Military-political situation in Arctic regions and the scenario of possible conflicts

Until recently, the problem of the militarization of the Arctic was almost exclusively a theoretical value for the reasons of the natural-climatic nature. Because of the presence in the region permanent ice cover in the Arctic Ocean and the extremely harsh natural conditions of land-based activities of all types of aircraft in the Arctic was either extremely difficult or even impossible. And at the end of the Cold War, even those troops who were in the Arctic, were either reduced or even eliminated.

The situation has changed in the recent years due to the start of the intensive melting of the Arctic ice, while the discovery of the large hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf. [1] The possible disappearance of the sea ice creates conditions for the year-round sailing merchant vessels and warships of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage and the season - in the high latitudes, as well as for the extraction of hydrocarbons on the shelf. Thus, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from Europe to Asia by almost 5 thousand km shorter than the path through the Suez Canal [2], the Northwest Passage (FFP) for 9 thousand km shorter than the path through the Panama Canal. [1] In this case, the United States insists that the SMP and FFP are international waters, while Russia and Canada, respectively, according to their own internal waters [3].

In connection with this problem of the militarization of the Arctic re-emerged. It is compounded by the fact that the waters of the Arctic Ocean and its shelf are not differentiated, as all in the Arctic countries have different views on this issue [2, 4].

In this research, the Arctic countries will be Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark (in the Arctic via Greenland) and the United States (via Alaska). Close to the Arctic Circle is Iceland, but it has no sun and no claims on the shelf and the Arctic waters. Sweden and Finland have territory in the Arctic Circle, but they do not have access to the Arctic Ocean.

All of these countries except, of course, Russia are members of NATO, but in this case it is not critical, as there are serious differences between the two. It is necessary to consider the sun each country.

Canada

Since the end of the Cold War, Canadian Forces, as well as virtually all other aircraft of NATO member countries have gone through significant reduction and transformation. In 2005, it was created by the Canadian Command, which is responsible for all military operations in North America (as with the U.S. and its own). The structure consists of 6 Regional Command podkomandovany (Northern, Pacific, Steppe, Central, Eastern and Atlantic). In 2006 were formed Expeditionary Force Command (responsible for peacekeeping operations), Special Forces Command (responsible for the fight against terrorism) and the Auxiliary Command (responsible for the logistics BC) [5].

Thus in reality almost all aircraft [6, pp. 28-31] are subject to the Canadian command. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, Canadian troops had completely withdrawn from Europe, but after the start of NATO's Afghan operation about three thousand Canadian soldiers (one brigade group) were sent to Afghanistan.

The army (number - about 35 thousand people.) Include three motorized infantry brigade (1st, 2nd, 5th), engineer regiment, air defense regiment. In 2007, Canada acquired 100 tanks in Holland "Leopard 2", another 20 tanks of the same has been taken on lease in Germany, 12 tanks were purchased in Switzerland for parts. In this case, to date from the Netherlands received only 40 tanks. Most of them are immediately sent to Afghanistan. In addition, armed ground forces there to 60 obsolete tanks "Leopard-1", 200 combat reconnaissance vehicles (BRM) "Coyote", more than 1.2 thousand armored personnel carriers (APCs), about 200 artillery guns caliber 105 and 155 mm, more than 100 mortars, 500 anti-tank missiles (ATGM), "Toe" and "Erics", 33 antiaircraft missiles (SAMs) ADATS.

Air Force (about 20 thousand) include 11 Air Command and the Canadian component of the joint Canada-US air defense of the North America NORAD. On arms are 80 F-18 fighters, 18 antiaircraft CP-140, 7 tankers (2 A-310, CN-130 5), about 50 transport planes, including Strategic 7 (3 A-310 4 P-17) and tactical 24 (C-130), 30 training aircraft, a helicopter 130, including 6 heavylift CH-47 and CH-28 anti-submarine 124 "Sea King". Component of the system 11 includes NORAD radar (radar) long and 36 short-range [7].

Navy (11 thousand) has 4 armed submarines (PL) of the "Victoria" (the former British "Upholder"), three destroyers of the "Iroquois", 12 frigates, "Halifax", 12 minesweepers of the "Kingston" and 12 patrol ships. Another 60 patrol ships and boats, and there are six icebreakers in the Coast Guard.

Thus, the Canadian Forces is quite small in the number of personnel and number of vehicles, also have limited ability to move troops over long distances (in particular, the Navy does not have a landing craft). Almost all of the units and ground forces and air forces stationed in the southern part of the country (south of the 50th parallel), the most "northern" is the 1st motorized infantry brigade (Edmonton, 53 N). Stationed in the northern territories only the 1st Battalion, Canadian Rangers (Yellowknife, 62 N).

In the last 3 years Canadian government has repeatedly expressed concern about the situation in the Arctic, including Russian military activity, claims U.S. FFP and territorial disputes with Denmark. In connection with this supposed to increase the number of rangers from 4.1 to 5 thousand people, to build a center in Resolute Army to train combat operations in Arctic conditions. [1] So far, however, these plans have not been implemented because capacity of the country militarily and financially very limited, and cooperation with the United States is not always possible because of the contradictions between the two countries is on the issue of the Arctic.

Norwegian Armed Forces [6, pp. 150-152] and Denmark [6, pp. 126-128] after the end of the Cold War were very substantial cuts, becoming one of the smallest on the number of personnel and the number of weapons and equipment of aircraft of all NATO countries. At the same time, these two countries, in contrast to most other NATO countries, have kept the conscription system of recruitment of Navy.

Norway

The army (8 ths.) Include one mechanized infantry brigade of the "Nord" (used primarily as training), a regiment of the special forces, border battalion and a battalion of the Royal Guard. In the inventory consists of 72 tanks (52 "Leopard 2", 20 "Leopard-1"), more than 100 armored infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) CV9030, about 400 armored personnel carriers, more than 50 self-propelled artillery system (ACS), the M-109A3, 250 mortars , more than 500 anti-tank systems "Erics" and "Javelin".

Air Force (2,5 thous.) are armed with 57 F-16 fighters, six anti-aircraft P-3 "Orion", 3 aircraft electronic warfare (EW) DA-20, 4 transport aircraft C-130J, 15 training aircraft "Safari", 36 helicopters, including 12 anti-submarine "Sea King".

Navy (3.5 thousand) includes 6 Submarine "Ula", 5 frigates "Nancy", 6 missile boats hovercrafttype "Skjold", 6 minesweepers hovercraft-type "Alta" and "Oksey" 20 landing craft type 90N. In addition, 10 patrol ships are part of the Coast Guard. Frigates of the "Nansen" are among the most modern combat ships of this class in the world, missile boats and trawlers hovercraft actually have no analogues in the world. Frigates and missile boats are armed with only the West supersonic anti-ship missile (ASM) NSM (except in Norway, supersonic anti-ship missiles were able to create only Russia and China). [8]

The units of the Norwegian Armed Forces are fairly evenly distributed across the country. At the same tank battalion brigade "Nord" (the most efficient division within it) is located in the north of the country. There's also based anti-aircraft "Orion". In Narvik are naval base (HMB) Ramsund and item-based (PB) Sortland Norwegian Navy, but they attributed only ships and boats of the Coast Guard. Also in the north of the country there are a number of intelligence objects (radar station and RTR).

Denmark

The army (10.6 thousand) includs one division, which consists of two teams (including 1 training). In service with about 150 tanks (65 "Leopard 2", the rest - "Leopard-1"), about 120 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 500 armored personnel carriers, 24 M-109 self-propelled guns, more than 30 mortars, 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) MLRS, 20 anti-tank systems, "Tou" MANPADS "Stinger".

Air Force (3,5 thous.) Are armed with 48 F-16 fighters (another 7 to 10 - in stock capacity), 7 transport aircraft (4 C-130J, 3 CL-604), 28 training aircraft T-17, 33 helicopters (12 AS-550, 7 "Sea King", 14 EH-101

Navy (3,5 thous.) includes four frigates of the "Tethys", 10 corvettes like "Flyuvefisken" (4 with RCC, 2 in the patrol version, version 4 minesweepers), 9 patrol boats, 10 minesweepers, 2 support ship type "Absalon". The latter, in fact, have no analogues in the world. They have a powerful artillery and missile weapons (approximately at the level of a frigate), while acting as a landing craft. Also are unique Corvettes like "Flyuvefisken" in which design fully utilized modular [9]. All three icebreakers that existed in the Danish Navy, in early 2011, offered for sale, as in Jutland, they are not necessary, and the possibility of their operational use in the Arctic, apparently, is not considered [10].

All aircraft are stationed in Denmark "Denmark itself," ie, on the Jutland peninsula and the surrounding islands. At the same time in the Navy has the Greenland Command. It includes 1-2 warships (by rotation) and 2-3 guard boat fishing, his commander (headquarters is located in Grennedal) is a senior military chief of Denmark on the island. He obeys the sled patrol "Sirius", exercising control of the coastal strip by moving the sled dog in the summer. The number of patrol - about 30 people. (Junior officers and non-commissioned officers). [11]

Furthermore, in the city of Tula is the radar system of missile warning (EWS) of the U.S. BMEWS.

In general, with respect to Norway and Denmark, as well as to Canada, talk about the "militarization" there is no reason to be much more applicable term "demilitarization". Thus, according to data provided by the CFE Treaty (they may be at odds with the above data because of the different nuances of the classification system and the status of equipment), as of January 1, 1990 Norway had 205 tanks, 146 armored fighting vehicles (AFV) 531 pieces of artillery caliber greater than 100 mm, 90 combat aircraft. On 1 January 2010 it had 76 tanks, 208 armored vehicles, 67 artillery systems, 56 combat aircraft. Denmark on January 1, 1990 possessed 419 tanks, 316 armored vehicles, 553 artillery systems, combat aircraft 106. After 20 years she left 147 tanks, 321 armored vehicles, 42 artillery systems, 62 aircraft. Both countries, like Canada, have made specific update tank fleet through the acquisition of second-hand "Leopard 2" in Germany and the Nether- lands, but their number is too small for any serious operations. Norway and Denmark (and Canada) have no parts Navy and Marines, almost no money from them and moving troops. Navy all the three countries are also low, in addition, they do not have the capacity to attack coastal targets (no carrier-based aircraft or cruise missiles), except for the shelling of targets directly in the coastal zone.

On the other hand, in the Arctic major military operations with the use of armored vehicles, artillery and air in large quantities is hardly possible under the terms of natural and climatic character. As to the Navy and special forces groups, in varying degrees, all three countries are able to hold them. From this point of view, the general paucity of "traditional" BC Canada, Norway and Denmark, and their limited presence in the Arctic region does not give reason to completely disregard their combat capability.

If Canada, Norway and Denmark were considered state of their armed forces in general and in the Arctic, in particular, a complete description of the U.S. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and, of course, is not possible. We can only talk about their groupings stationed in the Arctic region at the moment, and that due to what capabilities can be conducted strengthening of these groups.

USA

With regard to the U.S. Armed Forces will be discussed in the first place, their grouping in Alaska. While virtually all parts and connections in the state are deployed to the south of the Arctic Circle, it is natural to consider the "American Arctic," Alaska as a whole.

The grouping of the Army in Alaska includes two of the four brigades of the 25th Light Infantry Division (the other two brigades and division headquarters stationed in Hawaii): 1st "Stryker" and 4th Airborne. These teams have a very high strategic mobility: 4th Airborne Brigade can be transferred to any point of the earth for 18 hours, the 1st "Stryker" - for 4 days. A weakness of both teams is a very low resistance to combat the "classic" war against a regular army equipped with armored vehicles and aircraft. So, a team of "Striker" is equipped with fighting vehicles of the "Stryker" a total of 308 units. Of these, 27 military vehicles with heavy weapons (BMTV) with a 105-millimeter cannon, 9 self-propelled anti-tank systems, "Tou-2" and 36 self-propelled mortars, the other cars do not have weapons. In addition, armed brigade has 12 M198 towed howitzers, there is no defense. It is important to note that the "Striker" (all versions) - this is the usual APC with corresponding to this class of bulletproof vehicles (14.5 mm) book. As for the airborne brigade, it has, in small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, 16 M119A2 towed howitzers (105 mm), 34 mortars, 28 self-propelled anti-tank systems, "Tou", 76 anti-tank systems "Javelin". Defense also absent [12, 13].

However, as mentioned above, imagine a battle in the Arctic with armored vehicles is difficult, so its absence from the American teams could hardly be considered a big drawback for this theater. As for defense, it can provide the Air Force group.

In Alaska, deployed the 11th Air Army Air Force, it is subject to the Air Force command in the Pacific. The basis of it is the 3rd Wing at an air force base (CDH) Elmendorf. It includes two squadrons of F-22, one squadron of F-15 fighters, aircraft, airborne early warning (AEW) E-3B and transport aircraft C-17. Of particular note is the F-22 - the world's only fighter of the 5th generation. Of the 187 vehicles of this type, procured for the U.S. Air Force, stationed in Alaska 40, as soon as their number is expected to increase to 45-50. In addition, the CDH Eylson placed 354th Air Wing, which includes two squadrons of F-16 fighters. One of them, 18-I (The 22 aircraft), a squadron of "aggressor". It formed in 2007, is equipped with the most qualified pilots, who on the teachings of the Air Force simulate enemy aircraft F-16 to its characteristics closest to MIG-29. It should be noted that the only country in Asia that has armed MiG-29 is the DPRK. In the Russian Federation in East IN fighters of this type is not, except for one air base in Domna Trans-Baikal region, 5 thousand miles from Alaska. In addition to the F-16 and MiG-29 are similar in their performance characteristics of the Chinese J-10 fighter jets.

Besides all the above Alaska deployed 176th Wing of the Air National Guard U.S. transports aircraft C-130H. In this state, there are still several airfields that could be used for the transfer of additional combat aircraft, first of all - a huge civilian airport Anchorage, which is used to refuel long-haul passenger and cargo aircraft for flights from North America to Asia and back (at the volume of freight traffic is ranked 5th in the world). The capacity of these airports can increase the grouping of the Air Force (now it has more than 100 F-22, F-15 and F-16) several times over 2-4 days. In addition, thanks to the airport network can be quickly strengthened and ground forces by transferring aircraft military transport aircraft to Alaska light brigades and brigades "Stryker". For transporting heavy compounds require rail transport (transit through Canada) and shipping, it will take a longer time.

It was in Alaska at Fort Greely is the largest global positioning area of the system of U.S. missile defense, equipped with missiles GBI. It was built 26 mines for these missiles, but some of them are flooded in June 2006 during heavy rains. [14] It is supposed to place missiles in Alaska 30-40 GBI [15, 16].

Warships of the U.S. Navy in Alaska are not based here stationed only a few ships and boats of the Coast Guard (Alaska is the 14th district of the Pacific zone coastguard). The structure consists of 4 U.S. Coastguard icebreaker, but 3 of them are based in the Seattle (WA), 1 - on the Great Lakes, ie Alaska permanently ice-breakers is not [17].

As for the European (Atlantic) part of the Arctic, apart from the aforementioned early warning radar in Thule (Greenland), no bases, military installations and groups of U.S. troops there now. The total number of U.S. military personnel in Canada and Norway is 200 people. without heavy equipment. In this case, the Arctic Ocean is divided into zones of responsibility between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets USA. The boundaries between them are the meridians 95 z.d and 100 E

Currently in the U.S. Atlantic Fleet has 6 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and 2 cruise missile (SSGN) such as "Ohio" 25 nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) (4 types of "Virginia",

21 of the "Los Angeles "), 5 nuclear aircraft carriers (" Enterprise "and 4 of the" Nimitz "), 10 cruisers of the" Ticonderoga ", 26 destroyers of the" Arleigh Burke "class frigates 18" Oliver Perry "(5 of them - in an emergency reserve) , 14 minesweepers, 14 amphibious ships. All ships are assigned to the naval base in the continental United States, except minesweepers assigned to the naval base Manama (Bahrain) [18].

As part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet SSBN are 8 and 2 SSGN type "Ohio", 29 submarines (3 of "Sea Wolf", 4 types of "Virginia", 22 of the "Los Angeles"), 6 nuclear aircraft carriers of the "Nimitz", 12 cruisers of the "Ticonderoga", 29 destroyers of the "Arleigh Burke" class frigates 12 "Oliver Perry", 17 amphibious ships. Of these, the Japanese naval base in Yokosuka and Sasebo assigned to the aircraft carrier "George Washington", 2 cruisers, destroyers, 7 and 5, amphibious ships, and the rest - to the naval base in the continental United States, Hawaii and Guam. Part of the Pacific Fleet, on a rotating basis is part of the 5th Fleet, located in the Indian Ocean. [19]

U.S. Navy has exceptionally high possibilities for the action against the Navy of any other country. In addition, they have the potential, unparalleled in the world, to attack ground targets. If you do not take into consideration is the potential class SSBNs "Ohio" (they refer to the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) and are designed for the application of a massive nuclear attack by ballistic missiles (SLBMs), "Trident-2"), then the potential of the U.S. Navy for use against coast is:

• a)    on each of the 11 aircraft carriers is based on 48 to 60 F/A-18 fighter-bombers of different modifications;

• b)    each of the four SSGN type "Ohio" is 154 cruise missiles (CD) "Tomahawk"; c) All types of PLA "Virginia" and 30 submarines of the "Los Angeles" are on the CD 12 "Tomahawk" in special mines; d) all of the PLA can run the CD "Tomahawk" through the torpedo tubes, if ra-chum salmon are available on board instead of the torpedo ammunition; e) each cruiser of the "Ticonderoga" is set to 2 vertical launch (OHR) Mk41 to 61 in each cell (ie, a total of 122 cells on the ship). Each cell can be either CD "Tomahawk", or anti-aircraft missile (SAM) "Standard" or anti-submarine missile (PLUR) "Asrok"; f) Each type of destroyer "Arleigh Burke" also has a 2 OHR Mk41. In the first 33 ships -90 cells (29 in the nasal OHR, 61 in the rear) to the next - to 96 cells (32 and 64) [20, p. 702-771].

Thus, theoretically, the ships of the U.S. Navy at the same time can carry 660 combat aircraft (excluding anti) and the 8838 cruise missile (not including unspecified number of missiles that can be launched via torpedo tubes PLA). The latter figure is constantly increasing due to the commissioning of new submarines of the "Virginia" and destroyers of the "Arleigh Burke" (on the other hand, the PLA such as "Los Angeles" are being phased out of the Navy).

At the same time, of course, the real value of the potential of the U.S. Navy to strike the coastal targets much smaller because at any given time of the ships and submarines is the database's mezhpohodovom or major repairs, and on transitions to or from databases. Furthermore, as stated above, the OHR Mk41 designed for three types of missiles. Therefore, they can be employed only "Tomahawks" because it will be close to zero possibility of air defense and antisubmarine ship. Finally, there are objective limits on the concentration of warships in a limited area because of the global reach of the U.S. Navy (in fact, it is the entire world ocean). If this concentration is made, that in itself is a very strong indication that there is a kind of preparation for combat operation s.

Pic. 1. URL:

However, even if the real potential at any given moment of time is only 25% of the maximum, it is still very significant. This primarily refers to the CD of the "Tomahawk", which have a very high accuracy (CEP less than 10 m), very low the efficiency of the scattering area (less than 1 sq. m.) That it is extremely difficult to detect reconnaissance defense. In this range the KR "Tomahawk» Block 3 is 1800 km (in the U.S. Navy has up to 2 million of these missiles), "Tactical Tomahawk" -2400-2900 km. Deficiencies "Hatchet" are subsonic flight speed and the lack of means and methods of self-defense, but they tend to offset low signature [21].

In addition, the U.S. Navy has a great potential to counter ballistic missiles, naval missile defense capability is developed much better than the ground. Some modifications SAM "Standard" have the ability to hit low-orbit satellites (satellites) and medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and tactical missiles (OTR), and may be accompanied by radar ships intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and pass them parameters ground aids ABM. At present, the relevant radar and missiles mounted on 3 cruisers and 15 destroyers of the U.S. Navy (all of them are part of the Pacific Fleet), is the corresponding upgrade 2 more cruisers and destroyers 1 [22].

Russia

According to open sources [23, 24], the military potential of Russia in the Arctic is concentrated in the extreme western part of the Russian Arctic in the north-west of the Kola Peninsula.

The grouping of the Russian Armed Forces in the region includes one motorized infantry brigade, one brigade of marines, 2 air base, 2 anti-aircraft missile regiment. Their armament consists of about 120 T-80 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, 80 self-propelled guns, mortars, about 20, 18 self-propelled anti-tank systems "Storm-S", 18 SAM army air defense, 6 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems (ZRPK) "Tunguska", not less than 20 reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR, 20 Mi-24 and Mi-8, 7 battalions of air defense missile system (ADMS) S-300PS and PM.

In addition, on the northern coast of Russia (although, technically and south of the Arctic Circle) in Severodvinsk deployed another anti-aircraft missile regiment of S-300PS (Division 4). At the airbase Besovets (Karelia) deployed by various estimates, from 40 to 60 Su-27 and MiG-31.

In a relatively short period of time (presumably from a few days to 2-3 weeks), grouping the sun on the Kola Peninsula, can be enhanced by transferring air and rail transport two airborne and two amphibious assault divisions, 1-2 air assault brigades Airborne and 3 tanks and 4 to 10 infantry brigades of the Western and Central VO. Airfields Kola Peninsula can be airlifted dozens of combat aircraft.

Russian Northern Fleet has 6 missile strategic submarine cruisers (RC CH) etc. 667BDRM, 16 SSNs of Project 945 and 971, 7 diesel submarine Project 877, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers (2 pr 1144, 1 in 1164, etc.) 2 destroyers, etc. 956, 5 large and 6 small anti-submarine ships (BOD and IPC), 3 small missile ship (MRK), etc. 1234 7 minesweepers, five amphibious assault ships. Of this number, seven nuclear and diesel submarines 1, 1 cruiser, etc. 1144 1 BOD, 3 IPC and 3 amphibious ships are under repair or conservation. There is a theoretical possibility of strengthening the fleet by switching on the inland waterways of a number of the ships and boats from the Baltic and Black Sea fleet.

In addition, for the comparison with the U.S. Pacific Fleet can cause the combat potential of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Today, he is in the ranks of PLA 7, 7 diesel-powered submarines, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 4 BOD 5 IPC, 3 MRC, 7 missile boats, minesweepers, 8, 4 landing craft. And all large surface ships are in Vladivostok, a distance of more than four thousand miles from the Arctic [20, p. 586-677]. However, the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed further south.

There are no units and army, air force and air defense forces to the east of Severodvinsk, Russia in the Arctic.

The possible scenarios of the military conflicts in the Arctic

BC Canada, Norway and Denmark, due to the overall weakness of the military capabilities are not capable carried exists any serious active military influence over the territory of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, even the strength of the U.S. ground forces and air force, which was stationed in Alaska during peacetime, can easily take Chukotka, where there are no parts of the Armed Forces. In this case, Russia will not be able to move there because of the heavy compounds considerable distances. The nearest Chukotka rifle brigade located on the Kamchatka Peninsula, the following - in the Khabarovsk and Primorsky regions. Because of the heavy equipment of their airlift impossible, and by sea - will take a significant amount of time and, more importantly, will block the U.S. Navy, which, as shown above, is much stronger than the Russian Navy. Russia has the ability to transfer only part of Chukotka Navy and Air Force, however, and this will make it very difficult because of opposition from the U.S. Air Force.

At the same time, however, it is not clear that the United States can give such an operation in political and military terms. It does not give them any apparent benefit, thus threatens to escalate the conflict until a full-scale nuclear exchange. Moreover, such a scenario is the more likely, the less the possibility of Russian to make their territory free by conventional forces. It is easy to understand, Chukotka does not represent a value for the United States to capture for her to jeopardize the existence of their own country. Moreover, this applies to other areas of the Russian Arctic coast as applied to him will be difficult for the U.S. chain tasks and defense (due to longer distances), and for Russia both of these tasks, respectively, will be simplified.

Much more serious is the risk of causing the ships of the U.S. Navy (along with strategic and possibly carrier aircraft) massive non-nuclear preemptive first strike by the Kyrgyz Republic "Tomahawk" on objects of strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. Such an attack would destroy a significant part of the Russian ICBM, the PKK CH and bombers, and without a global environmental catastrophe. Under this scenario, the U.S. strategic nuclear forces remain in full potential. If Russia still dare to strike back the remains of its strategic nuclear forces, it can be defeated with the help of even a limited missile defense. And in the reflection of the impact can also take part of the U.S. Navy ships with missiles "Standard-SM3» and the corresponding radar. To accomplish both of these tasks U.S. ships should strike it from the Arctic, as here with the sweep of the KR "Tomahawk" large part of Russian territory (and most of the objects SNF). In addition, the ships are under the flight paths of the remaining Russian ICBMs and SLBMs to the U.S. (their trajectories pass through the Arctic), which greatly simplifies the task of defense because of minimizing the value of the exchange rate and the possibility of setting fire to meet, not vdogon (in connection with this It should be noted that for the GBI to Alaska with the shooting at Russian ICBMs course setting and firing range is very large, which makes the task of destroying them virtually unsolvable). Further-more, in the United States may assume that if the Russian strategic nuclear forces will be significantly weakened as a result of a preemptive strike, despite the fact that U.S. strategic nuclear forces fully retain their potential, Russia did not dare to retaliate.

Also, such scenario has several riscs and restrictions:

• 1.    Disarming strike must be the only one because if the first strike was not successful, or brought limited success, the possibility to apply a second blow will not be, because Russia will automatically cause a full-scale nuclear attack on the United States. Therefore, the first and only strike should be involved maximum potential Navy and U.S. Air Force. This means that most of the American cruisers and destroyers should approach the minimum distance to the shores of Russia, which can not be seen by Russian intelligence agents. If the strike is not sudden, it makes no sense.

• 2.    The application of preemptive strike by the Kyrgyz Republic "Tomahawk" and the solution of missile defense are in conflict with each other, because, as mentioned above, the Kyrgyz Republic and missiles "Standard" are placed in the same cell OHR cruisers destroyers. Thus, the higher the CD, the smaller the SAM or vice versa.

• 3.    At this stage, defeat ICBM missiles with "Standard" can not be able to modify them accordingly - is unclear.

• 4.    Division of Strategic Missile Forces (SMF), stationed in Siberia, remain beyond the reach of the Kyrgyz Republic "Tomahawk" even when firing at them from the Arctic waters.Accordingly, the enforcement of such a scenario is possible only if at the same time the implementation of a number of conditions:

• a)    will be a complete degradation of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Force and Air Defense, the Navy and the space group of the Russian Federation to the rapid reduction of their operational capacity, which minimizes the number of targets for a preemptive strike and opportunities for reflection and for his retaliatory strike (both in the United States, and on U.S. Navy ships, inflicting a disarming strike);

• b)    the United States will increase the potential impact Navy and Air Force, which is not obvious in the context of budgetary constraints;

• c)    the political relations between the U.S. and Russia will deteriorate to such an extent that the U.S. government considers the risk of war with Russia acceptable. Currently, there is an opposite trend.

It should be emphasized that it is necessary to be performed all three conditions simultaneously, with at least one non-fulfillment of the attack does not. Therefore, the probability of such a scenario should be considered very low.

Another theoretical scenario of an armed conflict may be a struggle for the division of hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf. The participants of such a conflict may become all the Arctic countries in almost any combination. However, it must be borne in mind that, by itself, oil and gas from the ocean floor in the presence of even a temporary ice cover anyone else and never resolved. Accordingly, technological and financial risks are very great. Because of this, no oil or gas company will not agree to the implementation of such a project, if not settled by the risks of a legal, political and, especially of a military nature. That is, No one will "spur of the moment" to produce oil and gas in those areas of the shelf that are controversial. Accordingly, the scenario of the conflict can be considered completely illusory.

Perhaps the most probable conflict in the form of a collision Navy sides due to the unresolved problems of navigation in the Arctic under the condition of her release from the ice for an extended period. As mentioned above, the path through the Arctic of Europe and Asia is much shorter, i.e. more cost effective than through the Suez Canal and, especially, around Africa. This may be a conflict over the ownership of certain waters. Moreover, in such a conflict could be drawn not only Arctic country, but the entire NATO and the European Union (Arctic country is a member of the EU, only Denmark).

However, the probability of this scenario is very small. By itself, this unresolved issue, entailing the need to escort merchant vessels warships, and the entire route through the Arctic, just multiplies the cost of the transport, thereby eliminating the benefit of reducing the route. Moreover, as the experience of the war in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the incident with the Russian Airborne Troops Battalion capture the airfield in Pristina, as well as the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, even the United States, not to mention the European countries are not psychologically ready even on a very limited military conflict with Russia, even if it takes place outside the territory of both Russia and NATO countries. There is no doubt that this also applies to the potential clash of fleets in the Arctic because of the unresolved issue of the status of water bodies. The situation can change only if a very significant weakening of Russian military even in comparison with the current situation.

Another theoretical factor of the conflict in the Arctic may be activities in China, which in 2008 opened a research station in Svalbard in the Arctic has become a regular feature Chinese icebreaker "Snow Dragon", who previously worked in Antarctica [4]. China is experiencing an acute need for any natural resources, and, judging by some of the publications of Chinese authors in this country is growing determination to capture the necessary resources and territories, in- cluding and the use of military force. [25] Therefore the resources of the Arctic are for Beijing is very considerable interest. At the same time, however, a formal claim to the Arctic waters and the continental shelf of China has not. Navy also China, despite the rapid growth of their potential, not yet able to perform any significant military operations in the Arctic.

Conclusions

Thus, although the change of the climatic conditions and the economic interests of the Arctic states to create a theoretical possibility for the militarization of the Arctic and the appearance here of the various military conflicts in the foreseeable future, the probability of imple-mentation of any conceivable scenario of these conflicts appears to be very low. It should be noted that one of the major factors preventing such conflicts in the longer term is to strengthen the military potential of Russia in all its components, as actually in the Arctic, and as a whole.