Analysis on the agent-based Bertrand duopoly game model

Analysis on the agent-based Bertrand duopoly game model

Автор: Huang Xian , Hong Jia

Журнал: Вестник Южно-Уральского государственного университета. Серия: Экономика и менеджмент @vestnik-susu-em

Рубрика: Экономическая теория и мировая экономика

Статья в выпуске: 2 т.12, 2018 года.

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The duopoly market research has a long history. Due to such reasons as material supply, product patent right and concession of the government, development of many economic industries is similar to the process of duopoly. In game theory, the Bertrand model which considers price to be a strategic variable is closer to reality and provides the market with more references, especially for retail market and electricity market, as the competitive world develops. Firstly, we analyze the classical Bertrand model and the Nash equilibrium in the model. Secondly, multi-agent technology is applied and the Bertrand duopoly game bidding process is conducted; meanwhile, in order to help agents find the optimal solutions, genetic algorithm based on multi-agent Bertrand model is chosen as the main algorithm for the research; and we finish with software implementation of the algorithm and with example analysis. In the end, oligopoly market bidding is also modelled in MATLAB simulation, which provides us with more accuracies and flexibilities. It is evidently shown in the model that when none of the two companies are able to meet all the demands in the market, the bigger the price gap, the more oscillated it is in the process; thus, the pure strategic Nash equilibrium doesn’t exist. However, when one of the two can offer the demands independently, Nash equilibrium appears and is shown as the calculated results in Bertrand-Edgeworth model where the equilibrium reaches the cost price. Further, the reason for no pure strategic Nash Equilibrium is also discussed.

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Bertrand model, multi-agent, genetic algorithm, nash equilibrium

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147232343

IDR: 147232343   |   DOI: 10.14529/em180201

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