Intimations of Socratic Philosophy. Exploring the Apocryphal Dialogue: On Justice

Towards Elucidating a Notion of “Socratic Philosophy”

This essay draws inspiration from an unlikely source: it explores and pursues an understanding of Socratic philosophy through the reading of a dialogue that Plato did not author, namely, the apocryphal dialogue, On Justice. The dialogue, along with On Virtue, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, and Axiochus, is classified by A. E. Taylor as one comprising the notheumenoi all of which “seem to be undisguised imitations of Platonic ‘discourses of Socrates,’” and most of them are traceable to

“the work of the early Academy.”¹ W. K. C. Guthrie claims that On Justice (Greek: Peri Dikaiou; Latin: De Justo ), along with its companion, On Virtue , is “hardly worth mentioning,” for it amounts to nothing beyond a “trivial schoolboy” effort, a flawed and jejune exercise on the “Platonic model by pupils of Sophistic of Socratic schools” seeking to further the tradition of “Socratic literature [ Sokratikoi Logoi ] as a special genre.”² It must be noted at the outset that this essay is neither grand nor sweeping in scope, in fact it is written in the spirit of offering gestures toward and reflections on what I am interpreting and defining as “Socratic philosophy” as this view emerges and is developed by attending to the themes present to this dialogue, while recognizing the radically truncated nature of the dramatic elements of the ancient author’s presentation. So, as readers will note, I am dealing with subject matter that D. S. Hutchinson, in his English translation of the dialogue, accurately describes as offering “familiar Socratic ideas, presented in an unusually bald and unattractive format,”³ but despite this pejorative assessment, my claim is that there is a way to approach and develop the ideas presented in this apocryphal dialogue that contribute to the scholarly understanding of Socratic philosophy now viewed within contemporary academics as originating from a decidedly “non-doctrinal” and “non-systematic” reading of Plato’s corpus, e.g., as found in the recent scholarship of Sallis (1998), Gonzalez (1998), Kirkland (2010), and Fried (2021).

Dialectic as Philosophical Speech-Act

To begin, when considering justice (dikaiosunē) in terms of its use or practical manifestation, Socrates introduces into the discussion an analogy focused on “measure-taking” and “weighing,” and stresses that what is required is both an accurate measuring-stick and a trustworthy scale, instruments for calculating measure and weight, but also required out of necessity are competent persons possessing the skill at determining and judging the accuracy of such “measure-taking”; much like a scientist’s expertise is required when performing analyses and conducting meta-analyses. Socrates then moves to consider what is required when attempting to “distinguish what’s just and what’s unjust,” he wonders, “what instrument do we use to examine them? And, besides this instrument, what skill do we use in dealing with them” (On Justice 273a)?4 What emerges from this analogy is nothing other than a vista into Socratic Philosophia: The instrument is critical dialogue (dialectic) consisting of reasoned, dialectical argumentation (philosophy-as-speech-act)5 and one of the skills required might be identified as “interpreting” the value of the philosophical virtue of the soul or disposition termed “sophrosunē,” which is made possible through enlightenment or phronēsis, a view of knowledge relatable to the dialectically developing philosophical and practical understanding of the virtues. This skill assists in providing a clear-headed and even-tempered understanding of how the virtues, in this case justice, should best be applied or enacted in appropriate ways within ever-changing contexts and circumstances when encountering unique individuals. It must be noted that this form of phronētic understanding is always limited, for it is a form of “human wisdom” that fails to rise to the level of divine omnipotence, indeed, as Socrates continually stresses, “Human wisdom is of little or no value” (Apology 23b).

Thus, it is possible, at the outset, to define philosophy as the (instrument) process “which contemplates truth” in the service of “cultivation of the soul, based on correct reason” (Definitions 414b). Related to what was stated above, sophrosunē is that quality or virtue (skill) providing “good discipline in the soul,” contributing to the “rational agreement within the soul about what is admirable and contemptible,” the state of one’s disposition (hēxis) or soul (psychē) “by which its possessor chooses and is cautious” about the decisions he makes between right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, good and evil (Definitions 411e-412a). In On Justice, readers encounter three familiar Platonic/Socratic themes that will be discussed herein, and they are, in order of their manifestation in the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutor: (1) Justice and virtue are pursued through language (speech) in dialectical examination – though Socrates shows little concern for the “eidos” or Form of justice; (2) What is just and unjust is determined within specific situations and one must come to know the right time (kairos) to choose what is just and avoid what is unjust; and (3) Knowledge of virtue (e.g., justice and sophrosunē) is essential, i.e., if one is ignorant of justice, one cannot willingly or knowingly be just or unjust.6 Despite certain dialogues in the apocrypha being comparable to Platonic writings, to reiterate point (1) from above, On Justice does not explicitly undertake the task of seeking an essential definition of the virtue justice; in academic terms, it does not attempt to provide an “account” or give a logos for the essence, Being, or Form of justice (On Justice 372a; 373d-e). In addition, Socrates refrains from seriously pursuing the typical “ti esti;” question, such as “What is Justice?” or “What is virtue?” that typically provides structure and direction to Socratic questioning in many authentic Platonic dialogues, especially those identified as “early aporetic dialogues.”7

Since the pursuit of the essence ( ousia ), Form ( eidos ), or Being of justice is not taken up as a formalized line of inquiry, Socrates and his friend agree to question the manner in which justice manifests within the lived ( existential ) context of the experience of it, specifically, seeking to understand it by inquiring into the way in which it manifests through inquiry ( phronēsis ) and then is “used,” employed, or better, instantiated in and through enlightened praxis ( On Justice 372a). Socrates suggests that if this route into the understanding of justice is taken, it is perhaps best accomplished by examining the way in people tend to “speak” about justice, for Socrates concludes that it is through dialogue, by way of “speech” that we converse, argue, and then rationally decide “what’s just and what’s unjust” ( On Justice 373d). However, Socrates insists that if we are to learn about justice then the right people must be examined, those who might be considered experts in the matter of justice, for example, judges. When ruling or rendering judgments in the cases before them, it is through dialogue and deliberation (“by speaking”) that judges ultimately offer a “prescription of law which produces justice [ dikaion ]” ( Definitions

414e). It would be impossible, as Socrates contends, for judges to legitimately render just decisions in cases without knowledge or understanding of justice, for a “just person is just because of his knowledge [ phronēsis ]” ( On Justice 375c). Their “skill” in judging, which includes properly and ethically meeting out justice, adjudicating justly, is revealed by means of rational discussion and debate, thus it is concluded that this “skill” is contingent on and inseparable from the sustained participation in a dialectical “speech-act,” the “instrument” that consists of questioning, responding, refuting, and ultimately arriving at a rigorously reasoned, agreed upon conclusion.

Opening the discussion, Socrates’ friend declares that justice cannot be decided by “custom” or beliefs that have been passed along and codified by authorities, by the many (hoi polloi), and in addition, Socrates contends that the understanding of the virtues is neither given by “nature” (physis) nor transferred through education or teaching (didaskalia) grounded in didactic or the sophistic method of “transfer” (On Virtue 379c). Instead, as introduced above, the potential exists to arrive at an understanding of justice through the common Socratic practice of employing and engaging in a dialectical and rhetorical form of argumentation (epaktikoi logoi), which accepts that premises and subsequent conclusions are open to further questioning, with the potential for revision and clarification, working toward a temporary and tentative rational consensus among participants. What is unique about this type of argumentation, and the reason we might identify it as a philosophical speech-act, is that it is dependent upon the beliefs, feelings, and disposition of those involved in the dialogue, i.e., the participant’s opinions, feelings, and ethical attitude are all at issue, in essence, their entire Being-in-the-world, which includes their Being-with-others, is of central concern. Hence, by means of dialectical examination the disposition (hēxis) or constitutional makeup of the soul (psychē) is called into question and the potential arises that it will undergo or suffer (pa-thos/pathein) a change or alteration; the soul within “Socratic learning” might be said to be “turned around” (periagogē) in such a way that it is changed and attuned by the freshly ignited light of truth and revelation, it “turns” back on itself in an enlightened manner.8 Ultimately, Socratic dialectic aims at altering and changing for the better, in the light of a new and developing understanding of justice, the manner in which one makes crucial “ethical” decisions about life, and this is the aspect of prohairesis tou biou (critical, informed decisions about one’s life) that is expressive of the intimate interconnection between one’s logos (word/thought) and bios/ergon (life/deed), indicative and expressive of the “normative” knowledge or understanding of virtue consistent with “philosophical understanding” (phronēsis), “practical wisdom…of what is good and bad…productive of human happiness (Definitions 411d). For example, in relation to the judges Socrates discusses, much like the dialectician, it is through debate and discussion that they become informed and enlightened when providing “good counsel [euboulia]…by virtue of reasoning” (Definitions 413c).

However, despite this conclusion, as indicated above, it is not the case that those practicing dialectic ultimately arrive at a level of certitude that forecloses further discussion, e.g., in the courtroom, judges do not assent to an axiomatic first principle or arrive at the dialectical “truth” of the essence (Form) of the virtue (dikiaosunē) itself. Indeed, even Socrates does not and cannot offer definitive “proof” for what justice in its essence is, but rather through conversation and interpretation he is committed to revealing or wresting from concealment new and unique aspects of justice, aspects of justice that had, prior to dialectical examination, remained concealed and obscured. And yet, despite such talk of “incomplete” knowledge, Socrates always holds an idealistic eye toward virtue’s perfected and unattainable essence or nature (On Virtue 379c), and this idea relates to an understanding of both practical-and-contextual and eudaimonistic ethics as will be discussed below. It must be noted that when there is talk in Plato’s dialogues regarding “proof” for various claims, the term most often employed is “apodeixis,” and this term does not mean that Socrates and his interlocutors are revealing and acquiring the knowledge of something that transcends the context of discourse, in the sense of gliding from hypothesis to noetic grasp of an intelligible axiomatic (transcendent) first principle, as in the idealized description of the philosopher kings and queens in the Republic. Instead, the Attic Greek apodeixis indicates that what is revealed does so only because it is inextricably linked to the issue that is under interrogation, e.g., in the case of the discussion in On Justice, what is revealed concerns the virtue and its practical place and role in a “good” (eudaimonic) life (Sallis 1984). So, Socrates’ dialectic works to reveal or “show” (deiknumi) aspects of the virtue that had previously remained concealed, and this showing or displaying is not the equivalent of proving or definitively defending a case or claim for justice, but rather apodeixis is a letting be seen of what shows itself in the midst of the discussion, in a way that is inextricably bound up with the existential immediacy of the lives of the participants. These moments of revelation contribute to the positive development of the understanding of justice in the dialectic, e.g., the proper way to question and investigate it, the right way to approach the experience of justice as it manifests in unique but understandable ways depending upon circumstances. Socrates is ultimately concerned with understanding (logos) the right way (ergon) and appropriate time (kairos) to act in concrete situations that call for specific ethical or virtuous actions. As is consistent with Socratic philosophy, which is nothing other than the practice of cultivation of the soul, the investigation of justice and the other virtues is a necessary, ethical, honorable, and question-worthy endeavor or life-task.

To reiterate my previous claim, the showing or revelation of “truth” through rational questioning and argumentation (reasoned speech) holds the potential to transform the character (hēxis) and hence alter the course of one’s Being-in-the-world with others, which is why the dialectic represents an “engaged” and “inspiring” philosophical speech-act. For in a non-technical manner it is possible to state that as the Socratic dialectic works to provide new inraods of understanding into the virtue under discussion, it simultaneously inspires, because it conditions in an enlightened manner, the choice and performance of phronētically informed actions, actions for Socrates that are ethical in nature, actions that might be labeled “normative” in their unfolding (Taylor 2010). Indeed, in the case of the Socratic dialectic the speech involved, as it is inspired by and facilitated in its movement by the emerging and developing understanding (phronēsis) of virtue, already lives as praxis. As stated, this is associated with prohairesis tou biou and is expressive of the intimate ethical connection between one’s logos (word/thought) and bios/ergon (life/deed).9 Further, it is possible to state that as philosophical speech-act, when dialectically interrogating the virtue of justice, “speaking” of and about justice, the participants in the dialogue instantiate, to greater and lesser degrees, the virtue itself. For example, if dikaiosunē is to be understood as “the unanimity of the soul with itself, and the good discipline of the parts of the soul with respect to each other and concerning each other” (Definitions 411d), then through the very practice or exercise (askēsis) of questioning and pursuing the understanding of justice, both Socrates and his interlocutors instantiate the virtue to some degree even without being able to fully define it or express it through propositional utterances (Gonzalez 1998). However, according to Socrates, definitive knowledge of any of the virtues is impossible, for as stated, Socrates is dealing specifically with “normative” issues, concerns that are expressed not through propositions but normative statements, the truth or falsity of which cannot can be determined with certainty, for they concern what ought to be done, they transcend the Either/Or epistemological register consistent with propositional locutions.

The Practical-and-Contextual Ethics of Socrates

Burnyeat is correct when observing that Socrates is primarily concerned “with virtues and vices, with what it is to be a good man and why one should aspire to perfection [cultivation] of the soul,” in contrast to this view, “the focus of much modern ethics is on actions rather than on character, the primary concern being with [discernable] principles of right conduct.” (Burnyeat 1971). If Socrates was able to capture the essence of the virtues he so doggedly pursues in the dialogues, it would be possible to establish an ethics of an objective nature, where an unwavering duty exists to adhere to immutable principles that inform and determine action and are acquired through certain knowledge. Such immutable and universal principles must be followed to in a way that transcends, and hence excludes, considerations regarding circumstances, intuitions, feelings, or interpretive philosophical judgments. This “objectivist” view of ethics emerges from certain “doctrinal,” “orthodox,” and antiquated readings of Plato, Socrates, and the dialogues, which embrace in an unadulterated manner the infamous Socratic dictum: knowledge = virtue, indicating that neither Socrates nor the interlocutors he encounters can truly be ethical without sure and certain knowledge of the virtues.10 This view harbors the distinction between having (echein – “to have”) knowledge of the virtues and seeking (zetein – “to seek”) knowledge of the virtues and erroneously privileges the former, seemingly ignoring that Socrates continually talks of philosophy as the ever-re- newed, erotic pursuit of wisdom, the completeness of which always eludes the human’s limited and finite grasp (e.g., Apology, Euthyphro. Meno, Laches, Charmides, Alcibiades I). Socrates does not subscribe to objectivist ethics,11 for it is undeniable that he embraces a form of ethics that considers the circumstances and unique situations that contribute to and in great part shape ethical responses, and this includes a concern for the uniqueness of the characters, dispositions, or “souls” of the individuals encountered. However, I note that this type of practical-contextual ethics espoused and practiced by Socrates eludes the trap of ethical relativism,12 which wrongly and dangerously indicates that what is just and unjust, and value itself, can be arbitrarily and subjectively determined based on one’s whim or mood; this is to say that Socrates does not endorse ethical subjectivism for important reasons we discuss below.

This indicates that the ethical, virtuous, and just individual will perform actions that are virtuous and just when assessing, deliberating (boulē), judging, and choosing within the appropriate conditions, at the “right” time (kairos) and for the right reasons, actions that are virtuous, and this is, as Socrates stresses, “because of his knowledge…because of his wisdom [phronēsis]” in matters of an ethical nature (On Justice 375e).14 However, this is not to indicate that Socrates here is referring to absolute knowledge or understanding of the virtues, and it is possible to envision the functioning of this type of Socratic ethical practice stressing what might be termed a developing-and-viable ethical understanding that has been experienced, wrested from concealment through rigorous and repeated Socratic examination. It is this well-informed but incomplete understanding of the virtues, which is ever evolving through continued dialectical examination that informs the choices made in praxis, and it is possible to identify this phronētic ethical wisdom with the tentative and fluctuating grounds of eudaimonistic ethics. Eudaimonia, according to Bobonich, plays a key role in Socrates’ views on “how to live and how to act” and is crucial when thinking about “other important notions, such as virtue and knowledge.” 15 In line with the interpretation presented, Bobonich recognizes that although “happiness” or human flourishing as eudaimonia may be the primary ethical and virtuous “object of desire, humans cannot completely or permanently attain it.”16

Concluding these thoughts on “ethical” circumstances, I briefly return the role of the judges that Socrates describes in On Justice, for they indeed have to make legal determinations when rendering ethical judicial decisions in the court, and this of course takes into account the specific criminal act to be adjudicated, the differences between individuals, and the unique circumstances surrounding the legal issue that is before them. As stated above, it is only when judges take these matters into account that they are truly informed and prepared because of their deliberations to render just verdicts, offering just “prescription[s] of law that produces justice [ dikaion ]” ( Definitions 414e-415a). Now consider Socrates’ practice of dialectical examination as portrayed in many of Plato’s dialogues, for it is the case that readers encounter Socrates employing a wide array of tactics or techniques when interrogating the virtues in the company of his many and varied interlocutors. In the service of cultivation of the soul, which is directed toward pursuing the understanding the virtues, Socrates strives to better the character and hence the behavior of those who are co-participants in the interrogative process, because if the interlocutors are strong and courageous enough to persevere and hold themselves in the context of questioning, the potential exists for their souls or dispositions to be transformed and shaped in light of the dawning understanding of the virtues that the questioning reveals. Although it is the case that so-called “end” or overarching eudaimonic goal of the Socratic project remains consistent throughout the dialogues, the same cannot be said of the “means” employed in the attempt to relentlessly interrogate the virtues. To offer but one example, which relates directly to the conversation between Socrates and his friend in On Justice, I stress that often, depending on the intellectual, emotional, and psychological ( psychagogic ) constitution of the interlocutor, Socrates alters and indeed consciously molds his philosophical tactics and rhetorical techniques, choosing actions in the opportune moment ( kairos ) that best suits the person and the uniqueness of the situation, specifically as these actions best contribute to the ethical development of the other’s soul or disposition.

Regarding Socrates’ conclusions about just and unjust actions, it is possible to agree that taunting, tormenting, and humiliating a friend would do injustice to the idea and experience of friendship, as it would appear to inflict harm on an ally, friend, representing the type of actions that are best directed toward our enemies or against those who we hold in contempt, as stressed in On Justice. Yet Socrates, in addition to demonstrating what we identify as care and respect for many of his interlocutors, often resorts to shaming and embarrassing those with whom he engages in discussion. For example, in the case of young Lysis, Socrates tends to handle him in a somewhat nurturing manner, employing the technique of protreptic, which manifests in the hortatory praise of Lysis in the attempt to gently guide him to the understanding that wisdom and truth are the true “friends” or companions he should seek. Contrarily, Socrates is much harsher and even vitriolic with the youth Menexenes, who is skilled in eristic. In this unique situation, the context of dialoging with the two young men, these seemingly contradictory actions are in fact necessary when seriously taking into account the philosophical development and emotional and psychological temperament of the youths. Here, Socrates makes the correct and good choice regarding the ethical course of action to take with respect to each young man, based on both the situation and their respective development. Indeed, in each instance Socrates does what is required for true friendship, had he not chosen these specific actions rightly and appropriately, he would have impeded the philosophical project and stifled the youths’ development, acting in stark contrast to what authentic friendship entails.17

Are People Unknowingly and Unwillingly Unjust?

In On Justice , Socrates introduces the wisdom of the comic poet Epicharmus of Syracuse to begin reflection on whether people do unjust things knowingly: “No one is willingly wicked, nor willingly blessed” ( On Justice 374a). The short discussion that follows is related directly to the Socratic dictum introduced above: knowledge = virtue , and it is indeed agreed upon by both participants in dialogue that people tend to “act unjustly and are unjust and wicked unwillingly,” and therefore it appears at first blush, as already discussed above, it is necessary to “have” or “possess” ( echein ) full knowledge of justice in order to act in a just, ethical manner ( On Justice 375d). Before simply accepting Socrates’ statement, because he is not attempting to vigorously defend this claim, it is necessary to consider several issues. To accept prima facie the Socratic dictum, is to endorse and indeed impose a sense of directionality upon his philosophy, namely, the necessary and direct movement from

“knowledge” acquisition ( epistemology ) ⇒ “virtuous” behavior ( axiology ), which assumes the logical, deductive form, “If P, then Q, ” and this view wrongly assumes that epistemology is antecedent to ethical concerns in a way that wrongly stresses chronology and causality. It also reveals a notion of ethics that requires sure and certain knowledge of the virtues in a way that smuggles in the relationship of identity. Based on the conclusions from the previous section, if virtue is contingent on possessing full knowledge of it, and further, to know virtue is to enact it, then performing wicked or unjust actions, would be involuntary, carried out because of ignorance or lack of education (Guthrie 1971, 39). Such a view suggests that humans are capable of having sure and complete knowledge of such things as the virtues, yet this is a view that Socrates eschews repetitively in the dialogues, for as he often stresses, human wisdom, which is grounded in ontological finitude, is radically limited in breath and scope, falling far short of divine wisdom. It is also requires embracing the position that those who are ignorant of the virtues, and subsequently the actions emerging from out of this ignorance, are not and cannot be determined to be fully culpable for their actions, and this is a severely problematic, naïve, and dangerous position to espouse and endorse. So, I move to briefly explore what Socrates might indeed mean when he gets his friend to endorse the conclusion that unjust individuals “act unjustly and wicked unknowingly” ( On Justice 375d), i.e., “The unjust person is unjust, then, because of his ignorance” ( On Justice 375c).

I provide two examples that offer insight into Socrates’ meaning of these remarks regarding the ignorance of the virtues resulting in uninformed actions of an unjust nature. These are instances from Plato’s dialogues that appear to contradict what Socrates indicates in his brief remarks in On Justice but will offer clarification and an explanation for what Socrates might indeed mean. In the Republic Socrates and Glaucon are discussing and debating “justice,” and Glaucon offers the following hypothetical to which Socrates’ response will be of interest: Consider that it is actually most profitable for a human to embrace injustice, amassing a fortune and gaining immense power and influence, all the while putting on the air of justice, feigning the guise of a just individual. This will, according to Glaucon, afford an advantage over others, and most importantly, over others that are truly just and virtuous. The fact that Socrates takes this hypothetical seriously indicates that it is clear the fictitious individual does indeed have at least an understanding of the difference between what is just and unjust, and further, is basing his choice of actions on the understanding of this difference, i.e., his decisions are informed by this understanding and he is therefore acting in such a way that he is willingly to shun virtue and embrace vice for profit and gain (Republic 359a-360d). Consider also Socrates’ friend and companion, Alcibiades, perhaps the most infamous rouge to have ever kept company with Socrates. In the Symposium, Alcibiades states explicitly that when he is not engaged in dialectic with Socrates, which is the philosophical process of self-cultivation, he falls back into his common, nefarious ways, caving to the will of the crowd or the many (hoi polloi). In the case of Alcibiades, it is also clear that there is an understanding of the difference between virtue and vice, but it is his weakness for and in the face of the allure of the power and ambition, along with his resistance to continually and in a dedicated manner practice dialectical examination, that causes him, admittedly, to “willingly” and “knowingly,” out of convenience, ambition, and licentiousness, shun virtue and embrace vice, turning his back on the philosophical life Socrates offers (Symposium 216c-223d).

It is then possible to state that these types of individuals - (2) and (3) - do indeed perform certain actions out of ignorance, most particularly those actions related to ethics and virtue; their decisions, choices, and actions are performed without knowledge (“unknowingly”) of the “good” life, or without an understanding that emerges from practicing “the science of good and evil,” in a manner, from the perspective of Socratic philosophy, that is “ignorant” and hence “willed” in a way that is “uninformed”. They act without the understanding, or the developing sense of phronēsis , of the virtues that Socrates relentlessly pursues, and according to Socrates, there is undoubtedly a very real culpability and burden of responsibility that accompanies even these uniformed choices. To return to what was earlier discussed, when speaking of understanding the virtues, when practicing dialectical examination, Socrates does not arrive at a level of certitude that forecloses further discussion. Recall Socratic philosophy works to reveal or show ( deiknumi ) aspects of the virtue that had previously remained concealed, and this showing or displaying is, as stated, not the equivalent of “proving” a case for justice by offering a rigid and axiomatic definition, but rather this showing ( apodeixis ) is a letting be seen of what shows itself in the midst of the discussion and the unfolding of the questioning. It is possible to state that the philosopher, although “ignorant” in terms of lacking a complete knowledge of the virtues, longs for and strives to pursue that which he lacks, that which he has only an intimation or burgeoning understanding of. Indeed, it is through this longing or erotic desire for knowledge that he gains a veiled insight or intimation of the Being of virtue as it momentarily shines through and inspires the ever-renewed philosophical project. This intimation of virtue or justice, although it can evolve into a deeper phronētic understanding in the soul, can never rise to the level of a possession, and remains, as is consistent with Socrates understanding of the dialectic and the limits of human knowledge, the longing or love of wisdom, but never its possession (Scott, Welton 2000). Thus, what Socrates demonstrates and reveals in On Justice is that instead of acting out of ignorance it is best to be inspired to act in relation to the human ignorance that is recognized, acknowledged, and embraced as part and parcel of the human condition.

Much like Socrates, we should be inspired to act out of our acknowledged ignorance, our lack of full and complete knowledge about the most important things in human life, namely, invigorated in the pursuit of understanding the virtues, through which such knowledge is revealed when attending to and being guided by the normative “science of good and evil.”