The value of the Arctic for Russia's national security, China may become the Arctic Power

Russian Arctic occupies a vast territory between the meridians 32 ° 04'35 WL and 168 ° 58'49 NL, i.e. nearly 160 ° of the 360 ° of latitude. The length of Russia's Arctic coast is 22.6 thousand km (38.8 thousand km of the Russian coastline). Land territory of the Russian Federation in the Arctic is 3.7 million km2 (the population — 2.5 million people). Thus, they hold 21.6% of the entire territory of the Russian Federation with only 1.7% of the population. Form a military perspective, the value of the Arctic for the Russian national security has strategic and actual aspects.

The strategic importance of the Arctic region for ensuring the defense capability of Russia

The strategic importance of the Arctic region for the defense of the country is determined by the fact that it is traversed by the shortest air routes from North America to Eurasia and back. A hypothetical missile exchange between Russia and the United States could be done through the airspace of the Arctic and the near space above it. Since 1950s such attacks could be applied only in the nuclear option and in the 21st century there is possibility of a non-nuclear strike pursuing the objectives of a strategic nature.

The Arctic has become the front line of a missile and air defense. The BMD is currently located in the European part of the Russian Arctic — two radar stations of the missile attack warning (early warning radar station) in Olenegorsk (Murmansk region) and in Pechora (Komi Republic). The first of them, “Dnestr-M” type (modernized variant of “Dnepr”), is the oldest of the existing early warning radar station (since 1971), the second — a newer type of “Daryal”, established in 1984. Location of these two radar systems in Russia made them the “last in line” to be replaced with new radar type “Voronezh”, as the first new radars were constructed to replace those that appeared to be outside of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Construction of the radar type “Voronezh” in Olenegorsk will be launched no earlier than 2017 and in Pechora —even later. In the Asian part of the Russian Arctic (Siberia and Far East) there are no plans for radar construction.

Approximately the same is the situation with the Air Defense system (means the struggle with aerodynamic objects). In the European part of the Russian Arctic, there are three anti-aircraft missiles complexes equipped with anti-aircraft missile system (ZRS) S-300P: Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk Region), Olenegorsk and Polyarny (Murmansk Region), the latter got also latest S-400 system. In Monchegorsk (Murmansk region) a mixed air regiment is located and interceptors MiG-31 as well. It is theoretically possible to widen the air group and transfer aircrafts from the other areas of the Russian Federation. In the Asian part of the Russian Arctic ground air defense and fighter aircraft are missing. In the Far East some means of ground air defenses are available only in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The rest of its huge territory from Arctic to the border with Mongolia and China is fully open to possible enemies.

However, as mentioned above, in recent years there was threat of a preemptive strike against a non-nuclear Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF) using cruise missiles, sea and air (SLCM and ALCM) [1, 2, 3]. Such a blow could to solve strategic tasks without ecological disaster which is inevitable in the case of a massive nuclear strike (even if it remains unanswered). We can assume that the main role in disarming will have to be played by the US nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs types “Los Angeles” or “Virginia” and SSGN like “Ohio”). Their mission is facilitated by the fact that even during the peak of its combat power (in 1970 s-19 80s) Soviet Navy solved the problems of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) with very low efficiency [4]. In particular, Soviet Navy time tracking for foreign submarines did not exceed 0.3% of the time they stayed in the patrol areas [5]. Now the Russian Navy is able to do it effectively only in the immediate vicinity of their bases. The rest of the Russian territorial waters and, especially, outside the US submarines are able to operate almost unhindered if the intend to do so. The situation is even worse because of the fact that in the Arctic coastal area and near the edge of the ice a level of natural acoustic noise is high and it contributes to the stealth action of submarines [6]. In this regard, it is clear that the construction of the air defense system in the Arctic, able to detect and destroy SLCM and ALCM shortly after the start, is very diffi- cult and expensive, but still much simpler and cheaper than building ASW system covering the Arctic.

Reduced ice cover in the Arctic and its consequences for the RF national security

A well-known natural phenomenon of a sharp reduction of the Arctic Ocean’s ice cover (until its almost complete melting in the summer) is not just important, but, in fact, the only reason for a significant increase in interest in the exploration of the Arctic, not only in the countries of the region, but in many countries that are geographically not relevant to the Arctic. That natural phenomenon in the Arctic may lead to the full economic and military activities. In particular, the absence of ice facilitates the actions of SSGN submarines of the enemy in the Arctic Ocean. On the other hand, the ASW’s tasks are also facilitated. In addition, the lack of solid ice cover allows the US warships — aircraft carriers and cruisers and destroyers with the “Aegis” system, which can carry both SLCM and anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs) global missile defense system, to enter the Arctic waters surface1. In this regard, cruisers and destroyers of the US Navy also address strategic challenges, both offensive (SLCM hit targets on the territory of the Russian Federation) and defense (AWS) [8]. However, the actions of surface ships are hampered by the fact that it is almost impossible to ensure their secrecy.

The phenomenon of the reduction of the ice cover itself generates arctic aspect of the national security of the Russian Federation and the need for the Armed Forces in case of military conflicts in the Arctic territories and waters.

The basis of the RF armed forces in the Arctic region is Northern Fleet. It (without nuclear submarines belonging to the SNF) 7 ANS (1 pr. 885, 2 pr. 949A, 1 pr. 971, 1 pr. 945A, 2 pr. 671RTMK), 3 submarines (1 pr. 677, 2 pr. 877), aircraft carrier pr. 11435, nuclear missile cruiser prospect. 1144, destroyer ave. 956, 3 BOD pr. 1155, 6 IPC 1124M, 2 MRK 1234.1, 10 minesweepers, 3 BDK 775. In addition, a significant number of submarines and surface ships are being repaired. Naval aviation is represented by more than 70 aircrafts and 40 helicopters. On the Kola Peninsula three brigades are located: 61th Marines, 80th Arctic, 200th motorized rifle brigade. As is the case with air defense, the entire group located in the western part of the Russian Arctic. Moreover, the Northern Fleet has so far been largely focused on the actions in the Atlantic Ocean, not in the Arctic waters. In the Asian part of the Russian Arctic only 99th task force group is located on the New Siberian Islands and its capacity is limited. It involves the formation of the Arctic brigade in the Salekhard area. Thus, beyond the capacity of the Kola Peninsula, the Russian Armed Forces is currently negligible in the Arctic.

It should be understood that even in case of further global warming, the Arctic won’t be suitable for mass for the population for a long time. In addition, none of the current Arctic countries has an overpopulation problem. Everywhere, except the United States, there is a problem of depopulation. Accordingly, the potential redistribution of the Arctic may be of purely economic motives.

Possible scenarios of an armed conflict

The most popular theoretical scenario of the armed conflict in the Arctic is a struggle for hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf. However, we must bear in mind that the oil and gas from the ocean floor under the presence of even a temporary ice yet nobody ever truly extracted (at least — on a large scale). Accordingly, technological and financial risks are very high and they make the profitability of the project unobvious. Because of this, no oil or gas company will go for the implementation of such a project in case of unresolved legal risks of political and, especially, of a military nature. Nobody starts to “spur of the moment” and to extract oil and gas in the offshore areas, since such a project would be unprofitable. Moreover, no insurance company will insure such a project (or the price of the insurance would be unacceptably high). Accordingly, this scenario could be considered a conflict of a completely illusory nature. Especially if we consider the fact that among all of the existing oil and gas fields only 3% have undetermined owners.

Probably a conflict in the form of side collision of Navy forces might occur because of unsolved problems of navigation in the Arctic, provided by its release from the ice for an extended period. That issue remains unresolved, entailing the need for escort merchant ships by warships across the Arctic. But this greatly increases the cost of transport and eliminates the economic benefit from the reduction of the route.

The current “battle for the Arctic” is still rather on the level of political rhetoric than action. In particular, until now there have been no signs of a real military confrontation in the region. Armed forces of the Arctic countries have almost never come into contact with each other and have not had the practical ability to influence each other without serious additional measures that cannot be overlooked for the reconnaissance of other countries. Moreover, Canadian and Danish armed forces in the Arctic are negligible, Iceland has no armed forces, and Sweden and Finland have no access to the Arctic Ocean. This is virtually eliminating them from the “struggle for the Arctic” (because this term means redistribution of waters, but not territories). Accordingly, military terms, theoretically and practically in such a struggle is possible for Russia, the US and Nor- way. It is necessary to admit that it is possible to be more theoretically than practically. Currently, the activities of the armed forces in the Arctic region are only defensive [9, 10].

It can be stated that the armed forces of Canada, Norway and Denmark are not able to carry out any serious active military impact in relation to the Arctic territories of the Russian Federation due to the general weakness of military capabilities. On the other hand, the United States, even using the forces stationed in Alaska (Airborne Brigade, the brigade “Stryker”, two Wings) could easily take Chukotka, where there are no Russian Armed Forces at all. At the same time Russia won’t be able to use the heavy compounds because of the significant distances. The nearest to Chukotka motorized infantry brigade is located in Kamchatka, some more — in the Khabarovsk and Primorsky regions. The heavy machinery airlift is impossible, and by the sea — it will take a considerable amount of time and, what is more important, it will be blocked by the US Navy in the Pacific, which is much stronger than the Russian Navy. Russia has the opportunity to transfer only part of the Airborne Forces and the Air Force to Chukotka. However, this would make it quite difficult because of the US Air Force.

At the same time, however, it is not clear that the United States could have such an operation in political and military terms. It does not give them any apparent benefit, and carries the threat of escalation of the conflict up to the full-scale nuclear exchange. And such a scenario is getting the more possible, if Russia will lose its potential opportunity to liberate its territory by conventional forces in case of war. It is easy to understand that Chukotka is not a value for the United States to capture it and damage the existence of their country. This applies even more to other parts of the Russian Arctic coast, as the United States might get in a significantly complicated situation solving the issues of logistics and air defense (due to longer distances) and for Russia, both of these tasks, respectively, would be simplified.

Russia has already started working out troop transport in the Arctic from West to East, as well as deployment of the Airborne Forces there. In September 2013, it carried out an operation to restore the airfield “Temp” on the island of Kotelny. The operation involved the icebreaker “50 Let Pobedi”, “Vaigach”, “Taimyr” and “Yamal”, and the missile cruiser “Petr Veliky”. This operation led to the creation of the above-mentioned 99th tactical group. In March 2015, in the framework of the exercises, the Armed Forces of sudden division of the 98th Airborne Division of the Ivanovo region were transferred to the Arctic (Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land, and then — the Kola Peninsula). In August 2015, the units of the 80th Arctic brigade were deployed by the “Georgy Pobedonosets” and “Kondopoga” to Dudinka, where they had exercises on guarding and defense of “Norilsk Nickel” together with two airborne groups delivered to Norilsk by six IL-76 aircrafts.

These exercises show a significantly increased capacity of the RF Armed Forces of power projection within its own territory, even in its most remote regions. Apparently, the transfer of troops to Chukotka (even without the involvement of the Pacific Fleet) could be a completely solved problem.

However, the transfer of troops from the European part of the Arctic and other regions of the country is not always a suitable option compare to the permanent troops in this part of Russia. Creating a 5th Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the strategic-base of the Northern Fleet (which is removed from the Western Military District), the formation of the Arctic crews, and the establishment of military groups on the Arctic Islands are not only justified but absolutely necessary. On the Kotelny and Wrangel Islands, Cape Schmidt, the East coast of Chukotka, and the Kurils modern military bases are constructed. By the years 2016-2017, according to the plans of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, six Arctic airfields are going to be reconstructed. Arctic group of the RF Armed Forces will be fully completed by the 2018, according to S.K. Shoigu 2.

China might become an Arctic power

In the longer perspective, countries geographically not related to the Arctic may influence the situation in the Arctic. Many countries in the South, Southeast, and especially East Asia have a very an economic interest in the Arctic in terms of access to its natural resources and communications, a considerably short route from Europe to Asia. At the same time, however, even the

strongest of them (India, Japan, Republic of Korea) cannot provide a military presence in the Arctic, because they are very far away from the region and do not have opportunities to create military bases there.

At the moment, the same is true for China. However, this country with a large economy and population is the most interested in access to the Arctic in the framework of external expansion, without which it would be extremely difficult to solve internal problems of China [11]. At the same time its economic and military capabilities are significantly higher than in all of the Asian coun- tries. Therefore, China has made very significant efforts to get an access to the Arctic.

Beijing initially operated in the Arctic through Norway, placing its polar icebreaker and a re search station on Svalbard. In 2008, using the advantage of the economic crisis, China suffered a ma-

Sozdanie arkticheskoj gruppirovki vojsk RF zavershitsya k 2018 godu, soobshhil 22 oktyabrya ministr oborony Rossii

Sergej Shojgu. URL: (Accessed: 22 October 2015)

jor effort to Iceland. In 2012, China and Iceland signed a free trade agreement — the first such agreement China signed with European countries. After that, the President of Iceland Olafur Ragnar Grimsson said that China should enter the Arctic Council on a permanent basis, as the Arctic “ceased to be a regional, and has become a global theme”3. Moreover, the President of Iceland, apparently with the filing of Beijing, announced the creation of “Arctic Circle” — a new international organization for the Arctic. Any country or organization could be a member. Thus, it was intended to give the Arctic the same international status that Antarctica has. This appears to be completely unlawful. Antarctica is a desert continent and its international status is natural. The Arctic is mainly the Arctic Ocean’s coast which belongs to particular countries. Its delimitation is carried out with the help of maritime law and other international legislation. However, it is China via Iceland carries the idea of “the internationalization of the Arctic”, with a certain support of the the United States 4.

Some evidences that China intends to buy Iceland's northernmost island (or rather — a rock) — Kolbeynsi. Its area is 90 m2. And it, of course, does not allow China to have any economic or military activities there. However, this island is located north of the Arctic Circle, so possession would automatically make China one of the Arctic countries and China would claim a place in the Arctic Council, pursuing its interests there. In particular, China stands for the internationalization of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. This position coincides with the position of the US and is opposed by Russia and Canada. It is unclear whether the sale will take place. In the postwar era there were no precedents like that. In any case, the idea of internationalization of the Arctic shelf will create more problems for Russia than the current military activities of other Arctic countries combined.

The constant presence of Chinese submarines and ships in the Arctic will be possible if China get a naval base in the Atlantic Ocean (in the countries of Africa or Latin America). Such a development seems to be possible as long as China has economic and political influence on these continents. Apparently, Namibia will become the first of these countries. Chinese naval base on its territory may appear before the year 2020.

Conclusion

Thus, at present military-political situation in the Arctic is not dangerous for Russia. The probability of even a very limited military confrontation in the Arctic is close to zero. However, it should be understood that the only reason for that is Russian military superiority in the region and strengthening of the Arctic Group of the RF Armed Forces. However, if the warming would not be replaced by a sharp cold snap and reducing ice cover, the Arctic importance to national security will inevitably increase in strategic and Arctic aspects. The geopolitical situation can change radically China, who plays for the internationalization of the Arctic and has the opportunity to become a full-fledged Arctic Power, acquiring one of the arctic islands.