On the phenomenology of logical experiences in E. Husserl’s “Logical investigations”

In this paper, the author endeavors to clarify the relationship between logic and phenomenology in the context of a detailed examination of E. Husserl’s inquiries into the nature of logical knowledge. This endeavor appears justified not only from a historical-philosophical perspective but also from a purely conceptual standpoint: the present study investigates the role that E. Husserl assigns to ideal structures within the experience of consciousness, interpreted by him as logical objects. Through a sequential analysis, the philosophical approach of Husserl is illustrated by elucidating the essence of his anti-psychologist stance regarding logic, explicating the idea of the intentional character of consciousness, and subsequently synthesizing these two perspectives to reveal the reflexive nature of logic, which is necessitated by consciousness for self-discovery and self-clarification. It is emphasized that Husserl’s examination unfolds in a manner that defines the typological proximity of the considered acts of consciousness. By addressing these dimensions, the study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how Husserl intertwines phenomenology and logic, and how this interplay informs the dynamics of logical experiences within the framework of conscious acts.