The origins and prospects of dialectical conceptualization of the terms “mechanism” and “organism” in describing the phenomenon of artificial intelligence

The subject of the article is the issues of dialectical conceptualization of the terms “mechanism” and “organism” when describing the phenomenon of artificial intelligence. As a dialectical antithesis, these concepts have been used by philosophers for many centuries, but have not been given a coherent conceptual definition. Such a situation is connected with the constant qualitative development of technologies and with the emergence of mechanical technology along with computers and systems that imitate the higher nervous activity of living beings, which, at first glance, have blurred the boundary between the mechanical and organic world. The author notes that at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries the contrast between the concepts of “mechanism” and “organism” has been resumed with greater acuteness in describing and identifying the phenomenon of artificial intelligence. But in modern philosophy these concepts most often receive non-dialectical, but metaphysical conceptualization, which leads to one-sidedness in describing the phenomenon of artificial intelligence, primarily from a mechanistic standpoint. The author concludes that modern philosophy requires dialectical conceptualization of the terms “mechanism” and “organism” in order to fully and comprehensively consider the phenomenon of artificial intelligence.