The UK’s interests in the Arctic
Автор: Andrey A. Todorov, Dmitriy N. Lyzhin
Журнал: Arctic and North @arctic-and-north
Рубрика: Political processes and institutions
Статья в выпуске: 36, 2019 года.
Бесплатный доступ
The article analyzes the priorities of British policy in the Arctic. The UK has a long tradition of studying the Arctic and is one of the first observer countries of the Arctic Council. At the same time, the Arctic strategy of London has undergone several significant changes, which are a natural reaction to the changing situation in the region. An analysis of the British Foreign Ministry report 2018 reveals four primary areas of the UK's interest in the Arctic. First, the country's economy continues to rely heavily on the hydrocarbon and bioresources of the Arctic. Secondly, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis and in the conditions of deteriorating relations with Moscow, the British authorities have begun to pay more attention to the security, primarily the military one. Third, an important direction of the UK Arctic policy is to solve the problem of climate change since the country considered one of the world leaders in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the development of international cooperation in the region based on scientific diplomacy is one of the priorities of British Arctic politics. However, despite the official documents fixing the priorities of the UK’s Arctic strategy, London’s Arctic policy is passive. This fact is a reason for British expert criticism.
The UK, the Arctic, Russia, international cooperation in the Arctic, navigation, security, oil and gas, the Arctic Council, Paris Agreement
Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/148318447
IDR: 148318447 | DOI: 10.17238/issn2221-2698.2019.36.84
Текст научной статьи The UK’s interests in the Arctic
Ongoing climate change in the Arctic and the accelerated melting of ice, opening access to the seas of the Arctic Ocean, will inevitably lead to increased international attention to the region. In addition to the Arctic countries, many of which increase activity in the region, non-regional states and associations are interested in it. [1, Konishev V.N. Sergunin A.A., Rykhtik M.I., p. 156]. In 2016, the European Union accepted a document on an integrated policy in the Arctic. China, in early 2018, published a White Paper on the strategy for the Arctic 1, and Britain revealed ambition concerning the region. In April 2018 Polar Regions Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain published a report “Beyond the Ice: UK Policy Towards the Arctic” (Report 2018) 2, supplemented by another official document of the state policy in the Arctic — “Adapting
∗ For citation:
To Change UK policy towards the Arctic” 2013 3. Report 2018 signaled the desire of Britain to hold a leading position in dealing with Arctic issues.
According to experts, the active involvement of non-regional players can lead to the growth of the economic and political contradictions in the Arctic [2, Ivanov I.S., p. 112]. This thesis is not indisputable because the Arctic has always been and remains the region of the mutually beneficial cooperation, legal certainty, low potential for conflict, and war threats [3, Zagorski A. V., pp. 15–18]. At the same time, relations between Russia and the West against the background of the Ukrainian crisis had an impact on the Arctic. It is, first of all, fair for the sphere of military security, in which Western countries have stopped cooperation with Russia. Mutual accusations of militarization in the region and aggressive behavior 4 are the reality. Against this background, one publication is notable. In February 2019, it was announced the UK Armed Forces were planning to increase their presence in the Arctic, “to protect the northern flank of NATO from Russia”. 5
These circumstances actualize the question of Britain's role in the Arctic region, its priorities, and the evaluation of official documentation on the issue.
Main points
The United Kingdom follows the logic of some other non-Arctic countries with interest in the Arctic (esp. China) and has positioned itself as a “near-Arctic” state [9, Depledge D., p. 31]. London's main arguments to substantiate its interest in the polar territories are often referred to history and geography. British underline the significant contribution of their representatives in the study of the Arctic since the 16th century. A considerable period of growth in the significance of the Arctic for Britain was the Second World War. Sending Arctic convoys to assist the Soviet Union made the Barents and the Norwegian Sea area a strategic area [5, Murray R.W., Dey Nuttall A., p. 551]. The UK authorities emphasize the northern boundary of the exclusive economic zone of the Shetland islands comes to the Arctic Circle. In these circumstances, Scotland is a significant argument for the justification of the UK presence in the Arctic. Report 2018 mentions Scotland participated in a major international conference Arctic Circle. Moreover, Scotland will shortly develop its national strategy in the Arctic and calls for closer cooperation with the Arctic states 6. But we should not assume the presence of the British authorities in the Arctic is justified only geographically or historically [6, Ananyev E.V., Antyushina N.M., p. 70].
In the UK strategy in the Arctic, four aspects are essential: economy, security, the environment, and international cooperation. At the same time, the state does not have any single body responsible for conducting the state line in the Arctic. The powers are divided between several institutions according to the scope and form a rather complicated system [7, Depledge D., p. 132]. E.g., the authority to address climate issues and issues related to the exploitation of energy resources, assigned to the Department of Energy and Climate Change. Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are responsible for navigation. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs deals with the exploitation of living resources, incl. fisheries and environmental protection. Arctic research projects are the responsibility of the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills. Military security issues are related to the Ministry of Defense; the Foreign and Commonwealth Office coordinates British international cooperation in the Arctic.
Economy
One of the main interests of the country above the Arctic Circle remains the solution to energy problems. The UK has its facilities for oil and gas development, but, at the same time, the country is experiencing a significant shortage of hydrocarbons, covered by imports. Britain is one of the first in the world in terms of gas and oil import [6, Ananyeva E.V., Antyushina N.M., p. 71]. In this case, the largest partner of the UK is an Arctic nation — Norway. E.g., in 2017, the UK imported about 75% gas and 50% oil7 from Norway. By 2030, the total import oil may rise to 73% [8, Eremina N.V., p. 9].
In this case, the British oil and gas companies are the largest in the world. In 2018, the Anglo-Dutch Shell ranked first in the world in the oil and gas sector (in terms of total income criteria, turnover, assets, etc.), British Petroleum — the 7th8. Despite London's involvement in anti-Russian sanctions of Washington and Brussels, both corporations are closely working with Russian partners on Arctic initiatives. Thus, BP owns a 19.75% stake in Rosneft. In 2017, the company launched several joint projects in the Russian Arctic 9. This contradictory position is explained by the fact that the UK linked its energy interests with Russia, its priority market of hydrocarbons after the collapse of the Soviet Union [8, Eremina N.V., p. 16]. At the same time, in 2012, the British government was seeking to diversify energy sources and signed an agreement with Iceland on geothermal electricity supplied via submarine cables [4, Depledge D., p. 84].
Besides, the UK relates opening transport routes to specific economic prospects in the Arctic. In Report 2018, British experts noted the importance of the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and their potential to secure additional short commercial routes between Asia and
Europe 10. London is a world leader in insurances for marine companies, incl. those active in the Arctic. The London-based companies ensure risks associated with oil spills, lifting wrecks lives and health of the crew and passengers, etc. for a multimillion-dollar sum. L.R. (Lloyd's Register) leads a survey for about 25% of the world's icebreaker fleet and is the second-largest community classification (after Russian Marine Register) [4, Depledge D., p. 86].
Besides, the traditional interest of the British authorities are fisheries in the Arctic seas. The country remains one of the largest importers of cod and haddock [4, Depledge D., p. 90]. In 2014, the annual turnover of the UK fishing industry amounted to about 3 billion pounds. 95% of the cod in British stores are caught in the Arctic waters. Among the major suppliers are Canada, Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Norway [4, Depledge D., p. 91]. In these circumstances, London is following the situation around the fishing industry in the Arctic. It also applies to areas beyond the national jurisdiction of the Arctic Ocean, for which in 2018, it was concluded an international agreement to impose a temporary ban on commercial fishing 11.
Security
In Report 2018, more attention is devoted to security compared with documents in 2013. As the British experts' point, it is an indication of the growing concern of London against the changing environment in the Arctic 12. And it is not just about the emerging threats in connection with the intensification of shipping and the lack of search and rescue resources, but also about the challenges of military security. It is evidenced by the statement on the development of military strategy in the Arctic issues by the Ministry of Defense in September 2018 [9, Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy-Pipe C., p. 28]. At the moment, the document is under construction and should be published before the end of 2019 The UK recognizes the right of the Arctic states to protect their interests in the High North, but at the same time notes that “the build-up of military resources by some Arctic countries makes the region's future less certain” 13. Although some countries are not mentioned directly. Given the severe deterioration of relations between Moscow and London on the background of the scandalous case of Skripal, it does not remain doubt that the statement was about our state 14.
It should be noted that the growing attention of the British authorities to the military security in the Arctic is inextricably linked to the events in Ukraine in 2014. The subsequent crisis in relations with Russia affected the estimates of some British politicians of Russia's actions for the modernization of military infrastructure in the region [9, Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy-Pipe C., p. 35]. London sees the Russian Navy Northern Fleet a threat to the northern flank of NATO. However, as British experts noted, the Arctic itself should not become a pretext for a military conflict15.
Under these conditions, the Arctic has become an essential component in the justification of the British military need to increase defense funding to ensure an adequate response to the “threat” of Russia. For the same purpose, several activities, in conjunction with the allied states, are conducted. So, in 2017 the Royal Navy submarines resumed their work in the Arctic in a joint exercise with the US ICEX. In 2018 the sub-HMS Trenchant held ascent in the Arctic ice for the first time in a decade. Furthermore, British marines are scheduled to constitute the bulk of a military contingent of 800 men, conductive annual exercise in Norway to prepare the test, and the army resources in extreme conditions [9, Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy -Pipe C., p. 35] .
In matters of cooperation in the field of military security in the Arctic, the 2018 report calls NATO the central platform. The British naval forces hold regular exercises in Norway together with its NATO allies (Britain, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic and the Baltic countries) 16. At the same time, as we know, NATO's serious advancement in the Arctic is hampered by the lack of unity among the member states. Norway and Canada occupy opposing positions: Norwegians are the most consistent supporters of the alliance's expansion activities in the North, whereas Ottawa does not see the need for a more prominent role of the alliance in the Arctic [3, Zagorski A.V., pp. 244–248]. In these circumstances, the United Kingdom seeks to coordinate the efforts of Norway and the United States, forming the so-called “Northern Triangle” of the North Atlantic military cooperation [9, Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy-Pipe C., p. 36].
In general, over the past five years, the UK demonstrates its desire for military presence in the Arctic, arguing Russia mainly threatens it. This approach is somewhat contrary to the more traditional British policy in the Arctic, relying on cooperation with the Arctic states to address nonmilitary issues, esp. climate change. Despite this apparent transformation and growth of tension in relations with Moscow, the British experts urge not to consider a new military strategy of the country in the Arctic as a declaration of the Cold War and the arms race [9, Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy-Pipe C., p. 36]. Since 2010 the technical resources of the Ministry of Defense in the polar regions declined 17.
In addition to participating in the Arctic activities of NATO, the UK was involved in other security cooperation formats in the region. Since 2011, a round table meeting on Arctic security had been held. The aim was to discuss the security situation in the Arctic informally. In addition to the Arctic countries, the sessions were attended by the military of Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. However, since 2014 meetings were held without Russia [10, Zagorskiy A., p. 99].
Concerning non-military threats, in 2014, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security 18 stated that the opening of the northern route, along with an economic interest, is a potential threat to the safety of navigation. The interest in shipping problems is also determined by the fact that London took an active part - through the International Maritime Organization and the Arctic Council Working Group PAME - in the development and adoption of the Polar Code, which entered into force in 2017 and contains requirements for ships, functioning in arctic waters. It entered into force in 2017 and contained requirements for ships operating in Arctic waters. Britain is an advocate of strict environmental restrictions for navigation: e.g., the gradual introduction of zeroemissions requirements for vessels in polar seas 19.
Climatic direction
Britain focuses on the relationship of climate change in the Arctic and the other regions of the world, esp. the UK territory. In this regard, the UK stresses the need to achieve sustainable development in the Arctic, considering the importance of environmental protection measures. Report 2018 reveals the country intends to participate in the development of standards for the protection of the Arctic marine environment, the prevention of plastic pollution, and keeping biodiversity and ecosystems. In this area, London is celebrating its contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, incl. global climate instruments. The most important tool is called the Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) [11, Kopylov M.N., Kopylov S.M., Mohammad S.M.A., p. 139]. It calls not to let the global average temperature exceed by 2oC and take measures not to exceed the level of 1.5o C 20. The Paris Agreement (2015) is enforced since 2016, approved by 55 states that share 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions. London ratified the agreement at the end of November 2016.
It should be noted that the United Kingdom stood at the origins of approaches to the solution of global climatic problems [12, Gray T.S., p. 125]. Back in 1989, speaking at the UN, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said of the need to promote international cooperation in this area 21.
The critical piece of legislation in Britain that shapes the national climate policy is a law adopted in 2008, i.e., Act on Climate Change. The document became the world's first legally binding national legal action to deal with climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of the law is to reduce the total emissions of greenhouse gases in the country to 2050 (by 80% compared to the level of 1990 22). This goal was subsequently enshrined in the national contribution of the country to reducing global emissions within the Paris agreement.
Despite the British interest in the development of Arctic hydrocarbons, the country is one of the world leaders in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and energy decarbonization [13, Pugachev A.V., p. 109]. The United Kingdom is rapidly reducing the use of coal. In 2015, the Ministry of Energy had announced plans to stop using coal by 2025. In 2019, the economy of the United Kingdom (for the first time since the beginning of the industrial age) could function without coal for a week. An essential tool is to be a gradually increased tax on greenhouse gas emissions 23.
Britain plans to strengthen its actions to deal with climate change. After the analysis of the special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released in October 2018 25, the UK's government notified about the intentions to review climate policy and tighten it. The new target can be “zero emissions” of greenhouse gases in 2050 26. Thus, the United Kingdom will contribute to achieving the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement. It is important to stress that the UK climate policy is not interrelated with the US. The latter announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and is now sabotaging it at the international level, incl. the Arctic organizations 27. Difficulties in reaching new climate policy objectives can be associated with Brexit, as the EU funds several prominent British environmental programs.
International cooperation and science diplomacy
International cooperation in the Arctic is one of the priorities for the UK. The UK Arctic Strategy, adopted in 2013, emphasizes that the starting point of international governance and regulation in the region is the sovereign rights of the Arctic states themselves, as well as international treaties and conventions, among which the UNCLOS 1982 stands out. The country has become one of the first observers to the Arctic Council in 1998, two years after its establishment. Reports 2013 and 2018 note the critical role of the AC in establishing Arctic cooperation, despite the lack of competence to address military security issues. Developing bilateral collaboration with the Arctic countries and other interested players, Britain stands for scientific diplomacy 28.
According to the notes of the UK Parliament hearings on Arctic issues, the scientific achievements of the country arethe most significant 29. Britain is considered one of the leading states in Arctic research. About 9% of all scientific publications on Arctic issues are authored (and co-authored) by British organizations 30. In particular, the UK is a world leader in the study of the cryosphere and biodiversity, climate change in the Arctic, and Greenland's ice cover. Since 1991, a British research station has been operating in Ny-Ålesund (Svalbard Archipelago). The head of the state scientific organization is the British Natural Environmental Research Council. Its functions include financing and coordination of research activities of the British scientific organizations [6, Ananyeva E.V., Antyushina N.M., p. 72]. NERC Arctic Office was established with headquarters in Cambridge. In 2012–2017, NERC invested in the study of the Arctic more than 30 million pounds 31. For the next five years, it is planned to finance the Changing Arctic Ocean program for 16 million pounds 32.
However, the British Parliament notes that the Arctic is far from being the full scientific potential of the country. Science is funded situationally, depending on specific projects. No clear national strategy for research exists due to a lack of British scientists in international Arctic institutions, incl. the working groups of the Arctic Council 33.
In addition to conducting its research in the Arctic, the UK is a member of European joint projects and programs, e.g., EU-PolarNet. Financing of such projects (before Brexit) wholly or partially comes from the EU budget. Report 2018 notes that cooperation with the EU will be exceedingly complicated after Brexit. However, much will depend on the future agreement on Brexit34.
Conclusion
The analysis of the Report 2018 suggests the growing importance of the Arctic in the foreign policy of Great Britain. However, British experts noted the country's behavior in the Arctic had always been somewhat “reactive” rather than “proactive” [8, Eremina N.V., p. 10]. On the one hand, search for reasons why the Arctic will benefit the UK economy and security is continued. British authorities realize that the country will be welcomed in the Arctic only as a partner. They seek to persuade the international community of its utility for the Arctic by issuing this report.
At the same time, it is due to these circumstances and despite the apparent deterioration of relations with Moscow and attempts to see the aggressive intentions of Russia in its Arctic mili-
tary infrastructure, London will consider the Far North a region of mutually beneficial cooperation of all countries concerned, and not an arena for military confrontation.
Список литературы The UK’s interests in the Arctic
- Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A., Rykhtik M.I. Arkticheskaya strategiya evropeyskikh stran: problemy I perspektivy [Arctic strategy of European states: problems and prospects]. Arktika: zona mira I sotrudnichestva [Arctic: zone of peace and cooperation]. Ed. by A. Zagorskiy. Moscow, IMEMO Publ., pp. 156–169. (In Russ.)
- Ivanov I.S., ed. Arkticheskiy region: Problemy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva: khrestomatiya: v 3 t. [Arctic region: problems of international cooperation]. Moscow, Aspekt-Press Publ., 2013, vol. 3. 663 p. (In Russ.)
- Zagorskiy A.V., ed. Mezhdunarodno-politicheskie usloviya razvitiya Arkticheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii [International political development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation]. Moscow, Magistr Publ., 2015. 304 p. (In Russ.)
- Depledge D. Britain and the Arctic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 142 p. DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-69293-7
- Murray R.W., Nuttall A.D. International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance. Cambria Press Publ., 2014. 725 p.
- Ananyeva E.V., Antyushina N.M. Arkticheskaya politika Velikobritanii [The Arctic policy of the UK]. Arktika i Sever [Arctic and North], 2016, no. 24, pp. 61–70. DOI: 10.17238/issn2221-2698.2016.24.68 (In Russ.)
- Depledge D. The United Kingdom and the Arctic in the 21st Century. Arctic Yearbook 2012, pp. 130– 138.
- Eremina N.V. Arkticheskiy vektor britanskoy uglevodorodnoy strategii [Arctic vector of British energetic strategy]. Sovremennye issledovaniya sotsial'nykh problem [Russian Journal of Education and Psychology], 2017, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 6–28 (In Russ.)
- Depledge D., Dodds K., Kennedy-Pipe C. The UK’s Defence Arctic Strategy. The RUSI Journal, 2019, no. 164 (1), pp. 28–39. DOI 10.1080/03071847.2019.1605015
- Zagorskiy A.V. Nestrategicheskie voprosy bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva v Arktike [Conventional security and cooperation in the Arctic]. Moscow, IMEMO Publ., 2016, 104 p. DOI 10/20542/978-5-9535-0492-8 (In Russ.)
- Kopylov M.N., Kopylov S.M., Mokhammad S.M.A. Formirovanie global'noy ekologicheskoy politiki I mezhdunarodnykh rezhimov mezhdunarodnogo ekologicheskogo upravleniya: per aspera ad astrum [Formation of global ecological policy and international regimes for international ecological management: per aspera ad astrum]. Vestnik VolGU. Ser. 5: Yurisprudentsiya [Science Journal of Volgograd State University. Jurisprudence], 2015, no. 2, pp. 138–148 (In Russ.)
- Gray T.S. UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan Publ., London, 2016, 308 р. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24237-5
- Pugachev A.V. Ekologicheskaya politika v nekotorykh evropeyskikh stranakh: razlichnye podkhody [Environmental policies in some European countries: different approaches]. Vestnik KemGU [Bulletin of Kemerovo State University], 2014, no. 3 (59), pp. 109–111 (In Russ.)