On the Dual Nature of Interpretative Norms: Cognitive and Regulatory Aspects

The article examines the nature of interpretative norms as a specific phenomenon of legal reality. It is noted that contemporary legal regulation and law enforcement practice largely rely on explanations contained in the acts of higher judicial bodies, whichestablish stable rules for understanding legal provisions. Despite possessing external features of normativity, interpretative norms do not fit within the traditional understanding of a legal norm as a rule of conduct, which necessitates their theoretical reconsideration. In this regard, the paper analyzes the main approaches to the concept of normativity developed in legal theory (normativist, communicative, and libertarian-legal approaches, etc.) and argues that the classical deontological model is insufficient to explain the nature of the results of official interpretation. The article substantiates the concept of the dual nature of interpretative norms: on the one hand, they perform a cognitive-technical function by regulating the process of legal understanding; on the other hand, they exert a socio-regulatory influence, indirectly affecting the content of rights and obligations of legal subjects. The author advances and justifies the thesis of “functional normativity” or “second-order normativity” of interpretative norms. An original definition of an interpretive norm is proposed as a generally binding rule for the understanding and application of a legal provision, embodied in an official interpretive act.