Participation of the 12th Separate Armored Train Division in the Defense of Tuapse and the Combat Episode at Goytkh Station (Summer – Autumn 1942)

The study is devoted to the analysis of the actions of the 12th separate division of armored trains in the Tuapse direction (summer–autumn 1942). The division's participation in the fighting northeast of Tuapse spans a relatively short period and represents an understudied chapter in the history of the Battle of the Caucasus. A key turning point in the division's combat path was the battle near the Goytkh railway station on October 10, 1942, which resulted in severe damage to the armored trains and their prolonged incapacitation. A study of this episode allows us to reconstruct the overall combat situation in the Tuapse sector, identify the causes of the plight of the Soviet troops, and evaluate the effectiveness of the measures taken by the command. The source material consists of documents from Red Army units, formations, and associations from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as personal sources. The most informative for the study of the division's combat work in the specified period were its reporting documents from 1942-1943: characteristics, report and combat dispatch. Documents of the 18th Army and its formations also played a significant role in the analysis of the general situation. The principles of historicism and systematicity, as well as historical-comparative, chronological and historical-genetic methods were applied. In the course of the study (1) the combat path of the 12th separate armored train division from its formation until the autumn of 1942 was reconstructed; (2) the chronology of the development of the combat situation in the division's area of operations in early October 1942 was established; (3) a detailed analysis of the battle near Goytkh station on October 10 was conducted. The authors note that the division played a significant role in the defense of Tuapse, the personnel of the military unit were well trained and could solve complex combat missions with minimal losses. A complex set of unfavorable conditions under which the division's soldiers operated during the battle at Goytkh station was identified: a difficult railway line, active Nazi air force operations, and limited communications capabilities. It was determined that the division's defeat in this battle was due to insufficient air defense cover, as well as the combat mission assigned to the division to provide daylight fire support, which was inconsistent with its actual capabilities under the overwhelming superiority of enemy aircraft.