Ownerlessness of things: de jure vs. de facto

Introduction: the article presents critical analysis of the concept "ownerless thing", which is of topical interest due to the controversial nature of some theoretical aspects of the subject as well as due to the general social significance of the problem of ownerless things at present. Purpose: based on the analysis of legal and doctrinal provisions and case materials, to develop a concept of ownerless things which would conform with other provisions of the current legislation and would make it possible to solve problems arising in connection with determining the future of ownerless things in practice. Methods: formal-logical, historical, comparative, dogmatic; some of the inferences are based on the functional approach. Results: the legal definition included in the rule of Cl. 1 Art. 225 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and connecting ownerlessness of a thing solely with the question of the right of ownership to it fails to correspond with some other rules and regulations (in particular, par. 2 Art. 236 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation) and fails to comply with the needs of modern society, as it only assumes the statement of the legal ownerlessness of a certain thing, with vagueness in questions of its keeping, maintaining, repairing and legal responsibility in case of its harmful impact. Conclusions: ownerlessness of a thing ought to be understood as de facto state of this thing, without regard to the right of ownership to it, under which condition, the thing is in possession of nobody and (or) it has no claim from a certain person. Therefore, a thing which has its owner cannot be considered an ownerless one. Moreover, such understanding corresponds with the intended legislative consolidation of the provisions on possession as de facto and its defense in the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.