Two models of religious epistemology

The article analyses two models of religious epistemology - social epistemology and virtue epistemology. The author considers their implications for understanding religious knowledge, focusing on issues of transmission, validity and authority in religious communities. Social epistemology explores collective forms of knowledge, such as the beliefs of groups, institutions, and interpersonal interactions. The author analyses the concepts of John Greco, Alvin Goldman and Margaret Gilbert, emphasizing the role of testimony and trust in the formation of religious beliefs. Particular attention is given to critiques of reductionist approaches and arguments against scepticism, including the problem of divine hiddenness and Hume’s argument. Virtue epistemology, represented by the work of Linda Zagzebski and others, focuses on the moral and intellectual virtues necessary to attain true knowledge of God. The author relates this approach to the tradition of holy fathers’ theological anthropology, noting the importance of humility, purity of heart, and love in the process of God-knowledge. The article offers a synthesis of contemporary philosophical ideas with the religious tradition, demonstrating how social epistemology and virtue epistemology can enrich theological discourse. The author concludes that these models allow us to overcome the limitations of classical arguments and offer a deeper understanding of the nature of religious knowledge.