Deep disagreement and argumentative virtues

Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles relating to the choice of justification and argumentation methods. Relying on the conceptual metaphor of “hinges” by Wittgenstein, the researchers conclude that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the argumentation theory. The purpose of the study is to show that, in case of deep disagreement, one can theoretically determine which of parties in dispute has better epistemic status and, consequently, is argumentatively virtuous. To substantiate this thesis, we propose carrying out such thought experiment as an epistemic method game by M. Lynch and applying the virtue argumentation theory by D. Cohen and A. Aberdein. This research has a purely theoretical, philosophical aim to criticize relativism in argumentation theory and justify its regulatory status. The right moves in argumentation are such that an agent with the entire argumentative virtues would prefer, and wrong moves, or argumentative fallacies, are such that an agent with argumentative vices would make.