On stoic self-contradictions: vs. in Chrysippus (SVF III, 289)

In this paper I want, first, to clarify the possible conceptual and logical structure of Chrysippus’ treatment of “injustice” (ἀδικία) in SVF III, 289 and, second, to show that given its general Stoic background it should be considered very problematic or even self-contradictory.

The text of this fragment contains four separate quotations, all taken from Plutarch’s treatise “On Stoic Self-Contradictions” (1041CD):

T1 : A....in the Demonstrations concerning Justice he says that the one who does injustice (τὸν ἀδικοῦντα) is done injustice by himself (ἀδικεῖσθαί... ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ) and does himself injustice (αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν) whenever he does it to another (ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ), for he has become a cause of transgression for himself and is harming himself undeservedly (βλάπτοντα παρ' ἀξίαν ἑαυτόν);

ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 14. 2 (2020)

In my opinion, this text rather obviously implies

• Ι) . Every injustice is an act of harming those who suffer it, i.e. ἀδικεῖν always involves βλάπτειν.

To my mind, it is also fairly uncontroversial that the central idea of T1A–C can be put as follows:

• II) . One who does injustice to others thereby does it to oneself.

In other words, other -regarding injustice always implies self -regarding injustice. Indeed, it is explicitly stated in T1 that an unjust person “does himself injustice (αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν) whenever he does it to another (ὅταν ἄλλον ἀδικῇ)” ( A ), and “he who does anyone at all injustice does himself injustice too (ὁ ἄρα καὶ ὁντινοῦν ἀδικῶν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ)” ( B ). In C other-regarding injustice is not clearly mentioned, but the thesis that “every wrong-doer (ὁ ἁμαρτάνων)... does himself injustice (ἀδικεῖ ἑαυτόν)” certainly can be quite consistently interpreted as subsuming this kind of injustice under the general notion of morally wrong action (τὸ ἁμάρτημα).

But what is the philosophical meaning behind II)? What is meant by other-regarding and self-regarding injustice and why the former should necessarily lead to the latter? Intuitively, one possible interpretation of this thesis may be as follows: when somebody commits a “conventional” injustice (c-injustice) towards others, i.e. inflicts on them some undeserved non-moral damage (e.g., kills, robs, tortures, etc.), she thereby also commits what might be called “moralistic” injus- tice (m-injustice) towards herself, i.e. makes herself unjust and therefore morally harms herself8. Or, to put it succinctly:

IIa) . One who does c -injustice to others thereby does m -injustice to oneself.

This idea would be in line with general criticism of injustice put forward by Plato: since c-unjust actions9 make the soul of the agent unjust and vicious, they bring upon her moral harm10 and evil11, thereby overwhelmingly contributing to her unhappiness12. This is why injustice is inherently disadvantageous for anyone who commits it13. When combined with I), this moral self-harming may well be construed as self-regarding m-injustice. In fact, Aristotle who usually emphasizes the other-regarding character of justice among other virtues14 and accordingly denies the possibility of committing c-injustice towards oneself15 still admits that one can “metaphorically” speak about self-regarding m-injustice, if one accepts, as Plato and himself did, the existence of different parts of the soul16. It seems that within this approach self-regarding m-injustice is nonetheless understood as essentially “social” in the sense that these soul parts are regarded as distinct agents who may commit injustices towards each other. It is important to notice that when in SVF III, 288 Chrysippus himself criticizes Plato for admitting selfregarding injustice and thus seemingly contradicts his own statements in T1 he associates this notion precisely with this “social” understanding of the human soul, which he, of course, rejected in favour of comparatively monistic psycholog- ical theory17. But the very idea of self-regarding m-injustice does not crucially depend on whether one accepts the doctrine of the multipartite soul in the vein of Plato or Aristotle. There are many Stoic texts declaring or at least implying that by committing any kind of moral evil, including injustice, one morally “harms” oneself, which, given I), may be considered a self-regarding injustice18, and it seems plausible that Chrysippus in T1 could have in mind more or less the same thing.

The fundamental problem with IIa) within Stoic ethical framework concerns rather the notion of other-regarding c -injustice. Indeed, taken together, I) and II) must result in:

• III) . One who harms others thereby harms oneself¹⁹.

The crucial point here is that in order to commit any other-regarding injustice, implied in II) , one has to somehow harm others (according to I) ). And if we accept IIa) as an interpretation of II) , then this harm must be conventional and non-moral. That is, we must also accept

IIIa) . One who c -harms others, thereby m -harms oneself.

But from the Stoic point of view this would be impossible because the Stoics are rigorists who only admit the existence of moral evil and harm. Certainly, they can quite consistently say that anyone who kills, robs, tortures, etc. inflicts on others the so-called "things against nature" (τὰ παρὰ φύσιν) or, which is approximately the same thing, “dispreferred” (ἀποπροηγμένα) indifferents20. But the whole point of Stoic rigorism is that dispreferred indifferents are not evils21. And since the Stoics also believe that only evil is harmful22, these indifferents cannot harm anyone23. Consequently, the infliction of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν on others does not amount to harming (βλάπτειν) them and therefore (according to I)) to committing an injustice (ἀδικεῖν) towards them. But if those who inflict τὰ παρὰ φύσιν on others do not commit any other-regarding injustice, they also cannot be said to morally harm themselves by performing these actions. Therefore they do not commit any self-regarding injustice either. As a result, the whole argumentation by Chrysippus collapses. What this analysis shows is that within Stoic ethics it is logically impossible to combine I), i.e. the conceptual link between ἀδικεῖν and βλάπτειν, IIa), which implies the notion of other-regarding c-injustice, and basic Stoic rigorism according to which there exists no other harm than moral.

On the other hand, Chrysippus could reject the very notion of c -injustice and thereby IIa) . Since according to T1 he accepts II) , he would need a different interpretation of this thesis. It must be clear that the only option left is

IIb) . One who does m -injustice to others thereby does m -injustice to oneself²⁴.

That is, one who commits other-regarding injustice by morally harming others thereby commits self-regarding injustice by morally harming oneself. This solution would better agree with Stoic rigorism and, perhaps, with the rather enig- matic Stoic idea that mutual harming is limited to vicious people, just as mutual beneficence to virtuous ones25. But it has at least two serious problems. First of all, to put it frankly, the implications of this Stoic idea simply do not make much sense. For instance, in order to morally “benefit” one another virtuous people do not need to actually interact with each other or even to be aware of each other’s existence26, and if the same is the case with moral “harming” among vicious people (which seems likely), then it is rather hard to understand what is actually meant by all this “harming” and “benefiting”27. What is obvious, however, is that according to IIb) the Stoics, when arguing consistently, still cannot afford describing c-harmful acts (such as murder, robbery, torture, etc.) as “injustice”. And it is a problem for they surely want to describe them this way28. Secondly, the Stoics often insist that it is essentially up to us whether we are virtuous or vicious29, and that consequently nobody can really harm us since to morally harm us against our will is impossible whereas any infliction of non-moral damage is not really harmful by rigorist standards30. Basically, according to this view, the only possible harm is moral and self-regarding31. But this is incompatible with IIb) for it amounts to admitting that other-regarding m-injustice is inconceivable.

To conclude, when Chrysippus in T1 asserts that one who inflicts harm and injustice upon others thereby inflicts them upon oneself, he makes statements that are pretty unintelligible under any possible interpretation, and the main reason for this is his belief that injustice always involves harming those who suffer it (I)). For in this case he has to explain how it is possible for an unjust person to harm others if from the Stoic point of view non-moral harm does not exist at all, and moral harm is essentially self-regarding.