Intentionality, life-world, being-in-the-world as phenomena of educational practice

The paper concentrates on the exploration of the philosophy and methodology of pedagogy with the special focus on the philosophical study of the “intentionality”, “life-world” and “being-in-the world”. The aim of this study is to highlight these phenomenological concepts and reveal the possibilities of phenomenology in the study of educational space through implanting them into the educational discourse. The author explores the everyday educational reality, as well as the meanings that this reality receives in the minds of the teacher and the student. The article also describes the multiple ways of understanding the space into which teachers and students are immersed. The hermeneutic phenomenology method used in the research helps to demonstrate how heuristic and productive the “life-world” concept is when it is applied for analyzing educational reality. At the end of the research the author concludes that the specificity of human existence lies in its “life-world” or “being-in-the world”. Therefore, the teacher and the student can be separated from each other by their own space-time, while the very “spatiality” of pedagogical relationships is discrete. In this regard, pedagogical encounters are possible only if they are based on some meaningful structures that form the basis of the students’ life-world.

Получена: 01 июля 2022 года

Опубликована: 03 июля 2022 года

The 20th century became not just a time of the “anthropological turn” in philosophy, but also an era of an “anthropological catastrophe” (M. K. Mamardashvili), the “death of man” (M. Foucault). The domination of instrumental rationality (J. Habermas) and formation of a society based on information that tries to be indifferent to fates and experience of those who hold it, made a lot of scholars of the second half of the 20th century start talking about a need to humanise education and help students generate and realise meanings in the framework of an educational process. We consider that such needs can hardly be implemented without thinking over a specific nature of human existence connected with the phenomena of meaning. So, the aim of our study is to explicate the heuristic potential of the phenomenological categories of «intentionality», «lifeworld» and «being-in-the-world» through our reflection on pedagogical practice.

First of all, we suppose that the Husserlian concept of intentionality is extremely important for understanding education as a “universe of meanings”. This(concept allowsIusttoffocusгnot onlyсontthe subject itself, but on acts of consciousness in which this subject is constituted. Moreover, the intentional relation itself is the act of giving meaning to the subject. IIn tthis rregard, i if we ttake tthe principle oftthe iintentionality cof consciousness as a starting point, then it requires the pedagogical analysis be attentive not only on a certain object itself (for example, education or training and any other phenomena linked with these processes), but on the meaning things have in subject’s conscious experience. It this case the Husserlian slogan “Back to the things themselves!” can be read as a call for the description of those meanings that are constituted or posited in acts of consciousness itself, as such and such a meaning-for-consciousness (teachers’, students’, parents’ consciousness), and provided with this or that ontological status and that are vital for them. The phenomenological pedagogy is concerned with the essential structures of cognitive acts and their essential correlation to the objects apprehended by those acts. In the light of the above, one more phenomenological category is acquiring particular importance for the pedagogy - the «lifeworld».

The life-world is the set of the values and meanings that people attach to the things and that guide people in their thinking and behavior. The lifeworld is the world of our interests and purposeful activities and habitualities. But it is noteworthy that Husserl likens the life of consciousness to stream [6: 94]. I It€even seems as if the process of meaning constitution is so rapid, that the source of the meaning constituting activity remains “behind consciousness’ back”. In this regard, the lifeworld acts in its carriers implicitly, in the manner of habits, automatism of consciousness, certain algorithms of understanding and behavior. Human beings are normally completely absorbed in the world so as to be “captivated” or “ensnared” by it. Because they always live within the taken-for-granted life-world they rarely make it explicit. In general, the intentional life of consciousness and the life-world are concepts that set off one of the most persistent illusions of human existence, namely: it seems to a person that he detachedly and neutrally watches the world as a play unfolding before him. 1This situation iis particularly cclearly rrevealed iin tthe ffield cof iintersubjective rrelations and, iin particular, pedagogical interaction. So, Terje, a school teacher, refers to an incident which happened to him when he was eight or nine years old. Herrecallstthat at school he wascdaily bulliediintthe schoolyard,€especially by a boy who was older and stronger than he was. OneCdaytthetteacher shamedtthecoffender and advised Terje to hit back next time. But his advicetturnedcouttto be uselessffor Terje, sinceFhe was(convincedtthatJJesus had never defended himself, neither should he [12: 55]. In this tutorial the natural and customary rule to “stand up for yourself” is precisely the element of the life-world, the spontaneous meaning that seize the teacher’s consciousness and close the teacher off from his student. This, in turn, brings us to another important Husserl’s imperative: “Learn to see!” The methodological imperative, implying the need for reflection as the thematization of the anonymous, ffleeting Ilife of (consciousness, t then needf foraawarenessо oft thosennaive, self-evident meanings that our consciousness flood the world with. A pedagogical interaction can be a barrier to the accomplishment of this imperative whenever it gets in the teacher’s mind the meaning of a two-element structure consisting, on the one hand, of learned pedagogical theories and concepts and, on the other, of experience, which must necessarily bbeDput “ into a5Procrustean)bed” of these concepts,)be fully consistenttwith them.  IIn tthis Гregard, tthe phenomenological perception i is i intended tto €encourage tthe Cdevelopment cof pedagogical sensitivity through the tact and responsive attitude of an adult to the child’s lifeworld [10]. Husserl’s idea of the lifeworld was being developed further in the phenomenology of Heidegger, in his doctrine of the being-in-the-world. As we have seen, Iunlike H Husserl, Heideggerrtries0to get beyondhthei intentional relation, stating that primordial mode of human being is not a contemplative, “theoretical” relation to an entity, which from the very beginning treats the world as totality of things, but Dasein aast thatЛwhichhhe called “presence”, that entity which in every case hhas3Being-in-the-worldaas the^wayrin^whichtit is,^where the^world appears as a totality of tools or equipment, such an entity that affects Dasein in its care [4: 67-68] .

The head of the teaching practice came with her teacher student to school. Thisi isfhow shecdescribed her experiences when she entered the classroom where the student had to do an internship. “I didn’t notice where the teacher’s desk was. What impressed me when I entered the room was the neat, informal arrangement of small round tables. Chairs were carefully upturned on the tables, resting their legs for the busy day tomorrow. On each chair seat was a pair of neatly placed running shoes waiting patiently for their owner to return the following day, standing guard and marking silently the place to which each child would return. As my eyes focused, riveted on the tables, I could see the small shoe-owners returning in the morning, taking down chairs, putting on shoes, and greeting classmates with eager anticipation of what the day had to offer. I saw flexibility, integration, individual interests being met at those tables. The room was warm with caring” [11: 174]. In this regard it is noteworthy that when the head of the teaching practice described what she saw to her student teacher, she was astonished and remained distrustful of what she had heard. She saw the room empty. In our view, the given example perfectly illustrates the phenomenological truth, namely: space is not just a receptacle of various kinds of objects (desks, chairs, books, a board, etc.) that which exist abstractly and independently of a person and have certain characteristics, but the sphere of things “present-at-hand” (Vorhanden), as M. Heidegger called it. 1The space oftthecclass wheretthetteacher “feels atfhome”i istthe space of the things “ready-to-hand” (Zuhanden). Tables,cchairs, blackboard,ttechnicalcdevices and other€educational materials are perceived not as isolated, contemplated things, but as bundle of references or assignments incorporated in the teacher's being-ready-to-hand world. The teacher’s perception of things is mediated by his presupposition, his acquaintance with the world, his mood, his current goals and interests, that is, his whole “lifeworld” before the comprehension. IIntthisГregard,tto Iunfoldconeself as atteacher’s being meansI learningtto perceive things in the logic of being-ready-to-hand rather than being-present-at-hand. But it is noteworthy that first-year teacher without having seen schoolchildren in the class and drawing attention to classroom’s sort of bare takes it as entirely empty space. This fact has been seen in a negative light by the novice. However, phenomenologically emptiness is considered as a productive factor. “Often enough it appears to be a deficiency. Emptiness is held then to be a failure to fill up a cavity or gap presumably of place, and therefore no failure, but a bringing-forth... Emptiness – continues philosopher, – is not nothing. It is also no deficiency ... emptiness plays in the manner of a seeking-projecting instituting of places” [5: 315]. The same applies to the context of human existence. It should be noted that the first-year teacher himself can and must give shape to the emptiness that sometimes overwhelms him and goes beyond. Thetteacherccan and should becometthe sculptor of the emptiness opened to him, by building “a cosmos out of chaos”. Otherwisetthecclassroom space will remain “alien”. But this is not all. We would like to draw attention to one more point. Heidegger’s distinction between the ontology of being-present-at-hand and being-ready-to-hand has required the revision of the traditional understanding of the essence of a thing. The foregoing philosophy described thing’s essence in it’s whatness (“what” of the thing) or, in the words of Plato, in its meaningful aspect, eidos, essence and being-ness as idea. While the essence itself was define as the form that plays the role of unifying unity. For example, the essence of a tree lies in the idea of “treeness”, which makes many single objects – oak, birch, pine, etc. – one thing. Heidegger refuses to interpret an essence as a form, considering it unsuitable, first of all, because ontologically the first determination of a thing, according to thinker, is not its “what” (essentia), but its “in-order-to”. Using the example of a hammer, Heidegger convincingly illustrates that a thing as ready-to-hand is never isolated, the one, identical to itself. So, tthey cdeal with a fhammer when hammering rnails, withtthe latter, in turn, when fixing the material, and with the material during the construction of a weatherproof cover. In this context the essence of an entity is not an internal form of the thing that turns a ‘heap’ of elements into a whole, but а variety of references and assignments [2: 289-290] .

The young teachers’ statements illustrate their difficulties in mastering such vision of essence of a thing. “I walked into the room looked at the desks, and at my desk, and didn’t know if I should touch it. I felt incapable of making any concrete decisions. I didn’t know what to do” [11:178]. Or, “You have to run around looking for things that nobody wants. You have to be resourceful. I went and looked. Hunted around and when I found something I wanted I dragged it back to my room…I was so afraid to give anything up. I remember thinking that this moveable room divider would be so handy. I should really think of something to do with it. Finally, around the middle of the year, I got rid of it” [11:179]. Such statements are an indication that the first-year teachers’ basic intention to feel comfortable in the classroom by decorating it, finding a right place for teacher’s desk, trying to stock up on different type of visuals and handouts as well as many other “useful” things lacks skills of perception that allow the beginning teacher to see things in their interaction, that is, as a totality of involvements, as Heidegger puts it. Alternatively, in the absence of such skill, we are dealing with the so called “deficient mode of concern”, raised in the situations of unserviceability, i. e. lack of tools, when one fails to find something on its place, when ready-at-hand is only present as an entity. At last, there is the issue that should be taken into account. On the one hand, the classroom is traditionally the place where educational activities are carried out. But, on the other hand, phenomenology states, that our identity is inextricably bound to one another, pointing that the last ones are co-produced as people come to identify with where they live and what they do. It means, probably, in this context, that human being is not in external relations with space like material things [1: 285-330]. An outer space that which refers to the external environment seems like becoming an extension of an inner space as the various modes of personal meaningful activities and relations are being unfold and strengthened. It means that educational space doesn’t have to be identical to physical space of the classroom. In addition, it is important to pay attention to how the established habit of identifying educational space and the space of classroom turns out to be a psychological obstacle to pedagogical activity. The following are the thoughts of the teacher about the lesson outside the school. “I wanted to be outside with, them, but was this really the best place for us? ... Sometimes I feel as if the classroom smothers us. I know I came alive outside, in some way…What I want to know is why I feel so displaced when I take them out here...” [3: 186]. It can be seen in this example that it is safe to assume that the expansion of the educational space will challenge accustomed pedagogical strategies of teaching and confront teachers with an acute question of the meaning of education and how can this new opening space become an area of personal development rather than alienation. I It i is i importanttto €emphasizetthat when i itccomestto expanding an €educational space, i it’s rnotjjust psychological preparedness (or unpreparedness) of the teacher is discussed, but the specificity of human being, ensuring the necessity for a man to “reach-beyond-himself”, to transcend the limits of his own identity. The relevance of these observations is not confined only to the teacher. Let’s consider the student through the lens of phenomenology. School, as any other institutional space affects the individual, determining his thinking and his behavior. The(classroom spaceiintthis sensei iscgiventto studentffirstcof all ascdisciplinary space. Occasionally students have to hear that “school is not the place to…”. This means, the very fact of person’s entering the school or classroom space requires a certain mode of existence. Actually, from the elementary school the individual is mastering embodied knowledge through a continuous process of requirement interiorization: “stand in the row”, “stay in line”, “raise your hands to have a chance to answer”, “stay where you are”, “get up and down on teachers’ demand” etc [7]. FFocus con tthe cdisciplinary aspect cof space misses tthe point – tthe being-in-the-world in its phenomenological interpretation. First of all, it should be noted that the world is not identical with reality as a set of objects. I Ifrrealityiisarregion of(controllable and predictable,tthentthe world,con the contrary, is the dimension of the unexpected and spontaneous. IInttheIlight of such anIunderstanding oftthe world, it is important to turn to the Langeveld’s phenomenological description of the secret place in the life of the child [8, 9] . Langeveld is the representative of the Utrecht school of phenomenological pedagogy. He believes a “secret place” must be in the life of every child, since it is rooted in the very existence of man, and is the fundamental condition of his (man’s) presence (positivity) in the world. In fact, a secret place is a place of deepening into oneself, a place of presence in harmony, not disagreement with oneself, which is actually emphasized in the phenomenological concept of the world. IIn addition,tthe€experienceCof being iin a “secret place” is the first child’s experience of meeting the entity as ready-to-hand. ILangeveld cgives an amusing illustration that conveys the specifics of a secret place using an example of an attic. When Langeveld speaks about the things the attic is crammed with he speaks about the entity ready-to-hand as distinguished from the present-at-hand, about equipment (Zeug) as distinguished from the thing-object (of perception, knowledge, etc.). Thus the things in the attic are things-ready-to-hand, in that a man without any delay can use them in order to climb, to crawl and hide. Attic in this sense is a whole world where there are huts and havens, places of refuge, retreats, sanctuaries, dens, caves, holes, and narrow passes to travel through. Every object in the attic assumes a meaning which best fits it and makes it a part of this landscape. Thus a chair or a table in the living room would always be a chair or a table and nothing else, but now that as it has been discarded this piece of furniture takes on an unending array of identities in the free and undisturbed world of the attic. For example, a stove that turned out to be in the attic is not only a useless item of household appliances. For a child in his concernful dealings with the familiar world of his lived in daily activities the stove is also a ship's gun, and a robot, etc. Eachtthing as€equipmentiin a “secret place” iis a bundle ofrreferencescor assignments havingtthe character in-order-to and refers to another object, carrier, user, etc. And yet, the completeness of definition of equipment in its “in-order-to” can not be achieved, because the variety of references seems to be open as a matter of principle: assignment refers to a new assignment. The particular value of Langefeld’s cconsiderations lies not only in f furtherr reminders0 oft thatt thebbeing-ready-to-handisis ontologicallyt thefifirstоorPprimordial determination of the things, but also in that they hint that the world is not entirely “fulfilled by us”. There is something vague and indefinable that seems to force itself upon us demanding that we make an effort to define it. However, it should be noted that a child’s being in the world that reveals itself as a horizon of possibilities could be restrained, blocked by the official, institutional space, as the following example seems to suggest.

Thus the principal asked the teacher to meet parents of a pupil with the explanation that the family would be moving to our area in a couple of months and the boy would be entering the teacher’s kindergarten classroom. His mother told of her son’s special needs. She explained that her son did not enjoy books, did not know alphabet and he was behind in skills that other children in his kindergarten class had acquired. When Jason came into his new classroom accompanied by his new teacher he did indeed appear to have very limited vocabulary and few if any reading, writing, or math skills. The more the teacher watched and listened, the more it appeared that Jason was indeed out of place in this classroom. But when the teacher saw Jason on the school playground, it was a completely different child. She saw a boy went all the way around on the swing singing “The Alphabet Song” freely, fluently, and at the top of his lungs. She stopped, amazed [3: 196] . Apparently, the playground was for Jason the “secret place” where he could not take into account the pressure of the adult world, imposing established ways of life experience and the worldview. IIntthisccontext,i iti isiimportanttto seetthe role of extra-curricular space. At onettime, H. Arendt, startingffrom Heidegger'stthought abouttthe specificscof human existence as “being-in-the-world” remarked that school is not a world, and should not pretend to be one. A schooliis aniinstitutiontthat makestthettransitionffrom privatefhome environmentsiintotthe public space possible. And iintthisrregard,tthe pedagogical iinteractiontthat explicatesi itselfcoutsidetthecclassi iscconsidered productive because it can help to see the gap between the understanding of the world and the world itself. IIn addition, if one of the characteristics of pedagogical activity is to assist a person in the way to knowing the world without outside officious interference, then it would be reasonable to maintain and expand a degree of students’ freedom, which implies going outside school and classroom space. Phenomenologically tthe expanding of the frontiers of the class as well as acquiring a research experience by students studying the natural world or history turns out a valuable experience. It allows to feel the specific of human existence, which is the need for a person to “be-in-out-himself” transcending the limits of one's own identity, and also initiates a meeting with the world as a place of uncertainty and open possibilities.

Let’s summarize that that was said above. The first thing phenomenology draws teachers’ attention to is the specific nature of human being. Whether we interpret this specificity in the spirit of Husserl as “the intentional life of consciousness” or as presence (Dasein) in the sense of Heidegger, we go beyond naturalism which is a characteristic of the natural attitude of consciousness, we also question the natural positing the student and the teacher to one another. In fact what positivity is meant we can be judged by the words of a novice teacher, “I thought that there are going to be 20-odd children who are going to be constantly attentive and never fiddle about in their seats and they’re going to be with me constantly on whatever I do” [11: 180].

The teacher is the subject that forms the student as an object. This is the very givenness behind what has been said above. Such attitude meetstthe spiritcoftthernatural scientific€experimental knowledge -tto “endure” the nature (in this case, the pupil’s) to the state and type required by the theoretical scenario (educational standard). The searches for technologies to ensure the effective knowledge transfer is based on the assumption of continuity and homogeneity of the space where these technologies will be implemented. Meanwhile, human being is not a thing, and if to assume, as phenomenology does, the fact that the specific way of human existence lies in its “lifeworld” (or “being-in-the-world”), we’ll have to admit that the teacher and the student can be shielded from each other by space and time of their own, while the “spatiality” of the pedagogical interaction itself is discrete. Thus, pedagogicaliinteraction will become an encounter betweentthe students and the teacher only if it based on a tacit fund of shared meanings and values that is the core of the students’ life-world, their way of being-in-the-world.

The Husserl’s metaphor of consciousness as a flow forces one to focus attention on one more important aspect. So I long astthe iintentionalcdepth ofcconsciousnessi isiinexhaustible,tthen any\vision, understandingcof the world is limited, incomplete. In this regard, the being-in-the-world is possible only as being-with-others, as the experience of complementary views, perspectives. This in turn means that only the dialogical forms of learning are most appropriate to the nature of human existence and must become a priority issue for the educational policy.