Russian Arctic in the Contours of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation

DOI:

Among the regulatory documents of strategic planning of recent years 1, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 2022 2 and the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federa-

^∗ © Kozmenko S.Yu., Kozmenko A.S., 2024

This work is licensed under a CC BY-SA License

REVIEWS AND REPORTS

Sergey Yu. Kozmenko, Arina S. Kozmenko. Russian Arctic in the Contours … tion of 2023 ³ stand out in particular, since these documents define the degree of Russia’s positioning on the geopolitical and economic atlas of the modern world as a great maritime power. Such acts were adopted in the new Russia with a certain periodicity, but only the latter are classified as strategic planning documents that represent the target dominant of Russia’s development, in particular, in the implementation of budget policy in the medium term [1].

In the 21st century, three versions of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation are known, which reflect the totality of official views on the national maritime policy and maritime activities of the Russian Federation. These are the Maritime Doctrines of the Russian Federation approved by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation in 2001, 2015 and 2022, respectively (MD-2001 4; 2015 5; 2022).

MD-2001, based on its geographical characteristics (the longest maritime borders in the world, its own coastline on the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, and relatively free access to the North Atlantic), defines Russia as a “historically leading maritime power”. The same is emphasized in MD-2015 and other strategic planning documents regulating Russia’s maritime and naval activities, in particular 6, 7.

However, MD-2022, based on the “national interests of the Russian Federation, which extend to the entire World Ocean and the Caspian Sea”, defines Russia as a great maritime power. In addition to the presence and content of national interests in the World Ocean, the state of maritime potential is of key importance in confirming the status of a great maritime power. This is, first of all, the presence of competencies to maintain the economic, technical and technological base for ensuring the constant mobilization readiness of the Russian fleet and the means of developing resources of the World Ocean, especially oil and gas of the continental shelf, at the level of modern standards, as well as the availability of opportunities for the reproduction of naval and marine equipment on an industrial scale.

The national interests of Russia in the World Ocean, presented in MD-2022, partially combine and/or repeat the provisions of MD-2001 and MD-2015, but are mainly new, taking into account the modern realities of the development of the country’s maritime activities. The emergence of such significant national interests in the field of national maritime policy indicates the change in the status of Russia from a leading maritime power to a great one and the strengthening of the country’s role in the maritime activities of the modern world.

This is, first of all, Russia’s preservation of the status of a great maritime power 8 in the context of a developing polycentric world (clause 3, Article 9) 9 based on the development of the Russian fleet (clause 4, Article 9) 10 and the implementation of effective naval activities (clause 8, Article 9) 11. In the new geopolitical conditions, the Russian Navy performs new tasks to ensure the safety of pipeline transportation of hydrocarbons by sea (clause 6, Article 9) 12 and guaranteed access to the world’s systems of maritime communications, including the most important straits (clause 7, Article 9) 13.

For the first time in the history of the new Russia, MD-2022 includes among the country’s national interests in the World Ocean the rational use of the strategic resources of the Arctic, with special emphasis on the full-scale development of the Arctic continental shelf, including beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone 14 (EEZ, clause 13, Article 9) 15, if this is provided for by Article 76 of the UN Convention. The current Maritime Doctrine MD-2022 particularly emphasizes the need for the formation and development of the Northern Sea Route as a national transport communication as part of the attributes of a great maritime power (clause 14, Article 9) 16. Thus, the formation of Russia’s maritime greatness is inextricably linked with the Arctic, with the increasing importance of this region in the development of the country. Therefore, the waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas are (clause 3, Article 14) 17 vital areas for ensuring Russia’s national interests in the World Ocean.

Consequently, the order of prioritization in determining Russia’s national interests in the World Ocean and vital areas of support for the latter proves that the status of a great maritime power is confirmed, first of all, in the Arctic, in the Arctic regional direction of the national maritime policy. This determines the level of the country’s diversified presence in this geostrategic region.

The special allocation of the Arctic among regional directions is also noted in Art. 50 18. The Arctic is the second most important region in Russia’s foreign policy after the Near Abroad and stands ahead of the Eurasian continent, essentially China and India. This innovation of 2023 is associated with the geopolitical upheavals of previous years: in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the new Russia, including 2016 19, the three regional priorities looked as follows: 1. CIS countries; 2. the European Union and NATO; 3. the USA.

The foreign policy concepts of the new Russia consider our country to be more of a continental than a maritime power 20, since the maritime component adequate to a great power is localized only in the Arctic 21, while in the other maritime regions of the country, there is essentially no ocean-going sea zone fleet. The location of oceanic sea zone ships by the fleets of the Russian Federation is presented in [3].

It is especially important that Russia is one of the two largest nuclear powers with all the competencies to ensure the functioning and maintenance of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) as part of the nuclear triad, especially sea-based SNF. In general (Article 4 22) the centuries-old experience of independent statehood together with the countries of the Near Abroad and adjacent states allows us to identify “the special position of Russia as an original state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power”, that is, stretching in the space between Europe and the Pacific Ocean and representing the axis of the “Heartland” or the basis of continental civilization [6].

In general, maritime and continental powers coexist in the unity and opposition of world civilizations in the concept of “continent-vis-ocean” as two sides of the same coin.

Ibid.

Ibid.

In the diversity and on the basis of these powers, maritime and continental civilizations (essentially, great powers) are formed. In the confrontation of great powers, the main thing is the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential or obvious enemy, which can be varied: military, political, economic or other [7, pp. 506–507]. The concept of unacceptable damage is so individual and subjective that, in fact, it cannot be unified in any way. In order to be a great power by definition, it is necessary to be a state that is able to resist the power of any other power and respond symmetrically (or asymmetrically) to all the challenges and threats of the latter. However, a truly great power should be considered a state that is recognized as such by the majority of the world’s population.

The “continent-vis-ocean” concept and Russia’s rights in the Arctic

The “continent-vis-ocean” concept is embodied in the form of a discontinuous (broken) line of contact between two world civilizations, the thalassocratic (maritime) and the tellurocratic (continental), with the basis for the existence of this structure being the unity and insurmountable opposition of these two civilizations. Constant contact leads to the fact that in the depths of one civilization elements of another are gradually born, which over time, with a shift in the harmony of the combination, are rejected by the basic (mother) civilization. In the combination of civilizations, the principle of harmony certainly operates: not directly, but indirectly.

In the vicinity of the line “continent — vis — ocean”, there are coastal centers and zones that are in alliance with continental or maritime powers of the current state of geopolitical or other conjuncture. This is a discontinuous belt, the orientation of the components of which at any given moment depends precisely on the direction of the current vector of the conjuncture. While in the second half of the 20th century, the determining factor in the formation of alliances were economic considerations due to the specifics of the development of the dominant liberal economic model (LEM), in the 21st century, geopolitics is acquiring increasing importance. All the features of the coexistence of the “lords of the sea” and the “lords of the land” are successfully demonstrated in [8].

It should be emphasized that the “continent-vis-ocean” system is the basis of the universe. The disappearance of one of the components will lead to a global collapse and the destruction of the system of coexistence of world civilizations. An example of this is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which predetermined the geopolitical drama of Russia at the turn of the century [9].

In the context of global development and the establishment of the LEM in the world order based on rules, both civilizations strive for global superiority, that is, for world domination or dominance.

At the current stage of the decline of globalization, the tendency to assert national power according to the principle of “Make America (Russia, China) Great (Again)” and/or regional advantage is gaining strength. This means that on the geopolitical and economic atlas of the modern world, alliances of strong regional (or sectoral, for example, OPEC and OPEC+) states are being created, not yet powers, but which are quite capable of competing with the latter.

The maritime worldview is based on the well-known geopolitical concept of marinism, which was formed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries under the influence of the scientific ideas of naval theorists F. Colomb [10] (Concepts of absolute possession of the sea) and A.-T. Mahan [11; 12] 23 (Theories of “Sea Power”). The main positive assertion of marinism is considered to be the universal maxims [12]: “power at sea decides the fate of history” and “who controls the sea, controls everything”. That is, global superiority (dominance) or world domination is ensured through the implementation of the principle of “absolute possession of the sea” 24 [10].

In the theory of “sea power”, the World Ocean is a unifying communication, a communication line that ensures the integrity of countries and regions “separated by water” localized along this communication — “the sea separates and unites”, forming continental and/or maritime agglomerations.

From these positions, on the basis of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas along the NSR, there is a communication unification of three oceans: the Atlantic, the Arctic and the Pacific, which ensures the connectivity and territorial integrity of Russia and the Eurasian continent from the north. From the south, the same function is performed by the communication unification of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. The unifying ring (Eurasia - America) is closed by communication: Pacific Ocean - Arctic Ocean (Northwest Passage) - Atlantic Ocean from the north and Pacific Ocean - Atlantic Ocean from the south.

The methodological basis for the formation of continental civilization is the concept of “Heartland” (core land), formulated in [6], which implements the maxim (by analogy with “Sea power”): “whoever owns the Heartland (that is, Central Eurasia), owns the world island (the continent of Eurasia), and whoever owns the world island, owns everything”. Two worlds, two civilizations form a systemic whole. This is how the harmony of the universe is ensured.

By the beginning of the 20th century [6], the policies of European states and Europe as a whole, and consequently the main contours of world politics were determined by two established powers, two empires: the British (maritime) and the Russian (continental). The confrontation between them began with the Battle of Malta (1800) and over the course of a century developed and took shape in a geopolitical epic known as the “Great Game”. The basis of the confrontation was that in the 18th–19th centuries, in the depths of the continental civilization of Russia, elements of the great maritime power of that time emerged and developed, which was demonstrat- ed to the world by a series of glorious naval victories from Gangut (1714) in the Baltic Sea to Sinop (1853) in the Black Sea 25.

Legal regulation of the Arctic space is carried out by bilateral agreements and national legislation of eight 26 Arctic countries, as well as international law, including the UN Convention 27 on the Arctic Ocean and Arctic Seas. If the Arctic space is limited from the south by the Arctic Circle, the area of the Arctic is about 21.0 million km2, including sea (including islands and land) — 13.6 and land — 7.4 million km2. Russian territory in the Arctic is 3.3 million km2 or about 45% of the total land.

Russia borders three Arctic countries: Norway and Finland in the west and the United States in the east. There are no border disputes and claims to continental territory, that is, the entire land territory of the Arctic is included in the zones of national jurisdiction of the Arctic countries. In the 1920s, that is, long before the adoption of the UN Convention, the sectoral principle of delimitation of the boundaries of polar possessions was formed. Canada, the USSR, Norway and the USA declared Arctic lands and islands located within the boundaries of the allocated sectors as zones of national jurisdiction.

In particular, the Soviet sector of polar possessions was formed in April 1926 by the Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR 28, which included all polar islands and lands 29 currently belonging to Russia with a total area of 0.2 million km2 in the zone of national jurisdiction of the USSR. It should be emphasized that the sector principle that still exists determines the legal status of only islands and lands, without affecting other maritime zones, including the EEZ and continental shelf in the Arctic [14, pp. 4–12].

Russia, like other Arctic countries, strives to obtain sovereign rights to the Arctic waters covering the waters and airspace above them, as well as the continental shelf 30 within the boundaries of the declared sector.

According to the UN Convention, the length of the relevant maritime zone of a coastal state is determined by the total length of the baselines, and the maximum width is determined by the established values: territorial sea — 12 miles, contiguous zone — 24 miles and EEZ — 200 miles. The sovereign rights of a coastal state to these waters are limited by freedom of navigation, including transit passage of warships, and other types of maritime activities provided for by the UN Convention. The waters and surrounding waters beyond the EEZ are classified as high seas and cannot be an object of sovereign rights of coastal states. It should be noted that there is a special permissive procedure for navigation of foreign vessels in the waters of the NSR.

One of the ways to determine the outer boundary of the continental shelf (CS) is to fix this boundary at a 200-mile distance from the baselines, from which the width of the territorial sea is measured. This does not require confirmation by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Commission).

Thus, the conventional areas of the EEZ and the CS of Russia in the Arctic coincide and amount to 4.1 million km2 with a total area of the polar sector of 5.8 (5.842) million km2. That is, given evidence confirmed by the Commission, the maximum possible increase in the Russian CS zone is approximately 1.7 million km2. The initial (December 2001) and revised (August 2015) applications confirm Russia’s rights to expand the zone of national jurisdiction of the CS beyond the 200-mile 31 maritime zone by 1.2 (more precisely, 1.191) million km2. A decision on this Russian application has not been made for more than 20 years 32. The external geopolitical circumstances around Russia (sanctions) do not add optimism in the soonest positive resolution of this issue.

In the space of the Russian sector of polar possessions, a missing zone of the CS has formed with an area of 5.842 - 4.1 - 1.191 = 0.551 or about 0.6 million km2 in the polar region covered by ice all year round. There is no answer to the question of whether this area is a continuation of the underwater margin of the Eurasian continent or not. Therefore, the belonging of this area to the continental margin of North America or Eurasia or the non-continental origin of this section of the shelf are equally probable.

This is how the contours of Russia in the Arctic are determined with unconfirmed sovereign rights to 1.2 million km2 and the unspecified legal status of 0.6 million km2 of the Arctic Shelf.

Around the Arctic regions, and especially in the NSR zone, a completely expected confrontation has developed between the US and Russia in the established traditions of “continent-vis-ocean”. The essence of the remaining fundamental contradictions is that the US is striving for the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean space, including the NSR, while Russia insists on the principle of the sectoral division of the CS and the internal status of the NSR [15, pp. 59–67 ].

On the icebreaker fleet of a great maritime power and ensuring the NSR cargo turnover

The basis of the Arctic fleet, capable by definition of navigating in thin and solid ice, is formed by icebreakers and vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4–Arc9.

The symbol of Russia’s maritime power in the modern Arctic is rightly considered to be nuclear-powered icebreakers, which have virtually unlimited autonomy and are capable of overcoming even multi-year ice fields, creating a developed system of maritime communications to ensure the connectivity of the regional space.

The creation of the nuclear icebreaker “Arktika” project 10520, which was the first among surface ships in active navigation to reach the North Pole in August 1977, was an undoubted success of its time. This element received worldwide recognition as an achievement of a great maritime power. The entire series of six units of Project 10520 (Arktika and Sibir) and Project 10521 (Rossiya, Sovetskiy Soyuz, Yamal and 50 Let Pobedy) was launched and put into service over a period of 20 years, starting in 1972.

During the Cold War, the design of these vessels (in particular, Rossiya and Sovetskiy Soyuz) provided for the possibility of mobile inversion (re-equipment) into auxiliary cruisers, the corresponding equipment was placed on board these vessels and partially in the base warehouse.

The core of the Arctic icebreaker group at the turn of the century, until the decommissioning of Sovetskiy Soyuz in 2010 and Rossiya in 2013, consisted of vessels of Projects 10520 and 10580 33; These vessels ensured the safety of navigation along the NSR, mainly in the waters from the Gulf of Ob to the Yenisei Gulf in the areas of the large investment projects “Arctic Gate” and

“Yamal-LNG” (oil and gas) in the Gulf of Ob and “Norilsk Nickel” (non-ferrous metals) in the lower reaches of the Yenisei River (Dudinka).

A fundamentally new series of icebreakers of Project 22220 (Table 1) is intended to replace these vessels of Projects 10520, 10521 and 10580, the service life of which (except for the icebreaker “50 Let Pobedy”), taking into account the latest extension of the service life of the propulsion plant, ends in 2027 (Table 1).

Table 1

Project 22220 nuclear Icebreakers 34

Name	Commissioning, year		Current status	Operator	Flag
	plan	fact
Arktika*	December 2017	October 2020	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Sibir*	May 2020	January 2022	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Ural*	August 2021	November 2022	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Yakutiya	December 2024		Launched, November 2022
Chukotka	December 2026		Laying down, December 2020
Leningrad**	December 2028		Laying down, January 2024
Stalingrad**	December 2030		Laying down, plan, 2025

• ^*    The lead (“Arktika”) and the first two serial icebreakers (“Sibir” and “Ural”) were put into operation with a significant delay of 1.5 to 2.0 years, which is due to the implementation of import substitution programs for components in the field of marine power engineering, in particular, turbogenerators for the icebreaker “Arktika”, power plants for “Sibir” and turbines for “Ural”. The situation with the substitution of supplies of imported components from Ukraine and the EU countries was stabilized by 2020. The total volume of imported components on ships of Project 22220 is about 10% [17, pp. 166–167].

• ^{* *} The laying down of the 5th and 6th serial icebreakers (Leningrad and Stalingrad) was postponed for a year from 2023 and 2024 according to the Plan ³⁵ for 2024 and 2025, respectively, due to the difficulties of budget financing.

The modern icebreaker of project 22220 differs from the previous project 10520 by an increased service life (40 years versus 25), which is achieved by using the RITM-200 nuclear reactor with an optimal resource of 320 thousand hours, with core reloading performed once every seven years. In addition, the integrated location of the core and steam generators in a single housing allows for a significant reduction in the weight and size of the nuclear power plant, which reduces overall operating costs by increasing the reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant as a whole.

Achieving the shaft power (three shaft lines of 20 MW) to 60 MW allowed increasing the icebreaking capacity from 2.25 to 3.0 m. The width of the vessel (33 m at the cruising waterline) allows laying a channel 37 m wide (however, this is not enough to conduct gas tankers of the Yamalmax type with reinforced ice class Arc7 with a width of 50.13 m); following the icebreaker in the channel, the gas tankers break the edge of the channel to the optimal size. The 47.7 m hull width of the Project 10510 Lider icebreaker will allow laying a channel up to 52.0 m wide.

However, the main thing is that this icebreaker is universal for use both in shallow waters in the bed of Siberian rivers and on deeper sea routes of the NSR, since it has a ballast system for changing the draft from 9.03/9.3 to 10.5 m. The draft can be set at any level within the specified reversible values by filling/draining the ballast tanks. A full transition from 9.03 to 10.5 m and back is carried out using pumps in four hours. The use of one such icebreaker instead of two (heavy Arktika type project 10520 and shallow-draft Taimyr type project 10580) allows reducing the total cost of icebreaker escort by 1.5–1.8 times 36, depending on the number of changes in the draft level.

The construction of this series of icebreakers is carried out at JSC Baltic Shipyard 37, the customer is the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom 38, which also partially participates in the financing of the third (“Yakutia”) and fourth (“Chukotka”) serial hulls of Project 22220.

According to the Plan 39, the financial resources of the federal budget and extra-budgetary sources (own funds of Rosatom State Corporation and/or borrowed funds under the guarantee of Rosatom State Corporation) for the construction in terms of preparation for launching and launching, completion afloat and conducting MTs (mooring tests) of Yakutia in 2022-2024 amounted to (clause 3.2.2 of the Plan) 10.00 and 15.51 billion rubles, a total of 25.51 billion rubles. The same for “Chukotka” in 2022-2026 with an extended program of preparation for launching (clause 3.2.3) amounted to 6.50 and 33.25 billion rubles, a total of 39.75 billion rubles. The construction of the fifth icebreaker (“Leningrad”) over five years (2024–2028) and the sixth icebreaker (“Stalingrad”) over six years (2025–2030) from the moment of laying will cost the Federal Budget (clauses 3.2.6 and 3.2.7) 56.61 and 61.34 billion rubles, respectively 40. Budget financing is also planned (24.8 billion rubles in 2023–2027) for the construction of a nuclear-technological service vessel

(clause 3.2.8) and Rosatom State Corporation (220 billion rubles in 2023–2030) for the creation of four non-nuclear icebreakers 41 (clause 3.2.11).

In order to ensure year-round navigation of vessels along the Northern Sea Route, combined options for the placement of icebreakers in the areas of the NSR routes are possible depending on the characteristics of the latter and the period of navigation, which is determined by the Rules 42.

Taking into account the peculiarities of navigation in the waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas, the RMRS 43 distinguishes six classes of “Arctic” vessels, that is, vessels that have the necessary structural reinforcements for navigation in the Arctic seas. These vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4–Arc9 (Arc8 and Arc9 exist only in theory) can navigate in Arctic ice independently or in a channel behind an icebreaker under certain ice conditions (Table 2).

Table 2

Characteristics of ice classes, ice thickness, m

	Independent navigation		Navigation in the channel behind the icebreaker
	Winter (December-May)	Summer (June–November)	Winter (December-May)	Summer (June–November)
Arc4	up to 0.61	up to 0.81	up to 0.72	up to 1.02
Arc5	up to 0.81	up to 1.01	up to 0.92	up to 1.22
Arc6	up to 1.11	up to 1.31	up to 1.22	up to 1.72
Arc7	up to 1.43	up to 1.73	up to 2.02	up to 3.22
Arc8	up to 2.14	up to 3.14	up to 3.45	without limitation 6
Arc9	up to 3.57	up to 4.07	Episodic ice crossing by raids

• ¹    in thin one-year ice

in one-year ice

• ³    in compact one-year ice

• ⁴    in two-year ice

• ⁵    in compact one-year and two-year ice

• ⁶    in multi-year ice

7in compact multi-year ice

Ice fields in the Arctic are formed unevenly: the western part of the Russian Arctic is influ enced by the Gulf Stream, therefore vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4 and higher have the

REVIEWS AND REPORTS

Sergey Yu. Kozmenko, Arina S. Kozmenko. Russian Arctic in the Contours … structural capability to safely navigate year-round in the Barents Sea and in the southwestern part of the Kara Sea [16, pp. 37–43]. That is, in this water area the thickness of thin one-year ice does not exceed 0.6 and 0.8 m, respectively, in winter and summer.

For free navigation in the southeastern part of the Kara Sea, including the Yenisei Gulf, in the summer, vessels should have an ice class of at least Arc7; the same class is provided for vessels when navigating behind an icebreaker in the “channel” or “caravan” mode in winter [16, pp. 37– 43] 44. In these waters, the thickness of compact one-year ice does not exceed 1.7 m in summer, and 2.0 m in winter.

For work in the most difficult conditions of the eastern Arctic, where shore ice reaches a thickness of about 4.0 m, Rosatom State Corporation plans to build three hulls of Project 10510 “Lider” with a shaft capacity of 120 MW at the Zvezda shipyard by 2033. With such vessels, it will be possible to ensure year-round navigation along the entire NSR. The main hull of the Rossiya was laid down at the Zvezda shipyard in July 2021 using funds from the Federal Budget; 127.6 billion rubles has already been allocated [17, p. 165].

Thus, by 2030, the Arctic icebreaker group will consist of ten nuclear-powered icebreakers (project 22220 (7); 10510 (2); 10520 (1) — “50 Let Pobedy”), reinforced by non-nuclear (diesel) icebreakers. The strategic goal and planned dominant of this grouping is to ensure the safety of year-round navigation on the NSR routes, as well as the implementation of the NSR Development Plan for the period up to 2035 in terms of increasing cargo turnover, which reached 36 million tons in 2023 with a planned figure of 46.82 million tons.

The planned increase in NSR cargo turnover to 80 million tons 45 in 2024, to 90 million tons

• ⁴⁶    in 2030 and to 130 million tons ³⁵ in 2035 is provided for by strategic planning documents. These indicators are adjusted in the Plan ⁴⁷, which sets the target indicator of annual NSR cargo turnover at 80, 150 and 220 million tons in 2024, 2030 and 2035, respectively.

The current Russian icebreaker group operating in 2024 has 41 ships, including 7 nuclear and 34 diesel-electric, including port ones. The most powerful of the non-nuclear icebreakers is the Viktor Chernomyrdin, Icebreaker8, which has a propulsion power of 25 MW, allowing it to op- erate in Arctic ice up to 3 m thick. This icebreaker, built in Russia (Admiralteyskie verfi shipyard), was commissioned in November 2020.

To replace the main nuclear icebreakers of Project 22220 and 10520, the NSR Route Allocation Plan in the Ob Bay and Yenisei Gulf area requires diesel (non-nuclear) analogues with a capacity of 40 and even 45 MW. This will ensure the entrance and mooring of container ships and oil tankers to the ports of the Yenisei Gulf (Dudinka, Dikson, Sever Bay), as well as the maneuvering of gas tankers for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects at the entrance to the Ob Bay.

However, modern non-nuclear icebreakers of Russian construction, such as “Viktor Chernomyrdin” with a lower propulsion capacity (25 MW), are optimal for work in the Gulf of Ob. The Aker ARC 130A icebreaker support vessels Alexander Sannikov and Andrey Vilkitskiy with a capacity of 22 MW are also used there to support terminal operations for the Arctic Gate oil project; these icebreakers were built at the Vyborg Shipyard in June and December 2018 by order of PJSC Gazprom Neft.

In previous years, all non-nuclear icebreakers currently operating in the Arctic were built in Finland, which imposes well-known geopolitical sanctions restrictions on the maintenance and repair of these icebreakers by the manufacturer. These are icebreakers built in the 1970s of the Er-mak type (a series of three units) and Kapitan Sorokin type (a series of four units) with a propulsion capacity of 26.5 and 16.4 MW, respectively, as well as vessels of the 2010s of the Moskva type (a series of five icebreakers of Project 21900 and 21900M). The capacity of these icebreakers is not sufficient for year-round operation even in the relatively mild ice conditions of the southwest of the Kara and Barents Seas.

As the number of vessels passing along the NSR route increases, the arrangement of icebreakers also changes. Rosatom State Corporation assumes that, with the planned cargo turnover values, to ensure year-round navigation in the eastern sector of the NSR in the period from 2026 to 2030, five nuclear-powered icebreakers should be arranged at an interval of no more than 500 miles from each other. In the future, from 2031 to 2035, year-round navigation in the eastern sector of the NSR will be provided by nine nuclear icebreakers, spaced at intervals of no more than 250 miles from each other. The total need for icebreakers for the entire NSR for these periods is 14 (9 nuclear and 5 non-nuclear) and 18 (13 nuclear and 5 non-nuclear) vessels, respectively 48.

Conclusion

The basis of the Russian icebreaker fleet in the Arctic is organically supplemented by military icebreakers, Project 23550 ships with a capacity of 12.6 MW “Ivan Papanin” and “Nikolay Zubov” (built by JSC “Admiralteyskie verfi” for the Navy), “Purga” and “Dzerzhinskiy” (built by the Vyborg Shipyard for the Coast Guard of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation). In addition, a series of three 10.4 MW diesel-electric icebreakers of Project 21180 were built by JSC

REVIEWS AND REPORTS

Sergey Yu. Kozmenko, Arina S. Kozmenko. Russian Arctic in the Contours … “Admiralteyskie verfi” by order of the Navy — “Ilya Muromets” (part of the Northern Fleet since 2017), “Evpatiy Kolovrat” (part of the Pacific Fleet since 2024) and “Svyatogor”, which was laid down in 2023 [3, p. 55].

If Russia’s naval power in the Arctic is rightfully associated with the world’s strongest group of nuclear icebreakers, then in the World Ocean a great power should have an equally powerful fleet of the oceanic maritime zone.

At the turn of the century, along with the collapse of the USSR, the Russian fleet lost ships and left the World Ocean [3, pp. 53–55]. Of the ships of the oceanic maritime zone, there are only five left in the Russian Navy: of the four missile cruisers of Project 1164 “Atlant” built in the 1980s at the 61 Communard Shipyard (Nikolaev, Ukraine), only two remained in service by 2024: Marshal Ustinov (Northern Fleet) and Varyag (flagship of the Pacific Fleet); the missile cruiser Moskva (flagship of the Black Sea Fleet) sank while being towed in April 2022; the missile cruiser Admiral Lobov was transferred to Ukraine in 1993 when the Black Sea Fleet was divided. It should be noted that the competence to build missile cruisers of this class was lost along with the collapse of cooperative ties with Ukraine. Of the seven heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers (TAKR Project 1143 “Krechet”), built in 1970-1987 at the Chernomorskiy Shipyard in Nikolaev, today the Russian Navy (Northern Fleet) has only 1143-5, Admiral Kuznetsov, which after almost seven years (2017-2024) of repairs is expected to return to service by the end of 2024. The rest were either sold for scrap (1143-1, 2, 3 — one to China and two to South Korea), or modernized into warships for India (1143-4) and China (1143-6), one 1143-7 was dismantled on the slipway in 1992. The competence to build TAKRs has also been lost, and today Russia is simply unable to build such a ship.

The pride of the Russian shipbuilding industry is a series of heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers (TARKR, Project 1144 “Orlan”) consisting of five ships, built in the 1970-1980s at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad. However, this series of ships also shared the fate of the Russian fleet in the 1990s: the construction of the fifth hull was cancelled back in 1990. The lead hull (“Admiral Ushakov”, Northern Fleet) and the next (“Admiral Lazarev”, Pacific Fleet) hulls served in the USSR Navy from 1980 to 1990, then for more than 25 years they were prepared for modernization, then for disposal, until they were sent for scrap in 2021.

By 2024, there are two such ships left in the Russian Navy: “Admiral Nakhimov”, which is undergoing long-term and deep repairs at Sevmash, with more than 200 billion rubles already spent, and the flagship of the Northern Fleet (in service since April 1998) “Pyotr Velikiy”, which also requires similar expensive repairs.

Thus, if MD-2022 refers to Russia’s status as a great global maritime power, then in the current geopolitical conditions Russia is simply unable to build and maintain a fleet (not only naval, but also tanker fleet, including gas tankers, as well as dry cargo ships and bulk carriers) adequate to this status.

If we are talking about the fleet of a great maritime power in the Arctic with access to the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, then a series of ships of the far sea zone (Project 22350

“Admiral Gorshkov” built by JSC “Severnaya verf”), armed with hypersonic “Zirkons”, the cost of which is 7–8 times lower than the “Orlans”, is sufficient. At the same time, it is very important to ensure prompt inter-fleet crossings of surface ships by the Northern Sea Route all year round.

As it happens, the starting position for “preserving the status of a great maritime power” has been maintained only in the Arctic, so we should start from this point and make Russia great again.