Russian-Norwegian agreement about the division of the Arctic space

Norway – is the only country in the Arctic region,who is with Russia having a common land border. This is not only our closest neighbor, we know the historical ties between Russia and Norway, there are more than a thousand years, this long-standing stable economic partner, with which Russia maintains close scientific, research, international cooperation in the Arctic. But at the same time it is the subject of international law too, which is most difficult to agree on a fair, from the Russian point of view, the use of the Arctic resources. These are opposing economic interests of the public in both countries competing. Norwegian-Russian agreement in 2010 to be fully removed these differences, although the political leadership and both sides claimed the opposite.

The first mention of the contractual design of bilateral relations belongs to the XIII century. In 1251 between Russia (Novgorod State), and Norway is the first agreement on the settlement of relations in the border areas, and in 1326th – is the Treaty, which recognized the reality, like the current land border of two states. Never disturbed by wars, it was the first treaty now existing fixed abroad in Europe and is the oldest of the modern state borders of our country. The total length of the Norwegian-Russian border - 219 km (including 23 km of the sea).

Russia was the first, who officialy agreed with the independence of Norway in 1905. In October 1944 the Red Army, having carried out Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, liberated from German troops the east of the Norwegian Finnmark and thus marked the beginning of liberation from German occupation of Norway. Norway was among the first recognized the sovereignty of Russia on December 16, 1991

The painfull point of the Russian-Norwegian relations in the second half of the XX century was the legal status of Svalbard and the adjacent water areas. To understand the origins of these problems, it is necessary to revisit the story.

At the end of the term in 1590 concluded in 1583, the armistice of the Russian govern-ment,who had believed that the state was strong enough after the upheavals of the Livonian War, resumed the struggle for Narva and the return of the old Russian lands in the Baltic Sea, captured by Sweden in 1583. Russia's successful military operations were suspended in 1593 concluded a two-year truce, and the subsequent peace treaty in 1595, a peace treaty Tyavzinsky -

Sweden has secured the right to collect tribute from the people of Lapland, Ostrobothnia to the Varanger, Finnmark with the assignment of the latter. According to the agreement took place on the border of Neiden Fjord [1, p. 166].

As a result, Kalmar War 1611-1613, Denmark made abandon Sweden from acquired rights from Moscow State to Finnmark. During the difficult period of the Great Moscow State has not been able to put the weighty question of restoring their lost rights to the area, and then even longer to put it in front of the Danes. In 1814 Norway became a part of the Swedish-Norwegian union.

During the XV-XVIII centuries, the border area between Norway and Russia (the end of the western Murman and eastern Finnmark) was not delimited the site and according to Danish legal documents, its title was "general district» (fellesdistrikter). This area consisted of three districts along the rivers Neiden (Nyavdem), Pasvig (Pazrek) and Pace (Pechenga) with three groups of settlements of Eastern Sami (Skolt).

The lack of constantly guarded and controlled borders in space in the arctic territories of Russia – Norway, which indicates the area of the "three general constituencies" for more than five centuries was a place of open conncetion of jurisdiction of the both states and the area of joint management. Only the border graveyards of Sami (Siida) performed a symbolic barrier to the spread of political power by the neighboring entities. Thus, the area of the "three general constituencies" was outstanding political issue between the Russian Empire and Norway - Denmark.

The problem of the border demarcation of the spaces at the beginning of the XIX century between Russia and Norway, by this time was in union with Sweden, studied in details the work of K. Zaikov, "Spatial boundaries of the Russian Empire on the Murman coast in the early XIX century." The author rightly saw the cause of inefficient political control of the northern Russia on these spaces in their extreme remoteness from the capital of the empire as well as from the regional administrative center. "The extreme remoteness of the district's imperial capital - the city of St. Petersburg and the regional administrative center – the city of Arkhangelsk complicated the organization of management and control areas under the jurisdiction of the Kola district. The only commercial artery, which served as a liaison between the administrative center and the periphery (the city of Cola), passed through the White Sea, connecting the coast of Murmansk to Arkhangelsk and Onega port. However, the sea route by climatic conditions were not available from November to May, which greatly hampered the organization of a permanent communication margin of the administrative center of the empire "and the seasonality of the presence of tax officials in Russia and Norway, the Sami and the migration as a consequence - a periodic change in the area of tax collection was influenced by "political inconstancy of Frontier, its mobility and sporadic" [2].

In 1825 was hold, the demarcation of the borders in «the general region». Its suare (According Norwegian maps) was 4,4 thousand square km and which, according many reasons, was given to Sweden – Norwegian Union (personal union of Sweden - Norway existed from 1814 to 1905). Differentiation was confirmed by the Convention "On the border between Russia and Norway in Lapland graveyards", signed in 1826.

There are several versions of such unfavorable for Russia disengagement spaces of the "common area". In our opinion, one of the main reasons for "concessions" of Russia in the matter disadvantageous for Russia, the northern division of the spaces was that Russia is enough is rap- idly drawn into a major war in the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus, where she was confronted with such dangerous opponents, as the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Resolution of the territorial dispute with far-unfriendly neighbor to the north at that time seemed the best way out of this situation. Only this can explain the haste of distinction and exclusion from the process of administration of the Arkhangelsk province. More recent efforts of Russian diplomacy to return back to the negotiating process on the boundary line changes were strongly rejected by the Swedish government.

The most difficult problem in Russian-Norwegian relations in the twentieth century and up to the present time is a different approach in the understanding the legal status of Spitsbergen and its surrounding waters. The contradictions are not fully resolved, despite the ratification of either party to the Agreement dated September 15, 2010.

The area of the archipelago was firstly discovered by the Vikings, or Pomors in the XII century. It is known that in the annals of Norwegian at the end of XII century mentions some of Svalbard, but the researchers of this period of history there is no certainty that he had in mind exactly the present Svalbard. This could be Greenland and Jan Mayen.

"Svalbard", "Grumant", "Svalbard", "A New Earth of the King James" – there were a lot of different names which were given to this group of islands in the Arctic Circle, sandwiched in the icy waters of the Barents, Greenland and the Norwegian Sea between 76 ° and 86 ° north latitude.

Svalbard archipelago was named of the Dutch peaked mountains. Name Grumant he received from the Russian coast-dwellers, who believed that it is the part of the mysterious Greenland. Svalbard - "Cool edge" - called him the Norwegians.

Today the whole world uses the name "Spitsbergen", except for the Norwegians, who did not want to give the priority to the Russian discovery of the archipelago, continue to call it Svalbard, while the Spitsbergen was listed on their cards is the largest, the most development and study of the island of the archipelago.

From a scientific point of view of the islands were discovered and documented by Dutchman Willem Barents in 1596, which gave the main island , the name "Svalbard", which in translation means "pointed mountains". Barents discovered on the island and its adjacent waters of a large number of walruses and whales, which gave the start of the numerous fishing expeditions. Around the same time, the archipelago has appeared on Russian maps under the name "Holy Russian island."

In the XVII century, Danish-Norwegian kingdom was trying to gain international recognition of its sovereignty over Svalbard, but this was strongly prevented by Great Britain. In the years 1765-1766, Mikhail Lomonosov organized two marine scientific expeditions to Spitsbergen under the V.Y. Chichagov. However, the harsh climate did not allow the organization of the permanent settlements of the archipelago and until the early XX century the Spitsbergen didn’t have an official Russian presence. However, seasonal hunting Pomors maintained presence in the archipelago, and the most desperate of them regularly stayed for the winter1.

Can we considere an effective occupation of the territory by the periodic appearance of Spitsbergen whaling ships from different countries in its waters or during the hunting season, and even the presence of wintering coast-dwellers? But the effective occupation of the no man's land (terra nullius) was, according to the norms of international law, the main condition for international recognition of sovereignty of any state over such territory. By H. Grotius wrote according the questions of taking the State territories, that the acquisition is made by taking possession (oc-cupatione derelicti), or by contract (pactionibus), or through conquest (victoriae jure), while justifying the freedom to use the sea, he wrote that it can not be the property of any state [3, p. 219].

The answer to this question can only be negative. Lack of effective occupation of the archipelago by any country under international law could be a real basis for the nomination of such claims. While Russia has more than other countries, had the opportunity to prove its leadership in the development of the archipelago since the XVII to mid XIX century wintering of Arkhangelsk Pomors in the archipelago were common, and, for example, the father of Mikhail Lomonosov - Vasily Dorofeyevich, went five times to Grumant. According to the Norwegian scholar B. M. Keylhau with whom solidarity and Russian science, there appeared the first Russian coast-dwellers. Already in the XIII century, our ancestors frequented Svalbard Grumant. Traces of Arkhangelsk of Pomors in Svalbard are numerous and material. Proof of this are the data of the archaeological excavations, which are held for six years in the archipelago an archaeological expedition, led by a famous archaeologist V.F. Starkov. The expedition discovered traces of more than one hundred communities coast-dwellers, scattered throughout the range of Svalbard, have found an impressive number of craft items and everyday life of Russian explorers. Long before the Norwegian and Barents coast-dwellers were here fishing for polar bears, walruses, seals, whales, deer and foxes.

Among Pomors, Starostin preserved a tradition that their ancestors came from Novgorod, visited Grumant to the base of the Solovki monastery, that is, until 1435. At the entrance to the Cape Isford, named after Ivan Starostin, Russian hunters, who spent the winter quarters Gru-mant 39 and died in the archipelago. Until now, this record was not beaten anyone in the world. The last descendant of the "patriarch of Svalbard" in 1891 to the Minister of State a petition to grant him cash grant and permission to settle in the archipelago, but the imperial government refused to help him [4, p. 107].

The number of the regular participants in Russian wintering on Svalbard reached 200 people, and allowed to talk about the possibility of establishing Russia's sovereignty over the archipelago. Russia, however, this advantage is not taken advantage of, and after the devastation of Pomeranian villages Anglo-French fleet during the Crimean War in 1855 and the termination is for this reason Pomors wintering on Svalbard, and a hypothetical possibility has disappeared.

The first attempt to determine the legal status of Svalbard was made in 1872. Due to the proximity of Svalbard and Norway, Russia, and the fact that he mastered these subjects, mostly states, and the question of the international legal status of Spitsbergen is resolved between Russia and Sweden - Norway.

In 1871-1872 years combined the government of Sweden and Norway exchanged notes with the Russian government, which recognized the equality of all countries in the exploitation of the natural resources of Spitsbergen. Recognized the expediency of the archipelago of the scientific research and rejected the idea of exclusive ownership of the archipelago which any one state. For the first time they are contractually defined international legal status of Svalbard as a terra nullius. In fact, until the adoption of the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen in 1920, the territory was referred to the common use. Historically, this has resulted in the international practice of peaceful economic and scientific use of Spitsbergen, in the overgrown custom, treaty laid down in the years 1871-1872. This agreement became known as the "Agreement on Svalbard in 1872" [5, p. 133].

At the turn of the XIX and XX centuries, the Swedish and Russian Academies of Sciences have established a special committee set as its goal the study of the archipelago, and before the start of the World War I Russian, Norwegians and Swedes fit their names in bright pages of the exploration of Spitsbergen and the North: Rusanov, A. Nordenskjold, R. Amundsen, Makarov, Nansen, F. Bredikhin and many others.

Norway resumed its attempts to establish the sovereignty over Svalbard after the independence (1905). Russia firstly recognized its independence, but again did not support plans to Spitsbergen.

But on the eve of the World War I increased the strategic importance of the archipelago, and the Russian government decided to specify the Swedish Norwegian Russian agreement in 1872. Now the three governments involved in the negotiation process. The principal provisions of the agreement in 1872 became the basis of the draft convention of Spitsbergen, which was developed at the international conferences held in Christiania (Oslo). At the same time Russia had to demonstrate to the world community to be active in the archipelago, but since the government presence is very costly thing, and requires, of course, demonstrations and military power, which in the early twentieth century, Russia was not simple, then there was only one way - actively support private companies and research activities in the archipelago.

In 2012, to Svalbard was organized by the Scientific-Commercial Expedition of V.A. Rusanov on a small ship "Hercules." As a result of the work were examined approximately 2 000 km coastline of the archipelago, discovered deposits of the coal industry, they set Entry columns, which recognized Russia's right to develop these facilities.

And since 1913, Russia began actively creating the companies for the extraction of the polar coal. Among them won 2: "Grumant" and "Russian Joint Stock Company of Spitsbergen." In both cases, the company received government subsidies, delaying the beginning of commercial production. To support coil mining workers, the government decided to "coal mined on the island of Spitsbergen ... recognize coal of Russian origin" [6, D. 150. L. 38]. This freed the company from paying import duties.

This kind of activity of the Russian authorities explained simply: they finally appreciated the geopolitical importance of the archipelago, which is expressly stated in the Council of Ministers in 1910, when elaborated the position of the Russian delegation at an international conference on the status of the archipelago: "At the conclusion of the meeting, the value of Svalbard islands, Russian's first strategic "[6, D. 150. L. 31]. It was only the second place, which was given by the government to economic interests, "just in industrialized Spitzbergen, abundant fish and animal crafts, may represent a serious interest" [6, D. 150. L. 31]. It was important that any cost fix the Russian presence here. And not just the presence and leadership in all matters in the archipelago. Also in 1910 the Council of Ministers has set the task of diplomats to achieve the following: "1) the Spitsbergen archipelago and the island Mezhdvezhy admit to anyone not belonging to the territory, is equally open to commercial operation of all nations 2) the entire archipelago declared neutralized forever 3) the basis for international regulations for being founded on the archipelago of law, should be laid an indispensable condition for the participation of Russian delegate to the Government on an equal footing with peer Norwegian and Swedish delegates in all the organs, which are to have jurisdiction on Svalbard judicial and administrative proceedings "[6, D. 150. L. 33].

In the years 1910-1914 in Christiania have been three conferences devoted to the elaboration of a convention and had the Svalbard archipelago in order to give the status of "common areas, withdrawn from the sphere of the state sovereignty" and the regulated international legal regime. Russia has developed and introduced at the first conference in 1910, a draft convention on Svalbard, which emphasized that Russia and Norway have priority rights over all other states in determining the international legal status of Svalbard "... because of the proximity of their territories and by virtue of their participation in the opening and scientific use of these areas and on the basis of their economic interests".

In the article 1 of the convention dealt, we can read about the islands, located between 10 ° / 35 ° east longitude and between 74 ° / 81 ° north latitude. Russia proposed to extend the application of environmental measures on land, territorial waters and the "open sea around Svalbard." That is, to establish local jurisdiction outside the territory of the archipelago. But the proposal did not find support from other participants in the negotiations and the draft convention was not included. However, all participants agreed that Svalbard is withdrawn from the sphere of the state sovereignty and remains terra nullius. At the same time a number of amendments to the Russian-Norwegian-Swedish project agreement aimed at increasing "internationalization" of the regime of the archipelago. The last of these conferences was closed July 30, 1914 and was supposed to resume February 1, 1915. But this was prevented by World War II.

The status of "no man's land" of Svalbard was lost during a peaceful Paris conference at the conclusion of the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen February 9, 1920. An expert on international law issues in the Arctic, A. M. Oreshenkov rightly points out: "A small-time residence of the Norwegians in this archipelago, expressed, in particular, that the majority of wintering Norwegian mine coal on land owned by a U.S. citizen D. Longyear, did not fall within the definition of effective occupation and allowed to claim on this basis, recognizing Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. In this regard, the basis of the requirements of Norway's Svalbard territorial acquisition at the Versailles Peace Conference was compensation for losses incurred by the Norwegian merchant fleet during World War I. "[7].

There are no provisions in the international law about the territorial acquisitions to compensate for the loss of this kind, and notwithstanding the objections in this regard, a number of countries participating in the future treaty on Svalbard, Norway managed to get this archipelago on the basis of international treaty. "This is a direct recognition of the state on the acquisition of new territories through a collective act of other countries, - noted, for example, L. Oppenheim, -also often been requested and provided, when the reality of legal basis by which the state claimed, was a doubtful or disputed," [8, . 149]. But this was due to the acquisition of such clauses limiting state sovereignty, which in other circumstances would have caused a strong protest against any self-respecting state, but it was important to Norway at the moment to gain a foothold in the territory (Russian empire - the main opponent of Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago - lay in ruins).

Initially, the States parties to the treaty concerning Spitsbergen were: USA, UK, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden (currently 50). Soviet Russia was not invited to this conference, probably due to withdrawal from the war with Germany, after the October Revolution, and continueing of the civil war on its territory. This decision was not contrary to international law. However, realizing that the provisions of such multilateral treaty is absolutely impossible without the recognition of it by any Russian government, the Article 10 agreement in the respect of the Russians was made by a special clause: "In anticipation that the recognition of the High Contracting Parties to the Russian government will allow Russia to accede to this agreement, the Russian citizens and the society will enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties "[9].

We will consider the most important articles of Paris Treaty, which are very important for understanding of the subsequent conflict of Norway with other countries, primarily from the USSR (Russia) in the understanding of the spatial scope of the contract.

In the article 1 of the treaty recognized the complete and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, "spanning from the Bear Island and Berend-Eiland, all islands are lying between 10 degrees and 35 degrees east longitude from Greenwich, and between 74 degrees and 81 degrees from the north latitude, in particular the West Spitsbergen, the NorthEast land, Barents island, Edge island, island Weech, Isle of Hope, or Hope-Eiland and the earth of Prince Charles, together with all islands, islets and rocks, belonging to him. "Thus, Article 1 of the contract was declared complete and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the land territory of the archipelago.

However, the following articles substantially restricted this suvernitet (Art. 2, 3, 7, 8). For example, Article 2 of the installed position meant, that the boats and the citizens of the contracting countries would be admitted on an equal footing to the right of fishing and hunting in the areas referred in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. Moreover, Norway will have the right to maintain, adopt or declare actions that can be preserved and, if necessary, restoration of flora and fauna in these areas and territorial waters, but these measures should always be on the same grounds apply to citizens of all parties without exception, privileges and benefits, directly or indirectly in favor of any one of them.

Of particular importance, to the legal status of Spitsbergen is playing the paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the contract. We will give it here in full: "The citizens of all the High Contracting Parties shall have the same free access for any purpose and objectives of the waters, fjords and ports of the localities specified in Article 1, and the right to stop them, they can engage in them without any obstacles, subject to local laws and regulations, all kinds of shipping, industrial, mining and commercial operations on terms of complete equality. They will be admitted on the same terms of equality, to engage in all kinds of shipping, industrial, mining and commercial business to its operation, both on land and in territorial waters, and there can be no monopoly is created in respect of any company. " Although in these articles of the contract, we are talking about bodies of water supplies Norwegian archipelago (territorial waters, waters and fjords), but then secured a significant limitation of the sovereignty of Norway, expressed in the same assurance of free access for all citizens of the purposes of each country participating in the contract, and at the same time, establishes the right of member states to engage in industrial, mining and commercial business, both on land and in the waters, fjords and the archipelago's territorial waters in accordance with local laws. Thus, the spatial scope of the contract extended not only to the land, and water areas of the archipelago, however, in terms of the characteristic of the international law of the first third of the twentieth century, but with significant limitations of the sovereignty of Norway.

In the article 7 of the treaty, Norway undertook in areas referred to the Article 1, to provide to all citizens of countries participating in the contract equal rights with regard to ways of acquiring property rights, use it and its implementation, including the right to engage in mining. It should be a regime based on full equality.

In the article 8, Norway took the right to introduce in the areas referred to the Article 1, the Mining Code, which, especially in terms of taxes, duties or obligations of any kind, general or special conditions shall exclude all sorts of privileges, monopolies and concessions in favor of the state and in favor of citizens of the participating countries the contract, including Norway. Imposed taxes, fees and charges should be spent exclusively on the needs of these areas and can be installed only to the extent that justified by their purpose.

Finally, in Article 9 of the agreement, Norway is committed not to create or permit the establishment of a naval base in the areas referred to the Article 1, and not to build any fortifications in these areas, which should never be used for military purposes.

Thus, the main purpose of securing the contract in terms of distribution of Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard – is a "mode, which can provide them (Spitsbergen and Bear Island) and the development of peaceful uses" (Preamble) on the basis of equality of all member states. This decision effectively confirmed the historical tradition of common use area of the archipelago in the economic and scientific purposes.

Thus, in legal terms the status of Spitsbergen can be attributed to a "special", it is set not by the state-owner, and is fixed by international legal means. Thus, the treaty of 1920 - is the only international legal instrument that establishes the territory of the state of public land. In this unique international legal status affected the historical development of the archipelago. Since the contract does not contain provisions on the timing of its action, it is indefinite. This act – is a normative document of international law and can not be considered as a part of internal Norwegian law. This implies that Norway has no right to change the contract without the consent of all participants, including the Soviet Union (Russia). Trying to change unilaterally the status of the archipelago, it would undermine the object of the contract and theoretically made it null.

Norway, itself is actively involved in developing the provisions of the contract, voluntarily agreed to these terms, defining the space within its scope, as well as with his other conditions, despite the fact that many of them did not match and does not currently meet the standards of customary international law . But this does not mean that it is free from its obligations under the contract. In international law, the underlying principle is the principle of pacta sunt servanda -«treaties must be respected."

Immediately after the signing of the sides the agreement of the status of Spitsbergen (without the participation of the RSFSR), the government of Soviet Russia, February 12, 1920 was sent a note to the Government of Norway, where it was noted that "no international agreement in which he was not involved, does not have to be bound by it or by force political or legal "[10, p. 36]. However, realizing that in this situation is an illusion to seek a review of the provisions of the contract of, the government of Soviet Russia (USSR 1922), which led the complex negotiations with the Norwegian side with respect to its recognition. The Norwegians were interested in settlement of relations with Russia on such a sensitive issue as the entry into the possession of the archipelago, knowing that in the future it will be a constant-voltage source of strain and hardly without its consent, it is possible to implement the provisions of the contract. Compromise – is the recognition of the state in exchange for recognition of the Treaty of Paris .

On the February 15, 1924, Norway officially named the Soviet government, and at the next day the Soviet Union officially recognized the Treaty of Paris on Spitsbergen, although officially the Soviet Union joined the Treaty of Paris in May 7, 1935 - after the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Washington and Moscow (Article 10 linked the full-fledged participation of Russia in the Paris Agreement, depending on the recognition of Soviet Russia (Russian Government) by all States Parties, the U.S. was the last country).

Ability to conduct an economic activity on a non-discriminatory basis in Svalbard (Article 3 of the contract) was a very attractive idea for the Soviet Union. October 7, 1931 № 386, Resolution of the CPC, the USSR created a trest for the extraction and sale of coal and other minerals in the islands and the coast of the Arctic seas as "Arktikugol" who possessed the rights to some mines. Today, the archipelago of the Russian trust "Arktikugol" owns 23 outlets and four mountain areas with total area of 251 square km. Two of them in August 1927, the Soviet government bought from a Dutch company for 2.5 million Dutch guilders, two other sites were purchased from the Russian-British company "Russian Grumant." In the end, he owned up to the war sites Grumant, Barentsburg, Pyramid, Bogeman-tundra. Owned trust lands, mines, industrial equipment entitle Arktikuglyu, in addition to the coal business, explore the archipelago oil and gas, and in adjacent waters to fish. Near Spitsbergen our trawlers are gaining up to a quarter of the total rybodobychi in the Barents Sea. Since 1932, began a regular supply of cheap coal rather Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. However, the exhaustion of the 1990s, the mine layer uglenesuschego Pyramid put an end to Arktikuglya, quickly turned into a subsidized resource. In this state the planned costs of the trust account for 870, 820 and 806 million rubles for 2008, 2009 and 2010, but activity is reduced to the maintenance of life Barentsburg, with coal mining in 2006 only for their own consumption [11].

Despite this, the leadership ofr Arktikuglya regularly declares the imminent resumption of production at Pyramid or Grumant - a position supported by some Norwegian miners (Norwegians themselves very active in coal mining, but to them is always pressure to "green" ratuyuschimi for an end to coal mining in Svalbard.) Unfortunately, these statements are not backed up by concrete actions on the part of the Russian state.

Despite the additional annual public expenditure in Russia is almost 1 billion. rub, fold the economic activity on Svalbard would be extremely reasonable. In the long-term ice-free port of

Barentsburg can be used as a base to service the Northern Sea Route, increasing the likelihood of timely provision of icebreaking support and reducing the risks associated with ice damage to ships. Barentsburg development in this area hinders the absence of roads in the village of Long-yearbyen - Norway's administrative center of Svalbard, and the date format of the economic activity of Russia in the region. The issue in some detail in the paper of the candidate of historical sciences Portselya A. "The dispute over the Svalbard: the point is not set." The author, tracing the ancient history of relations between Russia and Norway, paying particular attention to the economic activity on both sides of the archipelago [12].

In the years before and after the Second World War, the USSR attempted to change the legal status of the archipelago, but the beginning of the "cold war" political aims of the USSR has become more consistent with its status as a specific Treaty of Paris. Over time, the same problem lost its urgency.

In 1925, according to the Norwegian Royal resolution, while the Treaty entered into force on Spitsbergen, the Mining Code for Spitsbergen (Norway developed in accordance with Art. 8 of the contract and agreed with other countries which have signed the above-mentioned agreement) and the National Law on Svalbard (Norway has, through its sovereign authority over the archipelago). With regard to the Mining Charter, its development, in accordance with the principles of the treaty in no way corresponded to the interests of the Norwegian government, and soon these acts of Norway tried to use to strengthen its sovereignty at the expense of the legal regime on Svalbard, and its unique international legal status, although no other rights and grounds for possession of the Paris Agreement except Svalbard Norway is not. It follows that, breaking the contract, avoiding it or refusing to correct compliance, Norway would have undermined his right to possession and control of the archipelago.

According to the former Soviet ambassador in Norway, A. Kvitsinsky, with no other rights to Svalbard, except provisions of the Treaty of Paris, "... during 10 decades, Norway has here skilful, but very risky game in order to make a conditional sovereignty over the archipelago in the unconditional, the emasculation of the Treaty of Paris ... and assignment of a right, not covered by said contract. These efforts are, unfortunately, a systematic and thoughtful character "[13].

Such actions of the Norwegian side, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, securing the rights of foreign states in the archipelago, leading to a "squeezing" them from Svalbard, Norway and usurps the rights not covered by this contract. Norwegians are skillfully using the possibility of legal maneuvering between the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, and subsequent documents of international law: the Geneva Conventions and the 1958 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. They are opposed to each other – is the usual method for selecting this option of the international legal interpretation of the question, which is in the best national interest of Norway.

Experts identify five major areas of disavowing the Norwegian sides of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris:

• 1)    a gradual reduction to zero, independent of foreign economic, primarily mining, as well as research activities in the archipelago, with the production of its remains under full Norwegian control and management;

• 2)    establish unilateral control over the Norwegian Svalbard surrounding waters and the shelf without special international status of Spitsbergen, some Treaty of Paris;

• 3)    steps to the actual status of the erosion of Svalbard as a demilitarized territory;

• 4)    failure to consider the issues of Spitsbergen on a bilateral or multilateral basis, which aims to achieve de facto recognition of the sole competence of the Norwegian and other matters of status in Svalbard and around it;

• 5)    The deliberate distortion of the meaning and the individual decisions of the Treaty of Paris in the Norwegian legal literature and speeches of officials to support and justify such a line [13].

Economic activities of the participating of the countries of the Paris agreement in the archipelago governed by the Mining Charter. It applies only to the mineral resources of land, but not to the bottom of the subsoil and territorial waters of the archipelago. Even after the publication of this document, the Soviet side, as noted by international lawyers A.N. Vylegzhanin and V.K. Zi-lanov, declared "non-recognition of a number contained in the Mining Charter requirements on environmental measures, as well as the regulation of exploration and drilling for oil and archaeological research "[14, p. 41]. But these authors stress: "In practice, however, in the absence of objections of the majority of parties to the treaty, the Mining Code of Svalbard has been applied and implemented. Accordingly, at present there is no robust and credible international legal grounds to consider it contrary to the development and adoption of the Treaty of Svalbard, and for that reason invalid or null and void "[16, p. 42]. The main thing - is respected in practice the principle of equality of all parties to the treaty with respect to their activities on the archipelago, is not whether the rules imposed by the Norwegian side (especially environmental), the desire to give one-sided advantage to anyone else

But on this issue there is another view, which is difficult to disagree. According to the expert Oreshenkov A.M: "As a result of back room political action and legal ekvilibristicheskih manipulation technique on the verge of international customary and conventional international law in developing additional international agreements on the Mining Charter for Svalbard Norway is not offered to citizens / nationals of countries participating in the Treaty of Paris 1920 the regime specified in the seventh article. In this regard, the international legal regime of the archipelago there is no basis for the rights of citizens / nationals of countries participating in this agreement in accordance with Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Treaty of Paris. The application of this Mining Code (approved and enacted in 1925) in the archipelago is actually made void the Treaty of Paris in 1920 "[15].

The countries - members of the Paris treaty recognized the sovereignty of Norway, just over the land area of Spitsbergen and Bear Island. According to the Article 8 of the agreement, the Mining Code also applies only to the same territory. But in the early 1960s, long before the establishment of the territorial sea around Svalbard (1970), Norway has unilaterally extended the Mining Code and, accordingly, the contract for offshore geological archipelago. At the same time Norwegian officials, citing the Royal Resolution of 31 May 1963, argued that since its adoption in the same law operated offshore of the mainland states. Neither of the member countries of the Spitsbergen Treaty does not protested the apparent violation of the provisions of the Norwegian side agreement, a unilateral change in its spatial scope of the Mining Charter. And this change it was to get their consent. No statement of protest in international law means a State's consent to the actions of the other party. In this case, even in Norway can continue to refer to this precedent as a customary norm than it is in the future and taken advantage of.

The question about Spitsbergen – is na constant theme of the Russian-Norwegian talks and contacts at high level. June 3, 1977 Norway declared unilaterally imposing 200-mile fisheries protection zone in the sea around Svalbard, in the note of protest that followed the Soviet Government on June 15, 1977. It was pointed out that the decision of Norway to establish a 200-mile conservation zone, means "clear discrepancy obligations assumed by Norway's Svalbard Treaty of 1920. The decision was made by the Norwegian government unilaterally and based on domestic legislation of Norway, although for a particular area which falls under the said contract.

Norwegian lawmakers considered the spatial distribution of the scope of the contract to the limits of the territorial sea of the archipelago. The law on oil and gas activities, adopted in 1985, and establishes the jurisdiction of the entire Norwegian shelf is hers, including shelf space in the area of the Spitsbergen Treaty, they took the land territory of the archipelago and the geological shelf within its territorial sea of the spatial scope of the Act.

Thus, legislators from Norway replaced the problem of the conventional order of the jurisdiction of the coastal State over the adjacent sea space arguments that the spatial point of view of the action is limited to the Spitsbergen Treaty, supposedly outside the archipelago, and on signing the Treaty of Paris in 1920, there was no internationally legal rules that allowed coastal states to establish sovereign rights outside territorial waters.

Here is the opinion on the subject specialist in the theory of international law professor at MGIMO AN Vylegzhanina: "... the essential limitation of the sovereignty of Norway makes it impossible for the equalization of the territorial waters of localities," Svalbard and institute "the territorial sea of the coastal State." Neither Norway nor the other State party to the Treaty of Paris does not have its territorial sea around Svalbard. These key provisions of the agreement can not be changed by national legislation of Norway, applicable by virtue of the sovereignty of Spitsbergen, Svalbard, even the Mining Charter. In the event of a conflict of Mining Charter Treaty concerning Spitsbergen, the provisions of the contract "[16, p. 65].

If we talk about an economic activity in other countries, it is now almost no one in Svalbard foreign country, except Russia, substantial independent economic activity does not, in fact, the archipelago has long closed for business, research and other activities of the States Parties to the Treaty of Paris. Already in the second half of the twentieth century, Norway has been declared of the protected lands 60% of Svalbard, and June 15, 2001 with a new law on nature protection of the archipelago was almost closed and the rest. In accordance with § 47-64 the law instead of the previous procedure, notifying the Norwegian authorities on the possible development of new minerals, or other economic activity introduces the licensing procedure for all economic activity in the archipelago. It can be seen as another attempt to circumvent the Norwegian higher authorities, if not the letter, the spirit of the Treaty of Paris.

His attitude to the introduction of such order, Russia presented in the memorandum of October 4, 2001, which stated the right to engage in all kinds of shipping, industrial, mining and commercial business in the territory of Svalbard provided in Article 3 of the contract and to carry out such activity does not require any or additional permits. In addition, in the Mining Charter, which was agreed by the member countries in 1925 (Article 8), does not provide authorization. The contents of the Mining Charter, worked out in connection with the Treaty of Paris, were a condition of entry into force of this treaty and can not be unilaterally changed by Norway.

Further, § 11-22 laws establish "protected areas", but does not restrict these measures by no real need for outside or international legal obligations in Norway. Accordingly, these provisions of law in this regard can not be interpreted otherwise than as aiming to limit and perhaps whittling down the principle of free access of citizens of all parties to the agreement to conduct business and other activities, as well as the right to carry out reconnaissance, acquire and develop natural deposits coal, oil and other minerals and rocks. Creating protected areas on land and Grumant Tundra Bogemana shall limit use of the part of those sections of their own - trust "Ark-tikugol", contrary to Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris.

These provisions of law not only hinder the exercise of the rights to conduct business activities in the archipelago of Article 3 of the Paris Agreement and the Mining Charter, but also unnecessarily expand the rights of the Norwegian authorities, which can enable or disable at their discretion, any activity on the archipelago, to interfere in it, and even to dispose of other human's property.

Further, § 82 of the law authorizes the Norwegian authorities have set in the waters of Spitsbergen areas where swimming is prohibited, as well as prohibit the use of certain types of vessels. All this is contrary to Article 3 of the Treaty of Paris which established the "freedom of access for any purpose and objectives of the waters, fjords and ports" Spitsbergen. Article 2 of the contract, as is known, ensures the courts and citizens of all contracting parties the right to access to fishing and hunting in the archipelago and its territorial waters. However, § 32 of the law provides for special charges, as well as a ban on the hunting of certain animals for persons who are not on Svalbard residence.

February 23, 2003, the Committee of the Council of Federation on the north and the indigenous peoples, it was decided "on the economic, social and international problems of the realization of the rights of the Russian Federation arising from the Treaty concerning Spitsbergen of 9 February 1920," which stated that "... seeks to Norway by additional expansion of protected areas and the prohibition of economic activity out there to oust Russia from the archipelago. At the same aims which came into force on 1 July 2002 the Law "On protection of the environment in Svalbard", some of which contradict the provisions of the Treaty of 1920. Questioned the status of demilitarized archipelago. All this creates a risk of forced departure from Svalbard Russia.

The Russian government regarded the law of this as an attempt to limit Russian rights to Svalbard and warned that reserves the right not to take into account a number of provisions of law on the protection of the environment on Svalbard and accepted based on these acts are in conflict with the treaty in 1920, and in continue to be guided directly to the provisions of that agreement. Only such a strong position of Russia led the Norwegian side of the joint begin to search for resolution of specific problems arising in connection with the use of parts of the territory of Svalbard, owned by Russia's property rights.

Long and controversial disputes walk around the question of Norway's unilateral actions to extend its jurisdiction to the vast archipelago surrounding area. It is about establishing in 1977 the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (fishing, fisheries protection, etc.) around Svalbard. From the standpoint of international law, Norway can not be assigned to these sections of the high seas with their internal legislation, or else it must be subordinate to the regime of these sites to the regime, which is set for the archipelago, the Treaty of Paris. Most countries, except Canada and Finland, do not recognize the legality of the actions of Norway. Russia does not recognize them.

Moreover, countries with active fisheries, such as Iceland or Spain, threatening to appeal to the International Court of Justice, but the Norwegians managed to keep over the decades they created position at the cost of the agreement with Russia on the distribution of fish caught in the Spitsbergen area of the fish.

The issue about the legal regime of marine areas around Svalbard, and its natural resources has not been resolved in subsequent years. Norway showed the intention to enforce its laws on the 200-mile zone, and the Soviet Union, Iceland and other countries have demonstrated intent to dismiss these claims as not consistent with international law. "From a practical point of view of the modern economic activity posed the following question of interpretation of the Treaty of Paris 1920: Norway is entitled to prevent all other States Parties to the Treaty of Paris to carry out fishing in the territorial waters of Svalbard - or, worse, the whole area of the contract - due to over-exploitation marine living resources, for example? "As the A.N. Vylegzhanin and V.K. Zi-lanov," some legislative action, led by Norway unilaterally (closing fishing areas just for trawl vessels, and other constraints) provide indirect benefits to the Norwegian side. The fact that these measures do not affect in practical terms, the Norwegian Navy: it is during these periods or do not fish for, or is it in tiers, rather than trawl "[16, p. 68].

With regard to fishing in the Spitsbergen area - Russia and Norway joint interest in preservation and stewardship of biological resources in the Barents and Norwegian seas, as defined by the Soviet-Norwegian treaty on fisheries in 1975 and 1976. Annually installed allowable fishing quota chosen by Russia and (to a lesser extent) in the waters of the Norwegian Sea, including the area of Spitsbergen. The opening of this section of the sea in accordance with the Treaty of Paris for unlimited access there third-country nationals would be inconsistent with both Russian and Norwegian interests. It is against this, and was concluded on the Soviet-Norwegian agreement on March 16, 1978 (Communiqué Ishkov-Evensen), which determine the mode and procedure of monitoring of fishing in the Svalbard area with a disclaimer that the parties continue to adhere to its principled positions.

While the USSR was a powerful nation, while warships escorted our fishing vessels (the usual international practice), there were not serious conflicts in fisheries, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline in the Russian Navy has several times in the 90 years of detention of Russian trawlers by Norwegian military courtsand it was almost the norm. In 2004, without anyone's consent Norway has increased its area of the Barents Sea by as much as 8 miles (from 4 to 12), moving the border illegally, but was soon arrested in the 12-mile zone three Russian trawlers have crossed a new frontier in the area of the Spitsbergen archipelago. Each year, humiliating search procedures are hundreds of Russian fishing vessels, and dozens of them - are arrested.

This task is in international waters in the Barents and Norwegian Seas perform Norwegian Navy warships. This problem has not found a resolution to the present day .

Despite all signed February 15, 1957 Agreement between Norway and the USSR on the maritime boundary between the two countries are still not completely solved the problem of delimitation of economic zones and continental shelf in the Barents Sea. Soviet Union and Norway have put forward a fundamentally different proposals for the establishment of border economic zones, and consequently, offshore holdings in the Barents Sea.

Norway was among the first States to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 and on the basis of Articles 57, 74, 83 of the Convention [17] required a section along the line equidistant between the two sides of the two countries. But it is legitimate to demand from the Norwegian point of view of international law? A very controversial issue. Firstly, the delineation of the Arctic spaces was the subject of W Naval Conference, it is too specific part of the maritime spaces, which represents for the most part of the ice-covered sea areas with a very ecologically sensitive environment. A strong stand on this issue of the USSR delegation, led by real statesman, Andrei Gromyko, supported by the delegations of other countries, has placed the issue beyond the scope of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. Second, even with Russia's ratification of the Convention in 1997 and the possibility of applying the principle of partition of maritime spaces through equal distances, this principle is frequently encountered partition is not universal. Indeed, one of the countries can gain a decisive advantage in the section simply by the speaker or the Cape Peninsula. That is the case in the Barents Sea, where the extreme eastern point of the Norwegian coast, "hangs" over Russia's westernmost point, and the same part 1 of article 74 of the Convention states: "The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law ... in order to achieve an equitable solution. " Therefore, this principle is often corrected by taking into account the length and the population of the coast. The Soviet Union made a proposal to hold the line on the section of the polar boundary of the sector of the USSR, established in 1926. This is the polar sector, and still recognized, means that Russia is not the sea, but only land located within this sector (including the land, which can be opened or rise above the sea surface by tectonic processes). In the position of the Soviet Union had its own logic: if all the land within the Arctic, our sector, it is natural and maritime spaces to separate along this line.

These two divergent positions of the Soviet Union and Norway, and formed in the Barents Sea area of the disputed area of approximately 175 thousand square km. Neither Norway nor the Soviet Union was not ready to accept the position of the opposite side. The attempt of the USSR in the 80s to start this exploration of minerals encountered sharp criticism from Norway. Since then, management of geological exploration work in this area is declared a moratorium.

In 1975, Norway has proposed to distinguish the continental shelf of a line running east from the border of the polar domains of the Soviet Union, thus laying claim to 155 thousand square km of the Soviet (Russian) maritime areas. But that's not all. Norway has put forward a claim for another 10 thousand square km as its Economic Zone in the north of the straightening Schpitsbergens square boundary of the polar lands of Russia. Russia, in this case becomes part of the waters in the area of 25 thousand square km.

To resolve the problems in the relationship in October 15, 1976, the Soviet government and the Kingdom of Norway signed an agreement on mutual relations in the field of fisheries, and January 11, 1978 - The Protocol on the provisional rules of fishing in the so-called "gray zone" in the Barents Sea. It is a controversial area, where the clash of interests two countries, as already mentioned above. But this does not solve the problem of the continental shelf.

Since the 70s, the most heated debates are carried out on the legal origin of hydrocarbon deposits on the seabed around Spitsbergen, as encountered in this matter the interests of many states. The Norwegian side aggressively seeking to consolidate their rights over the continental shelf in this region. This was stated by Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre G. J., speaking November 10, 2005 at the University of Tromsø: "Norway ... will seek international recognition of their views on the Svalbard archipelago ... oil and gas production, and resource management" [18].

How legitimate are the claims of the Norwegian side? This answer should be finding in the same single title of today international legal instrument on the Svalbard Treaty of Paris. An expert on legal issues in the Arctic A. M. Oreshenkov rightly points out that in terms of geographic terms and legal concepts used in the Article 3 of the Spitsbergen Treaty, and the exercise of jurisdiction within their limits of this article is almost completely correspond to the concepts of the circle V «Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ) of the UN Convention on law of the Sea in 1982. Under its provisions, the EEZ is an area located outside the territorial sea adjacent to it. It is composed of water covering the sea floor, the very sea-bed and subsoil thereof, which are subject to a special legal regime established by the relevant provisions of the Convention in 1982.

Norwegian lawmakers for avoiding these embarrassing for the country of the UN Convention in 1982, back in 1976 adopted a law on the economic zone of Norway (Lov om Norges shkonomiske sone », Rolf Einar Fife, Director General, Legal Affairs Department, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Oslo, «Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas), which regulates the legal relations concerning only the living resources in waters beyond the territorial sea and is located underneath the bottom, but does not affect the bowels of the bottom.

On this basis, in 1977, was adopted by Royal resolution on fisheries protection zone around Svalbard (Forskrifter Om fiskevernsone ved Svalbard). It did not take into account the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty, providing for the establishment within it of such a regime that would guarantee private individuals and companies participating countries of this contract the same rights in the waters surrounding the archipelago, which in its territorial waters. The validity of the adoption of such resolution, as well as fishery protection regime (economic) zones of Svalbard, which are not recognized by many participants in the Treaty of Paris in 1920, since the use of such a national regulation is a direct violation of Article 3 of this contract.

To justify their position, the Norwegian officials refer to the fact that the sovereignty of Norway over Spitsbergen, as it follows from Article 1 of the contract, was found just above the land territory of the archipelago, and negotiated the scope of its territorial rule extended to Articles 2 and 3, where there is mention of territorial waters of the archipelago. In addition, they argue that having the right to the exclusive economic zone, they were content with less - fisheries protection zone [19].

The Norwegian side explains such actions with the fact that the archipelago at the time of making the Royal resolution, there were not the limits of territorial waters, that was the points of reference baselines, which were are used to frame the boundaries of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Norway has set boundaries of the "territorial sea" of the archipelago only in 1970, without specifying the reasons for which it applies of its legal term "territorial sea". At the same time in Oslo say that "there is a shelf of Spitsbergen, as it is, according to this position is a natural continuation of the underwater part of the archipelago is not, and mainland Norway. In this regard, within the boundaries of the "Norwegian" Shelf, mounted on the base lines of the archipelago, subject to the same rules as on the mainland shelf of the country "[20]. With this in mind, in their opinion, on the Norwegian continental shelf, stretching from mainland Norway to the south to the potential of northern, western and eastern boundaries of the "shelf" of Spitsbergen, the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 in the interpretation, applicable to such continental shelf who, as their original basis is the land territory over which the State has complete and absolute sovereignty.

In 1985 Norway introduced a shelf in the spaces around the archipelago, the national oil and gas law, which was developed for the continental part of this country and its continental shelf. Under this law, Norway has unilaterally restricted zone of the Spitsbergen Treaty limits of land and territorial waters of the archipelago.

As it was stated above, the area of space in the zone of the Spitsbergen Treaty, the regime which has a controversial nature is more than 1 million square feet. Miles. Norway seeks to establish the boundaries of "shelf" and fisheries protection zone of Svalbard in the east and the west on the basis of the principle of median line. However, the boundary of this zone in the south (toward the mainland), it established without taking it into account.

In 2006 Norway entered into an agreement with Denmark on the delimitation between Greenland and Svalbard (Spitzbergen), but again, without taking into accounts of the spatial scope of the Spitsbergen Treaty. Trying to deal with these problems, launched in June 2006, the British foreign office, which was attended by experts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the Spitsbergen Treaty (without the participation of the Norwegian representative), did not produce results.

The studyof the the problem of determining the legal regime and the Svalbard shelf and it is impossible without determining the question of the legal nature of the Mining Charter. Clarification of this issue prevents that the official translation of the Spitsbergen Treaty on the Russian language is executed with errors of key provisions of the agreement and the transfer of the Mining Code in Russian language in general has not been published either in official or in the scientific literature. All this does not allow the Russian lawyers qualified to debate on the issues of the archipelago and the regime of the surrounding maritime areas.

To speak about the establishing the rejime of the Treaty of Paris of the adjacent sea areas to Spitsbergen and the boundaries of the adjacent shelf areas is possible only after ascertaining the legal nature of the issue of the Mining Charter. In turn, this issue will talk about the possibility of establishing in the geological continental shelf of Svalbard and tax laws in accordance with the Treaty of Paris in 1920 [21].

At the beginning of the XXI century, Svalbard has attracted increasing attention of politicians, scientists, business executives and journalists. This is largely due to the position of Norway, by activating the turn of XX-XXI centuries its "expansion of the Arctic." Norwegians developed a program of the Northern Territories, known as the "Barents-2020". According to the politicians, the plan will be the main determining policy in the Arctic regions of Norway. Presentation of the project was held November 10, 2005 at the University of Tromso. The report of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry № 30 (2004-2005 gg.) To the Storting noted that Svalbard is a key target in the "high-latitude northern policy" of Norway, and the latter, in turn, "has for a long period, central to the politics of Norway."

As already mentioned above, the negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the economic zones in the Barents Sea between Norway and began the USSR in 1970. The Soviet Union insisted on the principle of sectoral separation (along the meridian of the land border to the North Pole). The Norwegian side held a fair section of the median line drawn at an equal distance from the Svalbard archipelago in the west and from the islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land to the east. As a result, formed a controversial so-called "gray zone" (defined by Norwegians), an area of 175 thousand square kilometers (about 12% of the Barents Sea). Oil reserves in the area reached 1.36 billion tons, natural gas - 5.87 trillion cubic meters inferred resources are about 10 billion tons of standard fuel, the potential production - 20 million tons of hydrocarbons per year.

In 1975 and 1976 the sides entered into an agreement, which has already been discussed, on cooperation in fisheries and established unilaterally by its own exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from their shores. In 1977 negotiations were complicated by the introduction of the delimitation of Norway's 200-mile protection zone around Svalbard. Russia did not recognize this area, considering that it is contrary to international treaty concerning Spitsbergen in 1920. In 1978, the parties failed to agree on joint management of part of the disputed area of 67.5 thousand square meters. km (23 sq. miles of Norwegian economic zone and three thousand square meters. miles - Russia) signed an interim agreement on joint measures for the control of fisheries and fisheries management in the adjacent section of the Barents Sea (renewed annually, the last time in 2010 before July 1, 2011 or until the date of entry into force of the treaty on the delimitation of maritime areas). Quotas are fishing in the Norwegian and Russian economic zones, as well as catch quotas for the two countries in the adjacent zone of the Barents Sea defines a mixed Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (established in 1975).

The question of maritime delimitation came to the stage, when it was at the state level to solve the problem between Russia and Norway. So, in July 2007 signed an agreement on maritime delimitation in the Varanger Fjord, which came into force in 2008, based on the first time in both countries were on the relevant articles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. The Agreement was refined coordinates of the state border between the two countries on the sea. Va-ranger Fjord (Viking Bay of the Barents Sea) is located on the northern coast of Europe between the peninsulas Rybachy (RF) and Varanger (Norway). The agreement provides for the delineation of the outer part of the Gulf (the previous agreement on the Varanger Fjord from February 1957 to the internal part of it).

In April 2010, during the state visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Norway, he signed a joint statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, which has the intention to sign the contract. The sides agreed on the exact coordinates of the boundary line. In accordance with the agreement the disputed land to be divided almost equally. There was not a large area and the northern part of the open sea.

Finally, in September 15, 2010 in Murmansk, the heads of foreign ministries of both countries in the presence of the Russian President and the Prime Minister of Norway signed the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on the delimitation of maritime areas and about the cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. February 8, 2011 an agreement was ratified by the Parliament of Norway, March 25 - the parliament of Russia [22].

In accordance with Article 1 of the contract "line of maritime delimitation between the sides in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean is defined as the geodesic line connecting the points that are defined by the following coordinates:

• 1.    70°16’28.95” n. l. 32°04’23.00” e. l. This point corresponds to point 6 lines of demarcation, as defined in the Agreement of 2007.

• 2.    73°41’10.85” n. l. 37°00’00.00” e. l.

• 3.    75°11’41.00” n. l. 37°00’00.00” e. l.

• 4.    75°48’00.74” n. l. 38°00’00.00 e. l..

• 5.    78°37’29.50” n. l.. 38°00’00.00” e. l.

• 6.    79°17’04.77” n. l. 34°59’56.00” e. l.

• 7.    83°21’07.00” n. l. 35°00’00.29” e. l..

• 8.    84°41’40.67” n. l. 32°03’51.36” e. l.

The end point of the demarcation line is defined as the intersection point of the geodesic line drawn through the points 7 and 8, and the geodesic joining the easternmost point of the outer limits of the continental shelf of Norway and most western point of the outer limits of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation, as established in accordance with Article 76 and Annex II of the Convention. "According to him, Russia has departed 860 thousand square kilometers of the disputed area, Norway - 510 thousand.

Treaty confirmed all the previous agreements on fisheries. Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 4 reads: "To this end, the sides shall continue to cooperate closely in the field of fisheries, in order to maintain their existing share of the volume of the total allowable catch and to ensure the relative stability of fishing activities for each respective type of fish stocks." A paragraph 3 of the same article confirms the rational use of biological resources in the interests of the contracting parties: "Parties are widely used precautionary approach to conservation, management and use of shared fish stocks, including straddling fish stocks in order to protect marine living resources and marine conservation.

Annex I to the Treaty (Article 2) in the former disputed area within 200 nautical miles from mainland Russia and Norway, ostensibly in the interests of Russia, contains provisions on the conservation during the transition period of two years from the date of entry into force of this contract existing technical regulations regarding the size of mesh networks and the minimum commercial size specified for each of the sides for their own fishing vessels (in two years no changes in our old methods of fishing will not happen). Total allowable catches, mutual catch quotas and other measures regulating fisheries continue to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (Article 3).

It is assumed that after the treaty enters into force, at least after about fifteen years (with subsequent continueing six-year periods) will apply the basic Russian-Norwegian agreement gozhdov 1975-1976 and will continue the work of the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission.

At first acquaintance with the text of the agreement under the impression that he created a favorable legal environment for the development of oil and gas resources of the Arctic continental shelf (although subject to this section were exclusively marine area), the possibility of cooperation in exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the former disputed area (Annex II to the contract). Moreover, according to experts in the mainland in the Arctic may be placed about 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of gas reserves. The agreement provided for and detailed regulation of the Russian-Norwegian cooperation in the exploitation of mineral resources. The basis of cooperation in this area was proclaimed the principle lay down by agreement in 2007, according to which each field, crossed by the line of demarcation can only be operated together as a single entity (Article 5). This approach allows early and effectively removes possible disagreements over the distribution of hydrocarbon resources.

As a result of the separation from Russia and Norway in this area appeared clear boundaries of exclusive economic zones and continental shelf. In addition, the contract and removed the moratorium on mining in the disputed area.

However, no mention of whose laws will be regulated the taxes, fees, charges levied by the sides from the extraction of the mineral resources, whether they will be installed in accordance with Art. 8 of the Spitsbergen Treaty (very gentle mode) and sent to their needs, or will apply Norwegian law with transfer payments to the budget of Norway. If the parties have not stimulated the issue, it seems, assumed the latter option, and whether it would be advantageous to Russia?

Positive evaluation of the agreement, which was announced by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, has done the signing of the contract. The Russian president called the agreement, like the division of the Barents Sea "absolutely elaborated in terms of legal instruments, and verified ... It reflects the balance between the interests of all sensitive areas of cooperation", - said the president at the joint with Stoltenberg's press conference. "First of all, it is energy - said Medvedev, who - because of the unresolved issues of territorial demarcation, delimitation of maritime areas, of course, made it impossible to engage in major energy projects. The most common problem today was the opportunity to work in those fields that are in the spaces under the jurisdiction or referred to the jurisdiction and that, and on the other hand, that is, the joint field. This problem can only be one successful solution, and it lies in the fact that such deposits must work together "[23].

"The conclusion of the treaty in the interests of the Russian Federation. Clarification of the limits of the spread of the sovereignty, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the two countries will strengthen the stability and predictability of the Russian-Norwegian relations, create favorable conditions for expanding mutually beneficial cooperation ", - stated in a memorandum to the draft federal law" On ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents sea and the Arctic Ocean "[24].

But the more we think of the content of the contract, the more questions arise. With regard to its conclusion - yes, it is the objective reality of our time. The agreement of this kind between the neighboring countries is necessary. But the question is the content of the agreement. Why is the Norwegian parliament unanimously ratified without delay a new agreement? In addition to accolades on the merits of other contract with the Norwegian side, and it is not clear, it has achieved what she wanted. But what are the reasons of happiness of our politicians with the president? The fact that delineated maritime space, and we walked away even a bit much. But the separation was carried out on Norwegian conditions, we have voluntarily given to the rich oil and gas offshore fields, explored by the Soviet geologists (a very costly venture.) In particular, the Norwegians went Fedynskiy Code, which supplies gas condensate, approximately 10 billion cubic meters, which is three times the Shtokman field. Russia did not even attempt to appeal to the International Court of Justice for the purpose of equitable division, although it had good reason. Under the contract Russia retreated the north-eastern area is much more than the poor fish stocks and with much worse weather conditions, and the overtures of the Norwegian side with respect to temporary storage of previous agreements on fisheries significance does not have: the interim agreements are terminated once the property of and Norwegian side as our ships arrested for it is the accepted rules, so be it - is the competition does not stand on ceremony, the more weak.

The opponents of the treaty in the form in which it is made very convincing arguments. Thus, the first deputy chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Leonid Kalashnikov before the ratification of the treaty, expressing the position of the Communist Party, believed that the assignment of the richest parts of the Barents Sea with huge reserves of oil and fish undermining of the strategic interests of Russia. He believed that Russian's ratification of the new agreement "will mean the abandonment of the legal position that our country has championed for decades. This is our regular territorial concession to the U.S. after the transfer of the Bering Sea shelf, and China - the disputed islands in the Amur ... Main number, which must be considered when assessing the new agreement, as follows: 60% of Russian catches in the Barents Sea today is mined in areas that the new contract gives the jurisdiction of Norway. Russian fishermen know very well how the Norwegians know how to push our fishing fleet. And as indifferent to protect our fishermen from Norwegian Russian government tyranny "2. Or the view of O. Reut, which deals with the problem of demarcation of the Russian-Norwegian maritime areas over the past nine years, and believes that in September 2010 was signed unacceptably unfair contract. He supports his opinion by the following reasoning: "Yes, the treaty would allow Russia and Norway after a 30-year moratorium to freely explore oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea. But in the next two decades, Russia still will not do that. In the hands of Gazprom already has two giant fields - Shtokman gas and oil Prirazlomnoye. Despite all the searchlights (which could closely observe the fall of 1998, when he came to work for foreign trade in the direction of state authorities), they are not being developed. Final investment decisions, such as the Stockman is still pending. And it was almost thirteen years! Russia does not have its own gas liquefaction technology. Is not defined, will form an international consortium and, if so, to whom exactly? Is not defined, whether in the Murmansk region based gas liquefaction plant and, if so, where? Not deter-mined, and how much will the "big pipe" with the focus on the European market for consumer teley. Or is the preference will be given to the markets of the Asia-Pacific region, and then - how energy will be transported? The most important question - where to get 20-22 billion dollars on top of the Shtokman field development? In this situation, believing that Russia (Gazprom) is to develop new fields in the Barents Sea, which had previously not even examined, it is simply irresponsible, "[25]. Reasonable concern.

Its position on the ratification of the treaty were of prominent lawyers, politicians (Galich, V.P., Gomanom N.D., Gureev I.I., Zilanov V.K., Ilyukhin V.I., etc.) in an open letter to Russian President and the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation "The new arrangements of Norway should be connected with our national interests." Their concern is that the "flexibility" of the Russian side will, firstly,lead to the fact that Norway departs the territory on which our northern fishing fleet takes 60-70% of the annual harvest, and secondly, that Russia would no longer be grounds for objection against the 200-mile zone around Svalbard Norway, and thirdly, in Russia will not be grounds to object to the Norwegian continental shelf around Svalbard, and fourthly, that Russia would not be grounds to object to the Norwegian territorial sea around Svalbard, and the previously mentioned reasons were, according to Svalbard Treaty of 1920. Finally, any economic activity of Russia after the treaty enters into force in 2010 in the maritime areas around Svalbard, based on the Treaty of Svalbard in 1920 becomes legally impossible (this requires the consent of other parties to the treaty of Svalbard). Such activities are possible only when complete subjection Norwegian law on its territorial sea, the 200-mile zone, continental shelf [26].

Thus, it is legitimate to ask: what made the executive branch of Russia without a broad discussion of positive and negative aspects of the contract, without the legal expertise of its effects, hasty manner in March 2008 signed a law on the division of water in the Varanger Fjord, and in September 2010 agreement on delineation of the "gray" - the disputed zone in the Barents Sea, named the Norwegian side in 1974, and the representative power shoul be quickly approved the decision of the executive branch? The loss – we can see, the acquisition – is a big question, but "the spirit of cooperation and good neighborly relations," there is nothing. Gain energy companies, for the most part, have no effect on the welfare of Russians. Understand the position of the Norwegian government leaders. They consistently, persistently, aggressively defend the interests of their country, society and citizens (evidence of that - a high standard of living of the population), and our heads and deputies - whose interests? All the more shameful historical precedent agreement, called the Interim Agreement of the Baker-Shevardnadze in 1990 on the delimitation of the Bering Sea, too memorable. This sudden decision of the Soviet President Gorbachev, the United States were granted to 46 thousand square meters. miles of the Russian shelf and exclusive economic zone of the USSR "uzhalas" up to 150 miles, while the U.S. has grown to 250 miles. As a result, the Soviet Union lost not only the oil-producing wells on the shelf, but the rich biological resources of this area (only pollock catch was 200 tonnes per year).

There is only one conclusion: all the international treaties of Russian economic contests, which should be considered through the prism of their benefit to the society, population, government, the ultimate goal of which is also the benefit of society. If this is not the content of the treaty, and there is no need to hurry up with his signature. Of course, only time will confirm the correctness of the decision, but to hear and weigh the arguments of government experts was required.