The budgetary sector of deputy corps and patterns of relations between local government branches in small towns

Introduction: research on local government in the Russian Federation has remained relevant for the past three decades. This article examines the local government system as a center for the distribution of power in the local community, it focuses on representative government bodies and the inability of deputies to fully exercise the potential of legislative power. Objectives: to determine the reasons and consequences of the wide representation of budgetary institutions and enterprises in city Dumas as representative platforms and local self-government bodies in small Russian towns. Methods: in-depth study of representative public authorities in five small towns; in-depth semi-structured interviews; descriptive statistics. Results: the examples of five towns in the Ural region describe the budget sector of the deputy corps of the local self-government representative body in a small town; an explanation is given for the ubiquitous presence of budget workers in city Dumas; the reasons for the loyalty of municipal deputies – budget workers in relation to the head of administration and administration itself are clarified; the effects of the loyalty of the deputy majority in relation to the executive authorities on the power potential of the administration head and the relations of public authorities in small towns are revealed. Conclusions: in small towns, the broad budget sector in the deputy collective provides the head and their administration with an instrument of influence and control over the Duma. The high level of influence and control exercised by the administration head disrupts the balance between the representative and executive local authorities, ensuring the stable dominance of the executive one over the representative one.