The anatomy of research process in the light of the phenomenological approach and the problem of identification

The author undertakes a phenomenological analysis of research process on the example of the philosophical and anthropological study of education. In accordance with the phenomenological approach, the research process with its general methodological regularities is divided into three phases: 1) the preliminary phase of thematization; 2) the phenomenological phase itself, which opens up for the researcher his own direct experience of the subject, its obviousness; 3) the post-phenomenological phase. Within the boundaries of the last phase the tension between “experience” and “language” is resolved, that is, experience is expressed, an exit to the general life world apeears, an approach to certification is carried out. From this point of view, the problem of “reliability” and “identity” is raised, which is especially relevant for the phenomenological perspective. Certain phenomenological solutions to this problem were developed by Hegel and Husserl. Taking into account the existing solutions, three possible versions of the interpretations of the identity are considered: proceeding from objectivity; intersubjectivity; subjectivity. The application of phenomenological analysis to practical, scientific and philosophical fields of research allowed us to distinguish three levels of verification during certification. At the first level, experience, representation and concept come to the fore; at the second level – the requirement of unity of experience, representation and thinking; at the third – a certificate consisting of checking the stability of the trusted before the other / Other. The understanding of the latter has the meaning of a “dialectical movement”, according to Hegel, and represents an “infinite horizon... of approximations”, according to Husserl. These criteria are explained in the perspective of subjectivity, which reveals its possibilities when compared with interpretations based on the understanding of the true as objective (in particular, when compared with “scientific realists”) and intersubjective