Did Kant's third critique suggest that transcendent supersensible objects of cognition and goal-setting exist?

The study analyzes the existence problem of supersensible objects in “Critique of Judgment” by Immanuel Kant, where the power of judgment is understood as a transition from the pure theoretical ability to cognize to the practical concept of freedom. The research notes that the metaphysical problem statement implies the highest supersensible basis of the unity of the diverse and the integration of the unit diversity into a single universal system of laws and results of nature. The author emphasizes that all particular empirical laws should be considered as a kind of unity as if such unity gives the nature the supreme, divine, transcendent mind rather than human, transcendental one. Nevertheless, people as reasonable beings are able to cognize nature by the causality of the natural laws of matter instead of the ultimate causes and goals of nature. Rejecting the intellectual intuition, Kant argued that our knowledge was always based on experience. Therefore, in “Critique of Judgment”, he did not recognize the existence of transcendent supersensible objects of cognition and goal-setting. The philosopher believed that the unified supersensible basis for nature and freedom conceived by us, gave no real grounds for comprehending the transcendent things in ourselves. However, it allowed us to have in our heart the ideal of knowledge of the theoretical reason and the moral ideal of the practical reason.