Neoplatonic Exegesis of Hermaic Chain: Some Reflections

The Neoplatonic teacher transmits to his students, through exegesis,¹ an anagogi-cal excellence: the commentaries on Aristotle's treatises ( Categories and On In-

ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 16. 2 (2022)

terpretation ) or Plato's dialogues elevate the souls of the students, guided by the teacher-philosopher, towards Hermes and the other gods “guardians of discours-es”.² In his discourse On the Golden Chain , Michael Psellos conveys to us the Neoplatonic belief that Plato's soul itself was a god who lived in the company of Apollo and Hermes, that is, that he belonged to the “chain” of these gods.³ Hermes is the “eloquent” god or “friend of discourses” (λόγιος). In Cratylus (407e-408b), Plato shows the multiple affinities that Hermes maintains with the logos . The command of discourse characterises Hermes Logios, the master of discourse. The epithet “Logios” designates the functions attributed to the god as messenger, herald and ambassador. For this reason, Hermes is the patron of eloquence and orators, since he leads with the word.⁴ This conception, whose origin is ancient, expands in the Greek Neoplatonic schools of late antiquity. Hermes presides, together with Heracles, over the life of the gymnasiums, which for the philosophers corresponds to intellectual and rational life.

Hermes, god of the logos, connects rhetoric with philosophy, in line with the concerns of the Neoplatonic approach, through the expression of Aelius Aristides: “pattern of Hermes Logios”, taken from a work devoted entirely to Plato's exegesis, the discourse In Defence of the Four against Plato, where Demosthenes is in fact characterised with exactly these words.5 The term λόγιος comes from λόγος, “word” or “reason”. Thus, the meaning assigned to λόγιος depends on the context in which it is placed: it may refer to eloquence, understood in its technical sense, to the literary in general, or to the rational, alluding to intellectual qualities in general. Likewise, in the Neoplatonic schools the term “pattern” (τύπος) is a key element, since it expresses metaphorically the participation of sensitive things in a higher universal principle from which they come.

The formula Ἑρμοῦ Λογίου τύπος passes from Demosthenes, the prince of public speaking (4th century B.C.), to Olympiodorus, the professor of philosophy at Alexandria (6th century), at the same time as the epithet λόγιος takes on a religious sense, as it is adapted to the Neoplatonic courses. Hermes is no longer only the god who inspires the works of eloquence. He is now, and above all, the guardian of reasoning of thought. He is no longer, therefore, exclusively a god of argumentation, ultimately he is a god of reasoning.

In the Life of Isidore (Fr. 368 Zintzen; Fr. 152 Athanassiadi) , Damascius alludes to the Hermaic chain, explaining that the “pure chorus” (ἀκὴρατος χορός), referring to Proclus, had the clear vision that his soul belonged to the chain of Hermes. Proclus told this vision to Isidore, who in turn passed it on to Damascius, who wrote it down in his biography.⁶

According to what Marinus tells us, Proclus had received the revelation that he belonged to the “chain” of Hermes and had dreamt that his soul was that of the reincarnated Pythagorean Nicomachus of Gerasa:

And in addition to what I have said, he clearly beheld that he was of the Hermaic chain (τῆς Ἑρμαϊκῆς εἴη σειρᾶς) and believed because of a dream (ὄναρ) that he had the soul of Nichomachus the Pythagorean (τὴν Νικομάχου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου ψυχὴν).7

From this testimony of Marinus, Dillon (1969, 274–275 = 1990, XV) places the death of Nicomachus in 196, based on the following deduction: if Proclus (born in 412) believed to be the reincarnation of Nicomachus and if the period between two reincarnations, according to The Theology of Arithmetic of Pseudo-Iamblichus (52.5–16 De Falco) is 216 years, Nicomachus was born in 196.8 Tarán (1974, 113) is opposed to this dating, because there is nothing to indicate that Proclus gave special relevance to the number 216, since he does not cite it in his commentary on the Timaeus. Criddle (1998, 324–327), on the basis of a longer reincarnation period than Dillon, fixed at 270 years, considers the date of Nicomachus' death to be 142, considering the chronological proposal suggested by Dillon to be too late. Saffrey, Segonds and Luna (2001, 159–160, n. 6) judge that the arguments of Dillon and Criddle are not very convincing, considering them too speculative, since it is difficult to admit that Proclus knew the exact date of Nicomachus' death.

The ex-Christian Roman emperor Julian (reigned 361–363) devotes his discourse Against the Cynic Heraclius ( Oration 7) to refute the Cynic theses, focusing specifically on religious questions. At the end of the text, the emperor makes a list of philosophers who, unlike the Cynics, have respected the gods. In the early spring of 362, Julian was invited to hear a lecture delivered in a hall in Constantinople by a cynic by the name of Heraclius. The discourse is clearly divided into three parts: After an introduction (1.204a1–205a7), he announces the tripartite plan (205a7– c3): (1) it is more convenient for the “dogs”, or Cynic philosophers, to compose discourses than myths (2–29, 205c4–215a5); (2) the composition of myths must satisfy certain rules and what they are (10–23, 215a6–235c1); and (3) with the gods the greatest respect is required (24–25, 236c2–239c5). In this third and last part, to illustrate the respect due to the gods, Julian makes use of the argument from authority, showing to what extent Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle have honoured the names of the gods (236d2–4). When he refers to Aristotle, he alludes to a passage in Topics (I.105a5–7) that connects with the image of Hermes Logios:

But now will you allow me to cite next that all-wise Siren (τὴν πάνσοφον ὑπαγορεύσω σειρῆνα), the pattern of Hermes the god of eloquence (τὸν τοῦ λογίου τύπον Ἑρμοῦ), the man dear to Apollo and the Muses (<τὸν τῷ> Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ ταῖς Μούσαις φίλον)? Well, he declares that all who raise the question or seek to enquire at all whether gods exist ought not to be answered as though they were men but to be chastised as wild beasts (ὡς τὰ θηρία κολάσεως).9

Julian makes reference to Aristotle, specifically to a passage from Topics (I.105a) in which he states that every problem should not give rise to a philosophical argument and that in certain cases it is not worth arguing about. According to the Stagirite, he who wonders whether or not to honour the gods, whether or not to love one's parents, does not deserve a reasoned answer, but only a good punish-ment.10 Likewise, he who asks whether the snow is white or not deserves to be referred to the testimony of his senses.

This quote, as Saffrey (1968, 75) suggests, will become commonplace.¹¹ But Julian probably knew the text because, in his time, it had already become common-place.¹² The emperor, who quotes second-hand, wields this quotation as a weapon against atheism. Therefore, in order to make his quotation more effective, he refers to Aristotle with the following laudatory adjectives: “omniscient Siren” (τὴν πάνσοφον ὑπαγορεύσω σειρῆνα), “the pattern of Hermes Logios” (τὸν τοῦ λογίου τύπον Ἑρμοῦ) and “the man dear to Apollo and the Muses” (<τὸν τῷ> Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ ταῖς Μούσαις φίλον) . The expression “pattern of Hermes Logios” plays the role of an authoritative argument: by comparing Aristotle with Hermes, the emperor emphasises that the Stagirite is close to the gods, and this proximity lends greater weight to his argument in favour of Hellenic religion. In the face of the Cynics, the Aristotelian expression – taken from Aristides – is integrated into Julian's rhetorical strategy, with a religious projection. To refute Heraclius, Julian relies on a testimony of Aristotle, which he quotes through Aristides. The discourse peremptorily retorts to the Cynics' ignorance of the rhetorike techne of Hermes, and, therefore, their ignorance of the paideia in general.

For the emperor Julian, referred to as the Apostate, trying to reconcile philosophy and religion became a political challenge. On the one hand, deeply linked to the Greek paideia and religion, shaped by Homer and Hesiod, Julian tries to recover the myths related to the traditional Hellenic gods; on the other hand, both Christians and certain pagan intellectuals focus their criticism on Julian's works because of their content, which is incompatible with their beliefs. A little later, in the discourse Against the Cynic Heraclius, Julian attributes his salvation to Zeus, setting out in an allegorical way his own biography, which begins by recounting the cruel events that marked his childhood. According to the emperor, Zeus, seeing the impiety and disorder that reigned in the empire since Constantine, entrusts his son Helios with the task of caring for the child – little Julian – and curing him of the disease he suffers from – Christianity.13 In the story, Zeus, “father of all the gods” (230d), gives these same orders to Athena and Hermes. Then, in a face-to-face vision with Helios, the young Julian is given the mission to rid the empire of the filth of Christianity. In this account, Zeus occupies the top position in the levels of the divine hierarchy, emphasising his supremacy, and transmits his orders to Athena and Hermes.14 The emperor gives constant signs of his devotion, directing his honours to Zeus – father and common king of all things, who occupies the highest rank –, to Helios, Athena and Hermes.15

Proclus clearly acknowledges his debt to Syrianus with regard to the exegesis of the Parmenides, as is evident from the two magnificent eulogies he dedicates to his master, with which he begins the Commentary on the Parmenides (I.618.1–13) and the Platonic Theology (I.1.7.1–8) , which show the great importance he places on Syrianus. In the first of these prefaces, the diadochus turns to the opening prayer of the oration On the Crown by Demosthenes ( in Parm. I.617.1)¹⁶. Although he does not cite the name of Hermes, Proclus replaces the expression Ἑρμῆς Λόγιος, which he takes from Aristides’ In Defense of the Four against Plato ( Or . III.663 Behr and Lenz), by φιλοσοφία:

Of him I [Syrianus] would say that he came to men as the exact pattern of philosophy for the benefit of souls here below (φιλοσοφίας τύπον εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐλθεῖν ἐπ' εὐεργε-σίᾳ τῶν τῇδε ψυχῶν), in recompense for the statues, the temples, and the whole ritual of worship, and as the chief author of salvation (σωτηρίας ἀρχηγὸν) for men who now live and for those to come hereafter.17

Syrianus, a divine man (θεῖος ἀνῆρ), descended among the incarnated souls, occupies the place left by Demosthenes. Philosophy, likewise, replaces Hermes Logios. At the beginning of the general prologue to his Commentary on the Parmenides (I.617.1–659.22) rhetoric serves as an introduction to philosophical hermeneutics. From Proclus onwards, the Neoplatonic philosophical discourse is constructed in confrontation with what we could call “real” Christianity, as a social and political reality. In this passage, the reference to Syrianus replacing statues, shrines, and even sacred worship altogether, must be interpreted in a context of controversy directed against Christians, whom he accuses of ignorance, in contrast to the superiority of the theological science of the pagans. Christians are unjust souls, in the sense of Plato's Republic ,¹⁸ that is, souls trapped in internal dissension (στάσις), whose state of ignorance is inseparable from the structural disagreement of their parts, so that the reproach of ignorance in theology connects closely with other reasons of a moral nature.¹⁹

The expression Proclus uses, “chief author of salvation” (σωτηρίας ἀρχηγόν), refers back to the Epistle to the Hebrews (2.10), where Paul applies the same terms to Jesus: “It was fitting that God, for whom and through whom all things exist, in bringing many children to glory, should make the pioneer of their salvation (τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῆς σωτηρίας) perfect through sufferings (διὰ παθημάτων τελειῶσαι).” Thus, in a context of refutation before the Christians, integrated within the encomium to Syrianus, this reference places his master as the successor of Hermes who displaces the figure of Christ. Christians are forgetful souls, who live in the world of generation, far from intelligible and transcendent causes, ignoring the order reality: the distinction between being and becoming, between the intelligible world and the sensible world. In this way, by confusing the orders of reality, they destroy the hierarchy, since, being installed exclusively in the “sublunar” sphere, they only know the sensible becoming. Theological ignorance leads them in politics to the closing of temples, the destruction of sanctuaries and the prohibition of the rites proper to the traditional religion. In his praise of Syrianus, for Proclus, the science taught by Plato and projected on the whole of the philosophical and religious tradition responds to impious ignorance.

According to Marinus, Proclus had had the revelation that he belonged to the chain of Hermes.²⁰ For Proclus, Hermes is one of the twelve hypercosmic-cosmic gods, who constitute a class “separate from the world, supra-celestial, immaculate, elevating and perfect” ( Theol. Plat. VI.15.74.17–75.2). Hermes forms, together with Aphrodite and Apollo, “the elevating triad” (ἡ ἀναγωγὸς τρίας). Hermes “is the purveyor of philosophy and, by philosophy, raises souls, and, by the dialectical powers, leads souls, both universal and particular, towards the Good itself” ( Theol. Plat. VI.22.98.14–17).²¹

The hypercosmic-cosmic gods, also called “separated from the world” (ἀπόλυτοι), immediately follow the hypercosmic gods, and are characterised by the following attributes: “in contact, not in contact”. Given that these attributes appear for the first time in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides (148d5– 149d7) and are not denied of the One in the first hypostasis, Proclus does not address the hypercosmic-encosmic gods in the commentary on the first hypothesis ( in Parm . VII.1201.25–1202.14). Hypercosmic (or assimilative) gods are analysed in Platonic Theology .²²

Iamblichus uses the opposition between pericosmic gods and hypercosmic gods to designate the transcendence of the first gods. Saffrey and Westerink (1968-1997, vol. 6, XI–XII) attribute to Iamblichus the invention of the pericosmic-hypercosmic (περικόσμιος-ὑπερκόσμιος) pair that will soon become, in his successors, the pair: encosmic-hypercosmic (ἐγκόσμιος-ὑπερκόσμιος).²³ In Platonic Theology (VI.3) , Proclus demonstrates the intermediary function of the hypercosmic gods, which consists in establishing the similarity between the images and their models. The function of the demiurge is to act as a cause, and that of the hyper-cosmic gods, as assimilation. The assimilative gods (or hypercosmic: like, unlike) are followed by the gods separate from the world (hypercosmic-cosmic: in contact, not in contact) and the cosmic gods (equal, unequal). In this way, the assimilative gods, who come after the intellective gods, make the gods who follow them similar to the intellective gods ( In Parm . VII.1191.13–21).²⁴

In Platonic Theology (III.18) we discover a new direct link between Hermes and Truth, where Proclus establishes a correspondence between the three monads in the Philebus (65a2) – Truth, Beauty, Proportion – and three human types – the philosopher, the lover, the musician –,²⁵ which correspond to the three gods of the “elevating” triad.²⁶

Damascius, the last diadochus of the Platonic “Academy” of Athens, composed the Life of Isidore , where, in parallel to the biography dedicated to his master, Isidore of Alexandria, he produced a panoramic exposition of the philosophical paganism of the 5th century. The Life of Isidore is preserved in fragmentary form in the Codex 242 of the Bibliotheca of Photius and in a series of lemmata of the Byzantine biography of the Suda lexicon. In the beginning of this work, Damascius discovers Isidore's square face as “a sacred pattern of Hermes Logios”.

Isidore's appearance was that of a sensible, elderly man, dignified and resolute. His face was almost square (τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον ὀλίγου τετράγωνον ἦν), his sacred pattern being that of Logios Hermes (Ἑρμοῦ λογίου τύπος ἱερός). As for his eyes, how can I describe the true charm of Aphrodite herself that resided in them, how can I express the very wisdom of Athena that was contained in them?27

For the description of his master's face, Isidore borrows from Aelius Aristides the expression he applied to Demosthenes: “The pattern of Hermes Logios descended among men” ( Or. III.663). The square shape of Isidore's face is a “sign” (σύνθημα), that is, a divine mark inscribed in the sensible reality, which guarantees the integrity of the last “link” of the chain that Hermes orders. By means of this sign, Damascius incorporates the Pythagorean physiognomy into the Neoplatonic theurgy. He who is able to recognise this “sign” can return to the source from which it comes, to the previous link in the chain.

In Neoplatonic teaching, as Damascius shows, “professional” veneration possesses anagogical excellence ( Life of Isidore , Fr. 191 Zintzen; Fr. 84E Athanassiadi). This disposition of the soul provokes an “assimilation” of the “professionals” towards the gods who preside over their art, and converts them towards them. The mode of citation Damascius employs is similar to that employed above in the passages of Julian and Proclus. The last dialogue transfers the expression “pattern of Hermes Logios ”, taken from Aristides, applying it to a Neoplatonic philosopher, in this case his teacher Isidore, with the aim of praising him, highlighting his link with the divine.²⁸

Damascius' concise expression connects physiognomy with philosophy. Isidore's face reflects the natural ideal philosopher according to the conception of the Neoplatonic schools, i.e. the quadrangular shape of his face shows the mastery of discourse (logos) and the proximity to Hermes. In two passages, Epitoma Photiana 80 (Fr. 59A Athanassiadi) and Fr. 248 Zintzen, Damascius points out that Proclus and Isidore admired each other's faces, because they recognised in them the pattern – or mark – of the divine and of philosophy. In the quoted text, Damascius alludes to a continuity in the divinisation of the philosopher: Isidore's eyes show the proximity to Aphrodite and Athena; beyond the metonymy, the proximity between the goddesses strengthens the process of divinisation of his master. Damascius inserts the adjective “sacred” (ἱερός) in the expression “pattern of Hermes Logios”, thus emphasising the sacred character of his teacher. According to the biography, Isidore represents a “luminous apparition”, a “divine epiphany”, typical of the chain of Hermes.

The term τετράγωνος, applied to the form of Isidore's face, takes on a signification of “perfect”, in a sense very close to “good” (ἀγαθός). Damascius connects the “pattern of Hermes” with the quadrangular figure of Isidore's face: in this way, mathematics is linked to astronomy, in an exegetical context inherited from the Neopythagorean tradition: 4 represents harmony and perfection.²⁹ As Johnston and Mulroy (2004) suggest, Simonides (Fr. 37 Page) employs the adjective τετράγωνος in the sense of “perfect”, referring to Hermes. In this well-known fragment preserved in the Protagoras (339b1–3) of Plato, Simonides uses the term “square” (τετράγωνος) as a figurative way of describing a “truly good man”.³⁰

Olympiodorus writes his Commentary on Gorgias probably around 52531 and the Commentary on the First Alcibiades around 560.32 In both commentaries, one of the main purposes of Olympiodorus focuses on responding to the Platonic Dis- courses of Aelius Aristides and, specifically, to the In Defense of the Four against Plato (Or III.663).33

We must also cite the nice remark made by one of the philosophers (ἔφη τις φιλόσοφος), that Aristides does not realize that he is contradicting himself. For if Aristides himself says that Demosthenes was the pattern of Hermes (Ἑρμοῦ τύπον), and Demosthenes praises Plato, then all the more divine is Plato (πολλῷ πλέον Πλάτων θεῖος). Hence the story that Demosthenes was listening to Plato and praising his style, when one of his companions cuffed him for not attending to the substance of the lessons.34

In this passage, taken from the commentary on the Gorgias , after examining the consequences of Demosthenes being a disciple of Plato, Olympiodorus introduces the expression “pattern of Hermes” (Ἑρμοῦ τύπος), with the aim of putting Aristides in contradiction with himself. On the one hand, Arisitides attacks Plato, but on the other hand, he praises Demosthenes, applying to him the expression “pattern of Hermes”. Now, according to the author from whom Olympiodorus draws his inspiration, Demosthenes praises Plato (in Letter V.3). Aristides has therefore praised an advocate of Plato. Therefore, in believing he criticised the philosopher, Aristides has in reality only built him up. Olympiodorus' intention is to defend Plato, so he replies to Aristides.³⁵ This refutation of Olympiodorus has antecedents, like the philosopher he quotes: “one of the philosophers (τις φιλόσοφος)” ( in Gorg. 41.10.16) or the interpreter alluded to in another passage: “And certainly one of the commentators well observed (ἀμέλει καλῶς εἶπέ τις

τῶν ἐξηγητῶν)” ( in Gorg. 32.2.8–9).³⁶ In his refutation, Olympiodorus would defeat Aristides by employing his own weapons, using the same formula by which he believed he won. In this way, he leads into contradiction with himself the second century deuterosophist and professor of rhetoric, considered the greatest expert in the art of refutation.³⁷ Therefore, as Pernot (2006, 160–163) suggests, if it is a question of replying to Aristides, it is not so much a question of criticising Demosthenes, but only of relativising the hyperbolic formula to which the Neosophist of Smyrna resorts in this passage to praise Demosthenes. Olympiodorus agrees that Demosthenes should occupy a principal place on the podium, as long as Plato occupies a higher place than he does. Thus, he does not object to calling Demosthenes “pattern of Hermes”, as Aristides proposes, as long as Plato is placed above him in the hierarchical scale, occupying the rank of the gods, since if an orator can be divine, as the best of orators, the Orator par excellence, the philosopher, must be much more so.

The controversy against Aristides that appears in the Commentary on the Gorgias of Olympiodorus could come, at least in eight passages, from a treatise of Porphyry, divided into seven books, entitled Against Aristides (Πρὸς Ἀριστείδην ζ’).³⁸ In this work Porphyry replicates the Platonic Discourses of Aristides.³⁹ But Smith (1993, 487) has suggested that this Aristides to whom the treatise points is probably Aristides Quintilianus, and not Aelius Aristides, on the grounds that Porphyry (413T) may have been inspired by a passage in the treatise On Music (II.17).

Heath (2003, 144) is sceptical of Smith's suggested identification. While acknowledging that Porphyry is interested in music theory, it is clearly demonstrat- ed from Behr (1968, 186–199) that the work is probably a rejoinder to Aristides' criticisms of Plato on rhetoric, traces of which may be discernible in the Olympi-odorus' Commentary on the Gorgias. The treatise Against Aristides, therefore, is related to rhetoric, but its nature is not technical, but refutational: the preposition πρὸς in the title indicates that it is a “reply”. Therefore, the skopos of Against Aristides focuses on giving a response to the Platonic Discourses of Aelius Aristides.

It is, in fact, Aelius Aristides, and not Aritides Quintilianus, as Smith (1993, 487) considers.⁴⁰ A proponent of this identification, Pernot (2006, 307–309) provides the following four good reasons that dismantle Smith's proposal: (1) In the Suda , the treatise Against Aristides is cited among the literary and rhetorical writings. (2) A parallel of this treatise can be found in Porphyry's refutation of the apology of Alcibiades,⁴¹ composed by the rhetor Diophanes, which, according to his biography, made Plotinus enjoy it.⁴² (3) Porphyry was a pupil of Longinus, the most renowned philologist and literary critic of his time, admirer of Aelius Aristi-des.⁴³ (4) Aelius Aristides was better known than Aristides Quintilianus, as is proved by the fact that the former is cited ten times in the Suda, and the latter not once.⁴⁴

In a passage of his Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato ,⁴⁵ Olympiodorus claims the link with Hermes. If Demosthenes is a Hermes, then Socrates must be one too, and even more and better. The purpose of self-knowledge connects closely with the first place that the dialogue occupied in the curriculum of reading Plato's dialogues, as established by Iamblichus, and that will be adopted in the Neoplatonic schools of Athens and Alexandria in the fifth and sixth centuries.

Aristides also about the orator Demosthenes that ‘ He was the very pattern of an eloquent Hermes, come among men (Ἑρμοῦ λογίου τύπος ἦν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐλθών)’; but I would say that this [saying] is better suited to Socrates, since he was first assimilated to Hermes (for he is called ‘ Herm ’ s son ’ ), and just as Hermes used to produce sleep and wakefulness ‘ with one strike of his rod –’

[He charms to sleep]

whom he wishes, and he wakes again the sleepers ⁴⁶

–so too Socrates uses one rod, namely dialectic (μιᾷ ῥάβδῳ, τῇ διαλεκτικῇ), both to overthrow those who speak proudly, and to rouse again those who have fallen and call them back up.47

Olympiodorus replies to Aelius Aristides, one of the main representatives of the literary and social movement of the Second Sophistic,⁴⁸ who composed four treatise-discourses against Plato's attack on rhetoric and in praise of public speaking: Two On Rhetoric, against Plato , which are a reply to Plato's criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias; one In Defense of the Four against Plato, which is a defense of four of the great Athenian rhetors (“public orators”) – Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles – , and Against Capito , in which he answers the objections raised by the theses put forward in the other three discourses.

Although the tone is controversial, Aristides does not criticise the whole of Plato's philosophy, and devotes himself to demonstrating that several dialogues, among them the Gorgias admit the existence of a “good” rhetoric, represented by its homonym, the rhetor Aristides, son of Lysimachus.⁴⁹ Thus, reconstructed by rhetoric, Plato can be considered the “father and master of orators” (II.465); and dialectic, a part of rhetoric (II.450; III.509).⁵⁰

In the passage quoted above, Olympiodorus' argument rests on two pillars: (1) one, biographical, Socrates is said to be the son of a hermoglyph; (2) the other, symbolic, the caduceus – the rod (ῥάβδος) – of Hermes symbolises the Socratic dialectic.⁵¹ By means of dialectics, Socrates has the quasi-magical power to make spirits sleep or wake up, just as Hermes, thanks to the caduceus, can provoke wakefulness or sleep. The quotation from Homer alludes to Hermes psychopompus ( Od. XXIV.4). In exercising this function, Hermes can be seen as a model of the philosopher, and connects with the Platonic theme of philosophy as preparation for death: to learn to philosophise is to learn to die.⁵²

Likewise, in his argument Olympiodorus provides (3) an additional piece of information by comparing Socrates with Hermes, resorting, in this case, to the So- cratic exercise of maieutics: just as Hermes is the son of Maia, Socrates is the son of a midwife (μαῖα). The final context is projected onto the political theory and practice raised in the skopos of the dialogue under commentary, which focuses the conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades: Olympiodorus claims that Socrates knows how to guide men and that he is a better politician than Demosthenes. Thus, the comparison of the Commentary on the first Alcibiades agrees with the Commentary on the Gorgias.

Olympiodorus vindicates philosophy, embodied in Socrates, against rhetoric, embodied in Demosthenes. Philosophy implies a closer relationship with divinity than that offered by rhetoric; thus the dialektike techne of Socrates surpasses the rhetorike techne of Demosthenes. In his argumentation, Aristides resorts to Demosthenes against Plato; in his reply, using the same weapons, applying dialectics against oratory, Olympiodorus resorts to Socrates and Plato against Demosthenes.

Proclus shows that Alcibiades introduces the whole of Plato's philosophy and all the sciences. Although, as it seems, there may have been relevant differences in the exegesis that Proclus and Damascius devote to this dialogue and, in particular, about its central purpose ( skopos ).⁵³ Although Damascius' commentary has not come down to us, we can try to trace these differences in the commentary of Olympiodorus, which he wrote a century after that of Proclus, around 560.⁵⁴ Indeed, Olympiodorus successively exposes the divergent positions of Proclus⁵⁵ and Damascius⁵⁶ on the central purpose of Alcibiades I . For Damascius, the skopos of dialogue consists of self-knowledge from a political perspective:⁵⁷ “knowing oneself as a civic person (περὶ τοῦ πολιτικῶς γνῶναι ἑαυτόν)” (Olymp. In Alc. 4.16–17). As opposed to the exegesis of Proclus, Olympiodorus considers the interpretation of Damascius to be preferable.⁵⁸ However, in his approach he seeks to find a coherence between the two hermeneutical proposals defended by the two dialogues of the school of Athens.⁵⁹ Olympiodorus, professor in the school of Alexandria, beyond the internal disputes in the school of Athens between Proclus and

Damascius, maintains the claim of Alcibiades I as the introductory dialogue to the totality of Plato's philosophy and, with it, to all sciences.

The allusions to Christianity that appear in the preserved work of Olympiodo-rus, which corresponds to the lecture notes taken by his students, show a pagan philosopher, an Alexandrian professor, who, like Proclus and Damascius in Athens, marks his distancing from Christian society.60 From the beginning of the 6th century, the school of Alexandria had taken over from Athens to become the great cultural centre of the Greek world (starting with Hermias, a disciple of Syri-anus and companion of Proclus in Athens).61

6. Conclusion

The orators, rhetors and sophists are under the invocation of Hermes who, according to Protagoras and later Aelius Aristides, brought to men by order of Zeus the imponderable gift of the logos. ⁶² Aelius Aristides considers himself a “sophist” in the good sense of this term, that is to say, an expert in education in general (παιδεία), as a friend of beauty (φιλοκαλία), who cultivates the search for beauty and who is continually engaged in exercising himself in discourses (διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους).⁶³

In Aristides' paraphrase of Protagoras' myth in his discourse On Rhetoric (II.63–75 Dindorf), Hermes does not give humans “respect” (αἰδώς) and “justice”

(δίκη) by order of Zeus, but simply “rhetoric”.64 Therefore, rhetoric was the invaluable gift of the gods that preserves and keeps healthy and saves the human race by putting an end to the endless conflicts between men, giving them the ability to form communities, build cities and make laws.65

Neoplatonic schools from Apamea to Athens show a fervent devotion to Hermes, the first link of the chain (σειρά) on which the souls of great philosophers depend. At the beginning of the De Mysteriis, Iamblichus alludes to Hermes: “Hermes, the god who presides over rational discourse (Θεὸς ὁ τῶν λόγων ἡγεμών, Ἑρμῆς)”.⁶⁶ Proclus, according to his biographer and disciple Marinus, had had the revelation of belonging to the chain of Hermes.⁶⁷ In the Life of Isidore Damascius discovers Isidore's square face as “a sacred pattern of Hermes Logi-os”.⁶⁸ By means of this physiognomic observation, Damascius places Isidore in the Hermaic chain.

The expression “pattern of Hermes Logios”, originally applied to Demosthenes, appears transferred to the Neoplatonic philosophers, schoolmasters, in an encomiastic introduction before beginning the commentary on a dialogue of Plato, dedicated to his master, or on a treatise of Aristotle. In the prayer with which concludes the Commentary on Aristotle's Categories Simplicius first addresses the gods “guardians of discourse” (οἱ τῶν λόγων ἔφοροι), probably identified with Hermes and Athena, to ask them to grant him “a more precise understanding” (ἀκριβεστέρα κατανόησις) of the theory of the categories, in which he has followed Iamblichus, and, since the categories are the fundamental terms of the assertive statement (λόγος ἀποφαντικός), namely, the first element of all demonstrative knowledge, to grant him the grace of this precise understanding of the categories as a “viaticum on the way to the highest contemplations”,69 and specifically in view of the further studies that pertain to the properly “theoretical” part of philosophy.

The Neoplatonic commentaries, as is evident from a reading of his final prayers, undertake a religious and anagogical approach in keeping with the ascending order of the works of the Neoplatonic syllabus. These prayers are addressed to the gods who are situated in precise ranks within the hierarchy of Neoplatonic theological science: first of all, Hermes and the gods logoi and then, on a higher level, Zeus.