Phenomenology and the problem of visuality. Part 2

The article aims to analyze the postphenomenological project as well as the conceptual apparatus (new from the perspective of visual studies) of its philosophy in the person of M. Henry and, to a lesser extent, J.-L. Marion. In the philosophy of M. Henry, the originality of presence is connected with the pathotic theory of life. In terms of visuality, it is presented as an invisibility included in the original field of presence. It is expressed in the philosopher’s theory as a counter-intentional pathetic-affective ability of the sense of vision preceding the act «I see». However, Henry’s theory is not without contradictions. A special moment is the tautological formulation of subjectivity, which contradicts the movement of life as self-growth. The article shows that the development of redundancy and asymmetric relations between the I and the Other in the philosophy of J.-L. Marion appears to be a way out of the contradictions of Henry’s theory. In visuality, it is manifested in the conceptualization of saturated phenomena (icon, idol, picture, etc.). However, the philosopher’s concept is also problematic. This is indicated by such philosophers as J. Derrida, M. Hénaff, and others. In conclusion, it is suggested that the consideration of the postphenomenological development of philosophy, despite its incompleteness, represents a reserve both in developing a theory within the «visual turn» and beyond its limits, leading to an expansion of the conceptualization of the subject of vision.