Evolution of transcendental philosophy in phenomenology: transition from «construction» to «description»

At the turn of the XIX - XX centuries, two most significant branches of transcendental philosophy, neo-kantianism and phenomenology, formulated the outwardly similar projects of philosophy based on polar approaches. Neo-kantianism was seeking a field of philosophy competence in constructing a universal system of knowledge known as a theory of cognition, but phenomenology moved on further to the formation of a new language and a new subject universum in which any secular scientific knowledge got its new place and meaning. The new language, proposed by Husserl in «Ideas» and «Cartesian Meditations», includes notions and categories unknown in the early XX century philosophy, such as «intentionality», «noema», «noeses», etc. The notions of «reality, «object», «sense» acquired a radically new meaning different from the the meaning in neo-kantianism. Nevertheless, both philosophical systems are united with the common intention to keep philosophy as an autonomous and universal knowledge based on transcendental foundations. This intention was put into practice through different approaches: constructive methods in neo-kantianism and descriptive ones in phenomenology, the essence of which is considered in the article.