Stalin and the Red Army command on the eve of war, 1939 - 1941

This article is part of a general study of high level military decision making on the eve of the Great Patriotic War based on the author’s model for examining alternative history. In general, this ongoing work is intended to answer one of the most “painful questions” of our past: Could the catastrophic beginning of the Great Patriotic War have been avoided? Previously, the author proposed that a mobilization of Soviet armed forces in advance in order to increase the number of Red Army troops on the western border to 6-6.5 million people was an absolutely necessary precondition for any realistic possibility of repelling the German invasion or, at least, minimizing the damage it inflicted. According to the author, the Soviet military political leadership could have taken such actions in the period of the so called “alternative situations” from August 1939 to June 1941. The most favorable conditions for such a mobilization existed between autumn 1939 to summer 1940. By that time, the Red Army had already gained valuable experience in partial mobilization, border deployment, and conducting front line operations. The enemy, moreover, was tied up in combat on the Western Front. That study was conducted on the basis of a wide range of sources, including: archival documents from the collections of RGASPI, RGANI, RGVA, and GARF; records of the visitor log to J.V. Stalin’s Kremlin office; memoirs and diaries of individuals in Stalin’s political entourage and the military high command in 1939-1941. Analysis of these sources revealed the existence of a so called “military analytical center” (“Stalin’s war think tank”), which consisted of a relatively small group of politicians and military personnel who were invited by Stalin to hold meetings on military issues. Based on the records of visits to Stalin’s office, a statistical database was created on the meetings of the “military analytical center,” and the participation in them of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). These data made it possible to assess the dynamics and nature of the activities of Stalin’s “war think tank.” The data also showed that at no time did the “military analytical center” consider alternative measures to prepare the country for war. A study of the structure of the “military analytical center” and the role of its political component, represented by members of the Politburo, revealed a general decrease in the participation of Politburo members in military meetings in 1939-1941. In practice, this meant that the political contingent in Stalin’s “military political center” provided mere ornamentation, and was deprived of any chance to understand the alternative possibilities available, and to take the one decision that could avoid the catastrophe of 1941. The purpose of this article is to study the composition and functions of the military component of the Soviet “war think tank,” i.e., the representatives of the high command of the armed forces of the USSR who participated in discussions of the most important issues concerning war preparations in 1939-1941. The source base remains the same: documents from the largest federal archives, memoirs, and interviews with participants in the events under review. The main method used is an analysis of the statistical database based on the log of visits to Stalin’s Kremlin office in August 1939 - June 1941, as well as the minutes of Politburo meetings and the decisions made in regard to military issues. The article substantiates the conclusion that the peculiarities of Stalin’s configuration of his military entourage, the mechanism of interaction with it, and the functions assigned to it initially did not allow for the development of effective solutions to prevent the catastrophic start of the war with Germany.