Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, His Associates and Opponents in the Political Forces Struggle of British India (1944 - Early 1945)

• I.    INTRODUCTION

  During the Second World War, the Indian liberation movement reached that degree of maturity when the issue of ending British rule and restoring the independence of the Indian state was put on the agenda. At the same time, undoubtedly, there could not be a return to the Mughal statehood. Based on the program guidelines of the country's leading parties, an alternative emerged before India: independence for a united India or the partition of the country along confessional lines and the formation of two independent states – the Indian Union and Pakistan (Kashin, 2022, pp. 9, 12).

By 1944 – early 1945, the outcome was not yet clear. In view of the complexity of the tasks facing the country and the still unfinished war (by the summer of 1945, after the defeat of Germany, fighting continued in the Far East and efforts were required to defeat Japan), official London found it expedient to gradually transition India to independence. First, British India was to become a dominion in which all issues of domestic and foreign policy would be handled by the Provisional National Government, created on a broad inter-party basis under the Viceroy. After the development of a new Indian constitution, it was supposed to carry out the withdrawal of the British from India and grant it full independence. To what extent did India's national leaders share this vision of India's prospects? What efforts did they make to reach an inter-Indian consensus?

The Indian National Congress (INC), including his leaders Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) (Chereshneva M.S., 2019), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) were in prison after the so called August Revolution of 1942 – the mass anti-British movement of the INC (Chereshneva L.A., 2007, pp. 170-175, 189-196). Patel found the arrest of Gandhi a mistake of the Government.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, future Deputy Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru, Head of the Ministry of States and the Ministry of Home Affairs of India, was one of the favorite followers of Gandhi, member of the Working Committee of the INC. Many in the party considered him to be a successor of Gandhi. Patel wrote in 1942: «So long as Gandhiji remains in our midst, he is a Commander of our soles. But if he is arrested and imprisoned, then no one will be responsible for what happens in India. Britain alone will be responsible for whatever happens here. If anarchy comes that too will be Britain's responsibility» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 29).

The INC’s opponent, the Muslim League (ML) and its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) who demanded the partition of India and creation Pakistan – a state for Muslims, completely supported the British rule.

As for the war period conflict between the INC and the Government Patel said: «When the war started, Gandhiji declared his sympathy with Britain. However, Gandhiji made it clear that the Congress did not agree with him on this question. The Congress should ask British Government whether it was prepared to declare that India would be free at the end of the war. The demand was natural and proper. The reply was that we were not united, that minorities need to be protected and that the Princes had to be placated. How could we have continued in office when such was the attitude of the British Government? There can be no compromise» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 22).

Вut the freedom struggle continued and in the absence of the INC the problem of possible partition of India became even more actual.

• II.    DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

  With a fairly impressive body of domestic works (Yurlov, Yurlova, 2010), Russian historiography today lacks a comprehensive study of the political biography of Vallabhbhai Patel in general and in particular of the period of 1944–1945 studied by us. Some special articles dedicated to Patel contain important information for this study and evaluative characteristics of this Indian statesman. So, in his articles V.P. Kashin (Kashin, 1999, pp. 52-61; Kashin, 2004, pp.45-50) recreated a brief history and current situation of Indian princes and their States and a biography of Patel. The author focuses on the question of the annexation of the principalities and shows the manifestation of Patel's genius as a politician in this matter, writes about his persecution of the left. He also briefly characterizes the contradictions with Nehru, saying that Mahatma Gandhi stood up for Nehru. V.P. Kashin's articles allow us to get an idea of Patel's life path, but his political activities in our time frame are covered in an overview. The author did not set such goals. The article by L.A. Chereshneva takes one of the plots of Patel's political activity – his struggle against the Communists (on the example of the Telangana uprising 1946–1951).

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The author uses Indian archival data for the first time and comes to the conclusion that "Patel's anticommunism is the anti–communism of the government of India, and in the first years of independence it was a natural consequence of both the political views of the INC leaders and the international conjuncture. Supporters of liberal democratic ideals and representatives of the interests of the Hindu national elite, they feared the spread of the dangerous Chinese syndrome to India, the growing influence of pro-Soviet forces that strengthened in the world after the victory of the USSR over fascist Germany" (Chereshneva L.A., 2016, pp. 246-250). The monograph and articles by M.S. Chereshneva touch upon the issues of Patel's political activity in 1947-1950. The author concludes that "the historical awareness by the political forces of independent India of the need to combine traditional, conservative and innovative, democratic principles in domestic and foreign policy has become the main lesson of Vallabhbhai Patel's political activity" (Chereshneva M.S., 2019, p. 180).

Indian, Pakistani, English, and other research literature concerning the formation of the history of the INC during the Second World War, the transfer of power from the British to the Indians and the formation of independent India and Pakistan is fundamental and original. However, even in Indian historiography there are not enough monographs about Patel, his role in the period of the «August Revolution», his imprisonment of 1942–1945, in the suppression of popular movements in independent India by him as Minister of Internal Affairs, and other aspects of his political activity are practically not studied (Alaev 2018, p. 31). Modern Indian authors B. Krishna (Krishna, 1995), Ramakrishnan and Raig Zakaria (Sardar Patel and Indian Muslims, 1996), K.D. Gangrate (Gangrate, 2004, рp. 212-223), as a rule, consider the role of the Sardar during the formation of the Indian Union. Sh. Amin characterizes the state-building of independent India from a critical point of view. Patel in his work occurs sporadically, as an intelligent, far-sighted politician, anti-Muslim sentiments. Sh. Amin characterizes the state-building of independent India from a critical point of view. Patel in his work occurs sporadically, as an intelligent, far-sighted politician, anti-Muslim sentiments after 1947. (Amin, 2000, pp. 100-101).Sh. Pakistan's foreign policy. Reassessment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 101). British historian B. Zakaria presented his research devoted to J. Nehru, in which he critically assessed Patel's role as the «guarantor» of Nehru's political power, but like many authors Zakaria showed Patel in 1947 and later years (Zachariah, 2004, p. 134).

In conclusion we can stress upon the novelty and actuality of studying the figure of Sardar Patel and his entourage for a more complete reconstruction of the history of Indian independence and personalities.

The research is based on the principles of objectivity, historicism, and system. According to the principle of objectivity, the role of Vallabhbhai Patel's associates and opponents in the political struggle of colonial India in 1944–1945 was revealed. In accordance with the principle of consistency, the essence and content of the political demarches and programs of Mahatma Gandhi during negotiations with Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1944, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Bhullabhai Desai and Liaquat Ali Khan, the plan of the post-war constitutional settlement of the Viceroy of India A. Wavell are revealed. The authors used the method of analysis of archival published documents and materials on the history of political struggle and biography of British India in 1944–1945. Event analysis is used to determine the socio-political conjuncture of British India in 1944–1945; discourse analysis is used to analyze speeches, interviews, correspondence of Patel, Gandhi Jinnah and other personalities. The biographical method was used to identify the facts of the political biography of Patel, his associates and opponents in 1944-1945.

At the ML session in Delhi, held in April 1943, Jinnah invited Gandhi to write a letter outlining his vision of India's development prospects (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 70). Gandhi, who, like all the INC leaders, had been imprisoned on charges of organizing a «riot», the so-called «August Revolution» of 1942, was ready to meet with Jinnah if he received permission from the authorities. On May 26, 1943, the Government of India, however, refused him (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 70).

The pragmatically thinking part of the INC leadership, for example, a former member of the INC Working Committee Chakravarti Rajagopalachariya (1878–1872), by 1944 came to the conclusion that it was necessary to find a compromise with the ML. To achieve India's independence, it was necessary to create a united front of the country's political forces.

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The so-called «Rajagopalachariya Formula» was put forward by the Congress as a platform for future negotiations:

• 1.    The ML will support the Indian people's demand for independence and will cooperate with the Congress in creating an authorized government for the transitional period.

• 2.    After the war, a commission will be established to demark the border in the north-western and eastern regions of India, where the Muslim population is an absolute majority. A plebiscite of the entire adult population will be held in these areas.

• 3.    All parties will have the right to defend their position before the plebiscite.

• 4.    In the case of the partition of India, agreements should be concluded between the new states on the organization of defense, communications, trade, etc.

• 5.    The transfer of the population should be carried out exclusively on a voluntary basis. These conditions come into force only if Great Britain implements a complete transfer of power» (Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1957, p. 548).

The «Rajagopalachariya Formula» was a compromise document that equally incorporated the fundamental principles of INC and ML in achieving independence: the transfer of power to the Indian people as the main condition for further transformations in India (congressional thesis), the possibility of dividing India into Hindustan and Pakistan (ML thesis), making a decision on the partition of India solely on the basis of the will of the broad masses of the population (an objective and rational approach to the problem of state formation). If this «Formula» were implemented, the newly formed states of Hindustan would retain the commonality of management mechanisms for strategic industries.

By the summer of 1944, Gandhi's health had deteriorated dramatically and, unwilling to take responsibility for his life, the authorities released Gandhi. Contrary to doctors' predictions, Gandhi resumed active political activity. He wanted to have talks with Jinnah on the basis of the «Rajagopalachariya Formula». Before considering in detail the «Formula», Jinnah discovered the most vulnerable point of the congressional side: «Neither Gandhi nor Rajagopalachariya are vested with official powers to negotiate with ML on behalf of the Congress», thereby confirming the justified fears of the Mahatma (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 3).

As for the question of the Provisional Government for the transitional period, Jinnah stated that he did not find in the document accurate information about the quantitative and qualitative composition of the future government, about the degree of «subordination» of the ML to the congressional majority (Wavell, 1973, p. 86). He emphasized: «Messrs. Gandhi and Rajagopalachariya 'put the cart before the horse', believing that the IndoMuslim problem can be solved only after the transfer of power from the British to the Indians» (Wavell, 1973, p. 87). However, the ML Council did not listen to his critical remarks and spoke in favor of holding negotiations with Gandhi, wishing to defeat the INC in the «fight of the titans» and establish itself as a party equal to him in status. Moreover, the additional opportunity to widen the circle of the League's supporters and replenish its ranks through the wide propaganda of the Lahore Resolution could not be denied. Jinnah had to firmly defend the idea of Pakistan, denying the very possibility of concessions to the INC on the basis of «half-and-half schemes».

Patel, who stayed in prison, had no illusions about Jinnah’s negotiability. He said: «The condition, precedent to, any negotiations, which Mr. Jinnah makes, is that the Congress should accept the League as the sole representative of the Muslims in India. To concede the claim of Mr. Jinnah is for the Congress to commit suicide in the hope of being reborn a Hindu organization. Even if we are a handful, we will not allow the Congress to commit political harakiri. If the resignation of Ministries has brought real deliverance, it is to the Ministers, who had their daily worries. Our internal differences have disappeared» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 22).

Negotiations between Gandhi and Jinnah took place in Bombay from September 9 to September 27, 1944 in the form of personal meetings and correspondence, 14 letters. Jinnah expressed dissatisfaction with Gandhi's lack of formal authority to represent his party, which he, moreover, deliberately qualified as a «Hindu» organization. He belittled the status of Gandhi, not having such authority in the country and fame abroad.

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Jinnah tried to reduce the INC to the level of a Hindu confessional organization in order to equate it with the narrowly confessional Islamic ML, artificially depriving it of a nationwide secular character, as well as the right to represent the Muslims of India. With such a tone in the beginning of negotiations, the very fact of Gandhi's consent to continue them strengthened Jinnah's confidence in the adequacy of the tactics he had chosen and contributed to the growth of his (and the League's) authority in the political arena of India. Building his line of dialogue with Gandhi on the methods of offensive, aggressive, often uncritical comparison of the «Formula» with the text of the Lahore Resolution of the ML 1940, Jinnah offered Gandhi a list of problematic issues, counting on each of them to receive an answer.

• «1 . What exactly do you understand by independence? Do you allow the creation of Hindustan and Pakistan?

• 2.    Do you have a scheme for the formation of the Provisional Government?

• 3.    Who will appoint the commission mentioned in the text of the «Formula»? What is the essence of the so-called «absolute majority»? Will the proposed plebiscite be held by district?

• 4.    What exactly is meant by the expression «all parties» that will defend their points of view before holding a plebiscite? With the help of what mechanism and by whom exactly will what you call «mutual agreement to maintain defense capability, trade and communications and other purposes» be implemented?

• 5.    The sentence «These conditions will only come into effect if Britain makes a transfer of power to India» is alarming. I would like to know how, when and, most importantly, to whom this power is supposed to be transferred» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 5).

On September 11, 1944, Gandhi sent a detailed answer to all Jinnah’s questions regarding the «Formula of Rajagopalachariya», accompanying it with a remark regarding the «authorities» of the former. «The goal of my life is Hindu-Muslim unity», wrote Gandhi. «I promise to use all my influence in Congress to ensure that it ratifies my agreement with you, if we succeed in reaching it» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 5).

Answering Jinnah's questions, Gandhi singled out the following as the main one:

• «1 . The constitution will be framed by the Provisional Government, created for this purpose after the departure of the British from the country. By «independence for India» I mean independence for our entire country as it is. The principles and procedure for the formation of the Provisional Government will be developed jointly by the INC and the ML.

• 2.    The commission will be appointed by the Provisional Government.

• 3.    «Absolute majority» means the absolute predominance of Muslims over non-Muslim elements, as seen in Sindh, Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province. The procedure for holding a plebiscite and the legal features of the electoral right can be discussed jointly.

• 4.    «All parties» means «all interested parties».

• 5.    «Mutual agreement» means an agreement among the contracting parties. By «maintaining the defenses» I mean the creation of a central or joint council to control the defense of the country from those who might threaten our common interests.

• 6.    Power must be transferred to the nation, i.e. Provisional government. According to the «Formula of Rajagopalachariya», this will happen peacefully» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 6).

At that dramatic moment of Indian political history Sardar Patel wrote: «The Congress has again accepted the leadership of Gandhiji, the only man who can lead us to victory. He is the miracle worker. Under his guidance we must now work. If there are any among Congressmen who are impatient about his methods, they are welcome to try out their own experiments. But they will fail; success will depend only upon loyally following the lead of Gandhiji» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 22).

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ii,

Patel understood that the Congress position on communal question which meant Hindu-Muslim unity couldn’t satisfy Jinnah: «But before all else comes the question of Hindu Muslim or rather communal unity. The Congress believes that in an independent India, communal questions can only be solved on strictly national lines.

But as the Muslims and other minorities in general had expressed dissatisfaction over the solution of the communal question, the Congress assures the Muslims and other minorities that no solution thereof in any future constitution can be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the parties concerned. Therefore, the Congress can be no party to any constitution which does not contain a solution of the Communal question that is not designed to satisfy the respective parties. What we want is a heart unity, not parched-up paper-unity that will break under the slightest strain. That unity can only come when the majority takes courage in both the hands and is prepared to change places with the minority. This would be the highest wisdom» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 17).

Gandhi demonstrated his readiness to take into account the fundamental requirements of the League as much as possible, in connection with which the question arises: how long was he able to balance on the limit of the possible? Jinnah did not consider it necessary to give detailed answers to many questions that Gandhi had, limiting himself to monosyllabic sentences and demonstrating a clear rejection of Gandhi’s position: «See paragraph 7 of the Lahore Resolution», «Does not follow from the Lahore Resolution», «Does not follow from the Lahore Resolution at all» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 16-17). Such a manner of the League leader to negotiate in itself deprived them of practical meaning, responded only to the narrow party plans of the Working Committee and Jinnah to discredit the Congress and strengthen their positions in the struggle for Pakistan. It became obvious that both leaders gradually moved away from the main task – the development of mutually acceptable practical decisions on joint actions in the struggle for independence and the formation of one or more independent states. They are bogged down in fruitless theorizing on long-standing problems of the Hindu-Muslim political confrontation, competing in the logic of paradoxical thinking.

On September 15, 1944, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah: «If India had been one nation before the penetration of Islam, then it will remain the same even if the religion of a part of its people changes. Will your «two nations» become one if all of India embraces Islam today?» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 12). However, even more significant was the open refusal of the Mahatma from his position during the «August Revolution» of 1942, recorded in this letter. Resolution of the All India Committee of the Congress of August 8, 1942. If we come to an agreement, it will be based on the consideration of realities. India, having become free, will go through demarcation, plebiscite and partition if its people vote for partition» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, p. 15). This was the limit of the possibility of compromise with the League, and Gandhi, without hiding his dislike for Jinnah, reached it. On September 25, 1944, Jinnah replied to Gandhi for the last time, making it clear that no agreement could be reached. On October 4, he made a statement following the results of the negotiations, placing all the blame for their failure on Gandhi, accusing him of striving to form a central government, with the overwhelming majority of the Hindus. In addition, he categorically rejected the Gandhian interpretation of «the provinces of the Muslim majority» during the plebiscite: «Mr. Gandhi considered that only that district can be recognized as «Islamic» where Muslims constitute an absolute majority, i. Sindh, Balochistan and North-West Frontier Province» (Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, 1944, pp. 27-32).

Viceroy of India lord Wavell (1883–1950) wrote to London: «Two great mountains met and did not give birth even to one notorious mouse! This will hurt Gandhi's reputation. Jinnah, on the other hand, had a very simple task – to insist that the Mahatma was «nonsense» and rudely ... defend Pakistan. I think this will increase his prestige among like-minded people (Wavell, 1973, p. 91). Thus, the negotiations of the two charismatic leaders of India in September 1944 ended in failure, demonstrating their unwillingness and inability to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. On the other hand, the authority of Jinnah increased significantly, which in 1944 Gandhi for the first time actually recognized as an equal political value, and his ideological views, strategy and tactics of the struggle for Pakistan – a course worthy of attention and careful analysis. Moreover, Gandhi abandoned his strategy of fighting for an independent and united India (the «model» of 1942) and admitted the possibility of dividing the country along confessional lines, which he had previously referred to as «miasma intercommunal strife» The talks once again showed the absolute focus on the personality of both secular and confessional Indian nationalism.

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The second half of 1944 – the beginning of 1945 was marked by intensive negotiation activity not only of the leaders of the INC and the ML, who did not achieve success, largely due to the destructive impact of their ideological dogmas.

In parallel, there was a search for a way out of the political impasse by representatives of the «second echelons» of the party power, who were willing and able, unlike Gandhi and Jinnah, to find compromise formulas, however, they lacked the authority to bring the work done to its logical conclusion.

In the summer of 1944, Chakravarti Rajagopalachariya and the liberals, led by Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875– 1949), were drafting a constitution for India, which they believed could be taken as the basis for an agreement among the British government, the INC and the League. According to this project, it was supposed to give India the rights of a dominion. Sapru rejected the partition of the country, advocating the expansion of provincial autonomy and various constitutional guarantees in the interests of minorities.

On November 19, 1944, a Non-Party Conference was held, which was organized and conducted by Sapru, in order to study the draft of their constitution with Rajagopalachariya and «raise the discussion of the religious-communal problem in India to the legal level» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 211-212). The Non-Party Conference formed a 22-member Standing Committee. Sapru, who was elected chairman, assumed that in the course of his work he would be able to enlist the support of a large number of influential Hindus, Muslims, «untouchables» and Sikhs. Thus, a non-party body for the preparation of an inter-party and inter-confessional agreement was created and began to work, which was a certain progress in reconciling the positions, first of all, of the INC and the ML, and did not exclude the possibility of developing a compromise basic document for the constitutional transformation of British India in the future, without radical fractures of its historically established geographical and historical-cultural unity.

The administration of the viceroy did not believe in the success of the enterprise, primarily because of the low political weight in society of the persons participating in it, while the party representing the majority of nationally oriented Indians was still outlawed. On November 21, 1944, Wavell wrote to London: «This Sapru Committee is no good. Many of its members have already passed their best time as politicians. So, Sapru himself and Jayakar are embittered by life, Radhakrishnan is a typical academic scientist... The rest of the members of the Committee are mostly liberal-minded supporters of Sapru, and they are all equally incapable of anything» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 272-273).

Meanwhile, the Standing Committee of the Non-Party Conference began active work. He met from 29 to 31 December 1944, formed subcommittees, prepared the so-called «Sapru Questionnaire», containing questions to discuss the most important political problems of India with a view to a compromise final decision on the draft constitution, for example: what are the fundamental rights that should be enshrined in the future Indian constitution? What steps need to be taken to ensure adequate representation and equal opportunity in legislatures for all sections of the population? What is your attitude towards Jinnah's demand to create Pakistan? (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 431-432).

The Committee's work soon faced significant difficulties. Firstly, Jinnah officially refused to cooperate with it, and the leader of the «untouchables» Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956), who promised his assistance, did not keep his word, because «he saw that the members of the Committee were stricken with the virus of intercommunal confrontation» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 315, 349-350). Thus, the political parties of the two largest minorities – the ML and the Ambedkar organization – boycotted the work of the Standing Committee, which, in the absence of the leading leaders of the INC, made all its further efforts meaningless. The rational idea of Rajagopalachariya and Sapru to offer Indian politicians to rise above narrow communal and personal ambitions in search of a compromise solution to the religious-communal problem and create a united front for the struggle for independence turned out to be unclaimed by them. The Indian liberation movement revealed its «corporate» essence, in a certain sense – «fragmentation», evidence of the regional, caste, and religious disunity of Indians that had not been overcome under the conditions of a colonial federal state. This objective reality weakened Indian nationalism of many faces, its potential in front of the British regime, gave reasons and opportunities for external manipulation from London and Delhi.

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The activities of the Non-Party Conference and the Standing Committee testified that the nationalist movement of that time was dominated by an inclination towards liberal-reformist, legal methods of resolving the constitutional problem. During January-March 1945, however, no real progress was reached in the inter-party negotiation process. The futility of further searches for an inter-Indian consensus became obvious in the absence of the most important political actors, who – and only they – ultimately had the right to a decisive vote.

The authorities reacted very promptly to the political processes taking place in the country. On September 29, 1944, Wavell worked out the following plan of action:

«a) select 10 or 13 political leaders, invite provincial governors to meet with the Viceroy;

• b) create a full-fledged and multi-party Provisional Government, which will continue waging war with Japan, and prepare plans for the post-war development of the country» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 56-57).

Patel told: «The Government tells all the world outside that Congress is a clique; they are a handful of agitators; they have no influence whatsoever with the vast masses of Indian people; 90 millions of Muslims, 70 millions of Indian States population are not with the Congress. The Radicals are not with them, the Democrats are not with them; nor are the Communists with them. I ask if nobody is with us, why worry about us so much?» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 24).

However, the implementation of the Viceroy's plan required its detailed coordination with all political parties in India, including the repressed (after 1942) Congress, as well as with Churchill's government, Parliament and, finally, the King of Great Britain.

Another example of an attempt to find a compromise solution to the constitutional problem of India was the legislative activity of the leader of the Congressmen in the Legislative Assembly of India, Bhullabhai Desai (1877–1946), and the General Secretary of the Muslim League, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951).

The beginning of 1945 was marked by increased opposition to the British government in the Legislative Assembly, largely due to the participation in its activities of some congressmen who had been released from prison. An inter-party, multi-confessional group was formed in the Assembly, led by Desai, consisting of congressmen, Muslims close to the INC, liberals and representatives of the Sikhs. In essence, he succeeded in uniting the supporters of diverse strategies for achieving Indian independence in the legal struggle against the regime through constitutional methods, in preparation for the creation of a national government of India.

The bills introduced by the Viceroy for discussion in the Legislative Assembly in early 1945 were rejected by the majority of its deputies, and on many issues the representatives of the ML voted in solidarity with the Congress faction. For example, the budget of the colonial government for 1945–1946, submitted to the Assembly, was rejected. However, the most important initiative of the opposition was the negotiations between Desai and Liaquat Ali Khan, which took place in the winter of 1944-1945. These sort of «echoes» of the September negotiations between the INC and the ML ended with an agreement on the principles of staffing the Interim National Government of India, better known as the «Desai-Liaquat Ali Khan Pact».

In the preamble of the Pact, the authors pointed out that «Congress and the League agree on common actions in the formation of the central Provisional Government» (Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1957, p. 556), which, provided that this document was supported by the top leadership of both parties, could mean reaching an agreement in principle on preparations for the transfer of power to the Indian people.

The document contained a statement of the principles by which the composition of the future government was to be determined, among which the principle of party parity was fundamental. The INC and the ML received an equal number of seats in the Provisional Government, 40% each of their total number. The persons named by the parties did not have to be deputies of the Legislative Assembly. The confessional affiliation of representatives from the polyconfessional secular Congress was not formally specified either. In other words, the authors of the Pact did not seem to emphasize the so-called communal parity due to the wide representation of different religious groups in the INC, in contrast to the purely Islamic ML.

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There is reason to believe that for the General Secretary of the ML the concepts of «party parity» and «communal parity» were completely equivalent. The ML had always been preoccupied with the issue of proportional representation of communities in power structures, be it the Executive Council under the Viceroy or the aforementioned Provisional Government. Moreover, it found proportionally exclusively equal representation with the Hindu community, as if the number of Muslims in the country was equal to the number of Hindus and, in addition to that, it was a multiple of the number of the Sikh or «untouchable» community. In addition, the ML claimed to be the sole spokesman for the interests of the country's Muslims.

As proof of our thesis, let us cite an excerpt from Liaquat Ali Khan's interview with the Associated Press dated January 22, 1945: «The policy of the League was developed back in 1940 ... If the Congress enters the ruling body of India, then parity of Hindus and Muslims must be ensured. Moreover, the members of the Muslim government should be only from the ML» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 472). In this regard, it should be noted that the very appearance of the Pact testified that Desai generally agreed with the identification of the principles of party and communal parity in the interpretation of the ML, making significant concessions to the League. The recognition of new realities, the increased influence of the ML in society and, especially, in the Islamic environment, against the background of a significant weakening of the positions of the repressed INC, forced him to give such content to the compromise.

The problem of the partition of India was to be decided after the status of the country was determined. In other words, on this issue, Liaquat Ali Khan was forced to agree to the congressional algorithm for restoring Indian sovereignty (Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1957, p. 556). In fact, there was an opportunity to revive the united front of the INC and ML as the main segment in the Indian national movement.

Desai, having edited the Pact, began to implement its provisions. On January 12, 1945, he approached the Viceroy's secretary A. Jenkins for an audience with Lord Wavell. Desai said that Jinnah and Gandhi had already approved that document, but he could not provide formal confirmation of such an important circumstance. Wavell reported to London on his actions and attached the text of the agreement, which he called the «Desai Plan». The final content of the document was as follows:

• a)    the Viceroy entrusts Desai and Jinnah with the formation of the Provisional Government;

• b)    they will consult with members of the Legislative Assembly and propose a list of candidates for future ministers; the selection will be made by the Assembly itself;

• c)    INC and ML will receive an equal number of seats in the government (40% for each of these parties) and 20% for minorities;

• d)    the government will work under the current constitution, consist only of Indians, with the exception of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Indian Army;

• e)    the ML agrees to the establishment of an Interim Government without any reference to Pakistan. This issue will be raised when the government has been in existence for a year or more (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 400-401).

Thus, the Pact meant the transfer of power to the Indians on a legal basis, which was possible with the compromise behavior of the INC and the ML. On January 15, 1945, Emery wrote to Wavell: «Plan Desai is very similar to Yours!» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 401). On January 16, 1945, the government of W. Churchill at its meeting recognized the Pact as quite important and «mature», Wavell was ordered to study it and begin preparing an inter-party conference on the creation of a Provisional Government (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 411-412). On January 22, 1945, Wavell sent out his appeal to all the governors of British India, in which he drew their attention to the fact that on the question of the norms for the representation of communities in the future government, «Desai is ready to admit an equal number of Muslims and Hindus», i.e. recognize the principle of communal parity, which automatically assigns to the INC something that is not characteristic of it: the status of the Hindu Party (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 438).

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So, in India, a unique political situation was emerging, marked by a high probability of reaching a comprehensive agreement «Congress – League – Empire». The fate of religious and ethnic minorities was determined by the leading actors in the political arena, their organizations could only indirectly influence the content of the compromise documents. The similarity of the main provisions of the «Desai Pact – Liaquat Ali Khan» with the Wavell plan proved the objective, forced nature and historical inevitability of such transformations in India. The aggravation of inter-Indian contradictions forced London to admit the possibility of the formation of a Provisional Government before the end of the war; representatives of the INC, in turn, lost their absolute rejection of the idea of Pakistan and were ready to discuss it, but with the support of broad public opinion in the distant future. The ML, represented by Liaquat Ali Khan, agreed to postpone the creation of Pakistan and participate in the formation of the Provisional Government of a united India. Under the circumstances, however, a subjective factor again had a negative impact.

According to a number of prominent congressmen who were at large at that time, «Gandhi did not approve of Desai’s proposal, although he could moderate his categoricalness, since he managed to come to an agreement with Liaquat Ali Khan ... It is unlikely that Gandhi will allow Desai to act as his plenipotentiary representative» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 423). Gandhi did not even delegate unofficial powers to Desai and did not intend to support the Pact. Gandhi still remained an influential figure in Indian nationalism and identified himself with the top leadership of the INC, but he did not recognize Desai's claims to such a role. A similar position in relation to the actions of his party ally, Liaquat Ali Khan, was taken by Jinnah. He declared: «There is no reason to associate my name with the negotiations between Liaquat Ali Khan and Desai», thus making it clear that one should not count on his support (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 473).

The situation that arose in Hindu-Muslim relations in connection with the appearance of the Pact could get out of control. Contrary to the leadership of the INC and the ML, a virtually united front of Congressmen and ML members in the Legislative Assembly opposed the colonial government on almost all issues, except for the transformation of the Executive Council into a Provisional Government.

And this small chance to reach an agreement among all the players in the protracted conflict could not be missed. The time had come to implement the plan to convene a full-fledged inter-party conference.

Vallabhbhai Patel was rather sceptic on this «Pact». He didn’t believe in its effect. He wrote: «We are being threatened from all quarters. We know the methods of the Government. They will round up the leaders; round up all; they will issue Communiques and Ordinances. They have prepared many and kept them ready. There is little that is new in all this. They must have got most of the Ordinance from their old files. We may not mind them. We may only mind the responsibility that falls on us. So long as Gandhiji remains on the scene, we have only to do his bidding. We must obey orders strictly and be disciplined. We must follow implicitly every step that he announces for us. We shall carry out one and all programs, individually, collectively, simultaneously—in whatever way it strikes us within non-violence. We are being weighed in the scale of freedom. The whole world is watching us» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 29). In the spring of 1945, Wavell presented to official London his plan for resolving the Indian problem, the central idea of which was the formation of a new composition of the Executive Council on the basis of communal parity. It was about the Provisional Government, completely Indian in composition, with the exception of the Viceroy and the commander-in-chief of the colonial army. With cabinet support, on June 14, 1945, Wavell made an announcement calling for an interparty conference to discuss his «scheme» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 1122-1123). Simla, the summer residence of the Viceroys, was chosen as the venue for the conference. The conference opened on June 25, 1945. Sharp discussions between representatives of the INC (a significant part of which, including Vallabhbhai Patel, Abul Kalam Azad, were released from prison in connection with the end of the war in Europe) and the ML unfolded over the status of their parties. Patel and all the top colleagues used their opportunity to discuss «the scheme» on their preliminary party session. As a result the INC President Abul Kalam Azad stated that «The Congress is ready to accept the principle of equality of caste Hindus and Muslims, but should have the right to elect both non-Hindus in general and Muslims, since it is not a narrow communal organization» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 1152).

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The INC did not refuse to take into account the interests of Muslims, but did not want to embark on the path of desecularization of Indian nationalism. The principle of community parity in itself introduced a formally just beginning into the practice of forming Indian governments. However, the pluralism of Indian political life that had developed under the conditions of a colonial rule of law state by the middle of the 20th century was not based on this principle. The number of parties, the degree of their influence in society did not always correspond to the relative weight of the communities they represented. Often monocommunal parties did not play a national role. The greatest authority was possessed by the INC, whose members were from a wide variety of communities, although with a predominance of Hindus. By comparison, the purely Hindu Hindu Mahasabha was a political outsider. The INC laid down the tradition of secular political life, effectively equalizing the rights of the religious communities represented in its ranks.

The artificial leveling of communities according to the Wavell «scheme» was rejected by both the religious majority and minorities, since this very «scheme» was not really provided. Parity, in essence, concerned only Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, Muslim members of the INC lost their rights, they were artificially «equated» with the Hindus. Jinnah insisted on the exclusive right of his party to nominate Muslims. The leader of the Sikh organization Shirovani Akali Dal, Tara Singh, demanded «parity» with Hindus and Muslims for his community (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 1156). The representative of the so called «untouchables» Shiva Raj also insisted on protecting the rights of his «minority», which was not much inferior in number to Muslims and Sikhs (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, p. 1156).

Patel followed all the news of the conference, including the «untouchability problem» as cast system rudiment. He was a categorical opponent of «untouchability». He said: «Untouchability is a delusion. One does not have to bathe if one touches a cat or a dog; then why should one bathe when one touches another human being? Hindus awake! You are committing a mistake! We believe in selfpurification. If we are eager to be free from bondage, we should first see to it that all our countrymen are free from the bondage of untouchability. Untouchability is a blot on Hinduism. It is a travesty of religion» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 31).

Patel saw the future of India as a federation. He wrote: «Federation is a fascinating idea. But it introduces new embarrassments. Princes will not listen to reverence? Is it severance of British conection. But if they will come in the true spirit it will be a great gain. Their association must not be to impede the progress democracy… All the inhabitants of Federated India should enjoy some common elementary rights. And if there are rights, there must be a common court to give relief from any encroachment upon them» (A Nation’s Homage. Life and Work of Vallabhbhai Patel. Documents, 2006, p. 16). The talks at Simla were hard going, and the Viceroy decided to give them a boost by inviting party leaders to send him lists of candidates for the new Executive Council, from which he would select a team. Almost all conference participants agreed with him. Only Jinnah stated that he «probably would refuse to name the candidates from the ML» (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 1173-1174). The administration's maneuvers for a political compromise capable of ensuring the drift of British India to the status of a dominion and further independence within the borders of a single state did not make him abandon the idea of creating Pakistan.

On July 7, 1945, Azad sent a list of 15 people to the Viceroy, including 4 candidates from the INC, 4 from the ML, 2 from the «untouchables», 1 vacancy for Sikhs and other organizations. At the same time, the congressional faction included three Hindus and one Muslim. The INC demonstrated that it would not discriminate against its Muslim members. The plenipotentiary leadership of the party did not share the compromise aspirations of Desai, fixed at the time in his «Pact» with Liaquat Ali Khan. The ML refused to submit its version, and the viceroy sent his list of government members to London for approval, in which the INC and the ML received 4 seats each, the other parties – 6 seats. On July 10, 1945, the UK Cabinet decided that if the INC or the ML did not come to an agreement, then the Viceroy should declare the failure of the negotiations (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India, 1974, pp. 1216, 1221). Despite Wavell's best efforts, Jinnah refused to continue negotiations, saying that his demand for the exclusive right to nominate Muslims was not taken into account (Yurlov, Yurlova, 2010, pp. 257-258).

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The uncompromising nature of the INC and, in particular, the ML made the further continuation of the negotiation process in Simla, if not meaningless, then definitely requiring qualitatively new approaches to the problem of Hindu-Muslim political contradictions. Wavell, in fact capitulating to Jinnah, admitted that he was powerless to put his «scheme» into action. On July 14, 1945, at the closing of the Simla Conference, he, fearing the aggravation of inter-party contradictions, did not begin to analyze the reasons for the failure of the negotiations. «The entire responsibility for the failure falls on me», he concluded. «I ask party leaders to refrain from mutual claims and accusations» (Wavell, 1973, p. 156).

• III.    CONCLUSION

Thus, both the associates and opponents of Vallabhbhai Patel, everyone – Gandhi, Rajapopalachariya, Desai and Sapru, Liaquat Ali Khan, the colonial administration, despite all its maneuvers during the negotiation process, failed to overcome or even mitigate Indo-British and inter-Indian contradictions. By constantly curtsying to the ML to «appease» it, as well as by paying close attention to the slightest fluctuations in the behavior of the INC, the British side contributed to the preservation of a state of heightened anxiety in which the political organizations and leaders of the multi-million «minorities» of the country were, equally fearful of the establishment «Hindu Raj», and the creation of Pakistan. The Simla Conference was one of the last missed opportunities to keep India united. Patel understood – there was a partition ahead. But he could not know for certain – it would be his task to unite most of India.

• IV.    FUNDING

  The article is prepared with the financial support of the Russian Science Foundation, project № 23-2800478. https://rscf.ru/project/23-28-00478/