The argument of Severus of Antioch on the absurdity of confessing two common natures in Christ and the concept of “particular nature” within the structure of the “Arbiter” by John Philoponus: theology and methodology of school neoplatonic philosophy in the 6th century

The article considers the place of the famous argument of Severus of Antioch on the absurdity of confessing two common natures in Christ in the structure of the “Arbiter” by John Philoponus. In compliance with the general formula of this argument, the confession of two natures in Christ, taken as common natures of deity and humanity, necessarily entails agreeing that the incarnation of Christ signifies the incarnation of the whole Trinity in the whole humankind, namely, the incarnation of all the hypostases of the Trinity in each human being. John Philoponus supplements it with the distinction of common and particular natures: the common essence of deity, as represented by the aggregate of particular natures (Father, Son=Word, Saint Spirit), being incarnated in Christ, would lead to the incarnation of the mentioned particular natures in the common essence of humanity, i. e. in the aggregate of all whenever lived, living now and still not come into being people. In the article, a detailed analysis is given of the functional mode of Severus’ argument and of the concept of “particular nature” in the philosophical writings of John Philoponus, as well as that of the sense and the mechanism of transmission of this concept to the theological context of his substantiation of the Monophysite Triadology and Christology. On the grounds of scrutinizing these issues, the dependence is exposed of the procedures of substantiation of theological problems, applied in the “Arbiter”, on the methodology of school Neoplatonic philosophy.