Sospitator quidem ille et genitor est omnium. The Idea of a Transcendent God, Creator and Saviour of the Universe in the Writings of Apuleius of Madauros. Apuleius’ Philosophy of God

Introduction. Return to the Platonic concept of the transcendent and incorporeal God in the theology of Middle Platonism

Middle Platonism revived Plato’s philosophy and expressed it in a mystical spirituality that met the religious and spiritual needs of the people of that era, close to the mystical spirituality that characterized the mystery cults popular at that time, into which Apuleius was zealously engaged and initiated. The latter proves quite clearly his spiritual inclinations and the fact that he was looking for something more in religion than what the traditional cult of gods had to offer. The Middle

Platonic philosophy presented a high intellectual, and spiritual level. God and theological issues were not only the most important topic of philosophical studies, but also the most important goal of spiritual life. According to this philosophy, the meaning of the existence of the world and the meaning of human life can only be understood by reference to God.

A characteristic feature of the theology of Middle Platonism, and at the same time what defined the Middle Platonic theology in relation to then dominant Stoicism, was the return to the Platonic concept of an incorporeal and transcendent God – the Creator of the universe.1 This inevitably led to a clash between the Pla-tonists and the Stoics (and the Epicureans) in the field of theology. This is particularly visible in the work of Plutarch of Chaeronea, who clashes with the Stoic concept of God, which reduces Him to the immanently understood Logos as the rational soul of the world – that is, to the logical, but at the same time material nature of the cosmos. However, according to Plutarch, God cannot be burdened with any materiality (Plutarch, De E apud Delphos, 393 E). He is an incorporeal being and therefore indestructible. This indestructibility of God is ensured by the fact that in his metaphysical structure there is not even a trace of matter, which is destructible and subject to destruction. In the dialogue De E apud Delphos he defines God as “Being” (“Existence”), a true Being opposed to such beings as man and other things of the physical world, and the whole world in general about which it cannot be said that “exists”, but that “it becomes” (Ibidem, 391 F - 393 B).2 God, the only true being, exists beyond time, beyond all “is” and “will be”. It is unchanging and immovable. According to Plutarch, this is what the mysterious letter “E” of the Delphic temple foretells, so to speak, says: “ei” – “you are” (Ibidem, 391 F – 392 B). Only God can be addressed by saying “you are”, because only He is, i.e. exists in a true way. The world along with all things that are born and die, is condemned to eternal becoming (Ibidem, 392 A–B). Only God does not change. No concepts expressing temporal relations apply to it. Moreover, using such concepts in relation to him would be sacrilege because they refer only to natural reality, to which he is completely alien in the metaphysical sense, because he has a completely different metaphysical structure. God is one and is the unity that fills his essence (Ibidem, 393 A–B). In the De defectu oraculorum, based on the discussion about demons and the number of worlds, Plutarch completes the image of God, adding to Him virtues such as justice and love (Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum, 423 D). This gives God a fully personal character and enables Him to have personal relationships (also with people who, as his children, also inherit from Him his virtues, or at least dispositions to virtues). God is a person. This is an extremely important statement. Plutarch also expresses an interesting thought about God in the De Iside et Osiride in Chapter 67. He calls Him Reason who orders the world. And he adds that all people around the world, regardless of their religion, worship the same gods, they just call them differently (Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, 377 E – 378 A).

Plutarch’s theological thought is undoubtedly interesting and constitutes a very mature stage in the history of Middle Platonism. The next stage was the work of Apuleius, and Alcinous, around the middle of the 2nd century AD.3

“The Return” to the Platonic concept of transcendent and supernatural God was closely related to the Platonic concept of incorporeal, and supernatural human soul which somehow spiritually transcends the human body, with which it has been integrated, and can transcend (in spiritual sense) all material world. It may even have spiritual (personal) relationships with God himself (because the soul inherits the supernatural features of God, of its Creator and Father). This made the philosophy of Middle Platonism had spiritual, even mystical character, close to the mystical spirituality of the Mysteries popular at that time like Mysteries of Isis and Osiris, and Eleusinian Mysteries but without initiation rituals.4 But also, the philosophy of the Middle Platonism, as a result of her sensitivity and focus on what is supernatural, and on God, gained the features of a kind of initiation into divinity (like in Mysteries), through the mystical act of love (ecstasy) or an equally mystical act of illumination (cf. Alcinous, Didaskalikos, X 165, 27-33; Apuleius, De deo Socratis, III 124; Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes, XI, 9-11).5 According to Boys-Stones, “Platonism, as it emerged at the end of the Hellenistic era, is distinguished by its ‘religious’ character; even that it might in some sense be considered as a religion” (Boys-Stones 2016, 317). As Moreschini writes, “the texts of the Middle Platonic philosophers are all pervaded by a pronounced mysticism, according to the spirit of the times in which they taught” (C. Moreschini, op. cit., 162; transl. K.P.). This is also visible in the works of Apuleius of Madauros called Philosophus Platoni-6

cus.

The theory of God in the writings of Apuleius of Madauros

Theory of God is undoubtedly the most important part of Middle Platonic philosophy. It is widely discussed in the writings of the Middle Platonists, also in the works of Apuleius of Madauros, who repeats certain motifs already introduced by Plutarch, but in a slightly different way, and introduces themes specific only to himself.7

De Platone et eius dogmate.

God as the incorporeal, transcendent, difficult to know Creator of the world

Apuleius introduced the theory of God as part of the principality theory, as the causative principle of all things in chapter V book I of the De Platone et eius dogmate:

Initia rerum esse tria arbitratur Plato: deum et materiam inabsolutam, informem, nulla specie nec qualitatis significatione distinctam, rerumque formas, quas ideas idem vocat.

Sed haec de Deo sentit, quod sit incorporeus. Is unus, ait, aperimetros, genitor re-rumque omnium exstructor, beatus et beatificus, optimus, nihil indigens, ipse con-ferens cuncta. Quem quidem caelestem pronuntiat, indictum, innominabilem, et ut ait ipse, aoraton, adamaston; cuius naturam invenire difficile est; si inventa sit, in multos eam enuntiari non posse (Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate, I, V 190-191; cf. Platon, Timaeus, 28 C).8

God is an Architect, the Creator of the world. Apparently, He is a person, as evidenced by his attributes such as happy, making happy, not feeling any lack, creating everything himself. Its main feature is rationality, which is manifested in its rational operation – rational, because implementing a certain idea. The result of God’s rational action is harmony, the mathematical order of the world (the effect

(Sullivan 1967, 9-14; Hijmans 1987, 408; Sandy 1996, 188), and of the earlier scholars Meiss, Kawczyński and Sinko (Meiss 1886, 2-8; Kawczyński 1900, 41-43; Sinko 1905, 39-42; see also: Gersh 1986, 317-320). According to Redfors, the issue of the authenticity of De Platone et eius dogmate and De mundo cannot be resolved (Redfors 1960, 117). Harrison, however, is convinced „that the De Mundo and the De Platone are genuine Apuleian works“ (Harrison 2000, 179). According to Harrison, “The De Mundo and De Platone are respectively a free translation of the extant pseudo-Aristotelian Peri Kosmu, and a two-book handbook to the doctrines of Plato, which is also likely to be translation or paraphrase of an earlier Greek text; both are thus attempts to expound in Latin the doctrines of Greek philo-sophers“ (Harrison 2000, 174). Regen also believes that all Latin philosophical works of Apuleius had their Greek prototypes (Regen 1977, 194; 219-221). Mantenero also claims that the Latin version of the De deo Socratis is a translation of some lost Greek text. However, according to her, Apuleius was the author of both the Latin and Greek works (Mantenero 1970, 219-259). Apuleius was also interested in natural sciences, medicine, and astronomy, but his writings on these subjects have not survived. His poems have also not survived (see Harrison 2000, 14-36). The same fate befell his translations of Plato’s dialogues. More about Apuleius, his life and works see: Dillon 1997, 306-338; Fletcher 2014; Gersh 1986, vol. I, 215328; Harrison 2000; Kawczyński 1899; Kawczyński 1900; Moreschini 1978; Sandy 1997.

8 Cf. Dillon 1996, 312-313; Gersh 1986, 237-241; Mrugalski 2019, 25-51.

of God’s action is mathematically perfect). This is indicated by terms such as “number and measure”:

Quae (scil. elementa rerum) cum inordinate permixtaque essent, ab illo aedificatore mundi deo ad ordinem numeris et mensuris in ambitum deducta sunt (Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate, I, VII 194).

The features of God, his perfection and beauty, because of his activities appear in his created beings. That is why the world created by God has the same features (Ibid., I, VII 198). It does not have only one of its features, namely incorporeality. Since God is non-corporeal (Ibid., V 190). Having given God so many attributes, Apuleius adds that it is only with great difficulty to get knowledge about God, and even if one possesses it, then only a few would be able to pass it on, because only a few would be able to understand it (Ibid., V 191). It is not difficult to notice that this sounds almost like a quote from Plato’s Timaeus (Plato, Timaeus, 28 C; Plato, Epis-tulae, VII 341 C/D). This thought of how difficult it is to know God is very close to Plato and applies to his entire philosophy, as he suggests in his Letter II, and VII (Plato, Epistulae, II 314 B; VII 341 C – 344 D). There are other characteristics of God that are difficult to know, namely those that mean that he is inexpressible and unnamed (Apuleius, De Platone, I, V 191). God’s nature cannot be easily known. He is beyond the reach of any concepts trying to express his nature. One of God’s terms is “heavenly”. God is heavenly (celestis) (Ibid., I, V 190). This probably means that he is in his “heaven”. Presumably this term is to emphasize its separation from the world. God is separated from the world, he is outside of it, in his heaven.

Apuleius’ lecture on Platonic theology is supplemented by the teachings on providence and fate in Chapter XII of Book I of the De Platone et eius dogmate:

Sed omnia quae naturaliter et propterea recte feruntur providentiae custodia gu-bernantur nec ullius mali causa deo poterit adscribi. Quare nec omnia ad fati sortem arbitratur esse referenda. Ita enim definit: providentiam esse divinam sententiam, con-servatricem prosperitatis eius, cuius causa tale suscepit officium; divinam legem esse fatum, per quod inevitabiles cogitationes dei atque incepta conplentur. Unde si quid providentia geritur, id agitur et fato, et quod fato terminatur providentia debet suscep-tum videri. Et primam quidem providentiam esse summi exsuperantissimique deorum omnium, qui non solum deos caelicolas ordinavit, quos ad tutelam et decus per omnia mundi membra dispersit, sed natura etiam mortales eos, qui praestarent sapientia ceteris terrenis animantibus, ad aevitatem temporis edidit fundatisque legibus reli-quarum dispositionem ac tutelam rerum, quas cotidie fieri necesse est, diis ceteris tra-didit. Unde susceptam providentiam dii secundae providentiae ita naviter retinent, ut omnia, etiam quae caelius mortalibus exhibentur, inmutabilem ordinationis paternae statum teneant (Apuleius, De Platone, I, XII 205, 15–206, 12).

The doctrine of providence begins with the statement that everything that happens according to nature, and therefore rightly so, is done by virtue of God’s providence: Sed omnia quae naturaliter et propterea recte feruntur prouidentiae custodia gubernantur (Apuleius, De Platone, I, XII 205, 15-16). Apuleius defines providence as a divine thought that ensures prosperity for all those who have accepted such an obligation: providentiam esse divinam sententiam, conservatricem prosperitatis eius, cuius causa tale suscepit officium (Apuleius, De Platone, I, XII 205, 19-20). Instead, he presents Fate as a divine law by means of which God’s intentions and inevitable thoughts are realized: divinam legem esse fatum, per quod inevitabiles cogitationes dei atque incepta conplentur (Ibid. I, XII 205, 20-22). Therefore, it can be said that if something happens from providence, then it also occurs according to fate, that is, according to God’s law: Unde si quid providentia geritur, id agitur et fato, et quod fato terminatur providentia debet susceptum videri (Ibid. I, XII 205, 2224). And what is referred to as the effect of fate should be understood as a work of providence itself.

God is not the cause of any evil: nec ullius mali causa deo poterit adscribi (Ibid. I, XII 205, 16-17). In the same way, it cannot be attributed to fate, or God’s law: Quare nec omnia ad fati sortem arbitratur esse referenda (Ibid. I, XII 205, 17-18). What happens to a man cannot be attributed to fate without any restraint. Accidents depend partly on the people themselves and partly on what fate brings. Unforeseen random events remain covered for people. It happens that people’s thoughts are not fully realized due to obstacles sent by fate. When these obstacles prove to be beneficial to man, they are called happiness. When they bring evil, they are accepted as unhappiness (Ibid., I, XII 206, 15-23. Cf. Plato, Leges, 709 A-B).

Apuleius writes about two types of providence. He assigned the first and highest providence to the highest God (Father and Architect of the world). The bearers of the second providence are the other gods (who are themselves the work of the supreme God). Creator has arranged all parts of the world for their care and pride. It is up to the gods to providentially direct the daily affairs that occur under the ordinance and providence of the Supreme God (Apuleius, De Platone, I, XII 205, 22 – 206, 12).9 The lower gods in this second providence make sure that the providence of the supreme God is realized - that everything remains in the unchanged state of God’s assigned status. The lowest type of gods, i.e. demons, serve as servants and intermediaries between people and gods. The Romans called them Geniuses and Lars. They are guardians and people’s interpreters, submitting their wishes and re- quests to the gods: Daemonas vero, quos Genios et Lares possumus nuncupare, min-istros deorum arbitra[n]tur custodesque hominum etinterpretes, si quid a diis velint (Apuleius, De Platone, I, XII 206, 13-15. Plato, Symposium, 202 E).

De deo Socratis.

Theory of illumination

In his later work, in the De deo Socratis, Apuleius describes God similarly as the Creator and master of the whole world, whose majesty and greatness defies any attempt to put them into words. Knowing God, as it turns out here, is possible, though very difficult. Illumination is the only way to know God. Only the greatest of the wise men, that is, those who managed to free their souls from bodily bondage, access it. Having made such purification of the soul, they may experience a sudden and momentary illumination as in the passage of lightning:

Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solutum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicuius rei munia obstrictum, cur ergo nunc dicere exordiar, cum Plato caelesti facundia praeditus, aequiperabilia diis inmortalibus disserens, frequentissime praedicet hunc solum maiestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice conprehendi, vix sapientibus viris, cum se vigore animi, quantum licuit, a corpore removerunt, intellectum huius dei, id quoque interdum, velut in artissimis ten-ebris rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicare? (Apuleius, De deo Socra-tis, III 124).

It seems setting very clear ethical requirements as a necessary condition for illumination is interesting in the given theory of illumination is. The philosopher’s cognitive potential was apparently dependent on his ethical (and spiritual) power. A similar motif of illumination was found in the Asclepius by Pseudo-Apuleius

(Pseudo-Apuleius, Asclepius, XXIX).10 Plato signalized the theory of illumination in Letter VII (Cf. Plato, Epistulae, VII, 341 C–D).11

Apuleius’ conviction (expressed in the quoted text) that one can get to know the hidden nature of God only through intellectual illumination, and that only the noblest and wisest are capable of it, is also Plato’s thought. The ethical element of this thought about the need to have certain ethical predispositions and a noble nature in order to be able to get to know God, Plato emphasizes in Letter VII and in the Phaedo (Plato, Epistulae, VII 344 A–C; Phaedo, 82 D – 84 B). One has to be prepared for illumination, also as said above in ethical aspects too. However, it can only assure a short-lasting cognition, or rather experience of God. Full cognition of God is possible only after death, when the philosopher’s soul completely frees itself from the body (hence it can be concluded that posthumous knowledge is of the same nature as cognition through illumination, but long-lasting).

In relation to illumination, the question of what it is remains to be answered. From what Plato and Apuleius write about it, it can be concluded that it is a spiritual experience that can be described as a relationship – both cognitive and personal – between God and man. God is the object of knowledge here, but he remains a person, therefore illumination has not only purely cognitive, but also personal dimension. It is the personal dimension of illumination that justifies such high spiritual and ethical requirements that Plato sets for philosophers.

Illumination is naturally a form of noesis, spiritual knowledge; it is the highest form of this knowledge. Another type of experience (this time basically purely personal) is ecstasy, mystic unification with God (i.e. with the Form of Beauty), which Plato writes about in the Symposium, using terminology taken from the Mysteries of Eleusis (Plato, Symposium, 209 E-212 A).12 In the Phaedrus Plato calls love the “madness of Eros”, clearly suggesting that true love is always the fruits of divine inspiration (Plato, Phaedrus, 244 A-B; 249 C-E; 245 A-C; 253 C).13 In the illumination, because it is partly a personal union, there must also be experiences like those of the “madness of Eros”. For a reason, Platonists like Apuleius believed that philosophy was “the love of wisdom”, and moreover “the preparation for death” (melete thanatu) which was understood as nothing more than a journey to God (cf. Apu-leius, De Platone, II XXI 250-251).14

Apologia ( De magia ).

God as the King, Creator and Saviour of the world

It is undoubted that in both works, the De Platone et eius dogmate, and in the De deo Socratis, Apuleius writes about the same God. The same attributes given to God are evidence to this. In the De deo Socratis, God gains the attribute of the Father of other gods which in the De Platone et eius dogmate appear in chapter IX book I. Apuleius was strongly convinced to the thesis that God is unknowable (to be more precise - difficult to know). This is also supported by the fact that he also speaks about God in the Apology (Apologia sive Pro se ipso de magia liber):

… quisnam sit ille non a me primo, sed a Platone basileus nuncupatus: peri ton panton basilea pant’ esti kai ekeinou eneka panta, quisnam sit ille basileus, totius rerum naturae causa et ratio et origo initialis, summus animi genitor, aeternus animantum sospitator, assiduus mundi sui opifex, sed enim sine opera opifex, sine cura sospitator, sine prop-agatione genitor, neque loco ne-que tempore neque uice ulla comprehensus eoque paucis cogitabilis, nemini effabilis (Apuleius, Apologia, C 64).

It was mentioned that Apuleius gave God the name “heavenly”, indicating that it probably points to God’s “whereabouts”. This is a fairly important issue. It is argued that Apuleius speaks of this heavenly place where God resides, also in the Apology (Apologia sive Pro se ipso de magia liber), a work quite non-philosophical, although strongly saturated with philosophical threads. Here, referring to the Plato’s Phae-drus, in which Plato actually mentions the “sky-high place” and “the summit of the sky” (Plato, Phaedrus, 247 B–D) points to the highest point in the top of the world where he located the Platonic school (Apuleius, Apologia, 64). This fairly attractive school location, of course, only serves to emphasize its intellectual and ethical excellence and its unique position vis-à-vis other philosophical schools. Indeed, in this place there is none other than the King himself. Apuleius presented the King as a cause, principle of all things, and as a Father and Saviour (Ibid.).

It is not difficult to notice that the King (Basileus) described by Apuleius in his Apology has the characteristics of God from the De Platone et eius dogmate (and from the De deo Socratis). The special elevation of God – Creator (the King) above other beings probably refers to his metaphysical situation in relation to his creations. In the metaphysical sense, God is the first being (the first among all beings as their creator). The entire metaphysical structure of the world and all things individually, which is somehow initiated in it, depends on him. The location of God in the distant and inaccessible sky makes him aware his transcendence and his inaccessibility for ordinary human knowledge. Most likely, the King from Apuleius’ Apology is the same King about whom Plato speaks extremely mysteriously in the Letter II (Plato, Epistulae, II, 312 E). Presumably, this King in Apuleius’ Apology and in Plato’s Letter II is none other than God – Creator himself, about whom it is discussed in the De Platone et eius dogmate and the De deo Socratis (and in Plato’s Timaeus).

De mundo.

God as the Creator and Saviour of the World

Another work in which Apuleius discusses the topic of God is the De mundo. The text from the De mundo is even more interesting because it coincides with the quoted piece from the Apology. God is defined here as the cause of the creation of the world (auctor originis). He is not only the author of the world he created, but also his saviour (deumque ipsum salutem esse) and the cause of its duration (perse-verantia earum, quas effecerit, rerum):

“Vetus opinio est atque cogitationes omnium hominum penitus insedit deum esse originis [haberi] auctorem deumque ipsum salutem esse et perseverantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum” (Apuleius, De mundo, XXIV 342).

God is the Saviour and Father of all creatures in the universe. Nothing escapes his Fatherly protection. Apuleius points out that God the Saviour (sospitator) and Father (genitor) caused the world to appear without the slightest effort, by the power of his non-fatigable providence:

“Sospitator quidem ille et genitor est omnium, quae ad conplendum mundum nata factaque sunt, non tamen ut corporei laboris officio orbem istum minibus suis in-struxerit, sed qui quadam infaticaili providentia et procul posita cuncta contingit et maximis intervallis disiuncta conplexitur” (Ibid. XXIV 343).

It is he who rules from the highest and loftiest place where he has his abode (praestantem ac sublinem sedem tenere): “Nec ambigitur eum praestantem ac sub-limem sedem tenere…” (Apuleius, De mundo, XXV 343).15

From it he gives his power to the celestial bodies below him and the most distant Earth, thus giving them strength to last and move. God is the principle of all activity in the universe (Apuleius, De mundo, XXIV 342 – XXIX 355).

God is only known with the eyes of the soul (animae oculis): … quem tan-tummodo animae oculis nostrae cogitations vident (Ibid., XXX 357). Different names given to him by various followers indicate different aspects of his activity (Ibid. XXXVII 370–372). The names such as Providence, Necessity, and Fate refer to him (Ibid., XXXVIII 372–374). He is the most perfect law under which the whole world exists: Lex illa vergens ad aequitatis tenorem sit deus nulla indigens correctione mu-tabili (Ibid., XXXVI 369).

In the De mundo, similarly as in the Apologia, Apuleius underscores God’s transcendence accentuating his unique position towards his creations. God resides in the place called heaven (similarly as in the Apologia), totally separated from the rest of the world (Ibid., XXXIII 362). At the same time, he marks his ubiquity in this world that permeates with all its power, being not only its Creator, but also the one who keeps it in existence: ad hoc instar mundi salute tuetur deus aptam revictam sui numis postestate (Ibid. XXXII 361, XXXIII 362).

In a metaphysical sense, God pervades what He created with his actions. As a person, however, he stays in his heaven, completely separated from the world.

The Treatise De mundo is a translation of a Greek work, pseudo-Aristotelian Peri kosmu.16 Apuleius is probably the author of this translation. It is impossible not to notice that the theology of this treatise is consistent with the theology presented in the De Platone et eius dogmate and in the other writings of Apuleius (especially in the Apologia and in the De deo Socratis), which there is no doubt that they convey the beliefs of the author, i.e. Apuleius. Due to the convergence of the De mundo with the De Platone et eius dogmate, and with the Apologia and the De deo Socratis, in theological theories, it can be expected that the De mundo also expresses the theological beliefs of Apuleius. This position seems to be prompted by the fact that this treatise expresses the same spirituality in which the philosopher of Madauros lived and created. Characteristic for it and characteristic for Apuleius himself is the combination of philosophy and religion in it, which results in a picture of a kind of “philosophical Mysteries” in which philosophy becomes an instrument of knowing God, and a way to discover the divinity contained in the soul of the philosopher. This mystery tone resounds already in the first chapter of the De mundo. Apuleius maintains a mythological way of speaking about God in the De mundo referring to well-known ancient mythological figures. Extracting philosophical content from this mythological message is not difficult. In a metaphysical sense, God is the efficient cause of all things. His causative action never ceases, which is manifested by the existence of the world and metaphysical laws that are the skeleton of natural and ethical laws, according to which all creatures function. God Himself was called this (metaphysical) law – it is somehow a way of his activity (and for the world a way of its existence). God expresses himself through the world that he created in a way and through these laws. Ethical rights play a special role here. Apuleius emphasizes their inevitable nature and the necessity of surrendering to them citing Plato, who in fact expresses in the Leges his thought that man’s personal happiness depends on submission to these ethical laws (Plato, Leges, IV 715 c, 716 a). By the laws by which everything that exists in the world functions, God is present in it, although he remains transcendent to it.

It is worth paying attention to one more characteristic feature of God presented by Apuleius. Apuleius says that God is a constant Creator (auctor originis) of the world, creating without difficulty and the Saviour (sospitator) saving without effort. In short, God’s creative activity is not a one-time event, but a continuous process. Apuleius points out that this activity does not require any effort from God. It can be supposed that by this he means that God’s creative activity is somehow a way of his existence and life. God creates by the power of his thoughts, or his providence (Apuleius, De mundo, XXIV 343). It sounds quite mysterious to call God the Saviour (sospitator). On this basis, one might think that this expression appearing in the Apologia and the De mundo, in the works where religious accents and tones appear pretty frequently (e.g. in the De mundo the religious mood from chapter XXIV is undeniable) has a religious meaning. Apuleius gave the same term to Isis in the Metamorphoses (Apuleius, Metamorphoses, XI, 15). In this case, this concept is certainly religious. It can be assumed that the religiously disposed Apuleius, an expert and participant in numerous mystery cults, who very carefully stores souvenirs from all rites (Apuleius, Apologia, 55, 56), uses the term “the Saviour” (sospi-tator) in the religious sense also in the Apologia and in the De mundo. Therefore – if this supposition is correct – God, Creator and Father of all things is the Saviour of what he created. The unanswered question is why God’s work require salvation and what does salvation involve. Apuleius does not develop this issue. The Greek author of the De mundo again gives the name “the Saviour” to God, this time with undoubtedly religious meaning since it is clearly used in a mysterious (orphic) context (Aristoteles, De mundo, 401 a). This suggests that the saving attribute of God, however, has a religious dimension in both Greek and Latin texts, despite the fact that in the latter, in parallel to the Greek text just presented, this concept does not exist (Apuleius, De mundo, XXXVII 370–371). It can be assumed that the term “Saviour” expresses the religious aspect of God’s activity in relation to his creatures and supplements his metaphysical function of the efficient cause. In other words, God, in a metaphysical sense, creates and maintains the world in existence, which in this way lasts forever, although its individual structures are mortal. The religious aspect of God’s activity most probably refers mainly to rational creatures, and above all to people. It has probably the same meaning here as in soteric cults. It is possible that this attribute reveals the role of God expressed in Plato’s Politicus as a restorer of order in space, which is periodically shaken due to the presence of matter in it, which in Platonic concepts is itself a destructive element (Plato, Polit-icus, 173 B – 174 A). Salvation would consist in overcoming this destructive action of matter and restoring order in space.

Conclusion

It seems obvious that the theology of Apuleius, in its significant content, is very Platonic. It coincides with Plato’s theories in the Timaeus. It is also close to the main theses of Alcinous (Alcinous, Didaskalikos, X).17 As in Plato’s Timaeus, in Ap-uleius’ lecture God is the metaphysical cause of the universe. His deeds are eternal. The manifestation of these actions is the world harmony. The essence of God is Reason. That is why His actions are rational. God is absolutely perfect. He is incorporeal and has no shortcomings because he has no trace of matter. He is happy. His works are endowed with rationality (order) and happiness. The process of creation is mathematical in nature and consists in giving what is indefinite by itself specific features, i.e., in forming (giving forms). The mathematical nature of this forming is revealed in the fact that what a formed being is (and thus and what it is) depends entirely on the geometrical structure of the basic elements from which it is built. An important attribute of God is his inaccessibility to common minds. Only the wisest of philosophers, i.e. those who managed to free their souls from the bonds of the senses, are able to know God. God eludes ordinary cognition. It becomes known only through illumination, i.e. a sudden, most probably mystical illumination of the soul (the soul freed from sensual desires). God is ineffable – he cannot be described in words of his nature. Here, human language is as inept as reason wishing to know the essence of God hidden from it.

The term Saviour (sospitator) occupies a special place among God’s attributes. This attribute expresses the religious aspect of God’s activity towards the world. In a metaphysical sense, God creates and keeps the whole world in existence and order, although individual beings in this world are mortal. This attribute reveals the role of God expressed in Plato’s Politicus as a restorer of order in the world space, which is periodically shaken due to the presence of matter in it, which in Platonic concepts is a destructive element (Plato, Politicus, 173 B – 174 A). Salvation would consist in overcoming this destructive action of matter and restoring order in world.

It is worth adding here that one of the hallmarks of Platonic philosophy, in Ap-uleius works, is piety. Apuleius values piety very much (Apuleius, Apologia, 56, 6165).18 This is particularly clearly expressed in his Apology, where he shows his piety and godlessness of his prosecutors (Ibid. 56). Apuleius contrasts superstition and true religiosity. Similarly, in the De deo Socratis, he opposes superstition, which causes people to fear almost everything. Superstition, according to Apuleius, is worse than atheism (Apuleius, De deo Socratis, III 122-123). According to him, superstition is where people neither know nor care for gods. Some of them are overwhelmed by fear of the supposed gods, from the point of view of Apuleius, unjustified. That is why they are devoted to meticulous, purely ritual worship. Others despise the gods at all. In the first case, Apuleius could even refer to the Roman religion, in which a meticulous and rigorous ritual prevails. It is difficult to say who Apuleius in particular means in the second case. Similarly, it is not known who the few are who deny the existence of the gods.19

In religious terms, Apuleius of Madauros, the philosopher and magician, was a very complex personality. Various threads intertwined in it, including polytheism and Mystery cults, but Platonism was the strongest and dominant trend in it, both at the theoretical (doctrinal) level as well as spiritual and ethical. The dearest to him were Platonic spiritual and ethical ideals, such as the ideal of “likeness to God” (homoiosis theo), and the belief in the spiritual character of the human soul, with all the ethical and spiritual consequences that flow from this belief.20