Procurement of educational equipment and budget competition modeling

Educational establishments regularly acquire administrative and pedagogical equipment to ensure a quality educational process. In the context of limited budgets and competition among institutions, optimal resource allocation and efficient procurement management become crucial. This study builds upon approaches by applying game theory to model procurement in the educational sector. The first part extends single-stage auction models of procurement to account for heterogeneous participant information. Acquired knowledge enables participants to reduce uncertainty in procurement outcomes and outmaneuver stronger market participants with more favorable offers. Specifically, an optimal strategy is identified for the scenario where only one player possesses information, along with a quantitative order of neutralizing the undesired advantage through additional player inclusion. The second part of the study examines mechanisms of long-term budgetary competition among schools. Well-known Rubinstein, Baron, and Ferejohn game theory models are employed to investigate this setup. A substantive analogy between competition and multi-stage negotiations is drawn, and key parameters determining competitive outcomes are delineated. The purpose of the work is to evaluate the applicability of game theory models.