Dysfunctions of russian market of mergers and acquisitions: causes, consequences, methods of overcoming

The article deals with studying the institutional dysfunction of the Russian market of mergers and acquisitions. It proves that problems of functioning and quality of formal regulating institutions hinder its effective development. The contradiction of interests between the state as a subject of regulation and the state as a participant of the market resulted in forming institutional microdysfunctions connected with “double standards” of law enforcement for different types of owners, striving to obtain bureaucracy rent, intertwining functional actions of the state as a regulator and the state as a market participant. This contributed to the regular blocking of the trap effect in applying valuation norms in the antitrust law, causing impossibility to effectively prevent unfair deals and at the same time hinder fair and effective deals in the Russian market of mergers and acquisitions. To settle this problem it is required to use changes aimed at reducing asymmetric information between subjects of the Russian market of mergers and acquisitions and the state, and also blocking informal institutions which are in conflict with formal regulating institutions. Improving evaluation methods of economic analysis in the antitrust practice, expanding informal control (such as making independent expert research of future substantial deals and also analyzing performed deals) will contribute to overcoming the existing dysfunctions of the Russian market of mergers and acquisitions.