General meanings of the standard of proof in civil and arbitration proceedings (bayesian approach)

The article examines the history of the emergence of standards of proof in law, exam-ines the problem of applying probabilistic approaches in legal practice, in particular, the contradiction between classical (Pascal) statistics and the Bayesian method, which, despite its epistemological va-lidity, encounters resistance in the legal sphere. The author analyzes the category of judicial probabil-ity, showing that traditional mathematical models often do not correspond to legal standards of proof, especially in cases requiring the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships (for example, in tort disputes). Particular attention is paid to the concept of the standard of proof. Unlike the objective sub-ject of proof (facts that are important for resolving the dispute), the standard of proof is subjective in nature, since it depends on the inner conviction of the judge. The author draws attention to the fact that, although procedural codes do not contain a legal definition of the standard of proof, judicial practice already actively uses it, in connection with which it is proposed to amend Article 56 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (Part 4), Article 65 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (Part 6), enshrin-ing the concept of the standard of proof and the procedure for its application. This will improve the uniformity of judicial practice, the predictability of decisions and the fairness of the process.