The power of green parties in government coalitions of Western European countries: Factors in obtaining additional ministerial positions
Автор: Andrey K. Mikheev
Журнал: Ars Administrandi. Искусство управления @ars-administrandi
Рубрика: Публичная политика и управление публичной политикой
Статья в выпуске: 1 т.17, 2025 года.
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Introduction: in contemporary political systems of Western Europe, green parties play a significant role, garnering substantial voter support and frequently participating in coalition governments. However, parties that focus on a narrow range of issues (“niche” parties) face a dilemma: expanding their range of issues can attract more votes but may reduce support from their core electorate focused on environmental issues. This contradiction can also affect the distribution of governmental posts. Objectives: to identify the influence of the electoral weight and program preferences of green parties on obtaining additional ministerial positions in the government. Methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Results: QCA analysis of 15 governments with green parties’ presence in Western European countries confirmed the positive influence of blackmail potential, low priority of environmental issues and moderate priority of economic issues on obtaining additional ministerial posts. Issues of welfare and quality of life, as well as ideological proximity to the prime minister’s party, did not affect obtaining additional posts, as these factors were equally present in both positive and negative outcomes. Conclusions: the study of factors contributing to the acquisition of additional ministerial posts demonstrates the pragmatic approach of green parties. They are willing to reduce the emphasis on environmental issues to increase the number of government positions. This adaptation allows them to participate in the governance of various spheres of life and expand their influence.
Green parties, “niche” parties, coalition governments, electoral weight, Western Europe, QCA, ideological preferences
Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/147247373
IDR: 147247373 | DOI: 10.17072/2218-9173-2025-1-93-110