Dilettantes and citizen science: a philosophy of distributed cognition

The article offers a philosophical analysis of dilettantism and citizen science through the lens of distributed cognition. The author traces the historical transformation of the role of amateurs in science and examines various models of interaction between professionals and dilettantes today, drawing on current research in citizen science. Building on the work of E. Hutchins, S. Jasanoff, L. Shipovalova, D. Kasperowski and others, the author proposes a three-level architecture of citizen science (epistemic, organizational, and normative levels). Three types of citizen science architecture are identified: rigid (full control by scientists), flexible (collegiality and consideration of antiprograms), and participatory (bridging the gap between professionals and amateurs). The author concludes that the theory of distributed cognition provides a productive framework for critical analysis of citizen science, making it possible to account for the cognitive, social, and political dimensions of the participation of dilettantes in contemporary scientific research.