “long state”, all institutions in it ‘are subordinated to the main task – trusting communication and interaction of the President with citizens”.82

At the same time, the entire system of public administration built by Vladimir Putin during his presidential term reveals a lot of reasons to discredit the trust of citizens, and many experts ask a logical question: why hasn’t a “well-established mechanism of disciplinary responsibility based on clear criteria” been created in it or in the party in power? Is there no “mandatory and unavoidable personal responsibility for sabotage or poor-quality execution of management decisions”?⁸³⁸⁴

“There is a complete lack of personal responsibility for non-fulfillment or inadequate execution of government decisions, for functional inconsistencies, for mistakes, and even more so for deliberate sabotage... Most often, an official who has made serious mistakes simply moves to another position and remains in the administration system. And even more often, he/she stays in the same place and continues to engage in the same destructive activities as before.

It is necessary to introduce mandatory and inescapable personal responsibility for sabotage or poor-quality execution of managerial decisions, for ineffective activities of the head in a designated area, and this should be a well-established mechanism of disciplinary responsibility based on clear criteria. This is simply a necessary element of any management... in the current extreme and extraordinary conditions of the country's existence, it is already a matter of life and death, and the absence of this mechanism is suicidal, and from the point of view of state interests, it is criminal…”⁸³

According to VCIOM, as of July 2025, the RF President’s approval rating is 74.7%. The share of positive assessments of the activities of the Government of the Russian Federation is 49.5%; the State Duma is 43.9%, and the Federation Council – 43.7%.

The majority of Russians approve of the activities of “traditional” public institutions – the army (75.7%), the Russian Orthodox Church (61.4%), and law enforcement agencies (52.3%). However, the approval rate for the activities of other public institutions is less than half: the media – 44.9%; the Public Chamber – 34.5%; the judicial system – 38.7%; trade unions – 30.1%; political parties – 37.2%⁸⁴.

These features of the attitude of the population toward the President and the system of public administration he created quite logically explain the condition of “trust” and “consent” as methods of implementing a Social Contract: if we can talk about trust and consent, it is only in relation to the head of state himself (Insert 5):

^ the share of those who trust the President of the Russian Federation is 55% (the level of trust in all other state and public institutions is from 30 to 47%, that is, less than half of the population trusts them);

^ the share of those approving the activities of the head of state is 59% (of all other authorities – 40% or less).

The same applies to political parties: it is possible to say that the United Russia party is supported by the majority of Russians only in the electoral context, that is, in comparison with other political forces. However, this principle “does not work” when it comes to forming a Social Contract.

In fact, the level of support for the party in power ranges from 35 to 39%, according to VCIOM, on average in the country and around 40–43%, according to VolRC RAS, according to the results of research conducted in the Vologda Region (Insert 6).

Thus, the situation regarding “trust” and “consent” – the first two methods of implementing a Social Contract, which “work” only in relation to the President, but not the entire system of public administration, can hardly be called satisfactory. At least in the context of presenting an Image of the Future of Russia, in which public trust in government has a stable, systemic character, and does not depend on one person.

With regard to the third method, “solidarity”, which “presupposes the willingness of people to interact”⁸⁵, the results of sociological measurements show that, on average, during Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term, compared with his third presidential term, the proportion of people who are not ready to unite for the sake of some kind of joint action, the realization of common goals, increased by 10 percentage points (from 20 to 30%; Fig. 5).

Figure 5. “There are people who are ready to unite with other people for any joint actions if their ideas and interests coincide, and there are people who are not ready to unite. Who would you consider yourself to be – the first or the second?”, % of respondents

The question is asked once a year, since 2011, the question was not asked in 2012.

Source: VolRC RAS data.

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Of course, we should note that the proportion of people who are ready to interact remains higher (43%), but their share is decreasing (by 4 percentage points, from 47 to 43%), and most importantly– it is still not the majority of citizens.

Thus, if we summarize some interim results of the analysis of the situation regarding the criteria of a Social Contract in Russia, we see that at least three of them (“goal”, “means of achieving the goal” and “methods of implementing the Social Contract”) have different problems, but each has not yet been brought to a level that would allow us to count on the real achievement of the “philosophy of common destiny” between the state and society; on the opportunity to really turn the page of history. Even if an official state ideology is developed and adopted in Russia (whatever name and form it may have).

The fourth criterion of the Social Contract is “feedback between the state and society”.

As Zh.T. Toshchenko writes, it “gets a full and complete embodiment in the case when such a criterion of a social contract as the involvement of the people in the management of the affairs of society and the state is realized. Moreover ... in addition to direct participation in the work of governing bodies, in our opinion, it is worth talking about the possibility of influencing decision- making... It is the awareness of involvement and engagement in the management process that makes people themselves more responsible in their social and working lives…”86

Long-term monitoring studies conducted by VolRC RAS show that this criterion of a Social Contract in Russia remains in a stable and, unfortunately, in a negative condition. It is clear that people do not believe they can influence the state of affairs in the city, region or at the national level. Only 5–9% of the population thinks otherwise (on average for 2018–2024; Tab. 5).

We will also cite data from sociological surveys that reflect, perhaps, the quintessence of the state of all criteria of a Social Contract (Tab. 6). On average, during Vladimir Putin’s fourth presidential term (2018–2024), compared with his first presidential term (2000–2003):

^ the proportion of those who believe that “the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer” has not changed and still stands at 54%;

^ the proportion of those who believe that “people in power don’t care about ordinary people” increased by 7 percentage points (from 40 to 47%);

^ the share of those who “do not feel like a participant in the events taking place in the country” has also increased and amounts to 37% (by 3 percentage points, from 34 to 37%).

Table 5. “Do you think you can personally influence the state of affairs today... (response option is “yes”), % of respondents

Area of life	2013–2017	2018–2024	2018–2024 to 2011–2017
In my family	79.8	84.6	+5
At work	41.5	42.2	+1
In the house, in the yard	34.3	35.3	+1
In the city, in the neighborhood	8.1	8.8	+1
In the region	4.0	5.3	+1
In the country	3.6	5.4	+2
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / absence of changes / positive changes			0 / 0 / 6
The question is asked once a year since 2011. The question was not asked in 2012. Source: VolRC RAS data.

Table 6. Please read the following opinions about life in our society and mark those with which you agree, % of respondents

Respond option	Average annual data for presidential terms					Dynamics (+/-), 2018–2024 to 2000–2003
Respond option	2000– 2003	2004– 2007	2008– 2011	2012– 2017	2018– 2024	Dynamics (+/-), 2018–2024 to 2000–2003
The rich get richer, and the poor get poorer	53.9	37.8	45.6	47.0	53.5	0
People in power don’t care about ordinary people	39.7	38.8	41.2	44.1	47.4	+7
I don’t feel like a participant in the events taking place in the country	34.0	26.7	33.8	32.5	36.8	+3
The main thing for the central government in Moscow is to solve its problems at the expense of the regions and republics of Russia	25.5	22.9	21.7	27.9	33.1	+8
Now everyone who can and wants to work is able to ensure their financial well-being	28.7	26.9	29.8	28.5	29.3	+1
The authorities take care of the lives of ordinary people	4.5	6.0	7.2	5.2	8.2	+4
The Center pursues a policy in the interests of the regions	4.0	3.2	5.8	4.6	7.3	+3
Each of us can influence events in the country	5.6	5.6	4.6	6.8	6.2	+1

Source: VolRC RAS data. Ranked according to the average annual data for 2018–2024.

It only remains to add that in the structure of respondents’ judgments about life in the country, the assessments listed above were and remain the most common throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidential terms.

Thus, we get a general picture (based on longterm statistical data, expert assessments and opinions of citizens themselves, recorded by sociological surveys), indicating that the state of all criteria of a Social Contract does not yet allow us to talk about the possibility of its real achievement, at least without a correct assessment (primarily on the part of the President), conclusions and corrections of the situation that has developed today as a result of the country’s 30-year stay in a “liberal fog”…87

And this essentially correlates with the conclusions of Zh.T. Toshchenko, who points out the “deformation of the existing Social Contract”:

“There is a discrepancy between what the state considers important and necessary for its existence, and how people think about this importance and necessity. In other words, in reality there are disagreements between the state and a part of the people. This means that the state, represented by the political authorities, will not only have to comprehend this discrepancy, be aware of it, but also minimize it, not bring the situation to social tension, conflict, and even a possible social explosion”⁸⁷.

“In modern Russian reality, the Social Contract has significant reserves for its improvement in terms of coordinating development goals, means of achieving them, ideological support, regular feedback, and, finally, the effective participation of all social communities and groups in managing the affairs of society and the state. In modern Russian reality, the Social Contract has significant reserves for its improvement in terms of coordinating development goals, means of achieving them, ideological support, regular feedback, and, finally, the effective participation of all social communities and groups in managing the affairs of society and the state.

However, at present, solutions to specific state and public problems in a significant number of cases lead to deformed processes and phenomena that do not always embody the equal unity of the people and political power, which leads to various forms of tension reflecting the deformation of the existing Social Contract”⁸⁸.

The situation in the country, which has developed as a result of the constitutional ban on state ideology, and in fact, the establishment of a liberal ideology of the “consumer society”, prevents the formation of a new Social Contract; creates conditions when, even if the official state ideology is adopted, it will face inconsistencies in its content with reality.

For “ordinary” people, for the majority of Russians, it simply will not be the Truth and therefore will not have the effect that Zh.T. Toshchenko calls the “philosophy of the common destiny” of the state and the people – “mutually coordinated achievement of goals, means and methods of their implementation”⁸⁹.

Nevertheless, this only reinforces the urgency of developing and adopting ideology in Russia in exactly the form in which experts propose to do it today: compulsory “for those who seek to join the cohort of leaders of the Russian state”⁹⁰.⁹¹⁹²

After all, today many experts are formulating very specific outlines of the Image of the Future of Russia, which correspond to the needs of the population and could well become the basis of a new Social Contract ... but who will solve all these tasks?

“Putin expressed confidence that SMO members will be able to take their rightful place in Russia’s managerial elite, where they are planned to be incorporated through various projects and programs. Of course, this vector is absolutely correct. But so far one important question has remained unanswered: ‘How can such an incorporation of patriotic-minded cadres be carried out into the dominant stratum that has been created for decades, a significant part of which is damaged by ultra-liberal ideas, as well as corruption and other vices?”⁹¹

“A revised Social Contract includes the following requirements: a new ideology; defining the economic system of the country; ensuring professional social elevators and personal responsibility; integrating the Bank of Russia into the general system of government; debureaucratization of the economy; combating extreme forms of inequality; ending uncontrolled immigration; introducing responsibility for political sabotage. The ideology of Russian Civilization is the supporting structure of a new Social Contract”⁹².

Therefore, without a qualitative reorientation of the entire public administration system and its personnel toward publicly stated conditions for the implementation of ideology (statehood, sovereignty, patriotism, traditional values, social justice, etc.), it is extremely difficult to achieve compliance with the country’s situation with the criteria of a new Social Contract. This means that we will not have the Social Contract itself; we will not reach a new stage of historical development; we will not “turn over the page” of a “semi-colonial” Russia to build a sovereign Russia.⁹³

“You can issue decrees about traditional values, write books about heroes, show movies about faith and self-sacrifice, hold festivals and forums about preserving historical memory, but if there is a public enthusiasm for overconsumption, wealth and luxury, then children will be lost and wars will be lost”⁹³.

Even taking into account the fact that the state continues to pursue a very important and necessary active domestic policy to strengthen traditional values in society, social protection of the general population, support for SMO participants, etc. (Insert 7).

In conclusion, we note that in the discussion about whether Russia needs an ideology or not, whether a “big country” needs a “Big Idea”, we agree more with the position of S. Karaganov and the team of experts whose opinion he generally expresses94. It is difficult to disagree with the fact that “great nations are not built without great, guiding ideas, and having lost them, they collapse with a thunderous crash”95. 96

But in order for a Big Idea to captivate the masses, so that it can give people a clear and precise Image of the Future of the country and their personal lives in this country, and not become another “dead project” that contradicts reality and thus undermines trust between society and government, this Big Idea should not just be formulated. The society should be shown the realism of its implementation in real practical steps to achieve social justice, overcome inequality, and ensuring personal responsibility of officials, which implies the inevitability of punishment for deliberate abuse of their official position. A. Shkolnikov writes: “If the society sees that the movement toward strategic goals is underway, it begins to support the proposed solutions, trusting the leaders...”⁹⁶

Insert 7

97 The insert is a continuation of the monitoring of the most important regulatory legal acts signed by the President of the Russian Federation, which we have been conducting since June 2022 (the first issue of the monitoring is presented in the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). A difficult road after the Rubicon. Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast, 15(3), 9–41).

End of Insert 7

In this sense, ideology, which is obligatory for the ruling elites, seems to be a perfectly reasonable tactical step in the implementation of a more global strategic task – the formation of a new Social Contract in Russia... It is not just about the wording and not only about the “intellectual efforts” (as A. Dugin writes) of representatives of the expert community, but above all about the efforts of political will on the part of the President and the ruling party.⁹⁸

“Nowadays, it is necessary to realize that it will not be possible to immediately replace the entire political, economic and cultural social stratum that has dominated Russia since the end of the twentieth century... At the first stage, it is important to place the current dominant social stratum and the entire so-called ‘old elite’ within the strict framework of new ideological and moral realities, tightly controlling this process”⁹⁹.

“There is a large-scale and very difficult work ahead. It is obvious that the replacement of key leaders in ministries, departments and in the field should be carried out carefully, gradually, without shocks and disruptions to their functioning… It is necessary to continue the painstaking work to tighten responsibility for embezzlement and corruption, to ensure the inevitability of penalties and to close all loopholes fortax evasion and capital withdrawal…

The problem of elite renewal and the ways to solve it are clear. It’s solely up to the president’s political will to bring what he started to an end”⁹⁸.

We should note that the head of state does not have much time to solve this most difficult task – to complete the process of internal transformation of the country (first of all, the public administration system and its personnel).99

Because even with the achievement of longterm agreements on the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict (which, in particular, is indicated by regular contacts between Russia and the United States since the beginning of 2025, including the meeting of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump on August 15), there are too many signs¹⁰⁰ that the Collective West may make another attempt to encroach on sovereignty and the territorial borders of the Russian Federation. At the moment when Vladimir Putin will “hand over” the country to his successor¹⁰¹.

“The West’s strategy toward Russia, after an unsuccessful attempt to inflict a strategic defeat, is to exhaust it economically and psychologically in the war, to undermine our society, to undermine faith in the country’s leadership and its policies, causing new turmoil. The opponent proceeds from the fact that its efforts must reach a climax during the transfer of supreme power”¹⁰².

This means that by this time the country should be ready for everything; it should be ready internally – to have a well-functioning mechanism for selfreproduction of personnel in the public administration system (and not in the “manual control” mode); to have a common and clear understanding of the present and future between society and government (what Zh.T. Toshchenko calls the “philosophy of the common destiny” of the state and the people); to have a single Russia, rather than two, three or four Russias¹⁰³, at least at the moment when the conditions for ensuring national security and protecting national sovereignty require it.