Interpretation of truth as a way of developing communication in analytical philosophy (using the concepts of L. Wittgenstein and D. Davidson as an example)

This paper examines the interpretation of truth and its role in shaping the rules of communication within the framework of analytical philosophy. The focus is on a comparative analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early work and Donald Davidson’s approach. The study investigates the intricacies of speech act formation and addresses the question: “What role do the rules of communication play in the development of dialogue, the interpretation of truth, and the determination of its criteria?”. The novelty of this paper lies in the comparative analysis of these two prominent thinkers, ultimately arguing for the superiority of Davidson’s approach as a more suitable framework for facilitating effective communication, dialogue, and mutual understanding. The argument is that interpretation and comprehension of language between interlocutors are contingent upon specific criteria. Consequently, these rules must be formed through new axioms aimed at generating true knowledge. The paper critiques the limitations of logical positivism, arguing that its emphasis on cognitive schemes restricts human agency and presents a limited view of truth. In contrast, it posits that Davidson’s anti-realist approach offers a more comprehensive interpretation of meaning, encompassing its formation and transformation. This approach adequately addresses the dynamic aspects of meaning-making in communicative interaction.