Meno's Paradox, Cognitive Blank, and Levels of Knowledge: G. Fine on Plato's Epistemology

The article provides an overview of that parts of G. Fine's books – Essays in Ancient Epistemology (OUP, 2021) and The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus (OUP, 2014) – which deal with Platonic epistemology. Our task is to show the main epistemological problems that are formed around the Meno's paradox or directly depend on it, and also to present the formulations of these problems in Fine’ own version in order to make these problems well recognizable in ancient philosophical discussions for the reader. The article examines the structure and the problematic content of Menon's paradox, and the technical vocabulary of G. Fine, which allows her to formulate the problematic content of ancient epistemology. As well it examines the number of epistemological problems: the propositionality of perception in Plato, the theory of two worlds in Plato and Aristotle, as well as certain parallels between Menon and Sisyphus, which all together make it possible to show that Meno's problematics is basic, shaping the epistemology in ancient philosophy both in Plato himself and after Plato.