“To believe is to think with assent” and doxastic voluntarism

This paper is concerned with the problem of doxastic voluntarism in the light of Augustine’s epistemological formula “To believe is to think with assent”. The main question addressed in the paper is what does the idea of voluntary control over the formation of beliefs mean in general? In the first part I present the most popular theory of voluntary control over beliefs, constructed by analogy with the theory of action control, and the most common arguments for and against voluntary control over beliefs. In the second part I analyze Augustine’s famous formula “To believe is to think with assent”. I discuss its most probable historical background in terms of the question of whether ‘assent’ could be treated as a form of voluntary control. In the final part I raise two questions: first, to which type of control ‘assent’ corresponds most of all-direct or indirect, and second, to which beliefs it can be applied. I show, firstly, that the question of doxastic control must be treated for each kind of beliefs separately, and, secondly, that the problem of consciousness / unconsciousness in forming beliefs must be kept in mind. I conclude that the Augustinian idea of assent could be interpreted as the establishment of indirect control through the fulfillment of certain epistemic rules.